Executive Order No. 14257. Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

• Citation: 90 FR 15041
• Executive Order No.: 14257
• Published date: 07 April 2025
• Date: 02 April 2025
• FR Document: 2025-06063
• Pages: 15041-15109
• Issuer: Executive Office of the President
• Section: Presidential Documents

Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 65 (Monday, April 7, 2025)

Title 3--
                The President
                [[Page 15041]]
                 Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025
                
                Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To
                 Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and
                 Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits
                 By the authority vested in me as President by the
                 Constitution and the laws of the United States of
                 America, including the International Emergency Economic
                 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the
                 National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA),
                 section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19
                 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States
                 Code,
                 I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of
                 America, find that underlying conditions, including a
                 lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
                 relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff
                 barriers, and U.S. trading partners' economic policies
                 that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as
                 indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods
                 trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
                 threat to the national security and economy of the
                 United States. That threat has its source in whole or
                 substantial part outside the United States in the
                 domestic economic policies of key trading partners and
                 structural imbalances in the global trading system. I
                 hereby declare a national emergency with respect to
                 this threat.
                 On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade
                 Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my
                 Administration to investigate the causes of our
                 country's large and persistent annual trade deficits in
                 goods, including the economic and national security
                 implications and risks resulting from such deficits,
                 and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair
                 trade practices by other countries. On February 13,
                 2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled
                 ``Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,'' that directed further
                 review of our trading partners' non-reciprocal trading
                 practices, and noted the relationship between non-
                 reciprocal practices and the trade deficit. On April 1,
                 2025, I received the final results of those
                 investigations, and I am taking action today based on
                 those results.
                 Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits
                 have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing
                 base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic
                 manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply
                 chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base
                 dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and persistent
                 annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in
                 substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our
                 bilateral trade relationships. This situation is
                 evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff
                 barriers that make it harder for U.S. manufacturers to
                 sell their products in foreign markets. It is also
                 evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading
                 partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and
                 consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while
                 artificially increasing the competitiveness of their
                 goods in global markets. These conditions have given
                 rise to the national emergency that this order is
                 intended to abate and resolve.
                 For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has
                 been organized around the principle of reciprocity. The
                 Congress directed the President to secure reduced
                 reciprocal tariff rates from key trading partners first
                 through bilateral trade agreements and later under the
                 auspices of the global trading system. Between 1934 and
                 1945, the executive branch negotiated and signed 32
                 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to lower
                 tariff rates on a
                [[Page 15042]]
                 reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994,
                 participating countries engaged in eight rounds of
                 negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements
                 on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff
                 reduction rounds.
                 However, despite a commitment to the principle of
                 reciprocity, the trading relationship between the
                 United States and its trading partners has become
                 highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years. The
                 post-war international economic system was based upon
                 three incorrect assumptions: first, that if the United
                 States led the world in liberalizing tariff and non-
                 tariff barriers the rest of the world would follow;
                 second, that such liberalization would ultimately
                 result in more economic convergence and increased
                 domestic consumption among U.S. trading partners
                 converging towards the share in the United States; and
                 third, that as a result, the United States would not
                 accrue large and persistent goods trade deficits.
                 This framework set in motion events, agreements, and
                 commitments that did not result in reciprocity or
                 generally increase domestic consumption in foreign
                 economies relative to domestic consumption in the
                 United States. Those events, in turn, created large and
                 persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits as a
                 feature of the global trading system.
                 Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO)
                 Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-
                 favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their
                 best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not
                 agree to bind their tariff rates at similarly low
                 levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis.
                 Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States
                 has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in
                 the world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading
                 partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5
                 percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India
                 (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple
                 average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
                 Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much
                 larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates
                 applied to particular products. For example, the United
                 States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger
                 vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines),
                 while the European Union (10 percent), India (70
                 percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher
                 duties on the same product. For network switches and
                 routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff,
                 but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a
                 higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30
                 percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does
                 the United States (2.5 percent). For rice in the husk,
                 the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem
                 equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40
                 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose
                 higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free,
                 but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50
                 percent).
                 Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S.
                 manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around
                 the world. The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on
                 Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) details a great number of
                 non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports around the world on
                 a trading-partner by trading-partner basis. These
                 barriers include import barriers and licensing
                 restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in
                 trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g.,
                 unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity
                 assessment procedures, or technical regulations);
                 sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily
                 restrict trade without furthering safety objectives;
                 inadequate patent, copyright, trade secret, and
                 trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of
                 intellectual property rights; discriminatory licensing
                 requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to
                 cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices
                 affecting trade in digital products; investment
                 barriers; subsidies; anticompetitive practices;
                 discrimination in favor of domestic state-owned
                 enterprises, and failures by governments in protecting
                 labor and environment standards; bribery; and
                 corruption.
                 Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic
                 economic policies and practices of our trading
                 partners, including currency practices and value-added
                 taxes, and their associated market distortions, that
                 suppress domestic
                [[Page 15043]]
                 consumption and boost exports to the United States.
                 This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that
                 the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product
                 (GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it
                 is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent),
                 Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea
                 (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
                 At the same time, efforts by the United States to
                 address these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners
                 have repeatedly blocked multilateral and plurilateral
                 solutions, including in the context of new rounds of
                 tariff negotiations and efforts to discipline non-
                 tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S.
                 economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S.
                 trading partners have had few incentives to provide
                 reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports in the context of
                 bilateral trade negotiations.
                 These structural asymmetries have driven the large and
                 persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for
                 countries with which the United States may enjoy an
                 occasional bilateral trade surplus, the accumulation of
                 tariff and non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports may make
                 that surplus smaller than it would have been without
                 such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue
                 is not sustainable in today's economic and geopolitical
                 environment because of the effect they have on U.S.
                 domestic production. A nation's ability to produce
                 domestically is the bedrock of its national and
                 economic security.
                 Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden
                 Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing
                 domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national
                 security. According to 2023 United Nations data, U.S.
                 manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing
                 output was 17.4 percent, down from a peak in 2001 of
                 28.4 percent.
                 Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing
                 output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The
                 need to maintain robust and resilient domestic
                 manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in certain
                 advanced industrial sectors like automobiles,
                 shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology products,
                 machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, because
                 once competitors gain sufficient global market share in
                 these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently
                 weakened. It is also critical to scale manufacturing
                 capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we
                 can manufacture the defense materiel and equipment
                 necessary to protect American interests at home and
                 abroad.
                 In fact, because the United States has supplied so much
                 military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles
                 of military goods are too low to be compatible with
                 U.S. national defense interests. Furthermore, U.S.
                 defense companies must develop new, advanced
                 manufacturing technologies across a range of critical
                 sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and
                 microelectronics. If the United States wishes to
                 maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its
                 citizens and homeland, as well as for its allies and
                 partners, it needs to have a large upstream
                 manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem to
                 manufacture these products without undue reliance on
                 imports for key inputs.
                 Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also
                 has compromised U.S. economic security by rendering
                 U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical
                 disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the
                 vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this respect was
                 exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when
                 Americans had difficulty accessing essential products,
                 as well as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking
                 cargo ships in the Middle East.
                 The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens
                 the U.S. economy in other ways, including through the
                 loss of manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the
                 United States lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs
                 and experienced one of the largest drops in
                 manufacturing employment in history. Furthermore, many
                 manufacturing job losses were concentrated in specific
                 geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of
                 manufacturing jobs contributed
                [[Page 15044]]
                 to the decline in rates of family formation and to the
                 rise of other social trends, like the abuse of opioids,
                 that have imposed profound costs on the U.S. economy.
                 The future of American competitiveness depends on
                 reversing these trends. Today, manufacturing represents
                 just 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it
                 accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth
                 and 60 percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S.
                 manufacturing is the main engine of innovation in the
                 United States, responsible for 55 percent of all
                 patents and 70 percent of all research and development
                 (R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S.
                 multinational enterprises in China grew at an average
                 rate of 13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017,
                 while their R&D expenditures in the United States grew
                 by an average of just 5 percent per year during the
                 same time period, is evidence of the strong link
                 between manufacturing and innovation. Furthermore,
                 every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in other
                 related industries, helping to build and sustain our
                 economy.
                 Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured
                 products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs
                 for national security, neither can a nation long
                 survive if it cannot produce its own food. Presidential
                 Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical
                 Infrastructure Security and Resilience), designates
                 food and agriculture as a ``critical infrastructure
                 sector'' because it is one of the sectors considered
                 ``so vital to the United States that [its] incapacity
                 or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact
                 on security, national economic security, national
                 public health or safety, or any combination of those
                 matters.'' Furthermore, when I left office, the United
                 States had a trade surplus in agricultural products,
                 but today, that surplus has vanished. Eviscerated by a
                 slew of new non-tariff barriers imposed by our trading
                 partners, it has been replaced by a projected $49
                 billion annual agricultural trade deficit.
                 For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:
                 Section 1. National Emergency. As President of the
                 United States, my highest duty is ensuring the national
                 and economic security of the country and its citizens.
                 I have declared a national emergency arising from
                 conditions reflected in large and persistent annual
                 U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40
                 percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2
                 trillion in 2024. This trade deficit reflects
                 asymmetries in trade relationships that have
                 contributed to the atrophy of domestic production
                 capacity, especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and
                 defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact
                 U.S. producers' ability to export and, consequentially,
                 their incentive to produce.
                 Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-
                 reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign
                 trading partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff
                 barriers by foreign trading partners, which reduce the
                 competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially
                 enhancing the competitiveness of their own goods. These
                 non-tariff barriers include technical barriers to
                 trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules;
                 inadequate intellectual property protections;
                 suppressed domestic consumption (e.g., wage
                 suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other
                 regulatory standards and protections; and corruption.
                 These non-tariff barriers give rise to significant
                 imbalances even when the United States and a trading
                 partner have comparable tariff rates.
                 The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the
                 transfer of resources from domestic producers to
                 foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic
                 manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost
                 manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity,
                 and an atrophied industrial base, including in the
                 defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign
                 firms are better positioned to scale production,
                 reinvest in innovation, and compete
                [[Page 15045]]
                 in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S.
                 economic and national security.
                 The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing
                 capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial
                 sectors--another outcome of the large and persistent
                 annual U.S. goods trade deficits--also compromises U.S.
                 economic and national security by rendering the U.S.
                 economy less resilient to supply chain disruption.
                 Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade
                 deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial
                 capacity, have compromised military readiness; this
                 vulnerability can only be redressed through swift
                 corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into
                 the United States. Such impact upon military readiness
                 and our national security posture is especially acute
                 with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call
                 upon the public and private sector to make the efforts
                 necessary to strengthen the international economic
                 position of the United States.
                 Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of
                 the United States to rebalance global trade flows by
                 imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports
                 from all trading partners except as otherwise provided
                 herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports
                 from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and
                 shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty
                 shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex
                 I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to
                 this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall
                 apply until such time as I determine that the
                 underlying conditions described above are satisfied,
                 resolved, or mitigated.
                 Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise
                 provided in this order, all articles imported into the
                 customs territory of the United States shall be,
                 consistent with law, subject to an additional ad
                 valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of duty
                 shall apply with respect to goods entered for
                 consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for
                 consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
                 time on April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a
                 vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the
                 final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
                 daylight time on April 5, 2025, and entered for
                 consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption
                 after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5,
                 2025, shall not be subject to such additional duty.
                 Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this
                 order, at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,
                 2025, all articles from trading partners enumerated in
                 Annex I to this order imported into the customs
                 territory of the United States shall be, consistent
                 with law, subject to the country-specific ad valorem
                 rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such
                 rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered
                 for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for
                 consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
                 time on April 9, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a
                 vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the
                 final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
                 daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for
                 consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption
                 after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,
                 2025, shall not be subject to these country-specific ad
                 valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex I to this
                 order. These country-specific ad valorem rates of duty
                 shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the
                 terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as
                 provided below.
                 (b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to
                 this order, consistent with law, shall not be subject
                 to the ad valorem rates of duty under this order: (i)
                 all articles that are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b);
                 (ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum
                 subject to the duties imposed pursuant to section 232
                 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and proclaimed in
                 Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports
                 of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended,
                 Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports
                 of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and
                 Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting
                 Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative
                 Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended,
                 Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting
                 Imports of Aluminum
                [[Page 15046]]
                 Into the United States), and Proclamation 10896 of
                 February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the
                 United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive
                 parts subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant
                 to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as
                 amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March
                 26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and
                 Automobile Parts Into the United States); (iv) other
                 products enumerated in Annex II to this order,
                 including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,
                 lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy
                 and energy products; (v) all articles from a trading
                 partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of
                 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
                 (HTSUS); and (vi) all articles that may become subject
                 to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232
                 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
                 (c) The rates of duty established by this order are
                 in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes,
                 exactions, or charges applicable to such imported
                 articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)
                 of this section below.
                 (d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have
                 imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a
                 national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit
                 drugs across our northern border pursuant to Executive
                 Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To
                 Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern
                 Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of
                 February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
                 Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2,
                 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of
                 Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border). With respect
                 to articles from Mexico, I have imposed additional
                 duties on certain goods to address a national emergency
                 resulting from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal
                 migration across our southern border pursuant to
                 Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing
                 Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern
                 Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of
                 February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
                 Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2,
                 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at
                 Our Southern Border). As a result of these border
                 emergency tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico
                 under the terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS,
                 including any treatment set forth in subchapter XXIII
                 of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the
                 HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between the United
                 States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada
                 (USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S.
                 market under these preferential terms. However, all
                 goods of Canada or Mexico that do not qualify as
                 originating under USMCA are presently subject to
                 additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy
                 or energy resources and potash imported from Canada and
                 not qualifying as originating under USMCA presently
                 subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10
                 percent.
                 (e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles
                 imported from Canada or Mexico under the terms of this
                 order shall not apply in addition to the ad valorem
                 rate of duty specified by the existing orders described
                 in subsection (d) of this section. If such orders
                 identified in subsection (d) of this section are
                 terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico
                 that qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be
                 subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty, while
                 articles not qualifying as originating under USMCA
                 shall be subject to an ad valorem rate of duty of 12
                 percent. However, these ad valorem rates of duty on
                 articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not
                 apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to
                 an article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA
                 that is a part or component of an article substantially
                 finished in the United States.
                 (f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty
                 set forth in this order shall apply only to the non-
                 U.S. content of a subject article, provided at least 20
                 percent of the value of the subject article is U.S.
                 originating. For the purposes of this subsection,
                 ``U.S. content'' refers to the value of an article
                 attributable to the components produced entirely, or
                 substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S.
                 Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
                [[Page 15047]]
                 to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to
                 require the collection of such information and
                 documentation regarding an imported article, including
                 with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to
                 ascertain and verify the value of the U.S. content of
                 the article, as well as to ascertain and verify whether
                 an article is substantially finished in the United
                 States.
                 (g) Subject articles, except those eligible for
                 admission under ``domestic status'' as defined in 19
                 CFR 146.43, which are subject to the duty specified in
                 section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign
                 trade zone on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time
                 on April 9, 2025, must be admitted as ``privileged
                 foreign status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
                 (h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
                 1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the
                 articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
                 Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
                 1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain available for the articles
                 described in subsection (a) of this section until
                 notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the
                 President that adequate systems are in place to fully
                 and expeditiously process and collect duty revenue
                 applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles
                 otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment. After such
                 notification, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19
                 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the
                 articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
                 (i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further
                 Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid
                 Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China as
                 Applied to Low-Value Imports), regarding low-value
                 imports from China is not affected by this order, and
                 all duties and fees with respect to covered articles
                 shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
                 (j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and
                 evasion, all ad valorem rates of duty imposed by this
                 order or any successor orders with respect to articles
                 of China shall apply equally to articles of both the
                 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau
                 Special Administrative Region.
                 (k) In order to establish the duty rates described
                 in this order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in
                 the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall
                 enter into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes
                 to this order.
                 (l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior
                 Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other
                 Presidential directive or guidance related to trade
                 with foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with
                 the direction in this order is hereby terminated,
                 suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to give
                 full effect to this order.
                 Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of
                 Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
                 consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary
                 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
                 the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
                 Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the
                 Assistant to the President for National Security
                 Affairs, shall recommend to me additional action, if
                 necessary, if this action is not effective in resolving
                 the emergency conditions described above, including the
                 increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent
                 expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S.
                 trading partners in a manner that threatens the
                 economic and national security interests of the United
                 States.
                 (b) Should any trading partner retaliate against
                 the United States in response to this action through
                 import duties on U.S. exports or other measures, I may
                 further modify the HTSUS to increase or expand in scope
                 the duties imposed under this order to ensure the
                 efficacy of this action.
                 (c) Should any trading partner take significant
                 steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and
                 align sufficiently with the United States on economic
                 and national security matters, I may further modify the
                 HTSUS to decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed
                 under this order.
                 (d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output
                 continue to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to
                 increase duties under this order.
                [[Page 15048]]
                 Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of
                 Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
                 consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary
                 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
                 the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
                 Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the
                 Assistant to the President for National Security
                 Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade
                 Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers
                 granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary
                 to implement this order. Each executive department and
                 agency shall take all appropriate measures within its
                 authority to implement this order.
                 Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade
                 Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of
                 State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
                 Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
                 Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
                 Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the
                 Assistant to the President for National Security
                 Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and
                 final reports to the Congress on the national emergency
                 declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c)
                 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of
                 IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
                 Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
                 shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
                (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the
                head thereof; or
                (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
                relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
                 (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
                 applicable law and subject to the availability of
                 appropriations.
                 (c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
                 create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
                 enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
                 the United States, its departments, agencies, or
                 entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
                 other person.
                
                
                 (Presidential Sig.)
                 THE WHITE HOUSE,
                 April 2, 2025.
                Billing code 3395-F4-P
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                [FR Doc. 2025-06063
                Filed 4-4-25; 11:15 am]
                Billing code 7020-02-C