Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the TELEGRID Technologies, Inc. TELEGRID DE2020 Unmanned Aircraft

CourtFederal Aviation Administration
Published date17 March 2022
Record Number2022-05609
Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 52 (Thursday, March 17, 2022)
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 52 (Thursday, March 17, 2022)]
                [Rules and Regulations]
                [Pages 15032-15044]
                From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
                [FR Doc No: 2022-05609]
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                DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
                Federal Aviation Administration
                14 CFR Part 21
                [Docket No. FAA-2020-1088]
                Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for
                the TELEGRID Technologies, Inc. TELEGRID DE2020 Unmanned Aircraft
                AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
                ACTION: Issuance of final airworthiness criteria.
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                SUMMARY: The FAA announces the special class airworthiness criteria for
                the TELEGRID Technologies, Inc. Model TELEGRID DE2020 unmanned aircraft
                (UA). This document sets forth the airworthiness criteria the FAA finds
                to be appropriate and applicable for the UA design.
                DATES: These airworthiness criteria are effective April 18, 2022.
                FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher J. Richards, Emerging
                Aircraft Strategic Policy Section, AIR-618, Strategic Policy Management
                Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service,
                Federal Aviation Administration, 6020 28th Avenue South, Room 103,
                Minneapolis, MN 55450, telephone (612) 253-4559.
                SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
                Background
                 TELEGRID Technologies, Inc. (TELEGRID) applied to the FAA on
                February 24, 2020, for a special class type certificate under Title 14,
                Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.17(b) for the Model TELEGRID
                DE2020 unmanned aircraft system (UAS).
                 The Model TELEGRID DE2020 consists of a rotorcraft UA and its
                associated elements (AE) including communication links and components
                that control the UA. The Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA has a maximum gross
                takeoff weight of 24 pounds. It is approximately 39 inches in width, 39
                inches in length, and 17 inches in height. The Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA
                uses battery-powered electric motors for vertical takeoff, landing, and
                forward flight. The UAS operations would rely on high levels of
                automation and may include multiple UA operated by a single pilot, up
                to a ratio of 20 UA to 1 pilot. TELEGRID anticipates operators will use
                the Model TELEGRID DE2020 for delivering packages. The proposed concept
                of operations (CONOPS) for the Model TELEGRID DE2020 identifies a
                maximum operating altitude of 400 feet above ground level (AGL), a
                maximum cruise speed of 22 knots (25 mph), operations beyond visual
                line of sight (BVLOS) of the pilot, and operations over human beings.
                TELEGRID has not requested type certification for flight into known
                icing for the Model TELEGRID DE2020.
                 The FAA issued a notice of proposed airworthiness criteria for the
                TELEGRID DE2020 UAS, which published in the Federal Register on
                November 20, 2020 (85 FR 74289).
                Summary of Changes From the Proposed Airworthiness Criteria
                 Based on the comments received, these final airworthiness criteria
                reflect the following changes, as explained in more detail under
                Discussion of Comments: A new section containing definitions; revisions
                to the CONOPS requirement; changing the term ``critical part'' to
                ``flight essential part'' in D&R.135; changing the basis of the
                durability and reliability testing from population density to
                limitations prescribed for the operating environment identified in the
                applicant's CONOPS per D&R.001; and, for the demonstration of certain
                required capabilities and functions as required by D&R.310.
                 Additionally, the FAA re-evaluated its approach to type
                certification of low-risk UA using durability and reliability testing.
                Safe UAS operations depend and rely on both the UA and the AE. As
                explained in FAA Memorandum AIR600-21-AIR-600-PM01, dated July 13,
                2021, the FAA has revised the airworthiness criteria to define a
                boundary between the UA type certification and subsequent operational
                evaluations and approval processes for the UAS (i.e., waivers,
                exemptions, and/or operating certificates).
                 To reflect that these airworthiness criteria rely on durability and
                reliability (D&R) testing for certification, the FAA changed the prefix
                of each section from ``UAS'' to ``D&R.''
                 Lastly, the FAA revised D&R.001(g) to clarify that the operational
                parameters listed in that paragraph are examples and not an all-
                inclusive list.
                [[Page 15033]]
                Discussion of Comments
                 The FAA received responses from 15 commenters. The majority of
                commenters were individuals. In addition to the individuals' comments,
                the FAA also received comments from the European Union Aviation Safety
                Agency (EASA), unmanned aircraft manufacturers, a helicopter operator,
                and organizations such as the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),
                Droneport Texas, LLC, the National Agricultural Aviation Association
                (NAAA), Northeast UAS Airspace Integration Research Alliance, Inc.
                (NUAIR), and the Small UAV Coalition.
                Support
                 Comment Summary: ALPA, NUAIR, and the Small UAV Coalition expressed
                support for type certification as a special class of aircraft and
                establishing airworthiness criteria under Sec. 21.17(b). The Small UAV
                Coalition also supported the FAA's proposed use of performance-based
                standards.
                Terminology: Loss of Flight
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter requested the FAA define
                the term ``loss of flight'' and clarify how it is different from ``loss
                of control.'' The commenter questioned whether loss of flight meant the
                UA could not continue its intended flight plan but could safely land or
                terminate the flight.
                 FAA Response: The FAA has added a new section, D&R.005, to define
                the terms ``loss of flight'' and ``loss of control'' for the purposes
                of these airworthiness criteria. ``Loss of flight'' refers to a UA's
                inability to complete its flight as planned, up to and through its
                originally planned landing. ``Loss of flight'' includes scenarios where
                the UA experiences controlled flight into terrain or obstacles, or any
                other collision, or a loss of altitude that is severe or non-
                recoverable. ``Loss of flight'' includes deploying a parachute or
                ballistic recovery system that leads to an unplanned landing outside
                the operator's designated recovery zone.
                 ``Loss of control'' means an unintended departure of an aircraft
                from controlled flight. It includes control reversal or an undue loss
                of longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability and control. It
                also includes an upset or entry into an unscheduled or uncommanded
                attitude with high potential for uncontrolled impact with terrain.
                ``Loss of control'' means a spin, loss of control authority, loss of
                aerodynamic stability, divergent flight characteristic, or similar
                occurrence, which could generally lead to a crash.
                Terminology: Skill and Alertness of Pilot
                 Comment Summary: Two commenters requested the FAA clarify
                terminology with respect to piloting skill and alertness. Droneport
                Texas LLC stated that the average pilot skill and alertness is
                currently undefined, as remote pilots do not undergo oral or practical
                examinations to obtain certification. NUAIR noted that, despite the
                definition of ``exceptional piloting skill and alertness'' in Advisory
                Circular (AC) 23-8C, Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23
                Airplanes, there is a significant difference between the average skill
                and alertness of a remote pilot certified under 14 CFR part 107 and a
                pilot certified under 14 CFR part 61. The commenter requested the FAA
                clarify the minimum qualifications and ratings to perform as a remote
                pilot of a UAS with a type certificate.
                 FAA Response: These airworthiness criteria do not require
                exceptional piloting skill and alertness for testing. The FAA included
                this as a requirement to ensure the applicant passes testing by using
                pilots of average skill who have been certificated under part 61, as
                opposed to highly trained pilots with thousands of hours of flight
                experience.
                Concept of Operations
                 The FAA proposed a requirement for the applicant to submit a CONOPS
                describing the UAS and identifying the intended operational concepts.
                The FAA explained in the preamble of the notice of proposed
                airworthiness criteria that the information in the CONOPS would
                determine parameters for testing and flight manual operating
                limitations.
                 Comment Summary: One commenter stated that the airworthiness
                criteria are generic and requested the FAA add language to proposed
                UAS.001 to clarify that some of the criteria may not be relevant or
                necessary.
                 FAA Response: Including the language requested by the commenter
                would be inappropriate, as these airworthiness criteria are project-
                specific. Thus, in this case, each element of these airworthiness
                criteria is a requirement specific to the type certification of
                TELEGRID's proposed UA design.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the criteria specify that the
                applicant's CONOPS contain sufficient detail to determine the
                parameters and extent of testing, as well as operating limitations
                placed on the UAS for its operational uses.
                 FAA Response: The FAA agrees and has updated D&R.001 to clarify
                that the information required for inclusion in the CONOPS proposal
                (D&R.001(a) through (g)) must be described in sufficient detail to
                determine the parameters and extent of testing and operating
                limitations.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the CONOPS include a description of
                a means to ensure separation from other aircraft and perform collision
                avoidance maneuvers. ALPA stated that its requested addition to the
                CONOPS is critical to the safety of other airspace users, as manned
                aircraft do not easily see most UAs.
                 FAA Response: The FAA agrees and has updated D&R.001 to require
                that the applicant identify collision avoidance equipment (whether
                onboard the UA or part of the AE), if the applicant requests to include
                that equipment.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA add security-related (other
                than cyber-security) requirements to the CONOPS criteria, including
                mandatory reporting of security occurrences, security training and
                awareness programs for all personnel involved in UAS operations, and
                security standards for the transportation of goods, similar to those
                for manned aviation.
                 FAA Response: The type certificate only establishes the approved
                design of the UA. Operations and operational requirements, including
                those regarding security occurrences, security training, and package
                delivery security standards (other than cybersecurity airworthiness
                design requirements) are beyond the scope of the airworthiness criteria
                established by this document and are not required for type
                certification.
                 Comment Summary: UAS.001(c) proposed to require that the
                applicant's CONOPS include a description of meteorological conditions.
                ALPA requested the FAA change UAS.001(c) to require a description of
                meteorological and environmental conditions and their operational
                limits. ALPA stated the CONOPS should include maximum wind speeds,
                maximum or minimum temperatures, maximum density altitudes, and other
                relevant phenomena that will limit operations or cause operations to
                terminate.
                 FAA Response: D&R.001(c) and D&R.125 address meteorological
                conditions, while D&R.001(g) addresses environmental considerations.
                The FAA determined that these criteria are sufficient to cover the
                weather phenomena mentioned by the commenter without specifically
                requiring identification of related operational limits.
                [[Page 15034]]
                Control Station
                 To address the risks associated with loss of control of the UA, the
                FAA proposed that the applicant design the control station to provide
                the pilot with all information necessary for continued safe flight and
                operation.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA and two individual commenters requested the
                FAA revise the proposed criteria to add requirements for the control
                station. Specifically, these commenters requested the FAA include the
                display of data and alert conditions to the pilot, physical security
                requirements for both the control station and the UAS storage area,
                design requirements that minimize negative impact of extended periods
                of low pilot workload, transfer of control between pilots, and human
                factors/human machine interface considerations for handheld controls.
                NUAIR requested the FAA designate the control station as a flight
                critical component for operations.
                 EASA and an individual commenter requested the FAA consider
                flexibility in some of the proposed criteria. EASA stated that the list
                of information in proposed UAS.100 is too prescriptive and contains
                information that may not be relevant for highly automated systems. The
                individual commenter requested that the FAA allow part-time or non-
                continuous displays of required information that do not influence the
                safety of the flight.
                 FAA Response: Although the scope of the proposed airworthiness
                criteria applied to the entire UAS, the FAA has re-evaluated its
                approach to type certification of low-risk unmanned aircraft using
                durability and reliability testing. A UA is an aircraft that is
                operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from
                within or on the aircraft.\1\ A UAS is defined as a UA and its AE,
                including communication links and the components that control the UA,
                that are required to operate the UAS safely and efficiently in the
                national airspace system.\2\ As explained in FAA Memorandum AIR600-21-
                AIR-600-PM01, dated July 13, 2021, the FAA determined it will apply the
                regulations for type design approval, production approval, conformity,
                certificates of airworthiness, and maintenance to only the UA and not
                to the AE. However, because safe UAS operations depend and rely on both
                the UA and the AE, the FAA will consider the AE in assessing whether
                the UA meets the airworthiness criteria that comprise the certification
                basis.
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                 \1\ See 49 U.S.C. 44801(11).
                 \2\ See 49 U.S.C. 44801(12).
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                 While the AE items themselves will be outside the scope of the UA
                type design, the applicant will provide sufficient specifications for
                any aspect of the AE, including the control station, which could affect
                airworthiness. The FAA will approve either the specific AE or minimum
                specifications for the AE, as identified by the applicant, as part of
                the type certificate by including them as an operating limitation in
                the type certificate data sheet and flight manual. The FAA may impose
                additional operating limitations specific to the AE through conditions
                and limitations for inclusion in the operational approval (i.e.,
                waivers, exemptions, or a combination of these). In accordance with
                this approach, the FAA will consider the entirety of the UAS for
                operational approval and oversight.
                 Accordingly, the FAA has revised the criteria by replacing proposed
                section UAS.100, applicable to the control station design, with
                D&R.100, UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission, with substantively
                similar criteria that apply to the UA design.
                 The FAA has also added a new section, D&R.105, UAS AE Required for
                Safe UA Operations, which requires the applicant to provide information
                concerning the specifications of the AE. The FAA has moved the alert
                function requirement proposed in UAS.100(a) to new section
                D&R.105(a)(1)(i). As part of the clarification of the testing of the
                interaction between the UA and AE, the FAA has added a requirement to
                D&R.300(h) for D&R testing to use minimum specification AE. This
                addition requires the applicant to demonstrate that the limits proposed
                for those AE will allow the UA to operate as expected throughout its
                service life. Finally, the FAA has revised references throughout the
                airworthiness criteria from ``UAS'' to ``UA,'' as appropriate, to
                reflect the FAA determination that the regulations for type design
                approval, production approval, conformity, certificates of
                airworthiness, and maintenance apply to only the UA.
                Software
                 The FAA proposed criteria on verification, configuration
                management, and problem reporting to minimize the existence of errors
                associated with UAS software.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA add language to the
                proposed criteria to ensure that some level of software engineering
                principles are used without being too prescriptive.
                 FAA Response: By combining the software testing requirement of
                D&R.110(a) with successful completion of the requirements in the entire
                ``Testing'' subpart, the acceptable level of software assurance will be
                identified and demonstrated. The configuration management system
                required by D&R.110(b) will ensure that the software is adequately
                documented and traceable both during and after the initial type
                certification activities.
                 Comment Summary: EASA suggested the criteria require that the
                applicant establish and correctly implement system requirements or a
                structured software development process for critical software.
                 FAA Response: Direct and specific evaluation of the software
                development process is more detailed than what the FAA intended with
                the proposed criteria, which use D&R testing to evaluate the UAS as a
                whole system, rather than evaluating individual components within the
                UA. Successful completion of the testing requirements provides
                confidence that the components that make up the UA provide an
                acceptable level of safety, commensurate to the low-risk nature of this
                aircraft. The FAA finds no change to the airworthiness criteria is
                needed.
                 Comment Summary: Two individual commenters requested the FAA
                require the manned aircraft software certification methodology in RTCA
                DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
                Certification, for critical UA software.
                 FAA Response: Under these airworthiness criteria, only software
                that may affect the safe operation of the UA must be verified by test.
                To verify by test, the applicant will need to provide an assessment
                showing that other software is not subject to testing because it has no
                impact on the safe operation of the UA. For software that is subject to
                testing, the FAA may accept multiple options for software
                qualification, including DO-178C. Further, specifying that applicants
                must comply with DO-178 would be inconsistent with the FAA's intent to
                issue performance-based airworthiness criteria.
                 Comment Summary: NAAA stated that an overreliance of software in
                aircraft has been and continues to be a source of accidents and
                requested the FAA include criteria to prevent a midair collision.
                 FAA Response: The proper functioning of software is an important
                element of type certification, particularly with respect to flight
                controls and navigation. The airworthiness criteria in D&R.110 are
                meant to provide an acceptable level of safety commensurate with the
                risk posed by this UA. Additionally, the
                [[Page 15035]]
                airworthiness criteria require contingency planning per D&R.120 and the
                demonstration of the UA's ability to detect and avoid other aircraft in
                D&R.310, if requested by the applicant. The risk of a midair collision
                will be minimized by the operating limitations that result from testing
                based on the operational parameters identified by the applicant in its
                CONOPS (such as geographic operating boundaries, airspace classes, and
                congestion of the proposed operating area), rather than by specific
                mitigations built into the aircraft design itself. These criteria are
                sufficient due to the low-risk nature of the TELEGRID DE2020.
                Cybersecurity
                 Because the UA requires a continuous wireless connection, the FAA
                proposed criteria to address the risks to the UAS from cybersecurity
                threats.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested adding a requirement for
                cybersecurity protection for navigation and position reporting systems
                such as Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). ALPA further
                requested the FAA include criteria to address specific cybersecurity
                vulnerabilities, such as jamming (denial of signal) and spoofing (false
                position data is inserted). ALPA stated that, for navigation, UAS
                primarily use GNSS--an unencrypted, open-source, low power transmission
                that can be jammed, spoofed, or otherwise manipulated.
                 FAA Response: The FAA will assess elements directly influencing the
                UA for cybersecurity under D&R.115 and will assess the AE as part of
                any operational approvals an operator may seek. D&R.115 (proposed as
                UAS.115) addresses intentional unauthorized electronic interactions,
                which includes, but is not limited to, hacking, jamming, and spoofing.
                These airworthiness criteria require the high-level outcome the UA must
                meet, rather than discretely identifying every aspect of cybersecurity
                the applicant will address.
                Contingency Planning
                 The FAA proposed criteria requiring that the UAS be designed to
                automatically execute a predetermined action in the event of a loss of
                communication between the pilot and the UA. The FAA further proposed
                that the predetermined action be identified in the Flight Manual and
                that the UA be precluded from taking off when the quality of service is
                inadequate.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the criteria encompass more than
                loss or degradation of the command and control (C2) link, as numerous
                types of critical part or systems failures can occur that include
                degraded capabilities, whether intermittent or sustained. ALPA
                requested the FAA add language to the proposed criteria to address
                specific failures such as loss of a primary navigation sensor,
                degradation or loss of navigation capability, and simultaneous impact
                of C2 and navigation links.
                 FAA Response: The airworthiness criteria address the issues raised
                by the commenter. Specifically, D&R.120(a) addresses actions the UA
                will automatically and immediately take when the operator no longer has
                control of the UA. Should the specific failures identified by ALPA
                result in the operator's loss of control, then the criteria require the
                UA to execute a predetermined action. Degraded navigation performance
                does not raise the same level of concern as a degraded or lost C2 link.
                For example, a UA may experience interference with a GPS signal on the
                ground, but then find acceptable signal strength when above a tree line
                or other obstruction. The airworthiness criteria require that neither
                degradation nor complete loss of GPS or C2, as either condition would
                be a failure of that system, result in unsafe loss of control or
                containment. The applicant must demonstrate this by test to meet the
                requirements of D&R.305(a)(3).
                 Under the airworthiness criteria, the minimum performance
                requirements for the C2 link, defining when the link is degraded to an
                unacceptable level, may vary among different UAS designs. The level of
                degradation that triggers a loss is dependent upon the specific UA
                characteristics; this level will be defined by the applicant and
                demonstrated to be acceptable by testing as required by D&R.305(a)(2)
                and D&R.310(a)(1).
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter requested the FAA use
                distinct terminology for ``communication,'' used for communications
                with air traffic control, and ``C2 link,'' used for command and control
                between the remote pilot station and UA. The commenter questioned
                whether, in the proposed criteria, the FAA stated ``loss of
                communication between the pilot and the UA'' when it intended to state
                ``loss of C2 link.''
                 FAA Response: Communication extends beyond the C2 link and specific
                control inputs. This is why D&R.001 requires the applicant's CONOPS to
                include a description of the command, control, and communications
                functions. As long as the UA operates safely and predictably per its
                lost link contingency programming logic, a C2 interruption does not
                constitute a loss of control.
                Lightning
                 The FAA proposed criteria to address the risks that would result
                from a lightning strike, accounting for the size and physical
                limitations of a UAS that could preclude traditional lightning
                protection features. The FAA further proposed that without lightning
                protection for the UA, the Flight Manual must include an operating
                limitation to prohibit flight into weather conditions with potential
                lightning.
                 Comment Summary: An individual requested the FAA revise the
                criteria to include a similar design mitigation or operating limitation
                for High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). The commenter noted that
                HIRF is included in proposed UAS.300(e) as part of the expected
                environmental conditions that must be replicated in testing.
                 FAA Response: The airworthiness criteria, which are adopted as
                proposed, address the issue raised by the commenter. The applicant must
                identify tested HIRF exposure capabilities, if any, in the Flight
                Manual to comply with the criteria in D&R.200(a)(5). Information
                regarding HIRF capabilities is necessary for safe operation because
                proper communication and software execution may be impeded by HIRF-
                generated interference, which could result in loss of control of the
                UA. It is not feasible to measure HIRF at every potential location
                where the UA will operate; thus, requiring operating limitations for
                HIRF as requested by the commenter would be impractical.
                Adverse Weather Conditions
                 The FAA proposed criteria either requiring that design
                characteristics protect the UAS from adverse weather conditions or
                prohibiting flight into known adverse weather conditions. The criteria
                proposed to define adverse weather conditions as rain, snow, and icing.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA and two individual commenters requested the
                FAA expand the proposed definition of adverse weather conditions. These
                commenters noted that because of the size and physical limitations of
                the Model TELEGRID DE2020, adverse weather should also include wind,
                downdraft, low-level wind shear (LLWS), microburst, and extreme
                mechanical turbulence.
                 FAA Response: No additional language needs to be added to the
                airworthiness criteria to address wind effects. The wind conditions
                specified by the commenters are part of normal UA flight operations.
                The applicant must demonstrate by flight test that the UA can withstand
                wind without failure
                [[Page 15036]]
                to meet the requirements of D&R.300(b)(9). The FAA developed the
                criteria in D&R.130 to address adverse weather conditions (rain, snow,
                and icing) that would require additional design characteristics for
                safe operation. Any operating limitations necessary for operation in
                adverse weather or wind conditions will be included in the Flight
                Manual as required by D&R.200.
                 Comment Summary: One commenter questioned whether the criteria
                proposed in UAS.130(c)(2), requiring a means to detect adverse weather
                conditions for which the UAS is not certificated to operate, is a
                prescriptive requirement to install an onboard detection system. The
                commenter requested, if that was the case, that the FAA allow
                alternative procedures to avoid flying in adverse weather conditions.
                 FAA Response: The language referred to by the commenter is not a
                prescriptive design requirement for an onboard detection system. The
                applicant may use any acceptable source to monitor weather in the area,
                whether onboard the UA or from an external source.
                Critical Parts
                 The FAA proposed criteria for critical parts that were
                substantively the same as those in the existing standards for normal
                category rotorcraft under Sec. 27.602, with changes to reflect UAS
                terminology and failure conditions. The criteria proposed to define a
                critical part as a part, the failure of which could result in a loss of
                flight or unrecoverable loss of control of the aircraft.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested the FAA avoid using the term
                ``critical part,'' as it is a well-established term for complex manned
                aircraft categories and may create incorrect expectations on the
                oversight process for parts.
                 FAA Response: For purposes of the airworthiness criteria
                established for the TELEGRID Model TELEGRID DE2020, the FAA has changed
                the term ``critical part'' to ``flight essential part.''
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter requested the FAA revise
                the proposed criteria such that a failure of a flight essential part
                would only occur if there is risk to third parties.
                 FAA Response: The definition of ``flight essential'' does not
                change regardless of whether on-board systems are capable of safely
                landing the UA when it is unable to continue its flight plan. Tying the
                definition of a flight essential part to the risk to third parties
                would result in different definitions for the part depending on where
                and how the UA is operated. These criteria for the Model TELEGRID
                DE2020 UA apply the same approach as for manned aircraft.
                Flight Manual
                 The FAA proposed criteria for the Flight Manual that were
                substantively the same as the existing standards for normal category
                airplanes, with minor changes to reflect UAS terminology.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the criteria to
                include normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures along with
                their respective checklist. ALPA further requested the checklist be
                contained in a quick reference handbook (QRH).
                 FAA Response: The FAA did not intend for the airworthiness criteria
                to exclude abnormal procedures from the flight manual. In these final
                airworthiness criteria, the FAA has changed ``normal and emergency
                operating procedures'' to ``operating procedures'' to encompass all
                operating conditions and align with 14 CFR 23.2620, which includes the
                airplane flight manual requirements for normal category airplanes. The
                FAA has not made any changes to add language that would require the
                checklists to be included in a QRH. FAA regulations do not require
                manned aircraft to have a QRH for type certification. Therefore, it
                would be inconsistent for the FAA to require a QRH for the TELEGRID
                Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the airworthiness
                criteria to require that the Flight Manual and QRH be readily available
                to the pilot at the control station.
                 FAA Response: ALPA's request regarding the Flight manual addresses
                an operational requirement, similar to 14 CFR 91.9 and is therefore not
                appropriate for type certification airworthiness criteria. Also, as
                previously discussed, FAA regulations do not require a QRH. Therefore,
                it would be inappropriate to require it to be readily available to the
                pilot at the control station.
                 Comment Summary: Droneport Texas LLC requested the FAA revise the
                airworthiness criteria to add required Flight Manual sections for
                routine maintenance and mission-specific equipment and procedures. The
                commenter stated that the remote pilot or personnel on the remote
                pilot-in-command's flight team accomplish most routine maintenance, and
                that the flight team usually does UA rigging with mission equipment.
                 FAA Response: The requested change is appropriate for a maintenance
                document rather than a flight manual because it addresses maintenance
                procedures rather than the piloting functions. The FAA also notes that,
                similar to the criteria for certain manned aircraft, the airworthiness
                criteria require that the applicant prepare instructions for continued
                airworthiness (ICA) in accordance with Appendix A to Part 23. As the
                applicant must provide any maintenance instructions and mission-
                specific information necessary for safe operation and continued
                operational safety of the UA, in accordance with D&R.205, no changes to
                the airworthiness criteria are necessary.
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter requested the FAA revise
                the criteria in proposed UAS.200(b) to require that ``other
                information'' referred to in proposed UAS.200(a)(5) be approved by the
                FAA. The commenter noted that, as proposed, only the information listed
                in UAS.200(a)(1) through (4) must be FAA approved.
                 FAA Response: The change requested by the commenter would be
                inconsistent with the FAA's airworthiness standards for flight manuals
                for manned aircraft. Sections 23.2620(b), 25.1581(b), 27.1581(b), and
                29.1581(b) include requirements for flight manuals to include operating
                limitations, operating procedures, performance information, loading
                information, and other information that is necessary safe operation
                because of design, operating, or handling characteristics, but limit
                FAA approval to operating limitations, operating procedures,
                performance information, and loading information.
                 Under Sec. 23.2620(b)(1), for low-speed level 1 and level 2
                airplanes, the FAA only approves the operating limitations. In applying
                a risk-based approach, the FAA has determined it would not be
                appropriate to hold the lowest risk UA to a higher standard than what
                is required for low speed level 1 and level 2 manned aircraft.
                Accordingly, the FAA has revised the airworthiness criteria to only
                require FAA approval of the operating limitations.
                 Comment Summary: NUAIR requested the FAA recognize that Sec.
                23.2620 is only applicable to the aircraft and does not address off-
                aircraft components such as the control station, control and non-
                payload communications (CNPC) data link, and launch and recovery
                equipment. The commenter noted that this is also true of industry
                consensus-based standards designed to comply with Sec. 23.2620.
                 FAA Response: As explained in more detail in the Control Station
                section of this document, the FAA has revised the airworthiness
                criteria for the AE. The FAA will approve AE or minimum specifications
                for the AE that could affect airworthiness as an operating
                [[Page 15037]]
                limitation in the UA flight manual. The FAA will establish the approved
                AE or minimum specifications as operating limitations and include them
                in the UA type certificate data sheet and Flight Manual in accordance
                with D&R.105(c). The establishment of requirements for, and the
                approval of AE will be in accordance with FAA Memorandum AIR600-21-AIR-
                600-PM01, dated July 13, 2021.
                Durability and Reliability
                 The FAA proposed durability and reliability testing that would
                require the applicant to demonstrate safe flight of the UAS across the
                entire operational envelope and up to all operational limitations, for
                all phases of flight and all aircraft configurations described in the
                applicant's CONOPS, with no failures that result in a loss of flight,
                loss of control, loss of containment, or emergency landing outside the
                operator's recovery area. The FAA further proposed that the unmanned
                aircraft would only be certificated for operations within the
                limitations, and for flight over areas no greater than the maximum
                population density, as described in the applicant's CONOPS and
                demonstrated by test.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested that the proposed certification
                criteria require all flights during testing be completed in both normal
                and non-normal or off-nominal scenarios with no failures that result in
                a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of containment, or emergency
                landing outside of the operator's recovery zone. Specifically, ALPA
                stated that testing must not require exceptional piloting skill or
                alertness and include, at a minimum: All phases of the flight envelope,
                including the highest UA to pilot ratios; the most adverse combinations
                of the conditions and configuration; the environmental conditions
                identified in the CONOPS; the different flight profiles and routes
                identified in the CONOPS; and exposure to EMI and HIRF.
                 FAA Response: No change is necessary because the introductory text
                and paragraphs (b)(7), (b)(9), (b)(10), (b)(13), (c), (d), (e), and (f)
                of D&R.300, which are adopted as proposed, contain the specific testing
                requirements requested by ALPA.
                 Comment Summary: Droneport Texas LLC requested the FAA revise the
                testing criteria to include, for operation at night, testing both with
                and without night vision aids. The commenter stated that because small
                UAS operation at night is waivable under 14 CFR part 107, manufacturers
                will likely make assumptions concerning a pilot's familiarity with
                night vision device-aided and unaided operations.
                 FAA Response: Under D&R.300(b)(11), the applicant must demonstrate
                by flight test that the UA can operate at night without failure using
                whatever equipment is onboard the UA itself. The pilot's familiarity,
                or lack thereof, with night vision equipment does not impact whether
                the UA is reliable and durable to complete testing without any
                failures.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested the FAA clarify how testing
                durability and reliability commensurate to the maximum population
                density, as proposed, aligns with the Specific Operations Risk
                Assessment (SORA) approach that is open to operational mitigation,
                reducing the initial ground risk. An individual commenter requested the
                FAA provide more details about the correlation between the number of
                flight hours tested and the CONOPS environment (e.g., population
                density). The commenter stated that this is one of the most fundamental
                requirements, and the FAA should ensure equal treatment to all current
                and future applicants.
                 FAA Response: In developing these testing criteria, the FAA sought
                to align the risk of UAS operations with the appropriate level of
                protection for human beings on the ground. The FAA proposed
                establishing the maximum population density demonstrated by durability
                and reliability testing as an operating limitation on the type
                certificate. However, the FAA has re-evaluated its approach and
                determined it to be more appropriate to connect the durability and
                reliability demonstrated during certification testing with the
                operating environment defined in the CONOPS.
                 Basing testing on maximum population density may result in
                limitations not commensurate with many actual operations. As population
                density broadly refers to the number of people living in a given area
                per square mile, it does not allow for evaluating variation in a local
                operating environment. For example, an operator may have a route in an
                urban environment with the actual flight path along a greenway; the
                number of human beings exposed to risk from the UA operating overhead
                would be significantly lower than the population density for the area.
                Conversely, an operator may have a route over an industrial area where
                few people live, but where, during business hours, there may be highly
                dense groups of people. Specific performance characteristics such as
                altitude and airspeed also factor into defining the boundaries for safe
                operation of the UA.
                 Accordingly, the FAA has revised D&R.300 to require the UA design
                to be durable and reliable when operated under the limitations
                prescribed for its operating environment. The information in the
                applicant's CONOPS will determine the operating environment for
                testing. For example, the minimum hours of reliability testing will be
                less for a UA conducting agricultural operations in a rural environment
                than if the same aircraft will be conducting package deliveries in an
                urban environment. The FAA will include the limitations that result
                from testing as operating limitations on the type certificate data
                sheet and in the UA Flight Manual. The FAA intends for this process to
                be similar to the process for establishing limitations prescribed for
                special purpose operations for restricted category aircraft. This
                allows for added flexibility in determining appropriate operating
                limitations, which will more closely reflect the operating environment.
                 Finally, a comparison of these criteria with EASA's SORA approach
                is beyond the scope of this document because the SORA is intended to
                result in an operational approval rather than a type certificate.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested the FAA clarify how reliability at
                the aircraft level to ensure high-level safety objectives would enable
                validation of products under applicable bilateral agreements.
                 FAA Response: As the FAA and international aviation authorities are
                still developing general airworthiness standards for UA, it would be
                speculative for the FAA to comment on the validation process for any
                specific UA.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested the FAA revise the testing criteria
                to include a compliance demonstration related to adverse combinations
                of the conditions and configurations and with respect to weather
                conditions and average pilot qualification.
                 FAA Response: No change is necessary because D&R.300(b)(7), (b)(9),
                (b)(10), (c), and (f), which are adopted as proposed, contain the
                specific testing requirements requested by EASA.
                 Comment Summary: EASA noted that, under the proposed criteria,
                testing involving a large number of flight hours will limit changes to
                the configuration.
                 FAA Response: Like manned aircraft, the requirements of 14 CFR part
                21, subpart D, apply to UA for changes to type certificates. The FAA is
                developing procedures for processing type design
                [[Page 15038]]
                changes for UA type certificated using durability and reliability
                testing.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested the FAA clarify whether the
                proposed testing criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate
                aspects that do not occur during a successful flight, such as the
                deployment of emergency recovery systems and fire protection/post-crash
                fire. EASA asked if these aspects are addressed by other means and what
                would be the applicable airworthiness criteria.
                 FAA Response: Equipment not required for normal operation of the UA
                do not require an evaluation for their specific functionality. D&R
                testing will show that the inclusion of any such equipment does not
                prevent normal operation. Therefore, the airworthiness criteria would
                not require functional testing of the systems described by EASA.
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter requested the FAA specify
                the acceptable percentage of failures in the testing that would result
                in a ``loss of flight.'' The Small UAV Coalition requested the FAA
                clarify what constitutes an emergency landing outside an operator's
                landing area, as some UAS designs could include an onboard health
                system that initiates a landing to lessen the potential of a loss of
                control event. The commenter suggested that, in those cases, a landing
                in a safe location should not invalidate the test.
                 FAA Response: The airworthiness criteria require that all test
                points and flight hours occur with no failures result in a loss of
                flight, control, containment, or emergency landing outside the
                operator's recovery zone. The FAA has determined that there is no
                acceptable percentage of failures in testing. In addition, while the
                recovery zone may differ for each UAS design, an emergency or unplanned
                landing outside of a designated landing area would result in a test
                failure.
                 Comment Summary: The Small UAV Coalition requested that a single
                failure during testing not automatically restart counting the number of
                flight test operations set for a particular population density; rather,
                the applicant should have the option to identify the failure through
                root-cause and fault-tree analysis and provide a validated mitigation
                to ensure it will not recur. An individual commenter requested the FAA
                to clarify whether the purpose of the tests is to show compliance with
                a quantitative safety objective. The commenter further requested the
                FAA allow the applicant to reduce the number of flight testing hours if
                the applicant can present a predicted safety and reliability analysis.
                 FAA Response: The intent of the testing criteria is for the
                applicant to demonstrate the aircraft's durability and reliability
                through a successful accumulation of flight testing hours. The FAA does
                not intend to require analytical evaluation to be part of this process.
                However, the applicant will comply with these testing criteria using a
                means of compliance, accepted by the FAA, through the issue paper
                process. The means of compliance will be dependent on the CONOPS the
                applicant has proposed to meet.
                Probable Failures
                 The FAA proposed criteria to evaluate how the UAS functions after
                probable failures, including failures related to propulsion systems, C2
                link, GPS, critical flight control components with a single point of
                failure, control station, and any other equipment identified by the
                applicant.
                 Comment Summary: Droneport Texas LLC requested the FAA add a bird
                strike to the list of probable failures. The commenter stated that
                despite sense and avoid technologies, flocks of birds can overcome the
                maneuver capabilities of a UA and result in multiple, unintended
                failures.
                 FAA Response: Unlike manned aircraft, where aircraft size, design,
                and construct are critical to safe control of the aircraft after
                encountering a bird strike, the FAA determined testing for bird strike
                capabilities is not necessary for the Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA. The FAA
                has determined that a bird strike requirement is not necessary because
                the smaller size and lower operational speed of the TELEGRID DE2020
                reduce the likelihood of a bird strike, combined with the reduced
                consequences of failure due to no persons onboard. Instead, the FAA is
                using a risk-based approach to tailor airworthiness requirements
                commensurate to the low-risk nature of the Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA require that all probable
                failure tests occur at the critical phase and mode of flight and at the
                highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio. ALPA stated the proposed criteria are
                critically important for systems that rely on a single source to
                perform multi-label functions, such as GNSS, because failure or
                interruption of GNSS will lead to loss of positioning, navigation, and
                timing (PNT) and functions solely dependent on PNT, such as geo-fencing
                and contingency planning.
                 FAA Response: No change is necessary because D&R.300(c) requires
                that the testing occur at the critical phase and mode of flight and at
                the highest UA-to-pilot ratio.
                 Comment Summary: Droneport Texas LLC requested the FAA add recovery
                from vortex ring state (VRS) to the list of probable failures. The
                commenter stated the UA uses multiple rotors for lift and is therefore
                susceptible to VRS. The commenter further stated that because recovery
                from settling with power is beyond a pilot's average skill for purposes
                of airworthiness testing, the aircraft must be able to sense and
                recover from this condition without pilot assistance.
                 FAA Response: D&R.305 addresses probable failures related to
                specific components of the UAS. VRS is an aerodynamic condition a UA
                may encounter during flight testing; it is not a component subject to
                failure.
                 Comment Summary: Droneport Texas LLC also requested the FAA add a
                response to the Air Traffic Control-Zero (ATC-Zero) command to the list
                of probable failures. The commenter stated, based on lessons learned
                after the attacks on September 11, 2001, aircraft that can fly BVLOS
                should be able to respond to an ATC-Zero condition.
                 FAA Response: The commenter's request is more appropriate for the
                capabilities and functions testing criteria in D&R.310 than probable
                failures testing in D&R.305. D&R.310(a)(3) requires the applicant to
                demonstrate by test that the pilot has the ability to safely
                discontinue a flight. A pilot may discontinue a flight for a wide
                variety of reasons, including responding to an ATC-zero command.
                 Comment Summary: EASA stated the proposed language seems to require
                an additional analysis and safety assessment, which would be
                appropriate for the objective requirement of ensuring a probable
                failure does not result in a loss of containment or control. EASA
                further stated that an applicant's basic understanding of the systems
                architecture and effects of failures is essential.
                 FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the expectation that applicants
                understand the system architecture and effects of failures of a
                proposed design, which is why the criteria include a requirement for
                the applicant to test the specific equipment identified in D&R.305 and
                identify any other equipment that is not specifically identified in
                D&R.305 for testing. As the intent of the criteria is for the applicant
                to demonstrate compliance through testing, some analysis may be
                necessary to properly identify the appropriate
                [[Page 15039]]
                equipment to be evaluated for probable failures.
                 Comment Summary: An individual requested that probable failure
                testing apply not only to critical flight control components with a
                single point of failure, but also to any critical part with a single
                point of failure.
                 FAA Response: The purpose of probable failure testing in D&R.305 is
                to demonstrate that if certain equipment fails, it will fail safely.
                Adding probable failure testing for critical (now flight essential)
                parts would not add value to testing. If a part is essential for
                flight, its failure by definition in D&R.135(a) could result in a loss
                of flight or unrecoverable loss of control. For example, on a
                traditional airplane design, failure of a wing spar in flight would
                lead to loss of the aircraft. Because there is no way to show that a
                wing spar can fail safely, the applicant must provide its mandatory
                replacement time if applicable, structural inspection interval, and
                related structural inspection procedure in the Airworthiness
                Limitations section of the ICA. Similarly, under these airworthiness
                criteria, parts whose failure would inherently result in loss of flight
                or unrecoverable loss of control are not subjected to probable failure
                testing. Instead, they must be identified as flight essential
                components and included in the ICA.
                 To avoid confusion pertaining to probable failure testing, the FAA
                has removed the word ``critical'' from D&R.305(a)(5). In the final
                airworthiness criteria, probable failure testing required by
                D&R.305(a)(5) applies to ``Flight control components with a single
                point of failure.''
                Capabilities and Functions
                 The FAA proposed criteria to require the applicant to demonstrate
                by test the minimum capabilities and functions necessary for the
                design. UAS.310(a) proposed to require the applicant to demonstrate, by
                test, the capability of the UAS to regain command and control of the UA
                after a C2 link loss, the sufficiency of the electrical system to carry
                all anticipated loads, and the ability of the pilot to override any
                pre-programming in order to resolve a potential unsafe operating
                condition in any phase of flight. UAS.310(b) proposed to require the
                applicant to demonstrate by test certain features if the applicant
                requests approval of those features (geo-fencing, external cargo,
                etc.). UAS.310(c) proposed to require the design of the UAS to
                safeguard against an unintended discontinuation of flight or release of
                cargo, whether by human action or malfunction.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA stated the pilot-in-command must always have
                the capability to input control changes to the UA and override any pre-
                programming without delay as needed for the safe management of the
                flight. The commenter requested that the FAA retain the proposed
                criteria that would allow the pilot to command to: Regain command and
                control of the UA after loss of the C2 link; safely discontinue the
                flight; and dynamically re-route the UA. In support, ALPA stated the
                ability of the pilot to continually command (re-route) the UA,
                including termination of the flight if necessary, is critical for safe
                operations and should always be available to the pilot.
                 Honeywell requested the FAA revise paragraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) of
                the criteria (UAS.310) to allow for either the pilot or an augmenting
                system to safely discontinue the flight and re-route the UA. The
                commenter stated that a system comprised of detect and avoid, onboard
                autonomy, and ground system can be used for these functions. Therefore,
                the criteria should not require that only the pilot can do them.
                 An individual commenter requested the FAA remove UAS.310(a)(4) of
                the proposed criteria because requiring the ability for the pilot to
                dynamically re-route the UA is too prescriptive and redundant with the
                proposed requirement in UAS.310(a)(3), the ability of the pilot to
                discontinue the flight safely.
                 FAA Response: Because the pilot in command is directly responsible
                for the operation of the UA, the pilot must have the capability to
                command actions necessary for continued safety. This includes
                commanding a change to the flight path or, when appropriate, safely
                terminating a flight. The FAA notes that the ability for the pilot to
                safely discontinue a flight means the pilot has the means to terminate
                the flight and immediately and safely return the UA to the ground. This
                is different from the pilot having the means to dynamically re-route
                the UA, without terminating the flight, to avoid a conflict.
                 Therefore, the final airworthiness criteria include D&R.310(a) as
                proposed (UAS.310(a)).
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the criteria to
                require that all equipment, systems, and installations conform, at a
                minimum, to the standards of Sec. 25.1309.
                 FAA Response: The FAA determined that traditional methodologies for
                manned aircraft, including the system safety analysis required by
                Sec. Sec. 23.2510, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309, would be
                inappropriate to require for the TELEGRID Model TELEGRID DE2020 due to
                its smaller size and reduced level of complexity. Instead, the FAA
                finds that system reliability through testing will ensure the safety of
                this design.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the criteria to add
                a requirement to demonstrate the ability of the UA and pilot to perform
                all of the contingency plans identified in proposed UAS.120.
                 FAA Response: No change is necessary because D&R.120 and
                D&R.305(a)(2), together, require what ALPA requests in its comment.
                Under D&R.120, the applicant must design the UA to execute a
                predetermined action in the event of a loss of the C2 link.
                D&R.305(a)(2) requires the applicant to demonstrate by test that a lost
                C2 link will not result in a loss of containment or control of the UA.
                Thus, if the applicant does not demonstrate the predetermined
                contingency plan resulting from a loss of the C2 link when conducting
                D&R.305 testing, the test would be a failure due to loss of
                containment.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA and an individual commenter requested the FAA
                revise the criteria so that geo-fencing is a required feature and not
                optional due to the safety concerns that could result from a UA exiting
                its operating area.
                 FAA Response: To ensure safe flight, the applicant must test the
                proposed safety functions, such as geo-fencing, that are part of the
                type design of the Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA. The FAA determined that
                geo-fencing is an optional feature because it is one way, but not the
                only way, to ensure a safely contained operation.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the criteria so that
                capability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles is a
                required feature and not optional.
                 FAA Response: D&R.310(a)(4) requires the applicant demonstrate the
                ability for the pilot to safely re-route the UA in flight to avoid a
                dynamic hazard. The FAA did not prescribe specific design features such
                as a collision avoidance system to meet D&R.310(a)(4) because there are
                multiple means to minimize the risk of collision.
                 Comment Summary: McMahon Helicopter Services requested that the
                airworthiness criteria require a demonstration of sense-and-avoid
                technology that will automatically steer the UA away from manned
                aircraft, regardless of whether the manned aircraft has a transponder.
                NAAA and an individual commenter requested that the FAA require ADS-B
                in/out and traffic avoidance software on all UAS. The Small UAV
                Coalition requested the
                [[Page 15040]]
                FAA establish standards for collision avoidance technology, as the
                proposed criteria are not sufficient for compliance with the
                operational requirement to see and avoid other aircraft (Sec. 91.113).
                The commenters stated that these technologies are necessary to avoid a
                mid-air collision between UA and manned aircraft.
                 FAA Response: D&R.310(a)(4) requires the applicant demonstrate the
                ability for the UA to be safely re-routed in flight to avoid a dynamic
                hazard. The FAA did not prescribe specific design features, such as the
                technologies suggested by the commenters, to meet D&R.310(a)(4) because
                they are not the only means for complying with the operational
                requirement to see and avoid other aircraft. If an applicant chooses to
                equip their UA with onboard collision avoidance technology, those
                capabilities and functions must be demonstrated by test per
                D&R.310(b)(5).
                Verification of Limits
                 The FAA proposed to require an evaluation of the UA's performance,
                maneuverability, stability, and control with a factor of safety.
                 Comment Summary: EASA requested that the FAA revise its approach to
                require a similar compliance demonstration as EASA's for ``light UAS.''
                EASA stated the FAA's proposed criteria for verification of limits,
                combined with the proposed Flight Manual requirements, seem to replace
                a traditional Subpart Flight.\3\ EASA further stated the FAA's approach
                in the proposed airworthiness criteria might necessitate more guidance
                and means of compliance than the traditional structure.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \3\ In the FAA's aircraft airworthiness standards (parts 23, 25,
                27 and 29), subpart B of each is titled Flight.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 FAA Response: The FAA's airworthiness criteria will vary from
                EASA's light UAS certification requirements, resulting in associated
                differences in compliance demonstrations. At this time, comment on
                means of compliance and related guidance material, which are still
                under development with the FAA and with EASA, would be speculative.
                Propulsion
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA conduct an analysis to
                determine battery reliability and safety, taking into account wind and
                weather conditions and their effect on battery life. ALPA expressed
                concern with batteries as the only source of power for an aircraft in
                the NAS. ALPA further requested the FAA not grant exemptions for
                battery reserve requirements.
                 FAA Response: Because batteries are a flight essential part, the
                applicant must establish mandatory instructions or life limits for
                batteries under the requirements of D&R.135. In addition, when the
                applicant conducts its D&R testing, D&R.300(i) prevents the applicant
                from exceeding the maintenance intervals or life limits for those
                batteries. To the extent the commenter's request addresses fuel
                reserves, that is an operational requirement, not a certification
                requirement, and therefore beyond the scope of this document.
                Additional Airworthiness Criteria Identified by Commenters
                 Comment Summary: McMahon Helicopter Services requested that the
                criteria require anti-collision and navigation lighting certified to
                existing FAA standards for brightness and size. The commenter stated
                that these standards were based on human factors for nighttime and
                daytime recognition and are not simply a lighting requirement. An
                individual commenter requested that the criteria include a requirement
                for position lighting and anti-collision beacons meeting TSO-30c Level
                III. NAAA requested the criteria require a strobe light and high
                visibility paint scheme to aid in visual detection of the UA by other
                aircraft.
                 FAA Response: The FAA determined it is unnecessary for these
                airworthiness criteria to prescribe specific design features for anti-
                collision or navigation lighting. The FAA will address anti-collision
                lighting as part of any operational approval, similar to the rules in
                14 CFR 107.29(a)(2) and (b) for small UAS.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA add a new section with
                minimum standards for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), as the
                UAS will likely rely heavily upon GNSS for navigation and to ensure
                that the UA does not stray outside of its approved airspace. ALPA
                stated that technological advances have made such devices available at
                an appropriate size, weight, and power for UAs.
                 FAA Response: The airworthiness criteria in D&R.100 (UA Signal
                Monitoring and Transmission), D&R.110 (Software), D&R.115
                (Cybersecurity), and D&R.305(a)(3) (probable failures related to GPS)
                sufficiently address design requirements and testing of navigation
                systems. Even if the applicant uses a TSO-approved GNSS, these
                airworthiness criteria require a demonstration that the UA operates
                successfully without loss of containment. Successful completion of
                these tests demonstrates that the navigation subsystems are acceptable.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA revise the criteria to add
                a new section requiring equipage to comply with the FAA's new rules on
                Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft (86 FR 4390, Jan. 15, 2021).
                An individual commenter questioned the need for public tracking and
                identification of drones in the event of a crash or violation of FAA
                flight rules.
                 FAA Response: The FAA issued the final rule, Remote Identification
                of Unmanned Aircraft, after providing an opportunity for public notice
                and comment. The final rule is codified at 14 CFR part 89. Part 89
                contains the remote identification requirements for unmanned aircraft
                certificated and produced under part 21 after September 16, 2022.
                Pilot Ratio
                 Comment Summary: ALPA, NAAA, and one individual questioned the
                safety of multiple Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA operated by a single pilot,
                up to a ratio of 20 UA to 1 pilot. ALPA stated that even with high
                levels of automation, the pilot must still manage the safe operation
                and maintain situational awareness of multiple aircraft in their flight
                path, aircraft systems, integration with traffic, obstacles, and other
                hazards during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. As a result,
                ALPA recommended the FAA conduct additional studies to better
                understand the feasibility of a single pilot operating multiple UA
                before developing airworthiness criteria. The Small UAV Coalition
                requested the FAA provide criteria for an aircraft-to-pilot ratio
                higher than 20:1.
                 FAA Response: These airworthiness criteria are specific to the
                Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA and, as discussed previously in this preamble,
                operations of the Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA may include multiple UA
                operated by a single pilot, up to a ratio of 20 UA to 1 pilot.
                Additionally, these airworthiness criteria require the applicant to
                demonstrate the durability and reliability of the UA design by flight
                test, at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio, without exceptional
                piloting skill or alertness. In addition, D&R.305(c) requires the
                applicant to demonstrate probable failures by test at the highest
                aircraft-to-pilot ratio. Should the pilot ratio cause a loss of
                containment or control of the UA, then the applicant will fail this
                testing.
                 Comment Summary: ALPA stated that to allow a UAS-pilot ratio of up
                to 20:1
                [[Page 15041]]
                safely, the possibility that the pilot will need to intervene with
                multiple UA simultaneously must be ``extremely remote.'' ALPA
                questioned whether this is feasible given the threat of GNSS
                interference or unanticipated wind gusts exceeding operational limits.
                 FAA Response: The FAA's guidance in AC 23.1309-1E, System Safety
                Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes defines ``extremely
                remote failure conditions'' as failure conditions not anticipated to
                occur during the total life of an airplane, but which may occur a few
                times when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of
                the same type. When assessing the likelihood of a pilot needing to
                intervene with multiple UA simultaneously, the minimum reliability
                requirements will be determined based on the applicant's proposed
                CONOPS.
                Noise
                 Comment Summary: An individual commenter expressed concern about
                noise pollution.
                 FAA Response: The Model TELEGRID DE2020 will need to comply with
                FAA noise certification standards. If the FAA determines that 14 CFR
                part 36 does not contain adequate standards for this design, the agency
                will propose and seek public comment on a rule of particular
                applicability for noise requirements under a separate rulemaking
                docket.
                Operating Altitude
                 Comment Summary: ALPA, McMahon Helicopter Services, and NAAA
                commented on the operation of UAS at or below 400 feet AGL. ALPA,
                McMahon Helicopter Services, and NAAA requested the airworthiness
                criteria contain measures for safe operation at low altitudes so that
                UAS are not a hazard to manned aircraft, especially operations
                involving helicopters; air tours; agricultural applications; emergency
                medical services; air tanker firefighting; power line and pipeline
                patrol and maintenance; fish and wildlife service; animal control;
                military and law enforcement; seismic operations; ranching and
                livestock relocation; and mapping.
                 FAA Response: The type certificate only establishes the approved
                design of the UA. These airworthiness criteria require the applicant
                show compliance for the UA altitude sought for type certification.
                While this may result in operating limitations in the flight manual,
                the type certificate is not an approval for operations. Operations and
                operational requirements are beyond the scope of this document.
                Guidance Material
                 Comment Summary: NUAIR requested the FAA complete and publish its
                draft AC 21.17-XX, Type Certification Basis for Unmanned Aircraft
                Systems (UAS), to provide additional guidance, including templates, to
                those who seek a type design approval for UAS. NUAIR also requested the
                FAA recognize the industry consensus-based standards applicable to UAS,
                as Transport Canada has by publishing its AC 922-001, Remotely Piloted
                Aircraft Systems Safety Assurance.
                 FAA Response: The FAA will continue to develop policy and guidance
                for UA type certification and will publish guidance as soon as
                practicable. The FAA encourages consensus standards bodies to develop
                means of compliance and submit them to the FAA for acceptance.
                Regarding Transport Canada AC 922-001, that AC addresses operational
                approval rather than type certification.
                Safety Management
                 Comment Summary: ALPA requested the FAA ensure that operations,
                including UA integrity, fall under the safety management system. ALPA
                further requested the FAA convene a Safety Risk Management Panel before
                allowing operators to commence operations and that the FAA require
                operators to have an active safety management system, including a non-
                punitive safety culture, where incident and continuing airworthiness
                issues can be reported.
                 FAA Response: The type certificate only establishes the approved
                design of the UA, including the Flight Manual and ICA. Operations and
                operational requirements, including safety management and oversight of
                operations and maintenance, are beyond the scope of this document.
                Process
                 Comment Summary: ALPA supported the FAA's type certification of UAS
                as a ``special class'' of aircraft under Sec. 21.17(b) but requested
                that it be temporary.
                 FAA Response: As the FAA stated in its notice of policy issued
                August 11, 2020 (85 FR 58251, September 18, 2020), the FAA will use the
                type certification process under Sec. 21.17(b) for some unmanned
                aircraft with no occupants onboard. The FAA further stated in its
                policy that it may also issue type certificates under Sec. 21.17(a)
                for airplane and rotorcraft UAS designs where the airworthiness
                standards in part 23, 25, 27, or 29, respectively, are appropriate. The
                FAA, in the future, may consider establishing appropriate generally
                applicable airworthiness standards for UA that are not certificated
                under the existing standards in parts 23, 25, 27, or 29.
                Out of Scope Comments
                 The FAA received and reviewed several comments that were general,
                stated the commenter's viewpoint or opposition without a suggestion
                specific to the proposed criteria, or did not make a request the FAA
                can act on. These comments are beyond the scope of this document.
                Applicability
                 These airworthiness criteria, established under the provisions of
                Sec. 21.17(b), are applicable to the TELEGRID Model TELEGRID DE2020
                UA. Should TELEGRID wish to apply these airworthiness criteria to other
                UA models, it must submit a new type certification application.
                Conclusion
                 This action affects only certain airworthiness criteria for the
                TELEGRID Model TELEGRID DE2020 UA. It is not a standard of general
                applicability.
                Authority Citation
                 The authority citation for these airworthiness criteria is as
                follows:
                 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, and 44701-44702, 44704.
                Airworthiness Criteria
                 Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the
                following airworthiness criteria are issued as part of the type
                certification basis for the TELEGRID Model TELEGRID DE2020 unmanned
                aircraft. The FAA finds that compliance with these criteria
                appropriately mitigates the risks associated with the design and
                concept of operations and provides an equivalent level of safety to
                existing rules.
                General
                D&R.001 Concept of Operations
                 The applicant must define and submit to the FAA a concept of
                operations (CONOPS) proposal describing the unmanned aircraft system
                (UAS) operation in the national airspace system for which unmanned
                aircraft (UA) type certification is requested. The CONOPS proposal must
                include, at a minimum, a description of the following information in
                sufficient detail to determine the parameters and extent of testing and
                operating limitations:
                 (a) The intended type of operations;
                 (b) UA specifications;
                [[Page 15042]]
                 (c) Meteorological conditions;
                 (d) Operators, pilots, and personnel responsibilities;
                 (e) Control station, support equipment, and other associated
                elements (AE) necessary to meet the airworthiness criteria;
                 (f) Command, control, and communication functions;
                 (g) Operational parameters (such as population density, geographic
                operating boundaries, airspace classes, launch and recovery area,
                congestion of proposed operating area, communications with air traffic
                control, line of sight, and aircraft separation); and
                 (h) Collision avoidance equipment, whether onboard the UA or part
                of the AE, if requested.
                D&R.005 Definitions
                 For purposes of these airworthiness criteria, the following
                definitions apply.
                 (a) Loss of Control: Loss of control means an unintended departure
                of an aircraft from controlled flight. It includes control reversal or
                an undue loss of longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability and
                control. It also includes an upset or entry into an unscheduled or
                uncommanded attitude with high potential for uncontrolled impact with
                terrain. A loss of control means a spin, loss of control authority,
                loss of aerodynamic stability, divergent flight characteristics, or
                similar occurrence, which could generally lead to crash.
                 (b) Loss of Flight: Loss of flight means a UA's inability to
                complete its flight as planned, up to and through its originally
                planned landing. It includes scenarios where the UA experiences
                controlled flight into terrain, obstacles, or any other collision, or a
                loss of altitude that is severe or non-reversible. Loss of flight also
                includes deploying a parachute or ballistic recovery system that leads
                to an unplanned landing outside the operator's designated recovery
                zone.
                Design and Construction
                D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission
                 The UA must be designed to monitor and transmit to the AE all
                information required for continued safe flight and operation. This
                information includes, at a minimum, the following:
                 (a) Status of all critical parameters for all energy storage
                systems;
                 (b) Status of all critical parameters for all propulsion systems;
                 (c) Flight and navigation information as appropriate, such as
                airspeed, heading, altitude, and location; and
                 (d) Communication and navigation signal strength and quality,
                including contingency information or status.
                D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe UA Operations
                 (a) The applicant must identify and submit to the FAA all AE and
                interface conditions of the UAS that affect the airworthiness of the UA
                or are otherwise necessary for the UA to meet these airworthiness
                criteria. As part of this requirement--
                 (1) The applicant may identify either specific AE or minimum
                specifications for the AE.
                 (i) If minimum specifications are identified, they must include the
                critical requirements of the AE, including performance, compatibility,
                function, reliability, interface, pilot alerting, and environmental
                requirements.
                 (ii) Critical requirements are those that if not met would impact
                the ability to operate the UA safely and efficiently.
                 (2) The applicant may use an interface control drawing, a
                requirements document, or other reference, titled so that it is clearly
                designated as AE interfaces to the UA.
                 (b) The applicant must show the FAA the AE or minimum
                specifications identified in paragraph (a) of this section meet the
                following:
                 (1) The AE provide the functionality, performance, reliability, and
                information to assure UA airworthiness in conjunction with the rest of
                the design;
                 (2) The AE are compatible with the UA capabilities and interfaces;
                 (3) The AE must monitor and transmit to the pilot all information
                required for safe flight and operation, including but not limited to
                those identified in D&R.100; and
                 (4) The minimum specifications, if identified, are correct,
                complete, consistent, and verifiable to assure UA airworthiness.
                 (c) The FAA will establish the approved AE or minimum
                specifications as operating limitations and include them in the UA type
                certificate data sheet and Flight Manual.
                 (d) The applicant must develop any maintenance instructions
                necessary to address implications from the AE on the airworthiness of
                the UA. Those instructions will be included in the instructions for
                continued airworthiness (ICA) required by D&R.205.
                D&R.110 Software
                 To minimize the existence of software errors, the applicant must:
                 (a) Verify by test all software that may impact the safe operation
                of the UA;
                 (b) Utilize a configuration management system that tracks,
                controls, and preserves changes made to software throughout the entire
                life cycle; and
                 (c) Implement a problem reporting system that captures and records
                defects and modifications to the software.
                D&R.115 Cybersecurity
                 (a) UA equipment, systems, and networks, addressed separately and
                in relation to other systems, must be protected from intentional
                unauthorized electronic interactions that may result in an adverse
                effect on the security or airworthiness of the UA. Protection must be
                ensured by showing that the security risks have been identified,
                assessed, and mitigated as necessary.
                 (b) When required by paragraph (a) of this section, procedures and
                instructions to ensure security protections are maintained must be
                included in the ICA.
                D&R.120 Contingency Planning
                 (a) The UA must be designed so that, in the event of a loss of the
                command and control (C2) link, the UA will automatically and
                immediately execute a safe predetermined flight, loiter, landing, or
                termination.
                 (b) The applicant must establish the predetermined action in the
                event of a loss of the C2 link and include it in the UA Flight Manual.
                 (c) The UA Flight Manual must include the minimum performance
                requirements for the C2 data link defining when the C2 link is degraded
                to a level where remote active control of the UA is no longer ensured.
                Takeoff when the C2 link is degraded below the minimum link performance
                requirements must be prevented by design or prohibited by an operating
                limitation in the UA Flight Manual.
                D&R.125 Lightning
                 (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the UA
                must have design characteristics that will protect the UA from loss of
                flight or loss of control due to lightning.
                 (b) If the UA has not been shown to protect against lightning, the
                UA Flight Manual must include an operating limitation to prohibit
                flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning activity.
                D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions
                 (a) For purposes of this section, ``adverse weather conditions''
                means rain, snow, and icing.
                 (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the UA
                must have design characteristics that will allow the UA to operate
                within the adverse weather conditions specified in the
                [[Page 15043]]
                CONOPS without loss of flight or loss of control.
                 (c) For adverse weather conditions for which the UA is not approved
                to operate, the applicant must develop operating limitations to
                prohibit flight into known adverse weather conditions and either:
                 (1) Develop operating limitations to prevent inadvertent flight
                into adverse weather conditions; or
                 (2) Provide a means to detect any adverse weather conditions for
                which the UA is not certificated to operate and show the UA's ability
                to avoid or exit those conditions.
                D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts
                 (a) A flight essential part is a part, the failure of which could
                result in a loss of flight or unrecoverable loss of UA control.
                 (b) If the type design includes flight essential parts, the
                applicant must establish a flight essential parts list. The applicant
                must develop and define mandatory maintenance instructions or life
                limits, or a combination of both, to prevent failures of flight
                essential parts. Each of these mandatory actions must be included in
                the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the ICA.
                Operating Limitations and Information
                D&R.200 Flight Manual
                 The applicant must provide a Flight Manual with each UA.
                 (a) The UA Flight Manual must contain the following information:
                 (1) UA operating limitations;
                 (2) UA operating procedures;
                 (3) Performance information;
                 (4) Loading information; and
                 (5) Other information that is necessary for safe operation because
                of design, operating, or handling characteristics.
                 (b) Those portions of the UA Flight Manual containing the
                information specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section must be
                approved by the FAA.
                D&R.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
                 The applicant must prepare ICA for the UA in accordance with
                Appendix A to Part 23, as appropriate, that are acceptable to the FAA.
                The ICA may be incomplete at type certification if a program exists to
                ensure their completion prior to delivery of the first UA or issuance
                of a standard airworthiness certificate, whichever occurs later.
                Testing
                D&R.300 Durability and Reliability
                 The UA must be designed to be durable and reliable when operated
                under the limitations prescribed for its operating environment, as
                documented in its CONOPS and included as operating limitations on the
                type certificate data sheet and in the UA Flight Manual. The durability
                and reliability must be demonstrated by flight test in accordance with
                the requirements of this section and completed with no failures that
                result in a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of containment, or
                emergency landing outside the operator's recovery area.
                 (a) Once a UA has begun testing to show compliance with this
                section, all flights for that UA must be included in the flight test
                report.
                 (b) Tests must include an evaluation of the entire flight envelope
                across all phases of operation and must address, at a minimum, the
                following:
                 (1) Flight distances;
                 (2) Flight durations;
                 (3) Route complexity;
                 (4) Weight;
                 (5) Center of gravity;
                 (6) Density altitude;
                 (7) Outside air temperature;
                 (8) Airspeed;
                 (9) Wind;
                 (10) Weather;
                 (11) Operation at night, if requested;
                 (12) Energy storage system capacity; and
                 (13) Aircraft to pilot ratio.
                 (c) Tests must include the most adverse combinations of the
                conditions and configurations in paragraph (b) of this section.
                 (d) Tests must show a distribution of the different flight profiles
                and routes representative of the type of operations identified in the
                CONOPS.
                 (e) Tests must be conducted in conditions consistent with the
                expected environmental conditions identified in the CONOPS, including
                electromagnetic interference (EMI) and high intensity radiated fields
                (HIRF).
                 (f) Tests must not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.
                 (g) Any UAS used for testing must be subject to the same worst-case
                ground handling, shipping, and transportation loads as those allowed in
                service.
                 (h) Any UA used for testing must use AE that meet, but do not
                exceed, the minimum specifications identified under D&R.105. If
                multiple AE are identified, the applicant must demonstrate each
                configuration.
                 (i) Any UAS used for testing must be maintained and operated in
                accordance with the ICA and UA Flight Manual. No maintenance beyond the
                intervals established in the ICA will be allowed to show compliance
                with this section.
                 (j) If cargo operations or external-load operations are requested,
                tests must show, throughout the flight envelope and with the cargo or
                external-load at the most critical combinations of weight and center of
                gravity, that--
                 (1) The UA is safely controllable and maneuverable; and
                 (2) The cargo or external-load are retainable and transportable.
                D&R.305 Probable Failures
                 The UA must be designed such that a probable failure will not
                result in a loss of containment or control of the UA. This must be
                demonstrated by test.
                 (a) Probable failures related to the following equipment, at a
                minimum, must be addressed:
                 (1) Propulsion systems;
                 (2) C2 link;
                 (3) Global Positioning System (GPS);
                 (4) Flight control components with a single point of failure;
                 (5) Control station; and
                 (6) Any other AE identified by the applicant.
                 (b) Any UA used for testing must be operated in accordance with the
                UA Flight Manual.
                 (c) Each test must occur at the critical phase and mode of flight,
                and at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio.
                D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions
                 (a) All of the following required UAS capabilities and functions
                must be demonstrated by test:
                 (1) Capability to regain command and control of the UA after the C2
                link has been lost.
                 (2) Capability of the electrical system to power all UA systems and
                payloads.
                 (3) Ability for the pilot to safely discontinue the flight.
                 (4) Ability for the pilot to dynamically re-route the UA.
                 (5) Ability to safely abort a takeoff.
                 (6) Ability to safely abort a landing and initiate a go-around.
                 (b) The following UAS capabilities and functions, if requested for
                approval, must be demonstrated by test:
                 (1) Continued flight after degradation of the propulsion system.
                 (2) Geo-fencing that contains the UA within a designated area, in
                all operating conditions.
                 (3) Positive transfer of the UA between control stations that
                ensures only one control station can control the UA at a time.
                 (4) Capability to release an external cargo load to prevent loss of
                control of the UA.
                 (5) Capability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles.
                 (c) The UA must be designed to safeguard against inadvertent
                discontinuation of the flight and inadvertent release of cargo or
                external load.
                [[Page 15044]]
                D&R.315 Fatigue
                 The structure of the UA must be shown to withstand the repeated
                loads expected during its service life without failure. A life limit
                for the airframe must be established, demonstrated by test, and
                included in the ICA.
                D&R.320 Verification of Limits
                 The performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA
                within the flight envelope described in the UA Flight Manual must be
                demonstrated at a minimum of 5% over maximum gross weight with no loss
                of control or loss of flight.
                 Issued in Washington, DC, on February 23, 2022.
                Ian Lucas,
                Manager, Policy Implementation Section, Policy and Innovation Division,
                Aircraft Certification Service.
                [FR Doc. 2022-05609 Filed 3-16-22; 8:45 am]
                BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
                

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