Reports and guidance documents; availability, etc.: Fissile material packaging exemptions and general licenses; assessment and recommendations,

[Federal Register: August 19, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 160)]

[Notices]

[Page 44477-44478]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr19au98-86]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses; Availability of NUREG/CR

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing the availability of NUREG/CR-5342, ``Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10 CFR Part 71,'' dated July 1998.

ADDRESSES: Copies of NUREG/CR-5342 may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box

[[Page 44478]]

37082, Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161-0002. A copy is also available for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip G. Brochman, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8592, e-mail PGB@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NRC is announcing the availability of NUREG/ CR-5342, ``Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10 CFR Part 71.'' This final report contains an assessment of the technical and regulatory bases for the NRC's regulations in Part 71 related to the transport of fissile material under general license or fissile exemption limits and provides recommendations on potential changes to the regulations.

1. Background

   In September 1996, an NRC licensee identified that the fissile material exemption standards in Sec. 71.53 do not provide adequate criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material ‹SUP›1‹/SUP› (i.e., highly-enriched uranium in the presence of beryllium oxide). The NRC licensee determined through calculation, that a planned shipment, which contained large amounts of low-concentration, highly-enriched uranium'which met the fissile exemption material limits in Sec. 71.53(d)--and which was also mixed with a large amount of beryllium, could result in a nuclear criticality ‹SUP›2‹/SUP› under certain conditions. As a consequence, the Commission issued an emergency final rule to revise the fissile material exemption limits in Part 71 (62 FR 5907; February 10, 1997). The Commission also requested that the public submit comments on the final rule, during a 30-day period following the rule's publication.

   \1\ Fissile material is defined in Part 71 as: plutonium-238, plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-233, uranium-235, or any combination of these radionuclides. Transportation packages used for shipment of materials containing these radionuclides must meet specific standards and operating limits designed to preclude nuclear criticality during transport, unless excepted by specific regulations.

   \2\ For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining, and neutron- multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a favorable configuration. Neutron moderating material cannot achieve criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration. However, It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.

   In developing the emergency final rule, the NRC staff noted that the regulatory and technical bases for the fissile material exemption limits and general license provisions of Part 71 were not internally consistent nor well documented. Additionally, all seven of the commenters on the final rule objected to parts of the rule as being unduly burdensome and overly restrictive. The NRC determined that further evaluation into the regulatory and technical bases for these regulations was necessary.

   Subsequently, the NRC contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to: (1) perform an independent evaluation of the regulations related to the transport of fissile material under the fissile material exemption and general license limits of Part 71; (2) review the technical issues raised by public comments on the emergency final rule; (3) perform independent calculations of the minimum critical mass limits for different combinations of fissile material and moderating material; and (4) identify potential changes to the fissile material exemption and general license limits of Part 71 which may be warranted.

   The results of ORNL's study are contained in NUREG/CR-5342 and are available for public review. The NRC is currently reviewing the recommendations contained in this report.

2. Electronic Access

   NUREG/CR-5342 is also available electronically in the Reference Library area of the NRC's Home Page under Technical Reports (http:// www.nrc.gov).

   Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

   In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified this determination with Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget.

   Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of July 1998.

   For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Susan F. Shankman, Deputy Director, Licensing and Inspection Directorate, Spent Fuel Project Office, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

   [FR Doc. 98-22331Filed8-18-98; 8:45 am]

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