Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail

Published date24 October 2019
Citation84 FR 56964
Record Number2019-22949
SectionProposed rules
CourtPipeline And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Federal Register, Volume 84 Issue 206 (Thursday, October 24, 2019)
[Federal Register Volume 84, Number 206 (Thursday, October 24, 2019)]
                [Proposed Rules]
                [Pages 56964-56977]
                From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
                [FR Doc No: 2019-22949]
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                DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
                Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
                49 CFR Parts 172 and 173
                [Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025 (HM-264)]
                RIN 2137-AF40
                Hazardous Materials: Liquefied Natural Gas by Rail
                AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
                Department of Transportation (DOT).
                ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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                SUMMARY: PHMSA, in coordination with the Federal Railroad
                Administration (FRA), is proposing changes to the Hazardous Materials
                Regulations to allow for the bulk transport of Methane, refrigerated
                liquid, commonly known as liquefied natural gas (LNG), in rail tank
                cars. This rulemaking proposes to authorize the transportation of
                Methane, refrigerated liquid by rail in the DOT-113C120W specification
                rail tank car.
                DATES: Comments must be received by December 23, 2019. To the extent
                possible, PHMSA will consider late-filed comments.
                ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the Docket Number
                PHMSA-2018-0025 (HM-264) via any of the following methods:
                 Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
                Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
                 Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
                 Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of
                Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing
                Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
                 Hand Delivery: To the Docket Management System; Room W12-
                140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
                SE, Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
                Friday, except Federal holidays.
                 Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
                Docket Number (PHMSA-2018-0025) or RIN (2137-AF40) for this rulemaking
                at the beginning of the comment. To avoid duplication, please use only
                one of these four methods. All comments received will be posted without
                change to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) and will include
                any personal information you provide. If sent by mail, comments must be
                submitted in duplicate. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of
                receipt of their comments must include a self-addressed stamped
                postcard.
                 Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or
                comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket
                Operations Office (see ADDRESSES).
                 Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business
                Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both
                customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the
                Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from
                public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this notice contain
                commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as
                private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or
                responsive to this notice, it is important that you clearly designate
                the submitted comments as CBI. Pursuant to 49 CFR 105.30, you may ask
                PHMSA to give confidential treatment to information you give to the
                agency by taking the following steps: (1) Mark each page of the
                original document submission containing CBI as ``Confidential''; (2)
                send PHMSA, along with the original document, a second copy of the
                original document with the CBI deleted; and (3) explain why the
                information you are submitting is CBI. Unless you are notified
                otherwise, PHMSA will treat such marked submissions as confidential
                under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of
                this notice. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Michael
                Ciccarone, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Standards and
                Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
                Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave.
                SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001. Any commentary that PHMSA receives which
                is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public
                docket for this rulemaking.
                 Privacy Act: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits
                comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT
                posts these comments, without change, including any personal
                information the commenter provides, to http://www.regulations.gov, as
                described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can
                be reviewed at http://www.dot.gov/privacy.
                FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Ciccarone, Standards and
                Rulemaking Division, (202) 366-8553, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
                Safety Administration, or Mark Maday, Federal Railroad Administration,
                (202) 366-2535, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
                Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
                SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
                Table of Contents
                I. Overview
                II. Background
                 A. Properties and Use of LNG
                 B. Current Requirements for LNG
                 C. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)
                 D. Regulatory Review
                 E. International Regulation
                III. Proposed Changes
                 A. Tank Car Specification
                 B. Operational Controls
                IV. Section-by-Section Review
                V. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
                 A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
                 B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
                Procedures
                [[Page 56965]]
                 C. Executive Order 13771
                 D. Executive Order 13132
                 E. Executive Order 13175
                 F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
                Policies and Procedures
                 G. Paperwork Reduction Act
                 H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
                 I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
                 J. Environmental Assessment
                 K. Privacy Act
                 L. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
                 M. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
                 N. Executive Order 13211
                List of Subjects
                I. Overview
                 PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is issuing this NPRM to solicit
                public comment on potential changes to the Hazardous Materials
                Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR parts 171-180) that permit the bulk transport
                of Methane, refrigerated liquid, commonly known as liquefied natural
                gas (LNG), in rail tank cars. Specifically, this NPRM proposes to
                authorize the transportation of Methane, refrigerated liquid by rail in
                certain DOT specification 113 (DOT-113) rail tank cars.\1\
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                 \1\ This NPRM is consistent with Section 4(b) of the President's
                April 10, 2019, ``Executive Order on Promoting Energy Infrastructure
                and Economic Growth,'' which directs the Secretary of Transportation
                to publish an NPRM that would propose to treat LNG the same as other
                cryogenic liquids and permit LNG to be transported in approved rail
                tank cars. The Executive Order also directs that the NPRM be
                published within 100 days of date of the order, and that a final
                rule must be published within thirteen months of the date of the
                order. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-promoting-energy-infrastructure-economic-growth/.
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                 LNG has been transported safely by highway and vessel for over 50
                years within the United States and is now a critical energy resource
                for the 21st century; however, the HMR do not authorize the bulk
                transport of LNG in rail tank cars. Historically, this limitation has
                not created a major impediment in the transportation of natural gas
                (either in gas or liquid form), but the expansion in United States
                energy production has led to significant challenges in the
                transportation system.
                 Between 2010 and 2018, the number of LNG facilities in the U.S.
                increased by 28.7 percent, and total storage and vaporization
                capacities increased by 21 and 23 percent, respectively.\2\ Over the
                same period, total liquefaction capacity increased by 939 percent due
                to new LNG export terminals.\3\ This data suggests that there may be a
                demand for greater flexibility in the modes of transportation available
                to transport LNG, which is supported by PHMSA's receipt of a petition
                for rulemaking (P-1697) from the Association of American Railroads
                (AAR) proposing amendments to the HMR to allow for the transportation
                of Methane, refrigerated liquid by rail in DOT-113 rail tank cars. As
                noted in the petition, some shippers have expressed that there is an
                interest in the transportation of LNG by rail (domestically and for
                international export), which would help address these challenges.
                Additionally, there is an existing request for a special permit that
                seeks to authorize shipments of LNG in DOT specification 113C120W tank
                cars subject to certain operational conditions that would be used to
                transport LNG to ports or the applicant's domestic customers.\4\
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                 \2\ Based on PHMSA annual report data from 2010-2018.
                 \3\ Id.
                 \4\ Docket No. PHMSA 2019-0100 at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=PHMSA-2019-0100.
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                 Federal hazardous materials law authorizes the Secretary of
                Transportation to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
                including security, of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate,
                and foreign commerce.'' 49 U.S.C. 5103(b)(1). The Secretary has
                delegated this authority to PHMSA in 49 CFR 1.97(b). The HMR are
                designed to achieve three primary goals: (1) Help ensure that hazardous
                materials are packaged and handled safely and securely during
                transportation; (2) provide effective communication to transportation
                workers and emergency responders of the hazards of the materials being
                transported; and (3) minimize the consequences of an accident or
                incident should one occur. The hazardous material regulatory system is
                a risk management system that is prevention-oriented and focused on
                identifying safety or security hazards and reducing the probability and
                consequences of a hazardous material release.
                 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq.
                requires Federal agencies to give interested persons the right to
                petition an agency to issue, amend, or repeal a rule. 5 U.S.C. 553(e).
                In accordance with PHMSA's rulemaking procedure regulations in 49 CFR
                part 106, interested persons may ask PHMSA to add, amend, or repeal a
                regulation by filing a petition for rulemaking along with information
                and arguments supporting the requested action (49 CFR 106.95). PHMSA
                has assessed P-1697 \5\ in accordance with 49 CFR 106.105 and
                determined that the request merits consideration in a rulemaking. In
                addition, a comment received to a notification \6\ of regulatory review
                issued by DOT's Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) in
                October 2017 further expressed industry support of deregulatory efforts
                to address the safe transportation of LNG by rail.
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                 \5\ Docket No. PHMSA-2017-0020.
                 \6\ See Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials
                Transportation comment in response to DOT's Notification of
                Regulatory Review, 82 FR 45750 (Oct. 2, 2017), which can be found at
                Docket No. DOT-OST-2017-0069, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069.
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                 PHMSA and FRA share responsibility for regulating the
                transportation of hazardous materials by rail and take a system-wide,
                comprehensive approach that focuses on prevention, mitigation, and
                response to manage and reduce the risk posed to people and the
                environment. In this rulemaking, PHMSA is seeking public comment on
                proposed changes to address the safe transportation of LNG by rail.
                II. Background
                A. Properties and Use of LNG
                 The proper classification of any hazardous material is required
                prior to it being offered into transportation. In accordance with Sec.
                173.115(g), a ``cryogenic liquid'' means a refrigerated liquefied gas
                having a boiling point colder than -90 [deg]C (-130 [deg]F) at an
                absolute pressure of 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia). Natural gas (methane) has a
                boiling point of -162 [deg]C (-260 [deg]F), which means it must be
                refrigerated to be liquid--hence, liquefied natural gas. Therefore, LNG
                meets the definition of Division 2.1, cryogenic liquid and is described
                by the entry ``UN1972, Methane, refrigerated liquid (cryogenic liquid),
                2.1'' in the Hazardous Materials Table (HMT; Sec. 172.101).
                 LNG is natural gas that has been liquefied through condensation at
                ambient pressure--a process referred to as liquefaction. The resulting
                LNG takes up about 1/600th of the volume of natural gas in its vapor
                state. Thus, LNG can be readily and economically stored and transported
                in specially designed storage tanks, highway cargo tanks, or
                International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers. LNG is
                odorless, colorless, non-corrosive, and non-toxic. It will float on
                water, causing the water to look like its boiling as the liquid
                transitions back to vapor. To be consumed, LNG must be vaporized by
                warming to return it to its gaseous form; this warming and vaporization
                process is called regasification. The vaporized natural gas is then
                injected back into a pipeline system, or used to fuel natural gas
                operated equipment.
                 There is an international market for LNG, whereas natural gas tends
                to be a
                [[Page 56966]]
                domestic commodity. International trends in the LNG industry directly
                impact domestic LNG and natural gas trends. LNG supplies regions, both
                domestic and international, that lack a natural gas source or the
                infrastructure to receive natural gas via pipeline. LNG production and
                consumption trends are related to international fuel prices, mainly
                crude oil, diesel, and coal. The LNG market in the United States grew
                considerably between 2010 and 2018.\7\ In that timeframe, the number of
                LNG facilities in the United States increased by 28.7 percent, and the
                total storage and vaporization capacities increased by 21 and 23
                percent, respectively. Over the same period, total liquefaction
                capacity increased by 939 percent due to new LNG export terminals.
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                 \7\ U.S. DOE, EIA: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34032.
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                B. Current Requirements for LNG
                 The current HMR do not authorize the bulk transport of LNG in rail
                tank cars.\8\ LNG may only be transported via rail in accordance with
                the conditions of a PHMSA special permit or in a portable tank pursuant
                to the conditions of an FRA approval.
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                 \8\ The HMR defines ``bulk packaging'' as having a capacity of
                greater than 119 gallons per 49 CFR 171.8. By way of comparison, a
                single DOT-113C120W tank car has a capacity of approximately 30,000
                gallons.
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                 The HMR include design, manufacturing, and maintenance standards
                for packaging (see parts 178-180). Additionally, the regulations
                specify which packaging types may be used for specific materials and
                provide requirements for filling and loading of packages (see part
                173). Column (8C) of the HMT provides bulk packaging authorizations for
                LNG in accordance with Sec. 173.318, Cryogenic liquids in cargo tanks,
                only, and does not include authorization of LNG for rail tank cars.
                Additionally, Column (7) contains portable tank instruction T75 (see
                Sec. 172.102(c)(7)), which allows for the transportation of
                refrigerated liquefied gases in certain United Nations (UN) portable
                tanks, which can then be moved by rail in accordance with Sec. 174.63.
                Currently, to transport LNG by rail in a method not authorized, a
                person must apply for a special permit from the Associate Administrator
                for Hazardous Materials Safety, PHMSA (see 49 CFR 107.105).
                C. Petition for Rulemaking (P-1697)
                The Association of American Railroads' Petition for Rulemaking
                 On January 17, 2017, AAR submitted a petition for rulemaking to
                PHMSA titled, ``Petition for Rulemaking to Allow Methane, Refrigerated
                Liquid to be Transported in Rail Tank Cars'' [PHMSA-2017-0020 (P-1697)]
                requesting revisions to Sec. 173.319 of the HMR that would permit the
                transportation of LNG by rail in DOT-113 tank cars.
                 In its petition, AAR proposed that PHMSA amend the entry for
                ``UN1972, Methane, refrigerated liquid'' in the HMT (see Sec. 172.101)
                to add a reference to Sec. 173.319 in Column (8C), thereby authorizing
                transport of UN 1972 in rail tank cars. Additionally, AAR proposed that
                PHMSA amend Sec. 173.319 to include specific requirements for DOT-113
                cars used for the transportation of LNG. AAR suggested that the
                authorized tank car specifications be DOT-113C120W and DOT-113C140W,\9\
                noting that 120W cars should provide 40 days in transportation and 140W
                cars should provide 45 days before the tank car might begin to vent the
                commodity from the pressure relief device.\10\ AAR further proposed
                amending Sec. 173.319(d)(2) to include maximum filling densities
                comparable to those specified for cargo tanks containing LNG in Sec.
                173.318(f)(3).
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                 \9\ The HMR do not authorize the DOT-113C140W specification tank
                car for hazardous materials transportation. See section ``III. A.
                Tank Car Specification'' of this rulemaking for further discussion.
                 \10\ PHMSA understands this to mean one-way transit time.
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                 AAR noted that the current HMR allow for transport of LNG by
                highway and expressed the opinion that rail transport of LNG is a safer
                mode of transportation by comparison. AAR stated that LNG is similar in
                all relevant properties to other flammable cryogenic liquids, such as
                ethylene, that are currently authorized for transportation by rail tank
                car. AAR further stated that they believe the DOT-113 tank car was not
                previously authorized because of a lack of demand in the market.
                However, AAR noted that there is commercial interest in transporting
                LNG by rail tank car domestically, and internationally from the United
                States to Mexico, and that some railroads are actively exploring LNG as
                a locomotive fuel, thereby requiring supply of LNG along their
                networks.
                 AAR's petition--P-1697--requests a regulatory change that has the
                potential to reduce regulatory burdens and enhance domestic energy
                production without having a negative impact on safety; therefore, PHMSA
                accepted it as having merit for consideration in a rulemaking. PHMSA
                requests public comment on all relevant aspects of this NPRM, including
                its potential to reduce regulatory burdens, enhance domestic energy
                production, and impact safety.
                The Center for Biological Diversity's Response to P-1697
                 On May 15, 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity (the Center)
                submitted a response to P-1697, recommending that PHMSA deny AAR's
                petition for rulemaking because of potential environmental impacts of
                LNG. The Center commented that PHMSA should not proceed in evaluating
                the petition request until the Agency has conducted a National
                Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) evaluation, prepared an Environmental
                Impact Statement (EIS) or Environmental Assessment (EA), and provided
                opportunity for public review and comment in accordance with the
                Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), as applicable.
                 PHMSA is issuing this NPRM in accordance with the APA and all
                related Executive Orders and laws, including NEPA. This NPRM provides
                opportunity for public notice and comment. See section ``V. J.
                Environmental Assessment'' of this rulemaking for further discussion of
                the EA.
                D. Regulatory Review
                 On October 2, 2017, DOT published a notice \11\ in the Federal
                Register expressing Department-wide plans to review existing
                regulations and other agency actions to evaluate their continued
                necessity, determine whether they are crafted effectively to solve
                current problems, and evaluate whether they potentially burden the
                development or use of domestically produced energy resources. As part
                of this review process, the Department invited the public to provide
                input on existing rules and other agency actions that have potential
                for repeal, replacement, suspension, or modification.
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                 \11\ Notification of Regulatory Review, Docket No. DOT-OST-2017-
                0069, 82 FR 45750 (October 2, 2017).
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                 The Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation
                (Interested Parties) submitted a comment \12\ requesting the
                authorization of LNG for rail tank car transport. Specifically, the
                Interested Parties noted in its comment that LNG shares similar
                properties to other flammable cryogenic materials currently authorized
                by rail tank car and has already been moved in the United
                [[Page 56967]]
                States under a special permit. Additionally, they noted that Transport
                Canada (TC) authorizes LNG for transportation by rail in DOT-113
                equivalent rail cars and that there is an increased commercial demand
                for rail transport within the United States and between the United
                States and Mexico.
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                 \12\ Comment from Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials
                Transportation, Document No. DOT-OST-2017-00692591, https://www.regulations.gov/searchResults?rpp=25&po=0&s=dot-ost-2017-0069-2591&fp=true&ns=true.
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                 PHMSA has reviewed the Interested Parties' comment and is proposing
                to authorize the transport of LNG by rail because it may support
                Department-wide safety investments and promote cost saving actions. The
                PHMSA proposal would amend the HMR to authorize transportation of LNG
                by rail in a DOT-113 specification tank car. PHMSA requests public
                comment on the potential regulatory impact of this proposal.
                E. International Regulation
                 The Transport of Dangerous Goods Directorate within TC develops
                safety standards and regulations, provides oversight, and gives expert
                advice on dangerous goods incidents to promote public safety in the
                transportation of dangerous goods by all modes of transport in Canada.
                TC recently published a new standard on the bulk transport of LNG. TC
                authorizes LNG for transportation by rail in DOT-113 equivalent rail
                tank cars (TC-113C120W). PHMSA is not currently aware of LNG being
                transported via TC-113C120W; however, should that change, PHMSA expects
                incident and commodity flow data within Canada to be shared with PHMSA
                and FRA.
                 In Mexico, the Railway Transport Regulatory Agency's (Agencia
                Reguladora del Transporte Ferroviario), under the Ministry of
                Communications and Transportation (Secretar[iacute]a de Comunicaciones
                y Transportes or SCT), mission is to promote, regulate, and monitor the
                railroad industry, and is responsible for regulating all types of cargo
                movement on trains. Currently, SCT does not provide explicit
                authorization for the bulk transportation of LNG in rail tank cars.
                III. Proposed Changes
                 LNG's role as an energy resource continues to expand with ongoing
                innovation and economic development. Historically, the United States
                transported LNG by highway and exported LNG via ports only. As a
                result, there was no need for a regulation that authorized
                transportation via rail tank car. With a growing supply and demand,\13\
                rail transportation is being considered as a viable alternative to the
                transportation of LNG by highway. PHMSA has identified this as an area
                where there are opportunities to allow industry innovation and to
                support infrastructure development while maintaining a high level of
                safety. The hazards of transporting LNG are no different than that of
                flammable cryogenic liquids already authorized for bulk rail transport
                in accordance with the HMR.\14\ The HMR provides the framework for the
                safe transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, and regardless
                of the future capacity for LNG rail transport, the material itself will
                be transported in the safe specification tank cars outlined below.
                Nonetheless, in this NPRM, PHMSA and FRA must consider requirements for
                both the packaging (i.e., the rail tank car) and operational controls
                for a train consisting of tank cars loaded with LNG.
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                 \13\ U.S. Energy Information Administration, ``Growth in
                domestic natural gas production leads to development of LNG export
                terminals,'' March 4, 2016, accessed at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=25232.
                 \14\ For description of potential safety hazards of LNG, see LNG
                Safety Assessment Evaluation Methods, https://prod.sandia.gov/techlib-noauth/access-control.cgi/2015/153859r.pdf.
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                A. Tank Car Specification
                 The DOT-113 specification cryogenic liquid tank car is built to
                comply with specifications contained in 49 CFR part 179, subpart F and
                TC regulation TC14877E, Section 8.6, as well as certain requirements of
                the rail industry as identified in the AAR Manual of Standards and
                Recommended Practices, Specifications for Tank Cars (M-1002). These
                rail tank cars are vacuum-insulated and consist of an inner alloy
                (stainless) steel tank enclosed with an outer carbon steel jacket shell
                specifically designed for the transportation of refrigerated liquefied
                gases, such as liquid hydrogen, oxygen, ethylene, nitrogen, and argon.
                Additionally, the design and use of the DOT-113 specification tank car
                includes added safety features--such as protection systems for piping
                between the inner and outer tanks, multiple pressure relief devices
                (pressure relief valves and vents), thermal integrity tests, and in-
                transit reporting requirements--that contribute to an excellent safety
                record throughout its 50 years of service.
                 In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing to authorize DOT-113C120W tank
                cars for use in the transportation of LNG by rail. The HMR currently
                authorize the DOT-113C120W specification tank car for another flammable
                cryogenic liquid which shares similar chemical and operating
                characteristics with LNG (i.e., ethylene). The DOT-113C120W design
                specification is similarly suitable for the transport of Methane,
                refrigerated liquid (LNG). We anticipate that DOT-113 specification
                tank cars will need to be manufactured to satisfy the demand for
                transporting LNG as the current fleet of these tank cars is used for
                the transportation of ethylene and other cryogenic liquids.
                 DOT-113 specification rail tank cars are constructed in accordance
                with the requirements of 49 CFR, part 179, subpart F, ``Specification
                for Cryogenic Liquid Tank Car Tanks and Seamless Steel Tanks.'' These
                cars are built to a double pressure vessel design with the commodity
                tank (inner vessel) constructed of ASTM A 240/A 240M, Type 304 or 304L
                stainless steel, and the outer jacket shell (outer vessel) typically is
                constructed of carbon steel. This design provides an increased
                crashworthiness when compared to a single vessel design rail tank car.
                The rail tank car is manufactured with an insulated annular space
                holding a vacuum between the two pressure vessels. This vacuum area and
                the insulation significantly reduce the rate of heat leak from the
                atmosphere to the liquid inside the tank car thus minimizing the
                heating of the cryogenic (i.e., refrigerated) material in the tank car
                while being transported. For these reasons, PHMSA has determined the
                DOT-113C120W specification tank car is an acceptable packaging to
                transport Methane, refrigerated liquid (LNG) by rail. This
                determination is based upon the design of the DOT cryogenic tank car
                specification, which includes added safety features designed to address
                the hazards presented by cryogenic liquids, and has a demonstrated
                safety record.
                 In addition to requesting a rule change to allow DOT-113C120W tank
                cars to transport LNG, AAR requested that PHMSA add a new tank car
                specification, the DOT-113C140W, for transportation of bulk quantities
                of LNG. AAR stated that the advantage to the DOT-113C140W tank car is
                that it is similar in design and construction to the DOT-113C120W
                specification, but would allow for an additional transportation
                timeframe of 5 days for cryogenic materials. This claim assumes that
                the new specification would use a thicker inner tank material that
                would allow for a higher inner tank test pressure (140 psig) and higher
                pressure relief device settings. These design changes could have the
                potential to increase the time in transportation by 5 days.
                 Currently, the HMR does not authorize the DOT-113C140W
                specification for cryogenic hazardous materials transportation and
                thus, this
                [[Page 56968]]
                type of regulatory change would require considerably more time and
                resources to incorporate a new specification proposal into this
                rulemaking. PHMSA believes the addition of this tank car specification
                warrants an extensive engineering review and evaluation, including
                consideration of the risk of release in a derailment and ignition when
                transported at these higher pressures. PHMSA does not want to delay
                deregulatory action authorizing the DOT-113C120W tank car for the
                transport of LNG pending evaluation of the DOT-113C140W tank car.
                Accordingly, PHMSA is not proposing to authorize the DOT-113C140W
                specification at this time.
                 Moreover, the petitioner did not include design specifications for
                the DOT-113C140W tank car. PHMSA may consider it for future rulemaking
                after design specifications, engineering details, and data
                demonstrating an equivalent level of safety are submitted to PHMSA in
                support of this regulatory change.
                 PHMSA is proposing to amend the Pressure Control Valve Setting or
                Relief Valve Setting Table in Sec. 173.319(d)(2) by adding a column
                for methane as follows:
                 Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Maximum permitted filling density (percent by weight)
                Maximum start-to-discharge pressure --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (psig) Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Hydrogen Methane
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                17................................. ...................... ...................... ..................... 6.60.................
                45................................. 52.8..................
                75................................. ...................... 51.1.................. 51.1................. ..................... 32.5.
                Maximum pressure when offered for 10 psig............... 20 psig............... 20 psig.............. ..................... 15 psig.
                 transportation.
                Design service temperature......... Minus 260 [deg]F...... Minus 260 [deg]F...... Minus 155 [deg]F..... Minus 423 [deg]F..... Minus 260 [deg]F.
                Specification (see Sec. 113D60W, 113C60W...... 113C120W.............. 113D120W............. 113A175W, 113A60W.... 113C120W.
                 180.507(b)(3) of this subchapter).
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The proposed changes to the table would authorize methane in DOT-
                113C120W specification tank cars with a start-to-discharge pressure
                valve setting of 75 psig; a design service temperature of -260 [deg]F;
                a maximum pressure when offered for transportation of 15 psig; and a
                filling density of 32.5 percent by weight. The maximum offering
                pressure of 15 psig is consistent with the 20-day transportation
                requirement for cryogenic materials and the estimated 3 psig per day
                pressure increase during transportation. The filling density is similar
                to the filling density requirements for cryogenic materials transported
                in a cargo tank motor vehicle. These requirements will provide a 15
                percent vapor volume outage (at the start-to-discharge-pressure of the
                pressure relief valve) for the rail tank car during transportation.
                B. Operational Controls
                 AAR's Circular OT-55 is a detailed protocol establishing
                recommended railroad operating practices for the transportation of
                hazardous materials that was developed by the rail industry through the
                AAR.\15\ The recommended practices were originally implemented by all
                Class I rail carriers operating in the United States, with short-line
                railroads following on as signatories. As a result, Circular OT-55 is
                comprehensive in its reach, applying to all train movements that fit
                within the terms of the circular. The circular outlines operational
                controls for trains meeting the industry definition of a ``Key Train,''
                including speed restrictions, track requirements, storage requirements,
                and the designation of ``Key Routes.'' \16\ Circular OT-55 defines a
                ``Key Train'' as any train with:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \15\ Circular OT-55, ``Recommended Railroad Operating Practices
                for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,'' https://www.railinc.com/rportal/documents/18/260773/OT-55.pdf.
                 \16\ Circular OT-55 defines a ``Key Route'' as ``any track with
                a combination of 10,000 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads
                of hazardous materials, or a combination of 4,000 car loadings of
                PIH or TIH (Hazard zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia, flammable
                gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, environmentally sensitive
                chemicals, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), and High Level Radioactive
                Waste (HLRW) over a period of one year.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard
                (PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia (UN1005),
                or ammonia solutions (UN3318), or;
                 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads of any
                combination of hazardous material, or;
                 One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), High
                Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
                 While PHMSA is not proposing to incorporate by reference Circular
                OT-55 or to adopt the requirements for ``Key Trains'' in the HMR in
                this rulemaking, the railroad industry's voluntary adoption of the
                circular is an important consideration for PHMSA in assessing what
                operational controls are necessary. In accordance with the ``Key
                Train'' definition and the changes being considered in this NPRM,
                Circular OT-55's operational controls would apply to the bulk transport
                of LNG by rail in a train consist that is composed of 20 car loads or
                intermodal portable tank loads in which LNG is present along with any
                combination of other hazardous materials. Therefore, bulk transport of
                LNG would be subject to the industry standard even if only one rail
                tank car of the 20-car consist contained LNG, regardless of the classes
                of hazardous materials contained in the remaining 19 rail cars. Due to
                the operational controls introduced for ``Key Trains,'' Circular OT-55
                provides an additional level of safety regardless of what combination
                of hazardous materials the train consist is transporting. As such,
                PHMSA and FRA believe this industry standard helps ensure the safe
                transportation of all hazardous materials, including LNG.
                 PHMSA and FRA considered other options for operational controls
                such as mirroring the operational controls adopted for high-hazard
                flammable trains (HHFT) \17\ or adopting the ``Key Train'' requirements
                into the HMR. Additional operational controls, while not limited to the
                following, might include limitations on train length, controls for
                train composition, speed restrictions, braking requirements, and
                routing requirements.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \17\ As defined in Sec. 171.8, a high-hazard flammable train
                means a single train transporting 20 or more loaded tank cars of a
                Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a single train
                carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid
                throughout the train consist.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Train Length and Train Composition. PHMSA and FRA have not
                restricted train length in the past; however, PHMSA solicits comment on
                whether
                [[Page 56969]]
                there is a reasoned basis for limiting the length of a train
                transporting LNG tank cars, and what that limitation would look like.
                Moreover, PHMSA solicits comment on whether there is a reasoned basis
                for limiting the amount of LNG tank cars that can be in one consist, or
                where the LNG tank cars may be placed within the train. For example,
                the National Transportation Safety Board issued a Safety Recommendation
                (R-17-001) \18\ to PHMSA to: (1) Evaluate the risks posed to train
                crews by hazardous materials transported by rail; (2) determine the
                adequate separation distance between hazardous materials cars and
                locomotives and occupied equipment that ensures the protection of train
                crews during normal operations and accident conditions; (3) and
                collaborate with FRA to revise 49 CFR 174.85 to reflect those findings.
                To date, PHMSA has initiated a literature review to help identify gaps
                and changes in factors from previous and current studies and ultimately
                determine the adequate separation distance of train crews from
                hazardous materials in a train.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \18\ https://ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-17-001.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Speed Restrictions and Braking Requirements. The HHFT regulations
                include a speed restriction of 50 miles per hour (mph) for all HHFTs
                with an additional speed restriction of 40 mph for those HHFTs
                traveling within a high-threat urban area (Sec. 174.310(a)(2)). The
                HHFT regulations also include advanced braking requirements for HHFTs,
                requiring all HHFTs operating in excess of 30 mph to be equipped and
                operated with distributed power system or a two-way end-of-train device
                (Sec. 174.310(a)(3)), which helps to propagate a quicker application
                of the air brake system throughout the entire train, particularly in
                emergency braking situations.
                 Routing Requirements. Section 172.820 prescribes additional
                planning requirements for transportation by rail, including route
                analysis, requiring railroads to address safety and security risks for
                the transportation along routes where commodity data is collected. This
                requirement applies to a rail carrier transporting one or more of: (1)
                More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs.) in a single carload of a Division 1.1,
                1.2 or 1.3 explosive; (2) A quantity of a material poisonous by
                inhalation in a single bulk packaging; (3) A highway route-controlled
                quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) material, as defined in Sec.
                173.403; or (4) A high-hazard flammable train (HHFT) as defined in
                Sec. 171.8.
                 PHMSA recognizes that there may be other operational controls or
                combinations of controls to consider and encourages comments on such
                controls. However, for this rulemaking, PHMSA and FRA decided not to
                propose additional operational controls because there is not sufficient
                data about the potential movements of LNG by tank car. While PHMSA
                expects LNG will initially move in smaller quantities (i.e., a few tank
                cars) as part of manifest trains, it is uncertain whether LNG will
                continue to be transported in those quantities or if LNG by rail will
                shift to be transported using a unit train model of service, and if so,
                how quickly that shift will occur.
                 Finally, PHMSA notes that there is an existing special permit
                application to transport LNG by tank car. PHMSA is seeking comment on
                the draft special permit and environmental assessment, see 84 FR 26507
                and Docket No. PHMSA-2019-0100, and will consider information provided
                to the special permit docket that is pertinent to the issue of
                operational controls in this rulemaking or potential future
                rulemakings. In conclusion, we invite comment on PHMSA's and FRA's
                reliance on existing regulations and the operational controls in
                Circular OT-55 (not incorporated into the HMR) and whether additional
                operational controls may be warranted based on an assessment of risk.
                We also encourage commenters to provide data on the safety or economic
                impacts associated with any proposed operational controls, including
                analysis of the safety justification or cost impact of implementing
                operational controls.
                IV. Section-by-Section Review
                 The following is a section-by-section review of the amendments
                considered in this NPRM.
                Section 172.101
                 Section 172.101 provides the HMT and instructions for its use.
                PHMSA proposes amending the entry for ``UN1972, Methane, refrigerated
                liquid'' in the HMT to add reference to the cryogenic liquids in (rail)
                tank cars packaging section--Sec. 173.319 in Column (8C).
                Section 173.319
                 Section 173.319 prescribes requirements for cryogenic liquids
                transported in rail tank cars. Paragraph (d) provides which cryogenic
                liquids may be transported in a DOT-113 tank car when directed to this
                section by Column (8C) of the Sec. 172.101 HMT. PHMSA proposes to
                amend paragraph (d)(2) to authorize the transport of Methane,
                refrigerated liquid (LNG). Additionally, PHMSA is proposing to amend
                the Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting Table in
                Sec. 173.319(d)(2) to specify settings for methane in DOT-113C120W
                tank cars, specifically, a start-to-discharge pressure valve setting of
                75 psig; a design service temperature of -260 [deg]F; a maximum
                pressure when offered for transportation of 15 psig; and a filling
                density of 32.5 percent by weight.
                V. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
                A. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
                 This rulemaking is published under the authority of Federal
                Hazardous Materials Transportation Law (Federal hazmat law; 49 U.S.C.
                5101 et seq.), and the Federal Railroad Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. ch. 201-
                213). Section 5103(b) of the Federal Hazmat Law authorizes the
                Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations for the safe
                transportation, including security, of hazardous materials in
                intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' Section 20103 of the
                Federal Railroad Safety Laws, authorizes the Secretary to prescribe
                regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety. The
                Secretary's authority is delegated to PHMSA at 49 CFR 1.97. This
                rulemaking proposes to authorize the transportation of LNG by rail in
                DOT-113C120W tank cars.
                B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
                 This rulemaking is considered a significant regulatory action under
                section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and
                Review'') and was reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
                (OMB). This rulemaking is also considered a significant rulemaking
                under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures of February 26, 1979
                [44 FR 11034].
                 Executive Order 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review'') \19\
                requires agencies to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to
                make a ``reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
                regulation justify its costs,'' and to develop regulations that
                ``impose the least burden on society.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \19\ See 58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993 for Executive Order 12866.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Additionally, Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to provide a
                meaningful opportunity for public participation, which also reinforces
                requirements for notice and comment
                [[Page 56970]]
                under the APA.\20\ Therefore, in this NPRM, PHMSA seeks public comment
                on revisions to the HMR authorizing the transportation of LNG by rail
                tank car. PHMSA also seeks comment on the preliminary cost and cost
                savings analyses, as well as any information that could assist in
                quantifying the benefits of this rule. Overall, this rulemaking
                maintains the continued safe transportation of hazardous materials
                while producing a net cost savings. For additional discussion about the
                economic impacts, see the preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis posted
                in the docket.\21\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \20\ See 5 U.S.C. 553.
                 \21\ See Docket No. PHMSA-2018-0025 at www.regulations.gov.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                C. Executive Order 13771
                 This proposed rule is expected to be an Executive Order 13771
                deregulatory action. Details on the estimated cost savings of this
                proposed rule can be found in the rule's economic analysis.\22\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \22\ Ibid.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                D. Executive Order 13132
                 This rulemaking was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
                criteria contained in Executive Order 13132 (``Federalism''). This
                rulemaking may preempt State, local, and Tribal requirements but does
                not propose any regulation that has substantial direct effects on the
                States, the relationship between the national government and the
                States, or the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
                various levels of government. Therefore, the consultation and funding
                requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
                 The Federal hazmat law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, contains an express
                preemption provision [49 U.S.C. 5125(b)] that preempts State, local,
                and Indian tribal requirements on the following subjects:
                 (1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous
                materials;
                 (2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
                placarding of hazardous materials;
                 (3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
                related to hazardous materials and requirements related to the number,
                contents, and placement of those documents;
                 (4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the
                unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; and
                 (5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance,
                recondition, repair, or testing of a packaging or container
                represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in
                transporting hazardous material.
                 This proposed rule addresses covered subject item (2) above and
                preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements not meeting the
                ``substantively the same'' standard.
                 Federal preemption also may exist pursuant to section 20106 of the
                former Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), repealed, revised,
                reenacted, and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106. Section 20106 of the
                former FRSA provides that States may not adopt or continue in effect
                any law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security
                that covers the subject matter of a regulation prescribed or order
                issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad
                safety matters) or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to
                railroad security matters), except when the State law, regulation, or
                order qualifies under the section's ``essentially local safety or
                security hazard.''
                 PHMSA invites State and local governments with an interest in this
                rulemaking to comment on any effect that revisions to the HMR relative
                to LNG transportation may cause.
                E. Executive Order 13175
                 This rulemaking was analyzed in accordance with the principles and
                criteria contained in Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and
                Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). PHMSA does not
                anticipate that this rulemaking will have substantial direct tribal
                implications. Therefore, the funding and consultation requirements of
                Executive Order 13175 are not expected to apply. However, PHMSA invites
                Indian tribal governments to comment on any effect that revisions to
                the HMR relative to LNG transportation may cause.
                F. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies
                and Procedures
                 The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires
                agencies to consider whether a rulemaking would have a ``significant
                economic impact on a substantial number of small entities'' to include
                small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently
                owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and
                governmental jurisdictions with populations under 50,000. This proposed
                rulemaking has been developed in accordance with Executive Order 13272
                (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking'') and
                DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the Regulatory
                Flexibility Act to ensure that potential impacts of draft rules on
                small entities are properly considered. The proposed changes are
                generally intended to provide relief by easing requirements with no
                anticipated reduction in safety.
                 Consideration of alternative proposals for small businesses. The
                Regulatory Flexibility Act directs agencies to establish exceptions and
                differing compliance standards for small businesses, where it is
                possible to do so and still meet the objectives of applicable
                regulatory statutes.
                 The impact of this proposed rulemaking on small businesses is not
                expected to be significant. The proposed changes are generally intended
                to provide regulatory flexibility and cost savings to industry members.
                However, PHMSA seeks comment on the potential impacts on small
                entities.
                G. Paperwork Reduction Act
                 Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations requires
                that PHMSA provide interested members of the public and affected
                agencies an opportunity to comment on information collection and
                recordkeeping requests. This NPRM does not impose new information
                collection and recordkeeping burdens.
                H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
                 A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
                action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
                Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
                April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
                this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
                Unified Agenda.
                I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
                 This rulemaking does not impose unfunded mandates under the
                Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. It does not result in costs of
                $100 million or more, adjusted for inflation, to either State, local,
                or Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or to the private sector and
                is the least burdensome alternative that achieves the objective of the
                rulemaking. PHMSA will evaluate any regulatory action that might be
                proposed in subsequent stages of the proceeding to assess the effects
                on State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector.
                J. Environmental Assessment
                 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires
                Federal agencies to consider the consequences of major Federal actions
                and prepare a
                [[Page 56971]]
                detailed statement on actions significantly affecting the quality of
                the human environment. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
                implementing regulations (40 CFR part 1500) require Federal agencies to
                conduct an environmental review considering (1) the need for the
                action, (2) alternatives to the action, (3) probable environmental
                impacts of the action and alternatives, and (4) the agencies and
                persons consulted during the consideration process (see 40 CFR
                1508.9(b)).
                1. Need for the Action
                 The purpose of this NPRM is to propose amendments that authorize
                the transportation of Methane, refrigerated liquid, commonly known as
                liquefied natural gas (LNG), by rail in a DOT-113C120W tank car. This
                proposed rulemaking would facilitate the transportation of LNG by rail
                in a packaging other than a portable tank. This action would facilitate
                the transportation of natural gas to markets where pipeline
                transportation is limited or unavailable.
                2. Alternatives Considered
                 Transportation of hazardous materials in commerce is subject to
                requirements in the HMR, issued under authority of Federal hazmat law,
                codified at 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq. To facilitate the safe and efficient
                transportation of hazardous materials in international commerce, the
                HMR provide that both domestic and international shipment of hazardous
                materials may be offered for transportation and transported under
                provisions of the international regulations.
                 In proposing this rulemaking, PHMSA is considering the following
                alternatives:
                Alternative 1: No Action Alternative
                 The No Action Alternative would not adopt the regulatory changes
                proposed in this NPRM. If PHMSA were to select this alternative, it
                would not proceed with any rulemaking on this subject and the current
                regulatory standards would remain in effect. If the current regulatory
                standards remain in effect, LNG would not be authorized for
                transportation by tank car. The No Action Alternative would not address
                AAR's petition for rulemaking or stakeholder comments to the October 2,
                2017, notification of regulatory review. LNG transportation by highway
                and by rail--via a PHMSA special permit \23\ or an FRA approval \24\--
                would continue and perhaps increase over time. However, these
                alternatives typically have limited applicability because they only
                apply to the parties to the PHMSA special permit or FRA approval. The
                No Action Alternative would also fail to comply with the April 10, 2019
                Executive Order, ``Executive Order on Promoting Energy Infrastructure
                and Economic Growth.'' That E.O. orders the Secretary of Transportation
                to propose regulatory changes ``no later than 100 days after the date
                of this order, that would treat LNG the same as other cryogenic liquids
                and permit LNG to be transported in approved rail tank cars. The
                Secretary shall finalize such rulemaking no later than 13 months after
                the date of this order.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \23\ On September 14, 2017, PHMSA announced it had received an
                application for a special permit to transport LNG by rail in DOT-113
                tank cars from Energy Transport Solutions, LLC. The PHMSA-assigned
                application number is 20534-N. See 82 FR 43285. PHMSA is currently
                reviewing the application. Additionally, PHMSA issued a notice
                announcing the availability for public review and comment of the
                draft environmental assessment for this special permit request to
                transport LNG by rail tank car. See 84 FR 26507 and Docket No.
                PHMSA-2019-0100.
                 \24\ FRA has granted approvals to Alaska Railroad and Florida
                East Coast Railroad allowing for the transportation of LNG by rail
                in ISO containers provided that the operators comply with certain
                operational controls.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Alternative 2: Authorize LNG in DOT-113C120W and DOT-113C140W Tank Cars
                 This alternative would adopt the AAR petition in its entirety,
                including the authorization of the DOT-113C140W specification tank car
                into the HMR for the transportation of LNG. As discussed earlier, in
                the section ``III. A. Tank Car Specification'' section, the intended
                advantage to the DOT-113C140W tank car is that it would have a similar
                design and construction to the DOT-113C120W specification, but would
                potentially allow for five days of additional transportation time
                because the tank car would use a thicker inner tank material that would
                allow for a higher inner tank test pressure (140 psig) and higher
                pressure relief device settings. PHMSA and FRA believe that a complete
                engineering review of this specification is warranted, and that more
                research and supporting data are needed to demonstrate that this
                additional transportation timeframe benefits safety or justifies the
                addition of a new tank car specification to the HMR. While PHMSA is not
                opposed to considering this request for future action, it does not want
                to delay action on the DOT-113C120W tank car. Accordingly, this
                alternative was eliminated from full consideration in this rulemaking
                and draft EA.
                Alternative 3: Proposed Alternative
                 The Proposed Alternative is the current proposal as it appears in
                this NPRM, applying to transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
                The Proposed Alternative would authorize the transportation of LNG by
                rail in a DOT-113C120W specification tank car. See sections ``III.
                Changes Being Considered'' and ``IV. Section-by-Section Review'' of
                this rulemaking for further discussion on the proposed amendments
                encompassed in this alternative.
                3. Environmental Impacts
                Alternative 1: No Action Alternative
                 If PHMSA were to select the No Action Alternative, current
                regulations would remain in place and no new enabling provisions would
                be added. This alternative would not amend the HMR to allow shippers to
                transport bulk quantities of LNG by rail tank car. As such, the current
                regulatory requirements would require that LNG continue to be
                transported by highway, or for rail transportation, be limited to
                certain PHMSA special permit holders or LNG in portable tanks pursuant
                to the conditions of an FRA approval. This alternative would prevent
                the use of a tank car that was designed to address the hazards
                presented by cryogenic liquids, and has a demonstrated safety record.
                Authorizing the transport of LNG by tank car via rulemaking has the
                potential to allow shippers to move a greater quantity of LNG more
                efficiently, as highway transportation requires the use of more
                vehicles to move the same amount of material as rail transportation,
                thereby increasing air pollutants, including greenhouse gases. In 2017,
                U.S. railroads moved a ton of freight an average of 479 miles per
                gallon of fuel. On average, railroads are four times more fuel
                efficient than trucks. Because greenhouse gas emissions are directly
                related to fuel consumption, moving freight by rail instead of truck
                reduces greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 75 percent. In
                addition, emissions of particulate matter and nitrogen oxides are
                significantly lower for railroads than for trucks.\25\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \25\ AAR ``Overview of America's Freight Railroads'' (October,
                2018) https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/AAR-Overview-Americas-Freight-Railroads.pdf.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Furthermore, highway transportation may present a greater risk of
                accident and release of LNG for each movement, which creates a danger
                for both humans and the environment. From 2005 to 2017, there were
                eight incidents involving Methane, refrigerated liquid
                [[Page 56972]]
                transported by cargo tank motor vehicle (CTMV).\26\ No injuries or
                fatalities were reported to PHMSA. Two of the crashes were single
                vehicle rollovers. Furthermore, the total quantity spilled in these
                eight incidents was 11,296 gallons. For three of the eight incidents
                reported, a total of 165 people were evacuated. One of the three
                incidents (not a crash) involved 102 evacuations and 1,000 gallons
                spilled. One other incident of the three, a rollover incident, involved
                50 evacuations and zero gallons spilled. The last of the three
                incidents involved 13 evacuations and 4,625 gallons spilled. In any of
                these incidents injuries or fatalities could have occurred, especially
                if an ignition source had been present; the gallons spilled and the
                number of evacuations demonstrate that the incidents presented
                significant risk to human life and environmental resources in the
                vicinity of each incident. While PHMSA understands there are limited
                rail shipments of Methane, refrigerated liquid, compared to highway
                transportation, PHMSA and FRA have no record of any reported incidents
                involving Methane, refrigerated liquid in portable tanks transported by
                rail since 2005.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \26\ See pages 11 and 12 of the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
                Analysis for further discussion of incidents involving cryogenic
                liquids.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Alternative 3: Proposed Alternative
                 PHMSA proposes to amend the HMR to allow the transportation of LNG
                in DOT-113C120W rail cars. PHMSA understands that authorizing the rail
                transportation of LNG would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
                requiring fewer trips to transport the same amount of material
                currently being transported by highway. Furthermore, fewer trips are
                anticipated to result in fewer accidents and spills of LNG during
                transportation.
                 PHMSA has collected data on the safety history of the DOT-113 tank
                car from its own incident database and from AAR, which compiles data
                provided by FRA. PHMSA has analyzed data regarding DOT-113 damage
                history. From 1980 to 2017 (a 37-year period), there were 14 instances
                of damage to DOT-113 tank cars during transportation. Of the 14
                instances, there were three instances where a DOT-113 tank car lost
                lading from breach of both the outer and inner tanks. This is the most
                serious type of damage. Additionally, there were three instances in
                which a DOT-113 tank car lost lading from damage or other failure to
                the valves/fittings. The vast majority of incidents causing damage to
                the DOT-113 tank cars did not result in a loss of hazardous materials.
                 The first derailment that resulted in breach of an inner tank of a
                DOT-113 tank car took place in May 2011 in Moran, Kansas. Three DOT-
                113C120 specification tank cars containing refrigerated liquid ethylene
                sustained damage. Two of the cars were breached in the derailment and
                initially caught fire. One of the fires consumed the entire contents of
                the DOT-113 tank car. The two remaining cars, that is, the one that had
                been breached in the derailment and the other that had been damaged but
                not breached, were mechanically breached to expedite the burning and
                consumption of the contents to expedite removal from the site of the
                derailment. The total quantity of refrigerated ethylene lost was
                approximately 45,000 gallons and the total damage estimate was
                calculated at approximately $231,000 in 2017. The other derailment that
                caused tank failure of a DOT-113 tank car occurred in October 2014 in
                Mer Rouge, Louisiana. The rail tank cars were filled with refrigerated
                liquid argon. One car was a DOT-113A90W specification tank car
                authorized by Special Permit and the other was an AAR204W tank car. The
                total quantity of refrigerated liquid argon spilled was 47,233 gallons
                and the total damage estimate is calculated at approximately $228,000
                (in 2017 dollars). No injuries or fatalities were reported as a result
                of the release of hazardous materials from either incident. Depending
                on demand, the numbers of DOT-113 tank cars in operation under the
                proposed regulatory change could increase well beyond the numbers of
                DOT-113 tank cars currently in operation.
                 Though rare, derailments involving DOT-113 tank cars can result in
                large quantities of hazardous materials released, which can result from
                venting or breach of the inner tank shell. These releases can be
                considerably larger than releases from a CTMV that travels by highway.
                Nonetheless, considering that the DOT-113 tank car has a 50-year
                service history and with the understanding it is possible there are
                unreported incidents from years past, the safety history is noteworthy.
                It is difficult to estimate the failure rate of the DOT-113 tank car in
                derailments because railroads are not required to report incidents to
                PHMSA or FRA unless they meet a baseline threshold. 49 CFR 171.16 and
                225.19. Incident data suggests that incidents involving rail tank cars
                can lead to higher consequence incidents; however, PHMSA believes that
                rail transportation is advantageous considering the quantity
                transported compared to miles traveled.
                LNG Characteristics and Hazards
                 With regard to how LNG could respond under accident conditions,
                when a large amount of LNG is spilled and its vapors come into contact
                with an ignition source, the vapors will ignite if the vapor
                concentration in a vapor-air mixture is between 5 and 15 percent and
                cause the spill to develop into a pool fire (if ignited immediately) or
                flash vapor fire if the vapor cloud is ignited at some distance from
                the spill location. Both types of fires present a radiant heat hazard.
                If there is no ignition source in the immediate vicinity of the
                release, the spilled LNG will vaporize rapidly forming a cold gas cloud
                that is heavier than air, which then mixes with ambient air, spreads
                and is carried downwind. The dispersion of the cloud due to the wind
                results in its temperature increase of the vapor due to mixing with air
                that gets entrained into the cloud; but the cloud temperature always
                remains lower than that of ambient air, because of exchange of heat
                between the air that is mixing and the virgin cold vapor. Also, the
                density of the cloud decreases due to continuous mixing with air;
                however, the cloud density is never lower than that of the ambient air.
                The result is that the cloud is always heavier than air and disperses
                hugging the ground (with highest vapor concentrations at ground level).
                The only way the vapor cloud can become either neutrally buoyant or
                buoyant is if external heat (such as from solar heating or heating from
                the ground) is added to the cloud. These heat transfer mechanisms
                provide insufficient heat to the cloud in normal dispersion before the
                vapor cloud dilutes to concentration below lower flammability limit,
                LFL, of 5 percent by volume.
                 The dispersing cloud is visible as a white cloud due to the
                condensation of water vapor from the atmosphere and because in the
                initial stages the dispersing cloud is cold (starting from -260 degrees
                Fahrenheit). However, as the overall cloud temperature increases due to
                mixing with ambient air, and as the cloud temperature increases to
                above the ``wet bulb'' temperature corresponding to the relative
                humidity of the atmospheric air, the condensed water re-evaporates and
                the cloud becomes non-visible. The flammable region of the vapor cloud
                is enclosed within the visible vapor cloud if the ambient relative
                humidity is greater than or equal to 55 percent. For regions with
                relative humidity less than this value, the flammable cloud is outside
                [[Page 56973]]
                the visible cloud. An ignition source can only ignite the vapor cloud
                when it is available and the vapor concentration is in the 5 to 15
                percent average vapor concentration in air. Once ignited, the vapors
                will burn back, generally upwind, to the LNG source. The distance over
                which an LNG vapor cloud remains flammable is difficult to predict;
                local weather conditions (wind speed, atmospheric stability or
                turbulence), terrain, surface cover (i.e., vegetation, trees, and
                buildings) will influence how a vapor cloud disperses, and how rapidly
                it dilutes.
                 If an LNG vapor cloud is ignited before the cloud has been
                dispersed or diluted to below its lower flammability limit, a flash
                fire will occur. Unlike other flammable liquids and gases, a LNG vapor
                cloud will not ignite entirely at once. If ignited, the flash fire that
                forms has a temperature of about 1,330 [deg]C (2,426 [deg]F). The
                resulting ignition leads to a relatively slow (subsonic) burning vapor
                fire which travels back to the release point producing either a pool
                fire or a jet fire. The radiant heat effects from such a flash fire
                does not extend to distances significantly larger than the width of the
                flammable cloud. The slow burning vapor fire will not generate damaging
                overpressures (i.e., explosions), if unconfined. To produce an
                overpressure event, the LNG vapors need to be within the flammability
                range and ignited, and either be confined within a structure or the
                travelling flame in the open encounters structural obstructions (e.g.,
                houses, trees, bushes, pipe racks, etc.) that can increase the flame
                turbulence significantly when the flash fire reaches the source of
                vapor (boiling LNG), if there is still a liquid pool of LNG evaporating
                at that time, a pool fire will result.
                 Methane in vapor state can be an asphyxiant when it displaces
                oxygen in a confined space. When LNG is spilled on the ground, into a
                confined area, such as bound by a dike, the LNG will initially boil-off
                rapidly forming a vapor cloud, but the boil-off will slow down as the
                ground cools due to heat being extracted from it to provide for the
                evaporation of LNG. If LNG is spilled on water, LNG will float on top
                of the water, spread in an unconfined manner, and vaporize very
                rapidly. This rapid vaporization will occur even at water temperatures
                near freezing since freezing water is significantly warmer than the
                spilled LNG.
                 LNG is stored and transported at -260 [deg]F (-160 [deg]C). Due to
                this extremely low temperature, contact with a cryogenic liquid can
                cause severe injury to human skin and eyes. It will also make ordinary
                metals, including carbon steel, subject to embrittlement and fracture
                when exposed to these temperatures. Transportation of cryogenic
                materials require specialized double walled (tank within a tank)
                containers for transportation.
                DOT-113 Tank Car Characteristics
                 The DOT-113 specification tank car is a specially designed rail
                tank car for the transport of cryogenic liquids. This tank car design
                has been in use for over 50 years. As noted above, there are only six
                documented derailments involving the transportation of the DOT-113
                specification tank car that resulted in loss of tank contents.
                 DOT-113 specification rail tank cars are built to a double
                pressure-vessel design with the commodity tank (inner vessel)
                constructed to withstand a burst pressure of 300 psig and fabricated of
                ASTM A 240/A 240M, Type 304 or 304L stainless steel; the outer jacket
                shell (outer vessel) is typically constructed of carbon steel and is
                designed to withstand an external pressure (critical collapsing
                pressure) of 37.5 psig. See Sec. Sec. 179.400-8(d) and 179.401-1,
                respectively. The inner vessel is designed with a minimum thickness of
                3/16 inch and the outer shell thickness is greater than 7/16 inch. The
                rail tank car is manufactured with an insulated annular space holding a
                vacuum between the two pressure vessels. This vacuum area and the
                insulation on the outer wall of the inner tank significantly reduce the
                rate of heat transfer from the atmosphere to the liquid inside the tank
                car, thus minimizing the heating of the cryogenic (i.e., refrigerated)
                liquid in the tank car while being transported. Other key safety
                features of the DOT-113 specification tank car include, but are not
                limited to, the following:
                 Several inches of aluminized Mylar super-insulation
                surrounding the inner tank.
                 A vacuum environment/annular space between the inner and
                outer tanks for enhanced product pressure and temperature control.
                 Specifically, designed loading and unloading equipment
                (piping, valves, gages, etc.) for use in cryogenic service.
                 Safety equipment (pressure relief valves, safety vents,
                safety shut off valves, and remote monitoring systems) to prevent or
                limit overpressure issues or non-accident releases.
                 Mandated in-transit tracking (time sensitive shipment) and
                car handling instructions.
                 Regulations controlling the movement of LNG in the DOT-113C120W
                packaging would be the same as those that apply to the transportation
                of other cryogenic liquids, including ethylene. Regulatory requirements
                governing these operational practices appear in 49 CFR part 174 and 49
                CFR 173.319, which is administered by the FRA. In addition, the AAR has
                issued Circular OT-55, which sets forth Recommended Railroad Operating
                Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials for key trains.
                Rail carriers require compliance with the standard through AAR
                Interchange Rules. AAR Circular OT-55 (currently designated as version
                Q) calls for operational controls for trains carrying certain
                quantities of hazardous materials, such as LNG unit trains, which are
                sufficient to address the risks associated with moving LNG in DOT-113
                tank cars. The operational controls recommended in OT-55 for the
                transport of hazardous materials regulate, among other things:
                 ``Key Trains'' are 20 carloads or intermodal portable tank
                loads of any combination of hazardous materials.
                 ``Key Trains,'' including LNG-carrying unit trains, are
                subject to a maximum speed restriction of 50 mph;
                 ``Key Routes,'' which are lengths of track on which either
                (i) 10,000 car loads or more of hazardous materials or (ii) 4,000 car
                loadings of flammable gas (such as LNG, which is refrigerated
                (cryogenic) liquid methane, a Division 2.1 flammable gas) will travel
                over a one-year period and are subject to additional inspection and
                equipment requirements;
                 Separation distance requirements relating to the spacing
                of loading and operations, loaded tank cars, and other storage tanks at
                rail facilities; and
                 Community awareness and preparations for emergency
                planning/incident response actions.
                DOT-113 Specification Tank Car Survivability
                 Due to its unique design requirements, the DOT-113 specification
                tank car is inherently more robust than other tank cars transporting
                other flammable liquids or liquefied gases. In the event of a DOT-113
                specification tank car derailment causing only breach of the outer
                shell, the breach would cause the loss of the insulating vacuum between
                the inner and outer tank, allowing the inner tank and material to warm
                and build pressure. The resulting pressure build would lead to the
                activation of the pressure relief systems on the car and the controlled
                venting of LNG vapor. While this scenario is concerning, the controlled
                venting of LNG vapor involves less risk than the uncontrolled release
                of an entire LNG lading. Additionally, it is highly unlikely that
                [[Page 56974]]
                damage to the tank car involved in a derailment would result in
                explosion due to a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE).
                This event is highly unlikely due to the loading pressure requirements
                \27\ for cryogenic materials, and due to the mandated requirements for
                redundant pressure relief systems (valves and safety vents) that are
                built into each car. This rulemaking proposes a 15 psig maximum loading
                pressure when LNG is offered for transportation in the DOT-113C120W
                tank car. This loading pressure, along with other safety requirements
                and operational controls reduce the potential of a BLEVE.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \27\ 49 CFR 173.319.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                LNG Release Scenarios
                 Based on the review incident reporting and the 50 year history of
                transporting cryogenic liquids in DOT-113 specification tank cars,
                there are three (3) possible release scenarios that could occur during
                the transport of LNG by rail tank car. Ranked in order of probability,
                they are:
                 1. Non-accident release (NAR) from service equipment. Probability--
                Low; Consequence--Low
                 2. Outer tank damage resulting vapor release from Pressure Relief
                Device (PRD). Probability--Low; Consequence--Low to High (in the event
                that ignition of vented vapors led to failure/explosion of the tank
                car)
                 3. Inner tank damage resulting in large release. Probability--Low;
                Consequence--High
                 Although Scenario 3 has a low probability, a breached inner tank
                during a transportation accident could have a high consequence because
                of the higher probability of a fire due to the formation of a flammable
                gas vapor/air mixture in the immediate vicinity of the spilled LNG.
                This probability is based on the likelihood of ignition sources
                (sparks, hot surfaces, etc.) being generated by other equipment, rail
                cars, or vehicles involved in a transportation accident that could
                ignite a flammable vapor cloud.
                Hazard Distances
                 As with any incident involving a hazardous material in
                transportation, the actual hazard distance created by a material that
                is spilled or burning will be influenced by many factors. These factors
                include, but are not limited to the following:
                 Spill Size
                 Weather (Wind, Temperature, Humidity, Precipitation)
                 Terrain Contours (Hills, Valleys)
                 Surface Cover (Vegetation, Structures)
                 Soil (Dirt, Clay, Sand)
                 As stated previously, hazard distance of a vapor cloud dispersion
                of LNG is difficult to predict. Local weather conditions, terrain,
                surface cover (i.e., vegetation, trees, and buildings) will influence
                how a vapor cloud disperses, and how rapidly it diffuses.
                 Similarly, the actual hazard distance that radiant heat from a pool
                fire of LNG would impact is dependent on the same factors that
                influence a vapor cloud. Additionally, the impact of radiant heat from
                a fire on occupied structures will be influenced by local building
                codes that govern building setback requirements from railroad right-of-
                way. Depending on the jurisdiction, setbacks for occupied structures
                could be within fifty (50) feet of either side of a railroad track.
                 Regardless of the scenario, the recommended protective action
                distances \28\ identified in the PHMSA Emergency Response Guidebook
                (ERG) for LNG would be appropriate for the initial protection of the
                public during an incident involving LNG. However, these protective
                distances may encompass occupied structures along rail tracks,
                depending on the location of a failure and the proximity of occupied
                structures to a breached tank car.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \28\ For a large spill, consider initial downwind evacuation for
                at least 800 meters. If a tank car is involved in a fire, isolate
                for 1600 meters in all directions; also, consider evacuation for
                1600 meters in all directions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Cascading Failure of Multiple DOT-113 Tank Cars
                 As stated previously, DOT-113 specification tank cars are
                inherently more robust when compared to other specification tank cars,
                due to their unique design, materials of construction, and their
                specific purpose to transport cryogenic liquids. The special design of
                the DOT-113 tank car reduces the probability of cascading failures of
                other undamaged DOT-113 specification tank cars being transported in a
                block or unit train configuration.
                 In the scenario where multiple DOT-113 specification tank cars are
                transported in a block or unit train configuration, fire/radiant heat
                exposure or cryogenic temperature exposure could potentially lead to
                the release of material or failure of otherwise undamaged tank cars.
                Fire/Radiant Heat Exposure
                 In a scenario involving fire/radiant heat exposure, an undamaged
                DOT-113 specification tank car exposed to a radiant heat source could
                eventually build pressure that would trigger the activation of the tank
                car's PRD.
                 As stated previously, this scenario would result in the controlled
                venting of LNG vapor to the environment. Ignition of these vapors could
                occur if an ignition source is present, but would be contained to the
                proximity of the release point of the vapors from the tank car.
                Additionally, as stated previously, it is highly unlikely that an
                undamaged DOT-113 tank car involved in a derailment would result in
                explosion due to a BLEVE. This event is highly unlikely due to the
                design of the tank car, the loading pressure requirements for cryogenic
                materials, the mandated requirements for redundant pressure relief
                systems (valves and safety vents) and insulation systems that are built
                into each car. It is not possible to state with certainty whether a
                BLEVE \29\ is possible in the case of a LNG tank car derailment, and
                what conditions need to be present for such an event to occur. However,
                a recent full-scale test with a double walled portable cryogenic tank
                filled with liquid nitrogen (and PRDs operated as designed) and exposed
                to a greater than 200-minute engulfing propane pool fire was neither
                destroyed nor did a BLEVE occur. The number of cars that could be
                impacted by this type of exposure would be dependent on multiple
                factors. Some of these include, but are not limited to: The number or
                LNG cars in the consist, the locations of those tank cars, type of
                fire, exposure distance, and defensive actions of responders. Exposure
                to radiant heat from an LNG pool fire or being caught within the flash
                vapor fire could result in fatalities, serious injuries, and property
                damage. These risks also exist in the transportation of LNG via
                highway, existing rail transportation, and pipeline. However, given the
                safety history of the DOT-113C120W tank cars, it is expected that the
                risk of tank car failure and ignition is low.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \29\ A BLEVE is not caused by a combustion explosion of a
                flammable material. As the name implies, it is the explosion caused
                by rapidly evolving vapor in relatively small space which leads to
                significant increase in pressure which may violently damage/destroy
                a container. When a container with a liquid in it is exposed to a
                fire and no pressure relief (or partial intermittent relief) occurs
                the liquid within it can be heated to superheat temperature
                conditions. If this is followed by a small breach of the container
                (due to, say, wall metal failure), the rapid depressurization that
                results leads to an extremely rapid boiling of the liquid, and
                release of a significant mass of vapor, in microseconds to
                milliseconds, into the container. This results in very high
                pressures inside the container leading to its burst, causing an
                ``explosion'' (an explosion is the release of energy in an extremely
                short duration of time). Whether such phenomena occur in a double
                walled tank car exposed to an external fire is uncertain.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                [[Page 56975]]
                Cryogenic Temperature Exposure
                 In a scenario involving cryogenic temperature exposure, the risk to
                an undamaged DOT-113 specification tank car is the embrittlement of the
                car's steel due to exposure to the extremely cold temperatures of the
                material. This type of exposure could lead to the failure of the tank
                car's outer carbon steel tank, but not the inner stainless steel tank.
                As stated previously, if a DOT-113 specification tank car has its outer
                tank compromised, the car would lose its insulating vacuum and would
                eventually start to build pressure within the product tank. This
                pressure build would eventually lead to the activation of the tank
                car's PRDs and the controlled venting of LNG vapors.
                Air Pollution and Greenhouse Gases
                 The rulemaking could result in the manufacture of additional DOT-
                113C120W tank cars. Depending on demand, this manufacture process could
                result in minor increases in the emission of air pollution and
                increased emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), due to the steel and
                insulating materials that the tank car is comprised of. Also, the
                transportation of rail tank cars filled with LNG would result in air
                pollution and GHG emissions associated with increased use of diesel-
                powered trains. However, transportation of LNG via rail instead of via
                highway would reduce the emission of air pollution and the emission of
                GHGs. In general, highway transportation requires proportionally more
                fuel and results in proportionally more emissions than rail
                transportation. According to AAR, moving freight by rail instead of
                truck lowers GHG emissions by 75%. Railroads move approximately one-
                third of U.S. exports and intercity freight volume in the United
                States. Despite the large volume of freight moved, U.S. Environmental
                Protection Agency data show freight railroads account for only 0.5% of
                total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and just 2% of emissions from
                transportation-related sources.\30\ Furthermore, removing barriers for
                the transportation of LNG could promote the use of LNG over more
                polluting energy sources.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \30\ https://www.aar.org/issue/freight-rail-and-the-environment/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The failure of one or more DOT-113C120W tank cars filled with LNG
                would release a large amount of either burned methane or unburned
                methane hydrocarbons into the atmosphere. Unburned methane hydrocarbons
                are a potent GHG and a pollutant. However, as described above, the
                likelihood of such a failure is very low, given the safety record of
                DOT-113C120W tank cars. Nonetheless, unburned methane enters the
                atmosphere in the production and transportation of methane on a more
                frequent basis.
                 While the authorization of the DOT-113 specification tank car for
                LNG service will facilitate the transportation of LNG, natural gas and
                LNG is currently transported via pipeline, vessel, highway, and rail.
                Increased transport of LNG by rail may result in fewer GHG emissions
                when compared to transport by highway or construction of new pipeline
                infrastructure. Also, facilitating LNG transport by rail may discourage
                the polluting and wasteful practice of natural gas flaring during the
                production of oil by allowing the natural gas to reach a viable market.
                This rulemaking may further decrease GHG emissions by facilitating the
                utilization of natural gas over more polluting sources of energy.
                Nonetheless, any action that facilitates the use of a fossil fuel
                arguably could contribute to the emission of GHGs, which are the
                principle cause of global climate change. As a regulator of hazardous
                materials packaging safety, PHMSA lacks the expertise to perform a
                quantitative prediction of how this rulemaking could affect GHG
                emissions. The selection of either the no action alternative or the
                proposed action alternative could both increase and decrease GHGs
                directly and indirectly depending on various economic variables.
                4. Agencies Consulted
                 PHMSA has coordinated with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
                Administration and FRA in the development of this proposed rulemaking.
                PHMSA will consider the views expressed in comments to the NPRM
                submitted by members of the public, State and local governments, and
                industry.
                5. Conclusion and Proposed FONSI
                 PHMSA believes that the amendments proposed in this NPRM will
                ultimately reduce the environmental impact of the transportation of
                LNG. PHMSA proposes to make a finding that the proposed amendments
                would not result in a significant environmental impact. PHMSA welcomes
                any views, data, or information related to safety or environmental
                impacts that may result if the proposed requirements are adopted, as
                well as additional information on possible alternatives and their
                environmental impacts. PHMSA proposes to find that the proposed
                regulations allowing the transport of LNG via DOT-113C120W tank car
                will not result in a significant environmental impact.
                K. Privacy Act
                 In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
                public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these
                comments, without edit, including any personal information the
                commenter provides, to http://www.regulations.gov, as described in the
                system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
                http://www.dot.gov/privacy.
                L. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
                 Under Executive Order 13609 (``Promoting International Regulatory
                Cooperation''), agencies must consider whether the impacts associated
                with significant variations between domestic and international
                regulatory approaches are unnecessary or may impair the ability of
                American business to export and compete internationally. See 77 FR
                26413 (May 4, 2012). In meeting shared challenges involving health,
                safety, labor, security, environmental, and other issues, international
                regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as
                protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such
                cooperation. International regulatory cooperation can also reduce,
                eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory
                requirements.
                 Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as
                amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465),
                prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging
                in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
                commerce of the United States. For purposes of these requirements,
                Federal agencies may participate in the establishment of international
                standards, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
                objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude
                imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires
                consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
                they be the basis for U.S. standards.
                 PHMSA participates in the establishment of international standards
                in order to protect the safety of the American public, and we have
                assessed the effects of the proposed rule to ensure that it does not
                cause unnecessary obstacles to foreign trade. Accordingly, this
                rulemaking is consistent with Executive Order 13609 and PHMSA's
                obligations under the Trade Agreement Act, as amended. This
                [[Page 56976]]
                rulemaking does not negatively impact international trade.
                M. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
                 The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15
                U.S.C. 272 note) directs Federal agencies to use voluntary consensus
                standards in their regulatory activities unless doing so would be
                inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical. Voluntary
                consensus standards are technical standards (e.g., specification of
                materials, test methods, or performance requirements) that are
                developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies. This
                rulemaking does not incorporate by reference any voluntary consensus
                standards; however, the development of this proposed rule is based on
                the applicability of the operational controls in AAR Circular OT-55 to
                the bulk transport of LNG by rail in a train consist that is composed
                of 20 car loads or intermodal portable tank loads in which LNG is
                present along with any combination of other hazardous materials.
                N. Executive Order 13211
                 Executive Order 13211 (``Actions Concerning Regulations That
                Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use'') [66 FR
                28355; May 22, 2001] requires Federal agencies to prepare a Statement
                of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' Under the
                executive order, a ``significant energy action'' is defined as any
                action by an agency (normally published in the Federal Register) that
                promulgates, or is expected to lead to the promulgation of, a final
                rule or regulation (including a notice of inquiry, ANPRM, and NPRM)
                that (1)(i) is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order
                12866 or any successor order and (ii) is likely to have a significant
                adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy; or (2) is
                designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and
                Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action.
                 This NPRM is a significant action under Executive Order 12866, but
                it is not expected to have an annual effect on the economy of at least
                $100 million. Further, this action is not likely to have a significant
                adverse effect on the supply, distribution or use of energy in the U.S.
                For additional discussion of the anticipated economic impact of this
                rulemaking, please review the preliminary RIA. PHMSA welcomes any data
                or information related to energy impacts that may result from this
                NPRM, as well as possible alternatives and their energy impacts. Please
                describe the impacts and the basis for the comment.
                List of Subjects
                49 CFR Part 172
                 Hazardous materials table, Hazardous materials transportation,
                Labeling, Markings, Packaging and containers.
                49 CFR Part 173
                 Hazardous materials transportation, Incorporation by reference,
                Packaging and containers, Cryogenic liquids, Reporting and
                recordkeeping requirements.
                 In consideration of the foregoing, PHMSA proposes to amend 49 CFR
                chapter I as follows:
                PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
                MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
                REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS
                0
                1. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as follows:
                 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81, 1.96 and
                1.97.
                0
                2. In Sec. 172.101, in table Sec. 172.101 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE,
                revise the entry for ``UN1972, Methane, refrigerated liquid'' to read
                as follows:
                Sec. 172.101 Purpose and use of the hazardous materials table.
                * * * * *
                 Sec. 172.101--Hazardous Materials Table
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (8) (9) (10)
                 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Hazardous Packaging (Sec. 173.* * *) Quantity limitations Vessel stowage
                 materials Hazard Special --------------------------------------- (see Sec. Sec. 173.27 -------------------------
                 Symbols descriptions and class or Identification PG Label codes provisions and 175.75)
                 proper shipping Nos. (Sec. --------------------------
                 names division 172.102) Exceptions Non-bulk Bulk Passenger Cargo Location Other
                 aircraft/ aircraft
                 rail only
                (1) (2).............. (3) (4)............. (5)......... (6)............. (7)........ (8A)....... (8B)....... (8C)....... (9A)....... (9B)....... (10A)...... (10B)
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                
                 * * * * * * *
                 Methane, 2.1 UN1972.......... ............ 2.1............. T75, TP5... None....... None....... 318, 319... Forbidden.. Forbidden.. D.......... 40
                 refrigerated
                 liquid
                 (cryogenic
                 liquid) or
                 Natural gas,
                 refrigerated
                 liquid
                 (cryogenic
                 liquid), with
                 high methane
                 content).
                
                 * * * * * * *
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
                PACKAGINGS
                0
                3. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:
                 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81, 1.96 and
                1.97.
                0
                4. In Sec. 173.319, revise paragraph (d)(2) to read as follows:
                Sec. 173.319 Cryogenic liquids in tank cars.
                * * * * *
                 (d) * * *
                 (2) Ethylene, hydrogen (minimum 95 percent parahydrogen), and
                methane, cryogenic liquids must be loaded and shipped in accordance
                with the following table:
                [[Page 56977]]
                 Pressure Control Valve Setting or Relief Valve Setting
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Maximum permitted filling density (percent by weight)
                 Maximum start-to-discharge ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 pressure (psig) Ethylene Ethylene Ethylene Hydrogen Methane
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                17................................ ..................... ..................... ..................... 6.60................
                45................................ 52.8.................
                75................................ ..................... 51.1................. 51.1................. .................... 32.5.
                Maximum pressure when offered for 10 psig.............. 20 psig.............. 20 psig.............. .................... 15 psig.
                 transportation.
                Design service temperature........ Minus 260 [deg]F..... Minus 260 [deg]F..... Minus 155 [deg]F..... Minus 423 [deg]F.... Minus 260 [deg]F.
                Specification (see Sec. 113D60W, 113C60W..... 113C120W............. 113D120W............. 113A175W, 113A60W... 113C120W.
                 180.507(b)(3) of this subchapter).
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                * * * * *
                 Issued in Washington, DC, on October 16, 2019, under authority
                delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
                Drue Pearce,
                Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
                Administration.
                [FR Doc. 2019-22949 Filed 10-23-19; 8:45 am]
                 BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
                

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