DOE Response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements
| Published date | 19 June 2020 |
| Citation | 85 FR 37086 |
| Record Number | 2020-13238 |
| Section | Notices |
| Court | Energy Department |
Federal Register, Volume 85 Issue 119 (Friday, June 19, 2020)
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 119 (Friday, June 19, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37086-37089]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-13238]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements
AGENCY: Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, Department
of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: On February 21, 2020, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board issued Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements, to the
Department of Energy. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
the Secretary of Energy's response to the Recommendation is provided in
this notice.
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's
response are due on or before July 20, 2020.
ADDRESSES: Please send to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
[[Page 37087]]
Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Mark Do, Office of the
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and Security, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC
20585, or telephone number (301) 903-6460, or email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On February 21, 2020, the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 2020-1, Nuclear Safety
Requirements, to the Department of Energy. Recommendation 2020-1 was
published in the Federal Register on March 13, 2020 (85 FR 14658). In
accordance with section 315(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2286d(c)), the Secretary of Energy's response to the
Recommendation is printed in full at the conclusion of this notice.
Signing Authority
This document of the Department of Energy was signed on June 15,
2020, by Joe Olencz, Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, Office of Environment, Health, Safety and
Security, pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of Energy.
That document with the original signature and date is maintained by
DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE
Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit
the document in electronic format for publication, as an official
document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Signed in Washington, DC, on June 16, 2020.
Treena V. Garrett,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
June 11, 2020
The Honorable Bruce Hamilton
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004
Dear Chairman Hamilton:
The Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges receipt of Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board) Recommendation
2020-1, Nuclear Safety Requirements, dated February 21, 2020, and
published in the Federal Register on March 13, 2020.
The Board stated that the Recommendation is ``intended to
strengthen DOE's regulatory framework in its current form,'' and
consists of actions which DOE understands are intended to improve
its existing nuclear safety regulatory framework, rather than remedy
Board-perceived flaws in such framework. DOE stated in its December
17, 2019, response to the Draft Recommendation 2020-1, that
continuous improvement is a core value in maintaining a robust
nuclear safety regulatory framework to ensure adequate protection of
public and worker health and safety.
DOE's recent actions to improve the framework include proposing
to modify and improve Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and associated DOE nuclear
safety directives and technical standards.
These efforts underscore DOE's goal to continuously improve its
nuclear safety regulatory framework, which has helped DOE achieve
and maintain an outstanding record of safety performance in recent
decades. DOE does not agree with the DNFSB's assertion that the
revisions proposed in the August 8, 2018, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for 10 CFR part 830 would erode DOE's nuclear safety
regulatory framework. Rather, DOE believes that these proposed
changes would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of that
framework while continuing to ensure adequate protection of the
public and worker health and safety across the DOE complex.
Following DOE's evaluation of Recommendation 2020-1, the
Department partially accepts the Board's Recommendation as
summarized below and detailed in the enclosure.
On June 9, 2020, DOE provided the Board staff with the draft
Final Rule, which touches on certain sub-elements of Recommendation
2020-1. Because the Department continues to consider these topics as
part of its current rulemaking process, DOE rejects sub-
recommendations 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 4.a, and 4.b.
In addition, DOE rejects sub-recommendations 3.b, 3.c, and 4.e,
as currently written because these topics are outside of the scope
of the current rulemaking process to amend 10 CFR part 830. However,
DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate whether further
changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed in an additional
rulemaking.
As explained further in the enclosure to this letter, DOE
partially accepts subrecommendations 1.a, 4.c, and 4.d, and will
develop an Implementation Plan to address these elements. We
appreciate the Board's advice and will continue working closely with
the Board to improve the Department's regulatory framework at DOE
defense nuclear facilities in a manner that meets our shared
objectives to ensure the continued safe, effective, and efficient
execution of our mission. We look forward to working with the Board
and its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Matthew Moury,
Associate Under Secretary for Environment, Health, Safety and
Security, at 202-586-1285.
Sincerely,
Dan Brouillette
Enclosure
Enclosure
Enclosure--Department of Energy Response to DNFSB Recommendation 2020-
1, Nuclear Safety Requirements
The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) has evaluated
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board)
Recommendation 2020-1. The following discussion presents a detailed
response for each DNFSB sub-recommendation, which reflects the
Department's partial acceptance of Recommendation 2020-1
(Recommendation).
DOE disagrees with the DNFSB's assertion that the revisions
proposed in the August 8, 2018, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR)
for 10 CFR part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, would erode DOE's
nuclear safety regulatory framework. Rather, DOE believes that these
proposed changes would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
the framework while continuing to ensure adequate protection of
public and worker health and safety at DOE defense nuclear
facilities.
The DNFSB's Recommendation includes specific sub-recommendations
related to two of the proposed revision topics identified in the
NOPR: Hazard categorization and the review and approval of safety
documentation. Because the Department continues to consider these
topics as part of its current rulemaking efforts, DOE rejects sub-
recommendations 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, 4.a, and 4.b.
Following issuance of the Final Rule, DOE plans to evaluate
affected directives and standards (primarily DOE-STD-1104-2016,
Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety
Design Basis Documents, and DOE G 424.1-1B, Implementation Guide for
Use in Addressing Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements) for
conformance with any new requirements and provide any necessary
implementation guidance. There will be an opportunity for the Board
to engage in these revisions. Further discussion regarding these two
topics is provided below.
In addition, DOE rejects sub-recommendations 3.b, 3.c, and 4.e
as written because these topics are outside of the scope of the
current rulemaking to amend 10 CFR part 830. However, DOE will
perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate whether changes to 10 CFR
part 830 should be pursued through an additional rulemaking.
Sub-Recommendation 1: Aging Infrastructure
Sub-Recommendation 1.a. Develop and implement an approach
including requirements to aging management that includes a formal
process for identifying and performing infrastructure upgrades that
are necessary to ensure facilities and structures, systems, and
components can perform their safety functions.
DOE partially accepts this sub-recommendation. DOE believes its
nuclear safety regulatory framework has requirements in place to
ensure facilities and safety structures, systems, and components
(SSCs), both active and passive, perform their safety
[[Page 37088]]
function. In the Department's December 17, 2019, response to the
Draft Recommendation, we included extensive discussion regarding
DOE's expectations for the performance of safety SSCs within DOE's
policy documents. At the highest level, compliance with 10 CFR part
830, including the requirement in Sec. 830.204(b)(4) to ``. . .
demonstrate the adequacy of these [hazard] controls to eliminate,
limit, or mitigate identified hazards . . .'', is required for all
Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities, and applies to
new and aging facilities.
In responding to this sub-recommendation, however, DOE will
ensure that nuclear safety is appropriately considered within
existing organizations and committees in the Department who are
charged with establishing Department-wide priorities and providing
recommendations regarding infrastructure.
DOE has also been involved in the development of ANS-3.14-202x,
Process for Aging Management and Life Extension of Nonreactor
Nuclear Facilities, and will continue to support this effort to
develop a consensus standard that is intended to guide the review
and management of aging degradation mechanisms.
Sub-Recommendation 2: Hazard Categorizies
Sub-Recommendation 2.a. Retain qualitative definitions of hazard
categories in 10 CFR 830.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because DOE is considering
this matter in the current rulemaking. The August 8, 2018 NOPR
proposed to remove Table 1 of Appendix A, which provides a
qualitative concept of hazard categories, and replace that table
with a formal definition in Sec. 830.3 for ``Hazard Category 1, 2,
and 3 DOE nuclear facilities'' that references DOE-STD-1027-92
Change Notice 1.
The NOPR notes that the removal of Table 1 would allow for a
clearer link between the HC determination and the methodology in
DOE-STD-1027-92 Change Notice 1 (as required in 10 CFR
830.202(b)(3)). As proposed, the qualitative ordering in which HC 1
would have higher potential consequences and HC 3 would have lower
potential consequences remains unchanged from the current method.
However, the determination of hazard categorization has always
required the use of a quantitative methodology consistent with DOE-
STD-1027-92, Change Notice 1, not on the guidance related to the
qualitative concept provided in Table 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part
830, subpart B.
Sub-Recommendation 2.b. Revise 10 CFR 830 to mandate use of a
single version of Standard 1027 when performing facility hazard
categorization.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because DOE is considering
this matter in the current rulemaking. It is worth noting that DOE's
current approach is as follows: Section 830.202(b)(3) mandates that
each facility be categorized ``consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92
(``Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for
compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reports,'' Change Notice 1, September 1997).'' DOE has allowed
updates to the Standard, as in DOE-STD-1027-2018, that retain the
same methodology as in DOE-STD-1027-92. The Recommendation states
that ``the words `consistent with' introduce flexibility in
implementation to not actually follow the requirements in DOE-STD-
1027.'' DOE disagrees with this point. The rule requires that hazard
categorization be conducted in a manner that is consistent with the
methodology in DOE-STD-1027-92.
DOE provided the Board staff with a draft Final Rule on June 9,
2020. In the future, if DOE were to propose a new methodology for
categorization, DOE would need to undertake a new rulemaking that
would include the revised methodology for public comment and
reference the new standard that includes the methodology.
Sub-Recommendation 3: DOE Approvals
Sub-Recommendation 3.a. Conduct a root cause analysis to
identify the underlying issues prohibiting the current safety basis
approval process from working efficiently and use the findings to
improve DOE's approval process.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because DOE is considering
this matter in the current rulemaking. The Recommendation identifies
a number of concerns with the NOPR regarding the deletion of the
requirement for review and approval of the annual updates to the
documented safety analysis (DSA). Sub-recommendations 3.a. and 4.a.
recommend conducting a root cause analysis to identify underlying
issues in the DSA annual submittal and approval process.
Prior to issuing the NOPR, DOE carefully considered the proposed
changes. DOE is the approval authority of safety bases and can
approve changes to safety bases outside of the annual update
process. DOE does not believe that the proposed change to delete the
requirement for review and approval of the annual updates
``complicates DOE's ability to ensure the configuration of the
facility, the processes, and the documentation'' on the safety of
DOE facilities, as asserted in the Recommendation. The following
discussion provides an explanation of DOE's proposal in the NOPR to
remove this requirement, and why DOE believes this would be an
effective path forward.
In Sec. 830.203, Unreviewed Safety Question Process, DOE
currently requires the contractor to obtain DOE approval prior to
taking any action determined to involve an unreviewed safety
question (USQ). DOE-STD-1104-2016 explains that ``[s]ince a
``positive'' [USQD determination (USQD)] indicates a situation that
is not within the current DOE-approved safety envelope (i.e., a
USQ), that situation or action(s) is required to be evaluated in
accordance with 10 CFR part 830 and approved by DOE.''
Additionally, Sec. 830.202, Safety Basis, requires the
contractor to annually submit to DOE either the updated DSA for
approval or a letter stating that there have been no changes in the
DSA since the prior submission. This effectively requires the
contractor to submit changes to the DSA, for DOE approval, twice.
The requirement in Sec. 830.201 that a contractor must perform
work in accordance with the safety basis remains unchanged. The NOPR
proposes a change to clarify that work must be performed in
accordance with ``the DOE-approved safety basis'' for a facility.
This has always been the expectation as described in Sec. 830.207,
DOE approval of safety basis; however, this change is proposed in
the NOPR to further clarify the point.
In the NOPR, the language in Sec. 830.207(b) has also been
proposed for revision and would be strengthened to say: ``Pending
issuance of a safety evaluation report in which DOE approves an
updated or amended safety basis for an existing Hazard Category 1,
2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility, the contractor responsible for the
facility must continue to perform work in accordance with the DOE-
approved safety basis for the facility and maintain the existing
safety basis consistent with the requirements of this Subpart''
(emphasis added).
The NOPR's proposed change to eliminate the requirement for DOE
to approve the annual update would rely on an effectively
implemented process for USQs. This proposed change would allow the
USQ process to be the primary mechanism by which DOE's approval for
changes to the DSA, where appropriate, would be obtained. If new
changes or planned DSA updates are proposed (which have not been
approved by DOE through the USQ process), DOE would review and
approve those changes as required by Sec. 830.207. The NOPR
proposes to amend 10 CFR part 830, Appendix A to Subpart B, Section
F.3, to include revised text to clarify this process.
Sub-Recommendation 3.b. Add language to the rule to explain that
DOE's review of safety basis updates should consider the cumulative
effect of changes to the safety basis.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because this topic is
outside of the scope of the current rulemaking to amend 10 CFR part
830. However, DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate
whether any changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through an
additional rulemaking.
Sub-Recommendation 3.c. Revise the body of 10 CFR 830, Subpart
B, to include formal DOE approval of justifications for continued
operation and evaluations of the safety of a situation.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because this topic is
outside of the scope of the current rulemaking to amend 10 CFR part
830. However, DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate
whether any changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through an
additional rulemaking.
Sub-Recommendation 4: Safety Basis Process and Requirements
Sub-Recommendation 4.a. Conduct a root cause analysis to
identify the underlying issues prohibiting contractors from
developing and submitting a documented safety analysis on an annual
schedule for DOE approval and use the findings to improve the
submission process.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because DOE is considering
this matter in the
[[Page 37089]]
current rulemaking. See discussion under sub-recommendation 3.a. for
the basis for rejection of 4.a.
Sub-Recommendation 4.b. While conducting the analyses in 3.a.
and 4.a. above, retain the requirement for contractors to submit a
documented safety analysis on an annual schedule for DOE approval.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because DOE is considering
this matter in the current rulemaking. See discussion under sub-
recommendation 3.a for the basis for rejection of 4.b.
Sub-Recommendation 4.c. Specify what safety basis documentation
a contractor must submit when seeking approval for an action
involving a USQ (proposed 10 CFR 830.203(d)).
DOE partially accepts this sub-recommendation and will evaluate
DOE's nuclear safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and
technical standards) to determine whether improvements are
necessary. DOE's understanding is that the Board staff is also in
the process of reviewing DOE's implementation of USQ requirements
for defense nuclear facilities. DOE looks forward to considering the
results of this review, once complete, to inform DOE's path forward
in this area. The Implementation Plan will further describe the
steps that will be taken to address this sub-recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 4.d. Establish requirements for USQs and TSRs
in 10 CFR 830 and/or orders, by elevating key guidance on USQs and
TSRs to clearly identified requirements.
DOE partially accepts this sub-recommendation and will evaluate
DOE's nuclear safety management framework (i.e., DOE directives and
technical standards) to determine whether improvements are
necessary. DOE's understanding is that the Board staff is also in
the process of reviewing DOE's implementation of USQ and technical
safety requirements (TSR) for defense nuclear facilities. DOE looks
forward to considering the results of these reviews, once complete,
to inform DOE's path forward in this area. The Implementation Plan
will further describe the steps that will be taken to address this
sub-recommendation.
Sub-Recommendation 4.e. Establish requirements for and
incorporate the concept of defense-in-depth and SACs and add a
discussion of defense-in-depth and SACs to 10 CFR 830 under safety
structures, systems, and components.
DOE rejects this sub-recommendation because this topic is
outside of the scope of the current rulemaking to amend 10 CFR part
830. However, DOE will perform a regulatory analysis to evaluate
whether any changes to 10 CFR part 830 should be proposed through an
additional rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 2020-13238 Filed 6-18-20; 8:45 am]
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