New Car Assessment Program

Published date09 March 2022
Citation87 FR 13452
Record Number2022-04894
SectionNotices
CourtNational Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Federal Register, Volume 87 Issue 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 46 (Wednesday, March 9, 2022)]
                [Notices]
                [Pages 13452-13521]
                From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
                [FR Doc No: 2022-04894]
                [[Page 13451]]
                Vol. 87
                Wednesday,
                No. 46
                March 9, 2022
                Part IIIDepartment of Transportation-----------------------------------------------------------------------National Highway Traffic Safety Administration-----------------------------------------------------------------------New Car Assessment Program; Notice
                Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 46 / Wednesday, March 9, 2022 /
                Notices
                [[Page 13452]]
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                DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
                National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
                [Docket No. NHTSA-2021-0002]
                New Car Assessment Program
                AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
                Department of Transportation (DOT).
                ACTION: Request for comments (RFC).
                -----------------------------------------------------------------------
                SUMMARY: NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) provides comparative
                information on the safety performance of new vehicles to assist
                consumers with vehicle purchasing decisions and to encourage safety
                improvements. In addition to star ratings for crash protection and
                rollover resistance, the NCAP program recommends particular advanced
                driver assistance systems (ADAS) technologies and identifies the
                vehicles in the marketplace that offer the systems that pass NCAP
                performance test criteria for those systems. This notice proposes
                significant upgrades to NCAP, first, by proposing to add four more ADAS
                technologies to those NHTSA currently recommends. The new technologies
                are blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane keeping
                support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Other plans on
                updating NCAP are discussed in the Supplementary Information.
                DATES: Comments should be submitted no later than May 9, 2022.
                ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket number above and be
                submitted by one of the following methods:
                 Federal Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
                Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
                 Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of
                Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground Floor,
                Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
                 Hand Delivery: 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building
                Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
                ET, Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
                 Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting
                comments, see the Public Participation heading of the SUPPLEMENTARY
                INFORMATION section of this document. Note that all comments received
                will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including
                any personal information provided.
                 Privacy Act: Anyone can search the electronic form of all
                comments received in any of our dockets by the name of the individual
                submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
                of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
                complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on
                April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or at https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. For access to the docket to read background documents or
                comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the street
                address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the
                dockets.
                FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact
                Ms. Jennifer N. Dang, Division Chief, New Car Assessment Program,
                Office of Crashworthiness Standards (Telephone: 202-366-1810). For
                legal issues, you may contact Ms. Sara R. Bennett, Office of Chief
                Counsel (Telephone: 202-366-2992). You may send mail to either of these
                officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200
                New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
                SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice also proposes changes (including
                an increase in stringency) to the test procedures and performance
                criteria for the four currently recommended ADAS technologies in NCAP
                to enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
                models and to harmonize with other consumer information programs.
                Second, this notice describes (but does not propose at this time) how
                NHTSA could rate vehicles equipped with these ADAS technologies and
                requests comment on how best to develop this rating system. Third,
                NHTSA seeks (but does not propose at this time) to provide a crash
                avoidance rating at the point of sale on a vehicle's window sticker,
                consistent with the 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST)
                Act, and discusses ways of implementing the program, including a
                potential process for updating such information. Fourth, as part of a
                new NHTSA approach to NCAP, NHTSA is proposing a ``roadmap'' of the
                Agency's plans to upgrade NCAP in phases over the next several years
                and presents the roadmap for comment. Fifth, as another first for NCAP,
                NHTSA is considering utilizing NCAP to raise consumer awareness of
                certain safety technologies that may have the potential to help people
                make safe driving choices. This information may be of particular
                interest to parents or other caregivers shopping for a vehicle for a
                new or inexperienced driver in the household, or parents wanting to
                know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/heatstroke. Sixth and
                finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several
                programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program. The proposal on
                ADAS technologies and the aforementioned initiatives pave the way for
                the Agency to focus on a much broader safety strategy, including
                fulfilling not only the 2015 FAST Act directive but also the recent
                mandates included in Section 24213 of the November 2021 Bipartisan
                Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
                Act, to improve road safety for motor vehicle occupants as well as
                other vulnerable road users.
                Table of Contents
                I. Executive Summary
                II. Background
                III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
                 A. Lane Keeping Technologies
                 1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
                 a. Haptic Alerts
                 b. False Positive Tests
                 c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
                 2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
                 B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
                 1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
                 a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
                 b. Test Procedure Harmonization
                 2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
                 C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
                 D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
                 1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
                 2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
                 a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
                 b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
                 c. Current State of AEB Technology
                 d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
                 e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
                 f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
                 g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
                 h. Regenerative Braking
                 3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
                 a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-to-Collision
                 b. False Positive Test Scenarios
                 c. Procedure Clarifications
                 d. Expand Testing
                 e. AEB Strikeable Target
                IV. ADAS Rating System
                 A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
                 1. Star Rating System
                 2. Medals Rating System
                 3. Points-Based Rating System
                 4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
                 B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
                 1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
                 2. Percentage of Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 1
                 3. Select Test Conditions to Meet--Concept 2
                 4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
                 5. Overall Rating
                [[Page 13453]]
                V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
                VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
                VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
                 A. Driver Monitoring Systems
                 B. Driver Distraction
                 C. Alcohol Detection
                 D. Seat Belt Interlocks
                 E. Intelligent Speed Assist
                 F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
                VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
                 A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
                 B. Baseline Risk Concept
                 C. Half-Star Ratings
                 D. Decimal Ratings
                 E. Rollover Resistance Test
                IX. Other Activities
                 A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
                 B. Website Updates
                 C. Database Changes
                X. Economic Analysis
                XI. Public Participation
                XII. Appendices
                I. Executive Summary
                 NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) supports NHTSA's mission
                to reduce the number of fatalities and injuries that occur on U.S.
                roadways. NCAP, like many other NHTSA programs, has contributed to
                significant reductions in motor vehicle fatalities. In the decade prior
                to the 1978 start of NCAP, fatalities from motor vehicle crashes
                exceeded 50,000 annually. In 2019, 36,096 people still lost their lives
                on U.S. roads. Passenger vehicle occupant fatalities decreased from
                32,225 in 2000 to 22,215 in 2019.\1\ This reduction is notable,
                particularly in light of the fact that the total number of vehicle
                miles traveled (VMT) in the U.S. has increased over time. However,
                during that same timeframe, pedestrian fatalities increased by 33
                percent, from 4,739 in 2000 to 6,205 in 2019.\2\ Furthermore, a
                statistical projection of traffic fatalities for the first half of 2021
                shows that an estimated 20,160 people died in motor vehicle traffic
                crashes--the highest number of fatalities during the first half of the
                year since 2006, and the highest half-year percentage increase in the
                history of data recorded by the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
                (FARS).\3\ In addition, the projected 11,225 fatalities during the
                second quarter of 2021 represents the highest second quarter fatalities
                since 1990, and the highest quarterly percentage change (+23.1 percent)
                in FARS data recorded history. Preliminary data reported by the Federal
                Highway Administration (FHWA) show that VMT in the first half of 2021
                rebounded from a large pandemic-related dip that occurred in the first
                half of 2020, increasing by 173.1 billion miles, or about a 13 percent
                increase over the comparable period in 2020. The fatality rate for the
                first half of 2021 increased to 1.34 fatalities per 100 million VMT, up
                from the projected rate of 1.28 fatalities per 100 million VMT in the
                first half of 2020. Early evidence suggests that these fatality rates
                have increased as a result of increases in risky behaviors like driving
                and riding while unbelted, impaired driving, and speeding.\4\ Although
                there have been notable gains in automotive safety over the past fifty
                years, far more work must be done.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
                Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \2\ Traffic Safety Facts 2000 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
                Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the
                General Estimates System.'' U.S. Department of Transportation.
                National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \3\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2021,
                October), Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the
                First Half (January-June) of 2021. (Traffic Safety Facts. Report No.
                DOT HS 813 199), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \4\ See https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2020-fatality-data-show-increased-traffic-fatalities-during-pandemic.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 This notice discusses how NCAP can support NHTSA's mission through
                its multi-faceted initiatives and broad safety strategies to address
                vehicle safety involving motor vehicle occupants, other vulnerable road
                users, and safe driving choices to further reduce injuries and
                fatalities occurring on the nation's roads. As stated in the Department
                of Transportation's National Roadway Safety Strategy, proposals to
                update NCAP are expected to emphasize safety features that protect
                people both inside and outside of the vehicle, and may include
                consideration of pedestrian protection systems, better understanding of
                impacts to pedestrians (e.g., specific considerations for children),
                and automatic emergency braking and lane keeping assistance to benefit
                bicyclists and pedestrians. In a first-of-its-kind focus--especially
                relevant in light of increases in fatalities caused by risky driving
                behaviors--this notice seeks comment on how automakers could encourage
                consumers to choose safety technologies that could prevent risky
                behaviors from occurring in the first place. This notice also proposes
                significant upgrades to NCAP by adding four additional crash avoidance
                technologies (also termed ADAS throughout this notice) to the program,
                increasing the stringency of the tests for currently recommended ADAS
                technologies in NCAP for enhanced evaluation of their current
                capabilities, and exploring, for the first time, expanding NCAP to
                include safety for road users outside of the vehicle. Finally, this
                document presents a roadmap of NHTSA's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
                phases over the next several years.
                 Many of these efforts align with Section 24213 of the Bipartisan
                Infrastructure Law, enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
                Act \5\ and signed on November 15, 2021. First, this RFC, once
                finalized, fulfills the requirements of Section 24213(a) of the
                Bipartisan Infrastructure Law because NHTSA intends for the addition of
                the four technologies proposed in this RFC to ``finalize the proceeding
                for which comments were requested'' on December 16, 2015.\6\
                Specifically, the finalization of this RFC will close the December 16,
                2015 proceeding and notice. While NHTSA has future plans described in
                the roadmap that the Agency discussed in the December 16, 2015 notice,
                none are considered an extension of the December 16, 2015 proceeding,
                though all information previously collected by NHTSA may be used in the
                development of future notices.
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                 \5\ (Pub. L. 117-58).
                 \6\ Id. at Section 24213(a); the notice referred to in the
                Bipartisan Infrastructure Law is 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015). This
                is the notice that will be finalized once the final decision notice
                for today's RFC is published.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Second, this RFC fulfills portions of the requirements in Section
                24213(b) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that mandates the Agency
                ``publish a notice, for the purposes of public comment, to establish a
                means for providing consumer information relating to advanced crash-
                avoidance technologies'' within one year of enactment that includes:
                (1) An appropriate methodology for determining which advanced crash
                avoidance technologies should be included in the information, (2)
                performance test criteria for use by manufacturers in evaluating those
                technologies, (3) a distinct rating system involving each technology,
                and (4) updating overall vehicle ratings to include the new rating.
                Through this RFC, NHTSA is proposing four additional advanced crash
                avoidance technologies \7\ for inclusion in NCAP, proposing the test
                criteria for evaluating the advanced crash avoidance technologies, and
                seeking comment on the future development of a crash avoidance rating
                system. NHTSA described in detail why it chose the four
                [[Page 13454]]
                technologies that it did and how those technologies meet NHTSA's
                established criteria for inclusion in NCAP. Since NHTSA is proposing
                the addition of four advanced crash avoidance technologies and test
                criteria for evaluating those technologies, NHTSA meets two of the four
                requirements for fulfillment of the Advanced Crash Avoidance section of
                Sec. 24213(b).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \7\ This notice refers to the advanced crash avoidance
                technologies as Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS)
                technologies.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Section 24213(b) of the law also requires that the Agency publish a
                notice ``to establish a means for providing to consumers information
                relating to pedestrian, bicyclist, or other vulnerable road user safety
                technologies'' within one year of enactment. This notice must meet
                requirements very similar to the advanced crash avoidance notice
                mentioned above. Since NHTSA is today proposing to include pedestrian
                automatic emergency braking (PAEB) in the program and is including test
                criteria for evaluating PAEB, NHTSA meets two of the four requirements
                for fulfillment of the Vulnerable Road User Safety section of Sec.
                24213(b). The remaining requirements will be fulfilled once NHTSA
                proposes and then finalizes a new rating system for the crash avoidance
                technologies in NCAP. The law also requires that NHTSA submit reports
                to Congress on its plans for fulfilling the abovementioned
                requirements. NHTSA plans to fulfill these reporting requirements in a
                timely manner.
                 Third, this RFC, once finalized, fulfills the requirements of
                Section 24213(c) for NHTSA to establish a roadmap for implementation of
                NCAP changes that covers a term of ten years, with five year mid-term
                and five year long-term components, and with updates to the roadmap at
                least once every four years to reflect new Agency interests and public
                comments. The first roadmap must be completed within one year of the
                law's enactment. Once finalized, the roadmap on future updates to NCAP
                proposed in this RFC in its entirety would fulfill the ten-year roadmap
                requirement, as some proposed initiatives will be considered in NCAP in
                the first five years while others will be proposed in the second half
                of the ten-year plan. The details and analysis of this fulfillment are
                available in the Roadmap section of this RFC.
                 Fourth, this RFC, once finalized, will fulfill a provision in
                Section 24213(c) of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that requires
                NHTSA to make the roadmap available for public comment and to consider
                the public comments received before finalizing the roadmap. These
                provisions are in accordance with the Agency's current practice for
                updating NCAP and will be followed to finalize the roadmap. Section
                24213(c) of the Law also requires that NHTSA identify opportunities
                where NCAP would ``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety
                rating programs.'' The Agency is taking steps to harmonize with
                existing consumer information rating programs where possible, and when
                appropriate, as noted in various sections of this RFC.
                 Fifth, Section 24213(c) of the Law requires the Agency to engage
                with stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and viewpoints not less than
                annually to develop future roadmaps. Again, this provision is in
                accordance with the Agency's current practice.
                Components of the Notice
                 There are six main parts to this notice:
                 1. Proposes to add four new ADAS technologies to NCAP and updates
                to current NCAP test procedures,
                 2. Discusses the Agency's plan to develop a new rating system for
                advanced driver assistance technologies,
                 3. Describes steps to list the crash avoidance rating information
                on the vehicle's window sticker (the Monroney label) at the point of
                sale,
                 4. Describes roadmap of the Agency's plans to update NCAP in phases
                over the next ten years,
                 5. Requests comments on expanding NCAP to provide consumer
                information on safety technologies that could help people drive safer
                by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior, and
                 6. Discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating several programmatic
                aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
                 Each of the aforementioned aspects of the notice are described in
                greater detail that follows. First, the notice discusses in detail the
                Agency's proposed upgrade to add four more ADAS technologies to those
                currently recommended by NHTSA through NCAP and that are highlighted on
                the NHTSA website. Since 2010, NCAP has recommended four kinds of ADAS
                technologies to prospective vehicle purchasers, and has identified to
                shoppers the vehicles that have these technologies and that meet NCAP
                performance test criteria.\8\ The current technologies are forward
                collision warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent
                braking (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS) (with the latter two
                collectively referred to as ``automatic emergency braking).\9\ This
                notice proposes changes (including an increase in stringency) to the
                test procedures and performance criteria for LDW, CIB, DBS, and FCW to
                (1) enable enhanced evaluation of their capabilities in current vehicle
                models, (2) reduce test burden, and (3) harmonize with other consumer
                information programs. This notice also describes and proposes four more
                ADAS technologies: Blind spot detection, blind spot intervention, lane
                keeping support, and pedestrian automatic emergency braking.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \8\ NCAP only indicates that a vehicle has a recommended
                technology when NHTSA has data verifying that the technology meets
                the minimum performance requirements set by NHTSA for acceptable
                performance. If a vehicle's ADAS is reported to have satisfied the
                performance requirements using the test methods specified by the
                Agency, then NHTSA uses a checkmark system to indicate on the NHTSA
                website that the vehicle is equipped with the technology. Each year,
                NHTSA also selects a sample of vehicles from that model year to
                verify ADAS system performance by performing its own tests.
                 \9\ https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 These four new ADAS technologies are candidates for NCAP because
                data indicate they satisfy NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in
                the program. The prerequisites are: (1) The update to the program
                addresses a safety need; (2) there are system designs (countermeasures)
                that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) existing or new system
                designs have safety benefit potential; and (4) a performance-based
                objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance. In
                order to address (1), a safety need, the Agency inherently looks first
                to address injuries and fatalities stemming from ``high-frequency and
                high-risk crash types''--as these crashes command the largest safety
                need and thus may also afford the biggest potential benefit. NHTSA does
                not calculate relative costs and benefits when considering inclusion in
                NCAP as it is a non-regulatory consumer information program. NHTSA
                discusses in this notice how each of the proposed ADAS technologies
                meets the four prerequisites. As explained in detail in this notice,
                the four new ADAS technologies proposed in NCAP are the only
                technologies that the Agency believes meet the four prerequisites for
                inclusion at this time. Each technology has demonstrated the ability to
                successfully mitigate high frequency and high-risk crash types. With
                the proposal to include pedestrian automatic emergency braking, NCAP
                would be expanded, for the first time, to include safety for people
                outside of the vehicle.
                 Second, this notice discusses the Agency's plan to develop a future
                rating system for new vehicles based on the availability and
                performance of all the NCAP-recommended crash avoidance technologies.
                Currently, NCAP only
                [[Page 13455]]
                recommends crash avoidance technologies to shoppers, and identifies the
                vehicles that offer the recommended technologies that pass NCAP system
                performance criteria. Unlike its crashworthiness and rollover
                protection programs that offer a combined rating based on vehicle
                performance in frontal, side, and rollover tests, the NCAP crash
                avoidance program does not currently have a rating system to
                differentiate the performance of ADAS technologies. NHTSA seeks to
                remedy this by developing a rating system for ADAS technologies to
                provide purchasers improved data with which to compare and shop for
                vehicles, and to spur improved vehicle performance. Accordingly, this
                document seeks public input on how best to develop this rating system.
                 Third, this notice announces NHTSA's steps to list the crash
                avoidance rating information on the vehicle's window sticker (the
                Monroney label) at the point of sale, as directed by the FAST Act.\10\
                NHTSA requests comment on ideas for the Monroney label information.
                Research is underway to maximize the effectiveness of the information
                in informing purchasing decisions. A follow-on notice will propose the
                crash avoidance rating system and explain how NHTSA would use the
                ratings. NHTSA will consider the comments received on this notice in
                conjunction with the information gained from the consumer research, to
                develop a proposal for a revised label. To help shoppers make more
                informed purchasing decisions, NHTSA also plans to provide fuel economy
                and greenhouse gas rating information with the NHTSA safety ratings,
                not only at the point of sale but also on the NHTSA website.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \10\ This Act requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to require
                vehicle manufacturers to include crash avoidance information next to
                the crashworthiness information on vehicle window stickers (Monroney
                labels).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Fourth, as part of a new approach to advancing NCAP, NHTSA has
                developed a roadmap of the Agency's current plans to upgrade NCAP in
                phases over the next several years. The roadmap sets forth NHTSA's
                near-term and longer-term strategies for upgrading NCAP. The roadmap
                takes a gradual approach, which contemplates NHTSA's issuing proposed
                upgrades in phases, as the technologies mature to readiness for
                proposed inclusion in NCAP. Following a proposal will be a final
                decision document that responds to comments and provides NHTSA's
                decisions for that phase of NCAP updates, including the lead time
                provided for the implementation. The roadmap presents an estimated
                timeframe of the phased request for comment (RFC) notices.
                 Fifth, this notice also considers expanding NCAP to provide
                consumer information on safety technologies that could help people
                drive safer by preventing or limiting risky driving behavior. The
                Agency is examining the possibility of expanding NCAP to include
                technologies that promote NHTSA's continuing efforts to combat unsafe
                driving behaviors, such as distracted and impaired driving, riding in a
                vehicle unrestrained, and speeding. NHTSA currently uses many
                approaches to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, including high
                visibility enforcement and advertising campaigns like ``Click it or
                Ticket'' and ``Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving.'' These campaigns have
                succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, human causes of crashes and
                there is some evidence that their success has reached a plateau. NHTSA
                is considering how NCAP can promote technologies that would reduce
                unsafe driving or riding behavior like distracted and impaired driving,
                speeding, or riding in a vehicle unrestrained by targeting the human
                behaviors most likely to lead to crashes. This information may be of
                particular interest to parents or other caregivers who are shopping for
                a vehicle for a new or inexperienced driver in the household, or
                caregivers wanting to know more about rear seat alerts for hot car/
                heatstroke.
                 Sixth and finally, this RFC discusses NHTSA's ideas for updating
                several programmatic aspects of NCAP to improve the program as a whole.
                NHTSA requests comment on the Agency's ideas for revising the 5-star
                safety ratings program. This document also discusses ways NHTSA would
                like to update the existing ADAS technology program components,
                outlines challenges the Agency has encountered relating to manufacturer
                self-reported data, and proposes possible solutions to those problems.
                Lastly, the RFC discusses (1) updates to the NCAP website to improve
                the dissemination of vehicle safety information to consumers and (2)
                the development of an NCAP database to modernize the operational
                aspects of the program, including a new vehicle information submission
                process for vehicle manufacturers.
                 This RFC includes numbered questions throughout the notice that
                highlight specific topics on which NHTSA seeks comments. Although
                several questions may be posed un-numbered within the body of certain
                sections, these un-numbered questions are reiterated at the conclusion
                of the topic discussion and in Appendix B. To help ensure that NHTSA is
                able to address all comments received, the Agency requests that
                commenters provide corresponding numbering in their responses.
                II. Background
                 NHTSA established its NCAP in 1978 in response to Title II of the
                Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972. When the
                program first began providing consumers with vehicle safety information
                derived from frontal crashworthiness testing, attention within the
                industry to vehicle safety was relatively new. Today's consumers are
                much more interested in vehicle safety, and this has become one of the
                key factors in vehicle purchasing decisions.\11\ Vehicle manufacturers
                have responded to these consumer demands by offering safer vehicles
                that incorporate enhanced safety features. This has resulted in
                improved vehicle safety performance in NCAP, which has historically
                translated into higher NCAP star ratings.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \11\ See www.regulations.gov, See www.regulations.gov, Docket
                No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for a report of ``New Car Assessment Program 5-
                Star Quantitative Consumer Research.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Over the years, NHTSA began to incorporate ADAS technologies into
                NCAP's crash avoidance program. In 2007, NHTSA, for the first time,
                issued an RFC exploring the addition of ADAS technologies in NCAP.\12\
                Later, based on feedback received from written and oral comments, NHTSA
                published a final decision \13\ expanding NCAP to include certain ADAS
                technologies and specific performance thresholds that a NHTSA-
                recommended ADAS system must meet. Beginning with model year 2011, the
                Agency began recommending on its website forward collision warning
                (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), and electronic stability control
                (ESC),\14\ and identified to shoppers which vehicles have the
                technologies that meet NCAP's performance requirements. NHTSA updated
                NCAP further to include crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic
                braking support (DBS)
                [[Page 13456]]
                technologies, beginning with model year 2018 vehicles.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \12\ 72 FR 3473 (January 25, 2007). The RFC included a request
                for comments on a NHTSA report titled, ``The New Car Assessment
                Program (NCAP); Suggested Approaches for Future Enhancements.''
                 \13\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
                 \14\ ESC was removed from the Agency's list of recommended ADAS
                technologies through NCAP beginning in model year 2014 when the
                technology became mandated under FMVSS No. 126, ``Electronic
                stability control.'' NHTSA also included rear video systems in its
                list of recommended technologies under NCAP from model years 2014 to
                2017 and removed that technology from its list when it became
                mandated under FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear Visibility.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 This RFC continues those efforts. Through several notices and
                public meetings, NHTSA has continued discussions with stakeholders
                about which technologies should be included in NCAP and the minimum
                performance thresholds those technologies should meet. NHTSA has set
                forth in Appendix C to this RFC a detailed history of the requests for
                comment, public meetings, and other relevant events that underlie this
                notice.
                 The last RFC NHTSA published to discuss potential changes to NCAP
                was published in 2015. It was broad in subject matter and sought
                comment on NCAP's potential use of enhanced tools and techniques for
                evaluating the safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and
                stimulating further vehicle safety developments.\15\ On the
                crashworthiness front, the RFC sought comment on establishing a new
                frontal oblique test and on using more advanced crash test dummies in
                all tests. The RFC also sought comment about establishing a new crash
                avoidance rating category and including nine advanced crash avoidance
                technologies. Additionally, the RFC sought comment on establishing a
                new pedestrian protection rating category involving the use of adult
                and child head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and adding two
                new pedestrian crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on
                combining the three categories (crash avoidance, crashworthiness, and
                pedestrian protection) into one overall 5-star rating. NHTSA also
                received comments at two public hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on
                January 14, 2016, and the second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in
                Washington, DC, on January 29, 2016. The numerous comments received on
                the RFC are discussed in a section below.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \15\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In October 2018, NHTSA hosted a third public meeting to re-engage
                stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the Agency plan the
                future of NCAP.\16\ The Agency has also been working to finalize its
                research efforts on pedestrian crash protection, advanced
                anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side
                impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover
                risk curve. As discussed in the roadmap, NHTSA plans to upgrade the
                NCAP crashworthiness program in phases over the next several years with
                the knowledge it has acquired from the research programs.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \16\ October 1, 2018.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
                 ADAS technologies have the potential to increase safety by
                preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of crashes that might
                otherwise lead to injury and death. NCAP currently conducts performance
                verification tests for four ADAS technologies: Forward collision
                warning (FCW), lane departure warning (LDW), crash imminent braking
                (CIB), and dynamic brake support (DBS). CIB and DBS are collectively
                referred to as automatic emergency braking (AEB). Vehicles that are
                equipped with one or more of these systems and pass NCAP's performance
                test requirements are listed as ``Recommended'' on NHTSA's website.
                When the Agency first began recommending FCW and LDW systems for model
                year 2011 vehicles, the fitment rate for these systems was less than
                0.2 percent (where ``fitment rate'' means the percent of vehicles
                equipped with a particular ADAS system). For model year 2018 vehicles,
                38.3 percent were equipped with FCW and 30.1 percent were equipped with
                LDW.\17\ Providing vehicle safety information through NCAP can be an
                effective approach to advance the deployment of safer vehicle designs
                and technology in the U.S. market, inform consumer choices, and
                encourage adoption of new technologies that have life-saving potential.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \17\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 With this notice, NHTSA is proposing to incorporate four additional
                ADAS technologies into NCAP's crash avoidance program: Lane keeping
                support (LKS), pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB), blind
                spot warning (BSW), and blind spot intervention (BSI). Each of these
                technologies meets the Agency's established criteria for inclusion in
                NCAP: (1) The technology addresses a safety need; (2) system designs
                exist that can mitigate the safety problem; (3) the technology provides
                the potential for safety benefits; and (4) a performance-based
                objective test procedure exists that can assess system performance.\18\
                Details about how each of the proposed ADAS technologies addresses a
                safety need (criterion 1) will be discussed immediately below, while
                the remaining criteria will be discussed in the relevant sections under
                each technology.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \18\ 78 FR 20599 (Apr. 5, 2013).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 To gain an understanding of the safety need that current ADAS
                technologies may address, NHTSA analyzed crash data for 84 mutually
                exclusive pre-crash scenarios.\19\ The pre-crash scenarios used in the
                Agency's analysis were devised using a typology \20\ concept \21\
                published by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe),
                which categorizes crashes into dynamically distinct scenarios based on
                pre-crash vehicle movements and critical events. As detailed in the
                referenced March 2019 report, NHTSA mapped the pre-crash scenario
                typologies to twelve currently available ADAS technologies \22\
                believed to potentially address certain pre-crash scenarios by
                assisting the driver to avoid or mitigate a crash. These mappings
                served to define the corresponding crash populations (i.e., target
                crash populations).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \19\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \20\ A typology is the study or analysis of something, or the
                classification of something, based on types or categories.
                 \21\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash scenarios
                based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS 812 745),
                Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \22\ The twelve ADAS technologies were as follows: FCW, DBS,
                CIB, LDW, LKS, lane centering assist (LCA), BSW, BSI, lane change/
                merge warning, PAEB, RAB, and rear cross-traffic alert.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Since several ADAS technologies presently available on passenger
                vehicles \23\ are designed to mitigate the same crash scenarios, NHTSA
                first grouped the technologies with similar design intent into
                categories. The five technology categories that resulted from this
                grouping process include: (1) Forward collision prevention, (2) lane
                keeping, (3) blind spot detection, (4) forward pedestrian impact, and
                (5) backing collision avoidance. As shown in Table A-6, these
                categories address the following high-level crash types: (1) Rear-end;
                (2) rollover, lane departure, and road departure; (3) lane change/
                merge; (4) pedestrian; and (5) backing, respectively. Of the original
                84 pre-crash scenarios studied, we mapped 34 relevant pre-crash
                scenario typologies to the five resulting technology categories that
                represented these crash types.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \23\ Passenger vehicles were defined as cars, crossovers, sport
                utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and vans having a gross
                vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The forward collision prevention category included three ADAS
                technologies: Forward collision warning, crash imminent braking, and
                dynamic brake support (FCW, CIB, and
                [[Page 13457]]
                DBS, respectively). The lane keeping category included lane departure
                warning (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS),\24\ and lane centering
                assist (LCA). The blind spot detection category included blind spot
                warning (BSW),\25\ blind spot intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge
                warning. The forward pedestrian impact avoidance category included
                pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB). Lastly, the backing
                collision avoidance category included rear automatic braking (RAB) and
                rear cross-traffic alert (RCTA). These ADAS technologies are
                characterized as SAE International (SAE) Level 0-1 \26\ driving
                automation systems.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \24\ The study uses the term ``lane keeping assist'' (LKA), but
                NCAP terminology differs. NCAP uses the term ``lane keeping
                support'' throughout this document instead.
                 \25\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``blind spot detection''
                (BSD) but NCAP uses the term blind spot warning (BSW) throughout
                this document instead.
                 \26\ SAE International (2018), Taxonomy and definitions for
                terms related to driving automation systems for on-road motor
                vehicles (SAE J3016). Level 0: No Automation--The full-time
                performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic
                driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems.
                Level 1: Driver Assistance--The driving mode-specific execution by a
                driver assistance system of either steering or acceleration/
                deceleration using information about the driving environment and
                with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining
                aspects of the dynamic driving task.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA derived target crash populations for each of the five
                technology categories using 2011 to 2015 Fatality Analysis Reporting
                System (FARS) and National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates
                System (NASS GES) data sets, which serve as records of police-reported
                fatal and non-fatal crashes, respectively, on the nation's roads. For a
                given technology category, we compiled data for each of the
                corresponding pre-crash scenarios to generate target crash populations
                surrounding the number of crashes, fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and
                property-damage-only vehicles (PDOVs).\27\ See Table 1 for a breakdown
                of target crash populations for each technology category.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \27\ PDOVs are vehicles damaged in non-injury-producing crashes
                (i.e., crashes in which vehicles only incur property damage and no
                occupants incur injury).
                 \28\ Defined as reverse automatic braking in DOT HS 812 653.
                 Table 1--Summary of Target Crashes by Technology Group
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Safety systems Crashes Fatalities MAIS 1-5 injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                1. FCW/DBS/CIB.............. 1,703,541 (29.4%) 1,275 (3.8%) 883,386 (31.5%) 2,641,884 (36.3%)
                2. LDW/LKA/LCA.............. 1,126,397 (19.4%) 14,844 (44.3%) 479,939 (17.1%) 863,213 (11.9%)
                3. BSW/BSI/LCM.............. 503,070 (8.7%) 542 (1.6%) 188,304 (6.7%) 860,726 (11.8%)
                4. PAEB..................... 111,641 (1.9%) 4,106 (12.3%) 104,066 (3.7%) 6,985 (0.1%)
                5. RAB/RvAB \28\ RCTA....... 148,533 (2.6%) 74 (0.2%) 35,268 (1.3%) 231,317 (3.2%)
                 Combined................ 3,593,18 (62%) 20,841 (62.2%) 1,690,963 (60.3%) 4,604,125 (63.3%)
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 It is important to note that target crash populations for the five
                technology categories covered 62 percent of all crashes. Crossing path
                crashes, which also represented a large crash population and a
                significant number of fatalities, were not part of our analysis because
                we are not aware of a currently available ADAS technology that can
                effectively mitigate this crash type.\29\ However, there are emerging
                safety countermeasures that hold potential to address some portion of
                these crashes in the future and these technologies will be considered
                for NCAP as they mature. These include intersection safety assist (ISA)
                systems that use onboard sensors with a wide field of view (e.g.,
                cameras, lidar, radar) as well as vehicle communications systems.\30\
                \31\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes \32\ also had a
                relatively high target population and fatality rate,\33\ but were not
                included because, aside from electronic stability control (ESC)
                systems, which are mandated,\34\ the Agency is not aware of an ADAS
                technology that effectively prevents this crash type and also meets
                NHTSA's criteria for inclusion in NCAP at this time.\35\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \29\ In its 2019 report, Volpe found that of the 5,480,886 light
                vehicle crashes occurring from 2011 through 2015, crossing path
                crashes, which totaled 1,131,273, represented 21 percent of all
                light vehicle crashes and 16 percent (3,972) of all fatalities
                (25,350).
                 \30\ NHTSA recognizes that ISA systems are currently available
                on a small number of light vehicles. However, preliminary NHTSA
                testing has shown that current-generation ISA systems have only
                limited capabilities and therefore would not effectively mitigate
                intersection-related crashes at this time--which is one of the
                requirements in the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
                 \31\ Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-everything (V2X)
                technologies have the potential to address crossing path crashes,
                but, while NHTSA remains strongly interested in these technologies,
                they are not included in the current roadmap. NHTSA is continuing to
                consider the various issues that bear upon the deployment path of
                V2X, including technological evolution and regulatory changes to the
                radio spectrum environment.
                 \32\ Crash scenarios were categorized by the first sequence of a
                crash event. Target crashes for a technology (e.g., lane-keeping
                crashes) were a collective of crash scenarios that are relevant to
                the technology. The Loss-of-control in single-vehicle scenario was
                defined as crashes where the first event was initiated by a
                passenger vehicle, and the event was coded as jackknife or traction
                loss. This crash scenario is mutually exclusive from those included
                in the lane-keeping crashes.
                 \33\ Loss-of-control in single-vehicle crashes are about 1% of
                crashes and associated with 3% of fatalities.
                 \34\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 126.
                 \35\ In its 2019 report, Volpe categorized 9 percent (470,733)
                of all light vehicle crashes (5,480,886) occurring from 2011 through
                2015 as control loss crashes. Furthermore, 18 percent (4,456) of all
                fatal crashes (25,350) were due to control loss.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Of the pre-crash typologies included in NHTSA's March 2019 study,
                rear-end collisions were found to be the most common crash type with an
                annual average of 1,703,541 crashes. Rear-end collisions represented
                29.4 percent of all annual crashes (5,799,883), followed by lane
                keeping typologies (1,126,397 crashes or 19.4 percent), and those
                relating to blind spot detection (503,070 crashes or 8.7 percent).
                Backing crashes (148,533) represented 2.6 percent of all crashes,
                followed by forward pedestrian crashes (111,641) at 1.9 percent.
                 Rear-end collisions also had the highest number of Maximum
                Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) \36\ 1-5 injuries at 883,386, which
                represented 31.5 percent of all non-fatal injuries (2,806,260) in Table
                A-1. Lane keeping crashes had the second highest number of injuries at
                479,939 (17.1 percent), as shown in Table A-2, and blind spot crashes
                had the third highest at 188,304 (6.7 percent), as shown in Table A-3.
                These typologies were followed by forward pedestrian crashes at 3.7
                [[Page 13458]]
                percent and backing crashes at 1.3 percent, as shown in Table A-4.\37\
                \38\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \36\ The Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) is a classification
                system for assessing impact injury severity developed and published
                by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine and is
                used for coding single injuries, assessing multiple injuries, or for
                assessing cumulative effects on more than one injury. AIS ranks
                individual injuries by body region on a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 =
                minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 = critical, and 6 =
                maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum injury severity,
                or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the highest single AIS
                for a person with one or more injuries). MAIS 0 means no injury.
                 \37\ The study uses the term ``impacts'' but for consistency
                purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this paragraph.
                 \38\ The Agency notes that the highest number of serious
                injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were recorded for lane keeping
                crashes (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal injuries), followed
                by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent), forward pedestrian
                crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot crashes (3,476 or 0.12
                percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02 percent).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA found that the lane keeping technology category, represented
                by rollover, lane departure, and road departure crashes, included the
                highest number of fatalities: 14,844, or 44.3 percent of all fatalities
                (33,477), as shown in Table A-2. This was followed by the forward
                pedestrian impact category, which included 4,106 pedestrian fatalities
                (12.3 percent), as shown in Table A-4. The forward collision prevention
                category, made up of rear-end crashes, included 1,275 fatalities (3.8
                percent), as shown in Table A-1.\39\ The blind spot detection
                technology category, represented by lane change/merge crashes,
                accounted for 1.6 percent of all fatalities, as shown in Table A-3.
                This was followed by backing crashes at 0.2 percent, as shown in Table
                A-5, which defined the backing collision avoidance category. The Agency
                notes that forward pedestrian crashes, which comprised the forward
                pedestrian impact category, ranked second highest for fatalities, and
                were the deadliest based on frequency of fatalities per crash.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \39\ Similarly, the study uses the term ``impacts'' but for
                consistency purposes, NCAP uses the term ``crashes'' in this
                paragraph.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In selecting the ADAS technologies to include in this proposal, the
                Agency wanted not only to target the most frequently occurring crash
                types, but also prioritize the most fatal and highest risk crashes.
                Based on the target crash populations studied, NHTSA believes that
                those represented by the forward collision prevention, lane keeping,
                blind spot detection, and forward pedestrian impact technology
                categories account for the most significant safety need.
                 The Agency notes that ADAS technologies representing the backing
                collision avoidance category (i.e., RAB, RvAB, and RCTA) are not being
                proposed for this program update. The backing collision avoidance
                category did not appear in the top third for number of crashes, number
                of fatalities, or number of MAIS 1-5 injuries. This may be due, in
                part, to the fact that a significant part of this crash target
                population is addressed by FMVSS No. 111, ``Rear visibility.'' \40\ The
                Agency needs additional time to assess all available real-world data
                and study the effects of the recent full implementation of FMVSS No.
                111 prior to considering adoption of ADAS technologies designed to
                prevent backing crashes in NCAP. Furthermore, while the Agency
                acknowledges that it previously proposed adding rear automatic braking
                (RAB) to NCAP in the December 2015 notice, it is continuing to make
                changes to the RAB test procedure published in support of that proposal
                to address the comments received. Thus, it is not proposing to add this
                technology to NCAP at this time. The Agency may propose adding to NCAP
                ADAS technologies that address the backing pre-crash typologies as the
                Agency continues to analyze the real-world data and refine test
                procedure revisions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \40\ 49 CFR 571.111. See 79 FR 19177 (Apr. 07, 2014).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Units of measure contained within this notice include meters (m),
                kilometers (km), millimeters per second (mm/s), meters per second (m/
                s), kilometers per hour (kph), feet (ft.), inches per second (in./s),
                feet per second (ft./s), miles per hour (mph), seconds (s), and
                kilograms (kg).
                A. Lane Keeping Technologies
                 A study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \41\ from the
                National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Study (NMVCCS) \42\ identified
                that 42 percent of lane departure crashes (i.e., where the driver left
                the lane of travel prior to the crash) resulted in a rollover and 37
                percent resulted in an opposite direction crash.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \41\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
                Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
                crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
                assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Conference on
                the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan. June 2017, Paper
                Number 17-0220.
                 \42\ The National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NMVVCS)
                was a nationwide survey of 5,471 crashes involving light passenger
                vehicles, with a focus on factors related to pre-crash events, which
                were investigated by the U.S. Department of Transportation and NHTSA
                over a 2.5-year period from July 3, 2005, to December 31, 2007.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 After analyzing NHTSA's 2019 target population study, NHTSA
                believes that lane keeping technologies such as lane departure warning
                (LDW), lane keeping support (LKS), and lane centering assist (LCA), can
                address ten pre-crash scenarios including the prevention or mitigation
                of roadway departures and crossing the centerline or median (i.e.,
                opposite direction crashes). These pre-crash scenarios represented on
                average 1.13 million crashes annually or 19.4 percent of all crashes
                that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 14,844 fatalities and
                479,939 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-2. This equals 44.3
                percent of all fatalities and 17.1 percent of all injuries
                recorded.\43\ \44\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \43\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \44\ When only serious injuries (i.e., MAIS 3-5 injuries) were
                considered, lane keeping crashes represented the highest number of
                non-fatal injuries (21,282 or 0.76 percent of all non-fatal
                injuries), followed by rear-end crashes (17,918 or 0.64 percent),
                forward pedestrian crashes (5,973 or 0.21 percent), blind spot
                crashes (3,476 or 0.12 percent), and backing crashes (454 or 0.02
                percent).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NCAP currently provides information on the performance of LDW, one
                of the lane keeping ADAS technologies. LDW was introduced in the
                program in 2010 for model year 2011 vehicles.\45\ At the time, the
                fitment rate for LDW was less than 0.2 percent. In model year 2018, it
                was 30.1 percent.\46\ Although the adoption rate for LDW has increased
                over this period, it has not increased as significantly as the fitment
                rate for forward collision warning (FCW), which saw an approximate 40
                percent increase over the same time period. A possible explanation
                regarding the lower fitment rate for LDW will be discussed in the next
                section. A second lane keeping ADAS technology that the Agency believes
                is appropriate for inclusion in NCAP is LKS. NHTSA believes that LKS
                may provide additional safety benefits that LDW cannot and may more
                effectively address the number of fatalities and injuries related to
                lane departure crashes.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \45\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
                 \46\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                1. Updating Lane Departure Warning (LDW)
                 Lane departure warning is a NHTSA-recommended technology that is
                currently included in NCAP to mitigate lane departure crashes. LDW
                systems are used to help prevent crashes that result when a driver
                unintentionally allows a vehicle to drift out of its lane of travel.
                These systems often use camera-based sensors to detect lane markers,
                such as solid lines (including those marked for bike lanes), dashed
                lines, or raised reflective indicators such as Botts' Dots, ahead of
                the vehicle.\47\ Lane departure alerts are presented to the driver when
                the system detects that the vehicle is laterally approaching or
                crossing the lane markings. The alert may be visual, audible, and/or
                haptic in
                [[Page 13459]]
                nature. Visual alerts may show which side of the vehicle is departing
                the lane, and haptic alerts may be presented as steering wheel or seat
                vibrations to alert the driver. It is expected that an LDW alert will
                warn the driver of the unintentional lane shift so the driver can steer
                the vehicle back into its lane. When a turn signal is activated, the
                LDW system acknowledges that the lane change is intentional and does
                not alert the driver.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \47\ Note that performance of LDW systems may be adversely
                affected by precipitation or poor roadway conditions due to
                construction, unmarked intersections, faded/worn/missing lane
                markings, markings covered with water, etc.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As NHTSA continues its assessment of LDW systems under NCAP, it
                plans to use the current NCAP test procedure titled, ``Lane Departure
                Warning System Confirmation Test and Lane Keeping Support Performance
                Documentation,'' dated February 2013.\48\ This protocol assesses the
                system's ability to issue an alert in response to a driving situation
                intended to represent an unintended lane departure and to quantify the
                test vehicle's position relative to the lane line at the time of the
                LDW alert. In NCAP's LDW tests, a test vehicle is accelerated from rest
                to a test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) while travelling in a straight
                line parallel to a single lane line comprised of one of three marking
                types: Continuous white lines, discontinuous (i.e., dashed) yellow
                lines, or discontinuous raised pavement markers (i.e., Botts' Dots).
                The test vehicle is driven such that the centerline of the vehicle is
                approximately 1.8 m (6 ft.) from the lane edge. This path must be
                maintained, and the test speed must be achieved, at least 61.0 m (200
                ft.) prior to the start gate. Once the driver reaches the start gate,
                he or she manually inputs sufficient steering to achieve a lane
                departure with a target lateral velocity of 0.5 m/s (1.6 ft./s) with
                respect to the lane line. The driver of the vehicle does not activate
                the turn signal at any point during the test and does not apply any
                sudden inputs to the accelerator pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal.
                The test vehicle is driven at constant speed throughout the maneuver.
                The test ends when the vehicle crosses at least 0.5 m (1.7 ft.) over
                the edge of the lane line marking. The scenario is performed for two
                different departure directions, left and right, and for all three lane
                marking types, resulting in a total of six test conditions. Five
                repeated trials runs are performed per test condition.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \48\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
                February). Lane departure warning system confirmation test and lane
                keeping support performance documentation. See http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0135.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 LDW performance for each test trial is evaluated by examining the
                proximity of the vehicle with respect to the edge of a lane line at the
                time of the LDW alert. The LDW alert must not occur when the lateral
                position of the vehicle, represented by a two-dimensional polygon,\49\
                is greater than 0.8 m (2.5 ft.) from the inboard edge of the lane line
                (i.e., the line edge closest to the vehicle when the lane departure
                maneuver is initiated), and must occur before the lane departure
                exceeds 0.3 m (1 ft.). To pass the test, the LDW system must satisfy
                the pass criteria for three of the first five valid individual trials
                \50\ for each combination of departure direction and lane line type (60
                percent) and for 20 of the 30 trials overall (66 percent).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \49\ The two-dimensional polygon is defined by the vehicle's
                axles in the X-direction (fore-aft), the outer edge of the vehicle's
                tire in the Y-direction (lateral), and the ground in the Z-direction
                (vertical).
                 \50\ Trial or test trial is a test among a set of tests
                conducted under the same test conditions (including test speed) with
                the same subject vehicle.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NCAP's LDW test conditions represent pre-crash scenarios that
                correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
                in real-world lane departure crashes. In its independent review of the
                2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe showed that approximately 40
                and 30 percent of fatalities in fatal road departure and opposite
                direction crashes, respectively, occurred when the posted speed was
                72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\51\ Similarly, the data indicated 64 and 63
                percent of injuries resulted from road departure and opposite direction
                crashes, respectively, that occurred when the posted speed was 72.4 kph
                (45 mph) or less.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \51\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Although travel speed was unknown or not reported for a high
                percentage of crashes in FARS and GES,\52\ when travel speed was
                reported, approximately 6 and 9 percent of fatal road departure and
                opposite direction crashes, respectively, occurred at travel speeds of
                72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Likewise, the data showed 22 and 25 percent
                of the police-reported non-fatal road departure and opposite direction
                crashes, respectively, occurred at 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. Volpe's
                data review indicates that speeding is prevalent in lane departure
                relevant pre-crash scenarios, but most road departure- and opposite
                direction-related fatalities and injuries did not occur on highways.
                For instance, 79 percent of road departure-related fatal crashes and 89
                percent of road departure-related police-reported injuries occurred on
                roads that were not highways. Similarly, for opposite direction-related
                crashes, 87 percent of fatalities and 98 percent of injuries did not
                occur on highways. Because highway driving speeds are on average much
                higher than non-highway speeds, the Volpe data about a high percentage
                of crashes occurring at speeds under 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears
                accurate. The test speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) appears to address a
                large portion of the travel speeds where the crashes are occurring.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \52\ For road departure crashes, 63 and 68 percent of the travel
                speed data, respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and
                GES. For opposite direction crashes, 65 and 67 percent of the data,
                respectively, is unknown or not reported in FARS and GES.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Furthermore, 62 percent of road departure-related fatalities and 76
                percent of road departure-related injuries occurred on straight roads,
                thereby aligning with NCAP's test procedure. For opposite direction-
                related crashes, 69 percent of fatalities and 67 percent of police-
                reported injuries occurred on straight roads.
                 In its December 2015 notice,\53\ NHTSA expressed concern that the
                safety benefits afforded by LDW technology were being diminished due to
                false activations. Several studies referenced in that notice had found
                that drivers were choosing to disable their vehicle's LDW system
                because it was issuing alerts too frequently. The Agency was also
                concerned about missed detections resulting from tar lines reflecting
                sun light or covered with water and other unforeseen anomalies that
                cause unreliable driver warnings. To address these issues and improve
                consumer acceptance, NHTSA requested comment in 2015 on whether to
                revise certain aspects of NCAP's LDW test procedure. Specifically, the
                Agency solicited comment on whether it is feasible to (1) award NCAP
                credit to LDW systems that only provide haptic alerts, and (2) develop
                additional test scenarios to address false activations and missed
                detections. The Agency also proposed to tighten the inboard lane
                tolerance for its LDW test procedure from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to 1.0
                ft.). In doing this, an LDW alert could only occur within a window of
                +0.3 to -0.3 m (+1.0 to -1.0 ft.) with respect to the inside edge of
                the lane line to pass NCAP's LDW procedure. This proposal effectively
                increased the space in which a vehicle could operate within a lane
                before triggering of an LDW alert was permitted. Each of these topics
                are
                [[Page 13460]]
                discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \53\ 80 FR 78522 (Dec. 16, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                a. Haptic Alerts
                 With respect to haptic warnings, NHTSA mentioned in its December
                2015 notice that these alerts may offer greater consumer acceptance
                compared to audible alerts, and thus improve the effectiveness of LDW
                alerts if the driver does not view the alerts as a nuisance and
                disengage the system. In response to the notice, commenters generally
                did not support a haptic alert requirement. Some commenters suggested
                that requiring a specific feedback type would unnecessarily limit the
                manufacturer's flexibility to issue warnings to the driver,
                particularly when considering the potential effectiveness of different
                feedback types and the need to optimize human-machine interface (HMI)
                designs to address a suite of ADAS. Bosch suggested the Agency should
                allow all warning options to promote the availability of such systems
                in a greater number of vehicles, which should ultimately increase
                consumer awareness and encourage vehicle safety improvements. Advocates
                stated that the Agency should provide details on the effectiveness of
                the different types of sensory feedback (visual, auditory, haptic) to
                justify its decision to encourage one warning type over another.
                Consumers Union (CU) suggested awarding credit for all LDW feedback
                types and awarding additional points or credit for haptic alerts to
                encourage this feedback type in the future. The Automotive Safety
                Council (ASC) acknowledged that haptic warnings may improve driver
                acceptance of LDW systems but suggested that false activations must
                also be reduced to realize improved consumer acceptance and additional
                safety benefits.
                 In a large-scale telematics-based study conducted by UMTRI \54\ for
                NHTSA on LDW usage, researchers investigated driver behavior in
                reaction to alerts. Two types of vehicles were included in the study:
                Vehicles with audible-only alerts and vehicles where the driver had the
                option to select either an audible or haptic alert. When the latter was
                available, the driver selected the haptic warning 90 percent of the
                time. Otherwise, the LDW system was turned ``off'' 38 percent of the
                time and thus was not providing alerts. For the system that only
                provided the audible warning, the LDW was turned ``off'' 71 percent of
                the time.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \54\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
                Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
                and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
                collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Based on the findings from the UMTRI's research, NHTSA concludes
                that haptic alerts improve driver acceptance of LDW systems. However,
                the Agency is not certain if an increase in driver acceptance will
                translate to an improvement in the overall efficacy of the LDW system
                in reducing crashes. Furthermore, NHTSA does not want to hinder
                optimization of HMI designs given the increasing number of ADAS
                technologies available in vehicles today. Therefore, the Agency has
                decided not to require a specific alert modality for LDW warnings in
                its related NCAP test procedure at this time, but is requesting comment
                on whether this decision is appropriate. Although NHTSA has limited
                data on the effectiveness of the various alert types, it has some
                concern (similar to the one raised for FCW) that certain LDW systems,
                such as those that may provide only a visual alert, may be less
                effective than other alert options in medium or high urgency
                situations.\55\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \55\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey,
                R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for
                connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings
                (Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. False Positive Tests
                 In responding to the 2015 RFC, vehicle manufacturers and suppliers
                asserted that additional false positive test requirements were not
                needed even though they acknowledged NHTSA's concern regarding the
                effect of nuisance alerts on consumer acceptance. Specifically, the
                Alliance \56\ stated that vehicle manufacturers will optimize their
                systems to minimize false positive activations for consumer acceptance
                purposes, and thus such tests will not be necessary. Similarly, Honda
                stated that vehicle manufacturers must already account for false
                positives when considering marketability and HMI. The manufacturer also
                indicated that it would be difficult for the Agency to create a valid
                false positive test procedure that is robust and repeatable. Mobileye,
                Bosch, and MTS Systems Corporation (MTS) also agreed. In fact, Mobileye
                explained that it would be hard to reproduce the exact test conditions,
                especially with respect to weather, over multiple test locations. Also,
                Bosch stated that the specialized tests required to address the
                Agency's concern may not be truly representative of all real-world
                driving situations that the system encounters. MTS suggested that,
                alternatively, a new test could be added to NCAP's LDW test procedure
                that would evaluate whether an LDW system can inform the driver that it
                is no longer able to issue warnings due to poor environmental
                conditions or other reasons.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \56\ After submitting individual comments on the 2015 RFC, the
                Alliance and Global Automakers merged to form the Alliance for
                Automotive Innovation. This document addresses the individual
                comments from the organizations that were then the Alliance and
                Global Automakers.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Given the concerns expressed regarding repeatability and
                reproducibility of test conditions, and the fact that the Agency's data
                do not currently support adoption of a false positive assessment for
                lane keeping technologies, NHTSA continues to monitor the consumer
                complaint data related to false positives to help inform an appropriate
                next step.
                 With respect to the recommendation from MTS, the Agency recognizes
                that vehicle manufacturers install LDW telltales on the instrument
                panel that illuminate to inform drivers when the system is operational.
                The systems are typically operational when the vehicle's travel speed
                has reached a preset activation threshold speed and the lane markings
                and environmental conditions are appropriate. The telltale will
                disappear if those conditions are not met to inform the driver that the
                system is no longer operational. In such a state, the system will not
                provide an alert if the vehicle departs the travel lane. Given this
                feature, NHTSA has decided a test to inform the driver that the system
                is no longer issuing warnings is unnecessary at this time.
                c. LDW Test Procedure Modifications
                 Support was varied with respect to NHTSA's proposal in the December
                2015 notice to modify the LDW test requirements to reduce the leeway
                for system activation inside of a lane line from 0.8 to 0.3 m (2.5 to
                1.0 ft.). Global Automakers stated that the proposed change was
                ``unduly prescriptive'' and recommended that the Agency retain the
                existing lane line tolerance. The organization explained that research
                showed 90 percent of drivers needed 1.2 s to react to a warning.\57\
                Citing NCAP's LDW test procedure, which requires a steering input
                having a target lateral velocity of 0.5 to 0.6 m/s (1.6 to 2 ft./s),
                the trade association remarked that this requirement equates to a
                necessary warning distance of 0.6 to 0.72 m (1.9 to 2.4 ft.) to ensure
                that 90 percent of drivers can react in time to prevent a
                [[Page 13461]]
                lane departure. Advocates agreed that nuisance notifications are a
                concern for driver acceptance, but noted that the Agency provided
                little information about the effectiveness of LDW systems meeting the
                proposed criteria. Conversely, Delphi, ASC, and MTS commented that some
                of the more robust systems that are currently available should be able
                to comply with the narrower specification. However, ASC suggested that
                the Agency may want to evaluate the impact of the proposed changes
                before finalizing the requirements to ensure that narrowing the lane
                line tolerances translates to a reduction in false positive alerts, and
                thus higher consumer acceptance for LDW systems. Mobileye stated that
                the tolerance reduction should increase the required accuracy and
                quality of lane keeping systems. MTS remarked that systems meeting the
                tighter specification will produce higher driver satisfaction, and, in
                turn, system use, compared to those that meet only the current
                requirements. Hyundai Motor Company (Hyundai) also supported the
                tolerance revision. Consumers Union (CU) agreed with others that the
                narrowed lateral tolerance should reduce the issuance of false alerts
                on main roadways but cautioned the Agency that this change may not
                effectively address false alerts on secondary or curved roads, as
                vehicles not only tend to approach within one foot of lane lines, but
                also may cross them. The group suggested that false alert conditions be
                subject to speed limitations or GPS-based position sensors to avoid
                ``over activation'' on secondary or curved roads.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \57\ Tanaka, S., Mochida, T., Aga, M., & Tajima, J. (2012, April
                16). Benefit Estimation of a Lane Departure Warning System using
                ASSTREET. SAE Int. J. Passeng. Cars--Electron. Electr. Syst.
                5(1):133-145, 2012, https://doi.org/10.4271/2012-01-0289.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Given NHTSA's goal of reducing nuisance notifications to increase
                consumer acceptance of LDW systems and the statements from several
                commenters that current LDW systems can meet the proposed reduced test
                specification, the Agency believes it is reasonable to propose adopting
                the reduced inboard lane tolerance of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.).
                 In addition to the comments received pertaining to the lane line
                tolerance, the Agency also received several suggestions to adopt
                additional test scenarios for NCAP's LDW test procedure or make
                alternative procedural modifications. Similar to CU's suggestion above
                for curved roads, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA add inner and outer
                curve scenarios that allow a larger tolerance for the inner lane
                boundary than that permitted on a straight road. The company further
                recommended that the Agency add road edge detection scenarios,
                including curbs and non-structural delimiters such as gravel or dirt,
                to reflect real-world conditions and crash scenarios more accurately.
                Similarly, Bosch suggested that NHTSA consider introducing road edge
                detection requirements in addition to lane markings since not all roads
                have lane markings. Additionally, Mobileye suggested that NHTSA alter
                the Botts' Dots detail #4 (Botts dots are round, raised markers that
                mark lanes) to align with California detail #13, which is more common,
                and modify the test procedure to include Botts' Dots on both sides of
                the lane or Botts' Dots and a solid line, as these are the most
                frequently observed marking pairings.
                 The Agency appreciates suggestions from commenters and agrees that
                there is merit to considering other procedural modifications for NCAP's
                lane departure test procedure(s). As will be discussed in the next
                section, the Agency is planning to conduct a feasibility study to
                determine whether curved roads can be considered for inclusion in NCAP
                test procedures to evaluate LKS systems objectively. NHTSA also plans
                to perform research to assess how lane keeping system performance on a
                test track compares to real-world data for different combinations of
                curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing. Additionally, the
                Agency recognizes that the European NCAP program (Euro NCAP) has
                adopted a road edge detection test that is conducted in a similar
                manner to their ``lane keep assist'' tests (described in the next
                section), but the road edge detection test does not use lane markings.
                Although NHTSA believes the number of vehicles equipped with an ability
                to recognize and respond to road edges not defined with a lane line is
                presently low, it has identified roadways where this capability could
                prevent crashes. Therefore, the Agency is requesting comment on whether
                a road edge detection test for either LDW and/or LKS is appropriate for
                inclusion in NCAP. In consideration of the lane markings currently
                assessed, the Agency proposes to remove the Botts' Dots test scenario
                from the current LDW test, as the lane marking type is being removed
                from use in California.\58\ At this time, the Agency believes the
                traditional dashed and solid lane marking tests would be sufficient.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \58\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
                century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
                Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Although NHTSA has tentatively decided not to adopt additional
                false activation requirements for this NCAP upgrade, the Agency is
                still concerned about the low effectiveness of LDW and its lack of
                consumer acceptance stemming from nuisance alerts and missed
                detections.
                 When NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP program in 2008,\59\
                LDW was selected because it met NCAP's four established criteria: (1)
                The technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) the system design
                of LDW had the potential to mitigate the crash problem; (3) safety
                benefits were projected, and (4) test procedures and evaluation
                criteria were available to ensure an acceptable performance level. At
                the time, the Agency estimated that existing LDW systems were 6 to 11
                percent effective in preventing lane departure crashes. Although the
                system's effectiveness was relatively low, NHTSA cited the large number
                of road departure and opposite direction crashes occurring on the
                nation's roadways as well as the resulting AIS 3+ injuries, as reasons
                to include LDW in NCAP. Several recent studies have provided varying
                results with respect to LDW effectiveness.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \59\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In a 2017 study,\60\ the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
                (IIHS) concluded that LDW systems were effective in reducing three
                types of passenger car crashes (single-vehicle, side-swipes, and head-
                on) by 11 percent, which is the same rate NHTSA originally estimated.
                Importantly, IIHS also concluded that LDW systems reduce injuries in
                those same types of crashes by 21 percent. In its recent study of real-
                world effectiveness of crash avoidance technologies in GM vehicles,\61\
                UMTRI found that LDW systems showed a 3 percent reduction for
                applicable crashes that was determined to be not statistically
                significant. Conversely, the active safety technology, LKS (which also
                included lane departure warning capability), showed an estimated 30
                percent reduction in applicable crashes.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \60\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2017, August 23),
                Lane departure warning, blind spot detection help drivers avoid
                trouble, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/stay-within-the-lines-lane-departure-warning-blind-spot-detection-help-drivers-avoid-trouble.
                 \61\ Flannagan, C. and Leslie, A., Crash Avoidance Technology
                Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
                Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
                Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Other studies that examined driver deactivation rates also suggest
                that LDW effectiveness may be lower than originally estimated. In a
                survey of Honda vehicles brought into Honda
                [[Page 13462]]
                dealerships for service,\62\ IIHS researchers found that for 184 models
                equipped with an LDW system, only a third of the vehicles had the
                system activated. Furthermore, in its telematics-based study on LDW
                usage,\63\ UMTRI found that, overall, drivers turned off LDW systems 50
                percent of the time. However, in Consumer Reports' August 2019 survey
                of more than 57,000 CR subscribers, the organization found that 73
                percent of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LDW
                technology. In fact, 33 percent said that the system had helped them
                avoid a crash, and 65 percent said that they trusted the system to work
                every time.\64\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \62\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, January 28),
                Most Honda owners turn off lane departure warning, Status Report,
                Vol. 51, No. 1, page 6.
                 \63\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
                Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
                and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
                collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \64\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
                warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
                drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In light of these findings, the Agency believes that, in addition
                to LDW, there is merit to adopting an active lane keeping system, such
                as lane keeping support (LKS), in NCAP. As an enhanced active system,
                LKS offers the steering and/or braking capability necessary to guide a
                vehicle back into its lane without consumer action and should therefore
                further enhance safety benefits beyond those that can be realized by
                LDW. A detailed discussion pertaining to LKS technology is provided in
                the following section.
                2. Adding Lane Keeping Support (LKS)
                 LDW systems warn a driver that their vehicle is unintentionally
                drifting out of their travel lane, while lane keeping support (LKS)
                systems are designed to actively guide a drifting vehicle back into the
                travel lane by gently counter steering or applying differential
                braking. During an unintended lane departure where the driver is not
                using the turn signal, LKS systems help to prevent: ``Sideswiping''
                where a vehicle strikes another vehicle in an adjacent lane that is
                travelling in the same direction; opposite direction crashes where a
                vehicle crosses the centerline and strikes another vehicle travelling
                in the opposite direction; and road departure crashes where a vehicle
                runs off the road resulting in a rollover crash or an impact with a
                tree or other object. LKS systems may also help to prevent unintended
                lane departures into designated bicycle lanes in situations where the
                system's speed threshold is met.
                 LKS systems typically utilize the same camera(s) used by LDW
                systems to monitor the vehicle's position within the lane, and
                determine whether a vehicle is about to drift out of its lane of travel
                unintentionally. In such instances, LKS automatically intervenes by:
                Braking one or more of the vehicle's wheels; steering; or using a
                combination of braking and steering so that the vehicle returns to its
                intended lane of travel. LKS is one of two active lane keeping
                technologies mentioned in the Agency's March 2019 report,\65\ with the
                other being lane centering assist (LCA). LKS assists the driver by
                providing short-duration steering and/or braking inputs when a lane
                departure is imminent or underway, whereas LCA provides continuous
                assistance to the driver to keep their vehicle centered within the
                llane.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                \65\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As discussed in the previous section, UMTRI evaluated the real-
                world effectiveness of ADAS technologies, including LDW and LKS.\66\
                The results of the LKS study (which also included lane departure
                warning functionality) showed an estimated 30 percent reduction in
                applicable crashes. Additionally, in its August 2019 survey, 74 percent
                of vehicle owners reported that they were satisfied with LKS
                technology, and 35 percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash.
                Sixty-five percent of owners said that they trusted the system to work
                every time.\67\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \66\ Carol Flannagan, Andrew Leslie, Crash Avoidance Technology
                Evaluation Using Real-World Crashes, DTHN2216R00075 Vehicle
                Electronics Systems Safety IDIQ, The University of Michigan
                Transportation Research Institute Final Report, March 22, 2018.
                 \67\ Consumer Reports. (2019, August 5), Guide to lane departure
                warning & lane keeping assist: Explaining how these systems can keep
                drivers on the right track, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/lane-departure-warning-lane-keeping-assist-guide/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In its December 2015 notice, NHTSA did not propose including LKS
                technology as part of the update to NCAP. However, many commenters
                recommended that the Agency consider including the technology. For
                instance, Bosch and Mobileye stated that LKS systems have the potential
                to prevent or mitigate a greater number of collisions involving
                injuries and fatalities than LDW systems. The ASC and Delphi
                recommended that the Agency adopt LKS in lieu of LDW, with the ASC
                adding that Euro NCAP has included LKS in its Lane Support Systems test
                protocol since 2016.\68\ \69\ The ASC, Bosch, and Continental noted the
                maturity of LKS technology and stated that such systems were already
                widely available in vehicles produced at the time. Other proponents of
                adopting LKS technology in NCAP include the National Safety Council
                (NSC), ZF TRW, and Honda. ZF TRW recommended that the Agency adopt both
                active lane keeping (termed LKS in this notice) and lane centering
                systems (termed LCA in this notice) due to the high frequency of fatal
                road departure crashes. Honda also supports the active safety benefits
                of LKS and the system's potential to help prevent crashes. NSC
                suggested that the Agency include LKS, as it would complement LDW,
                which is already in the program, similar to the way the warning
                component of FCW complements the active safety functionality of AEB.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \68\ The ASC argued that data from the Highway Loss Data
                Institute (HLDI) have shown no statistically significant difference
                in collision claim frequencies for vehicles equipped with LDW
                compared to those without, and questioned whether LDW systems are
                effective in reducing crashes or fatalities.
                 \69\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2015,
                November), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 1.0.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As mentioned previously, the Agency agrees with commenters that
                there is merit to adopting LKS technology in NCAP. However, NHTSA
                believes an LDW system integrated with LKS may be a better approach for
                the Agency to consider rather than replacing LDW with LKS. NHTSA
                believes, as NSC commented, that an integrated approach (inclusive of
                passive and active safety capabilities for lane support systems) would
                be similar to what the Agency is proposing for frontal collision
                avoidance systems, FCW and AEB, later in this notice.
                 NHTSA is considering the adoption of certain test methods (e.g.,
                those for ``lane keep assist'') contained within the Euro NCAP Test
                Protocol--Lane Support Systems (LSS) \70\ to assess technology design
                differences for LKS. Since the test speeds and road configurations
                specified in this protocol are similar to those stipulated in the
                Agency's LDW test procedure, the Agency believes Euro NCAP's test
                protocol will sufficiently address the lane keeping crash typology
                previously detailed for LDW.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \70\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019,
                July), Test Protocol--Lane Support Systems, Version 3.0.2. See
                section 7.2.5, Lane Keep Assist tests.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure includes a series of ``lane keep
                assist''
                [[Page 13463]]
                trials that are performed with iteratively increasing lateral
                velocities towards the desired lane line. Each ``lane keep assist''
                trial begins with the subject vehicle (SV) (i.e., the vehicle being
                evaluated) being driven at 72 kph (44.7 mph) down a straight lane
                delineated by a single solid white or dashed white line. Initially, the
                SV path is parallel to the lane line, with an offset from the lane line
                that depends on the lateral velocity used later in the maneuver. Then,
                after a short period of steady-state driving, the direction of travel
                of the SV is headed towards the lane line using a path defined by a
                1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.) radius curve. The lateral velocity of the SV's
                approach towards the lane line (from both the left and right
                directions) is increased from 0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) in 0.1
                m/s (0.3 ft./s) increments until acceptable LKS performance is no
                longer realized. Acceptable LKS performance occurs when the SV does not
                cross the inboard leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.3 m (1.0
                ft.).
                 NHTSA conducted a limited assessment of five model year 2017
                vehicles equipped with LKS systems. The Agency used a robotic steering
                controller to maximize the repeatability and minimize variability
                associated with manual steering inputs. For this study, NHTSA also used
                a slightly modified and older version of Euro NCAP's LSS test procedure
                from what was discussed above. Specifically, the lateral velocity of
                the SV's approach towards the lane line was increased from 0.1 m/s to
                1.0 m/s in 0.1 m/s increments (0.3 ft./s to 3.3 ft./s in 0.3 ft./s
                increments) to assess how LKS systems would perform at higher
                velocities. In addition, LKS performance was considered acceptable
                (when compared to Euro NCAP's assessment criteria at the time of
                NHTSA's testing) for instances where the SV did not cross the inboard
                leading edge of the lane line by more than 0.4 m (1.3 ft.).\71\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \71\ At the time of testing, an older version of Euro NCAP's LSS
                test procedure was available. This version stipulated a lane keep
                assist assessment criterion of 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) for the maximum
                excursion over the inside edge of the lane marking. European New Car
                Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). See Assessment Protocol--Safety
                Assist, Version 7.0 (2015, November).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 A preliminary analysis of the five tested vehicles identified
                performance differences between the vehicles depending on the lateral
                velocity used during the test. Some vehicles only engaged a steering
                response at lower lateral velocities and others continued to provide a
                steering input as the lateral velocity was increased.\72\ The maximum
                excursion over the lane marking after an LKS activation was also found
                to be inconsistent, particularly as lateral velocity increased. These
                preliminary findings suggested that there are performance differences
                in how vehicle manufacturers are designing their systems for a given
                set of operating conditions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \72\ Wiacek, C., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., & Shain, K.
                (2019), Applying lane keeping support test track performance to
                real-world crash data, 26th Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference,
                Eindhoven, Netherlands. June 2019, Paper Number 19-0208.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The results from these tests, as measured by the maximum excursions
                over the lane marking, were compared to the measured shoulder width of
                roads where fatal road departure crashes occurred. The analysis
                identified roadways where the shoulder width of the roadway was less
                than the 0.4 m (1.3 ft.) maximum excursion limit (e.g., certain rural
                roadways) used in the Agency's testing. It was observed that only
                vehicles displaying robust LKS performance, including at higher lateral
                velocities, would likely prevent the vehicle from departing the travel
                lane on these roadways. However, most of the roadway departure crashes
                were on roads where the shoulder width exceeded 0.4 m (1.3 ft.). On
                these roadways, assuming the LKS was engaged, the lane departure could
                have been avoided. However, some vehicles did not perform well, with
                several exhibiting no system intervention, and others exceeding the
                maximum excursion limit as the lateral velocity was increased. To
                supplement these initial findings, additional LKS testing has since
                been conducted and is undergoing analysis.
                 Since the analysis showed that most fatal crashes identified in the
                study were on roadways having shoulder widths that exceeded the current
                Euro NCAP test excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.), NHTSA believes that
                adopting the Euro NCAP criterion may provide significant safety
                benefits, but is requesting comment on whether an even smaller
                excursion limit may be more appropriate. Furthermore, as the study also
                identified fatal crashes where lane markers were not present on the
                side of the roadway where a departure occurred (such that LKS would not
                provide any benefit unless it had the capability to identify the edge
                of the roadway), the Agency is also requesting comment (as mentioned
                previously) on adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection test to NCAP so
                that it may begin to address crashes that occur where lane markings may
                not be present.
                 Based on the findings from NHTSA's LKS testing, which showed
                differences in LKS performance at greater lateral velocities, the
                Agency is concerned about LKS performance at higher travel speeds when
                the vehicle first transitions from a straight to a curved road where
                lateral velocity may inherently be high. In its independent analysis of
                the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that 29 percent of fatal road
                departure crashes and 26 percent of fatal opposite direction crashes
                occurred at known travel speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph). The
                analysis also showed that 55 percent of fatal road departure crashes
                and 67 percent of opposite direction crashes occurred on roads with
                posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph).\73\ \74\ Furthermore, the
                study revealed that speeding was a factor in 31 percent and 13 percent
                of fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes,
                respectively.\75\ Since NHTSA does not currently have data to show that
                LKS system performance at Euro NCAP's current test speed of 72 kph
                (44.7 mph) would be indicative of system performance when tested at
                higher speeds, NHTSA is requesting comment on whether it would be
                beneficial to incorporate additional, higher test speeds to assess the
                performance of lane keeping systems in NCAP.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \73\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \74\ For data where the travel speed was known, 63 and 65
                percent of the data is unknown or not reported in FARS for road
                departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively. For road
                departure and opposite direction crashes, respectively, 3 and 1
                percent of the posted speed data is unknown or not reported in FARS.
                 \75\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 To date, NHTSA has only performed test track LKS evaluations using
                the straight road test configuration specified in the Euro NCAP test
                procedure. However, the Agency recognizes that a significant portion of
                road departure and opposite direction crashes resulting in fatalities
                and injuries occur on curved roads. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
                set \76\ showed that for road departure crashes, 37 percent of
                fatalities and 20 percent of injuries occurred on curved roads. For
                opposite direction crashes, 30 percent of fatalities and 31 percent of
                injuries occurred on curved roads. NHTSA is not certain how LKS
                performance observed during straight road trials performed on a test
                [[Page 13464]]
                track would correlate to real-world system performance on curved roads.
                However, NHTSA believes, based on on-road performance testing
                experience of newer model year vehicles, that some current system
                designs include provisions to address lane departures on curved roads.
                The Agency observed that some LKS systems engage by providing limited
                operation throughout a curve--which may offer little (if any) safety
                benefits. However, other more sophisticated LKS systems maintain
                engagement longer and offer more directional authority throughout a
                curve. These systems may provide additional safety gains because the
                driver has more time to re-engage (i.e., restore effective manual
                control of the vehicle).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \76\ Ibid.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In NHTSA's study of the 2005 through 2007 fatal crashes \77\ from
                NMVCCS, crashes that occurred on curved roads \78\ where the driver
                departed the travel lane were analyzed. The analysis showed that,
                unlike for straight roads where LKS systems may provide smaller
                corrective steering inputs to prevent the vehicle from departing the
                lane, LKS systems would have to provide sustained lateral correction
                (i.e., corrective steering) on a curved road to prevent the vehicle
                from departing the llane.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                \77\ Wiacek, C., Fikenscher, J., Forkenbrock, G., Mynatt, M., &
                Smith, P. (2017), Real-world analysis of fatal run-out-of-lane
                crashes using the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey to
                assess lane keeping technologies, 25th International Technical
                Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Detroit, Michigan.
                June 2017, Paper Number 17-0220.
                 \78\ It should be noted that the paper identified crashes where
                lane markings were not present on the side of the departure.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Furthermore, in fleet testing of select model year 2012 through
                2018 vehicles equipped with LDW and LKS (referenced in the report as
                LKA), Transport Canada \79\ found variability in test results and
                generally unpredictable system behavior on curved roads. Thus,
                Transport Canada stated that it was not possible to gather enough data
                to assess the potential safety benefits associated with the technology.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \79\ Meloche, E., Charlebois, D., Anctil, B., Pierre, G., &
                Saleh, A. (2019), ADAS testing in Canada: Could partial automation
                make our roads safer? 26th International Technical Conference on the
                Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, Eindhoven, Netherlands, June 2019,
                Paper Number 19-0339.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 To address these unknowns and further understand the potential
                effectiveness of LKS systems in the real world, the Agency is
                considering additional research to study whether testing on curved
                roads should be considered for objective evaluation of LKS systems, and
                collect a combination of test track and real-world data to quantify how
                LKS systems will operate when exposed to different combinations of
                curve radius, vehicle speed, and departure timing (e.g., at curve onset
                or midway through the curve).
                 With respect to LDW and LKS, NHTSA is seeking comment on the
                following:
                 (1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW
                systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type? Why
                or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-only
                warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when
                determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test criteria?
                If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert modalities
                (such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective at re-
                engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If so,
                which one(s) and why?
                 (2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods
                from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure,
                should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program entirely
                and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test procedure
                instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW and LKS
                capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to conduct the LDW
                test if both systems are to be assessed separately. What tolerances
                would be appropriate for each test, and why?
                 (3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to address
                lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted).\80\ To help re-
                engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must be
                provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \80\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2016, October), Prevalence of
                driver physical factors leading to unintentional lane departure
                crashes, Traffic Injury Prevention, 18(5), 481-487, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2016.1247446.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts'
                Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this lane
                marking type is being removed from use in California? \81\ If not, why?
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \81\ Winslow, J. (2017, May 19), Botts' Dots, after a half-
                century, will disappear from freeways, highways, The Orange County
                Register, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/19/botts-dots-after-a-half-century-will-disappear-from-freeways-highways/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.)
                over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of
                the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be
                reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited shoulder
                width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance would be
                appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for LDW in
                addition to LKS? Why or why not?
                 (6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m
                (3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to
                establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane line
                it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that use of
                a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer indication of when
                an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the baseline tests
                performed without LKS, a process specified by the Euro NCAP LSS
                protocol. This is because the small curve radius allows the desired SV
                lateral velocity to be more quickly established; requires less initial
                lateral offset within the travel lane; and allows for a longer period
                of steady state lateral velocity to be realized before an LKS
                intervention occurs. Is use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather
                than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.), acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS
                test procedure? Why or why not?
                 (7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to
                evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may
                require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency
                use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
                 (8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection
                test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane
                markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be
                added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
                 (9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro
                NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from 0.2
                to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system performance, and
                that this range is representative of the lateral velocities associated
                with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an intended lane change).
                However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also specifies a range of
                lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to 2.0 ft./s) be used to
                represent unintended lane departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--
                Oncoming vehicle'' and ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle''
                tests. To encourage the most robust LKS system performance, should
                NHTSA consider a combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure
                ranges, lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for
                inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
                 (10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS
                performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the
                [[Page 13465]]
                Agency correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral
                velocities on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why
                or why not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does
                not exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on
                straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared to a
                vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral
                velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the
                Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is
                negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-engage?
                If not, why?
                 (11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is
                redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane departure
                when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker on the side
                not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a secondary lane
                departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion limit established
                for the first side. To prevent potential secondary lane departures,
                should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP ``lane keep assist''
                evaluation criteria to be consistent with language developed for
                NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this issue? Why or why not?
                NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI intervention shall not cause
                the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more beyond the inboard edge of the
                lane line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to
                the right of it within the validity period. To assess whether this
                occurs, a second lane line is required (only one line is specified in
                the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a
                second lane line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why
                not?
                 (12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction crashes
                occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the LKS test
                speed be increased, or does the current test speed adequately indicate
                performance at higher speeds, especially on straight roads? Why or why
                not?
                 (13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently
                contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure
                direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
                conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test
                only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance, should
                the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for only one
                departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to
                assure comparable system performance for the other direction? Or,
                should the Agency consider adopting only the most challenging test
                conditions? If so, which conditions are most appropriate? For instance,
                do the dashed line test conditions provide a greater challenge to
                vehicles than the solid line test conditions?
                 (14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for
                each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass
                rate for the LKS tests, and why?
                 (15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS
                test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so,
                what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?
                B. Blind Spot Detection Technologies
                 NHTSA's 2019 target population study showed that blind spot
                detection technologies such as blind spot warning (BSW), blind spot
                intervention (BSI), and lane change/merge warning (LCM) (which is
                essentially a BSI warning system), can help prevent or mitigate five
                pre-crash lane change/merge scenarios. These pre-crash movements
                represented, on average, 503,070 crashes annually, or 8.7 percent of
                all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways, and resulted in 542
                fatalities and 188,304 MAIS 1-5 injuries, as shown in Table A-3. This
                equated to 1.6 percent of all fatalities and 6.7 percent of all
                injuries recorded.\82\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \82\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Currently, NCAP does not include any ADAS technology that is
                designed to address blind spot pre-crash scenarios. NHTSA requested
                comment on the inclusion of BSW as part of its upgrade to the program
                in its 2015 notice. Although the Agency did not recommend BSI for
                inclusion at that time, the Agency is proposing that both BSW and BSI
                technologies be adopted as part of this program update.
                 Although the target population for blind spot detection technology
                may not be as large as the populations for AEB or lane keeping
                technologies, NHTSA believes there is merit to including blind spot
                technologies in NCAP. Consumer Reports found in its 2019 survey that 82
                percent of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW technology, 60
                percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 68 percent
                stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\83\ The Agency
                believes the technology's high consumer acceptance rate, in addition to
                its potential safety benefits discussed later in this section, supports
                its inclusion in the Agency's signature consumer information program.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \83\ Monticello, M. (2017, June 29), The positive impact of
                advanced safety systems for cars: The latest car-safety technologies
                have the potential to significantly reduce crashes, Consumer
                Reports, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/positive-impact-of-advanced-safety-systems-for-cars/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                1. Adding Blind Spot Warning (BSW)
                 A BSW system is a warning-based driver assistance system designed
                to help the driver recognize that another vehicle is approaching, or
                being operated within, the blind spot of their vehicle in an adjacent
                lane. In these driving situations, and for all production BSW systems
                known to NHTSA, the BSW alert is automatically presented to the driver,
                and is most relevant to a driver who is contemplating, or who has just
                initiated, a lane change. Depending on the system design, additional
                BSW features may be activated if the system is presenting an alert and
                then the driver operates their turn signal indicator.
                 BSW systems use camera-, radar-, or ultrasonic-based sensors, or
                some combination thereof, as their means of detection. These sensors
                are typically located on the sides and/or rear of a vehicle. BSW alerts
                may be auditory, visual (most common), or haptic. Visual alerts are
                usually presented in the side outboard mirror glass, inside edge of the
                mirror housing, or at the base of the front a-pillars inside the
                vehicle. When another vehicle enters, or approaches, the driver's blind
                spot while operating in an adjacent lane, the BSW visual alert will
                typically be continuously illuminated. However, if the driver engages
                the turn signal in the direction of the adjacent vehicle while the
                visual alert is present, the visual alert may transition to a flashing
                state and/or be supplemented with an additional auditory or haptic
                alert (e.g., beeping or vibration of the steering wheel or seat,
                respectively).
                 NHTSA requested comment on a draft research blind spot detection
                (BSD) test procedure (referred to in this notice as BSW) published on
                November 21, 2019 \84\ to assess systems' performance and capabilities
                in blind spot related pre-crash scenarios. This test procedure
                exercises the BSW system in two different scenarios on the test track:
                the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test, and the Straight Lane
                Pass-by Test. These two tests assess whether the BSW system displays a
                warning when other vehicles, referred to as principal other
                [[Page 13466]]
                vehicles (POVs), are within the driver's blind spot. The test occurs
                without activation of the tested vehicle's, referred to as the subject
                vehicle (SV), turn signal. Neither the SV nor POV turn signals are to
                be activated at any point during any test trial. A short description of
                each test scenario and the requirements for a passing result is
                provided below:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \84\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test--The POV and SV
                are driven parallel to each other at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
                mph) such that the front-most part of the POV is 1.0 m (3.3 ft.) ahead
                of the rear-most part of the SV in the outbound lanes of a three-lane
                straight road. After 2.5 s of steady-state driving, the POV enters
                (i.e., converges into) the SV's blind zone \85\ by making a single lane
                change into the lane immediately adjacent to the SV using a lateral
                velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5 ft./s). The period of steady-
                state driving resumes for at least another 2.5 s and then the POV exits
                (i.e., diverges from) the SV's blind zone by returning to its original
                travel lane using a lateral velocity of 0.25 to 0.75 m/s (0.8 to 2.5
                ft./s). This test is repeated for a POV approach from both the left and
                the right side of the SV.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \85\ SV blind zones are defined by two rectangular regions that
                extend to the side and rear of the SV. Each rectangle is 8.2 ft.
                (2.5 m) wide and is represented by lines parallel to the
                longitudinal centerline of the vehicle but offset 1.6 ft. (0.5 m)
                from the outermost edge of the SV's body excluding the side view
                mirror(s). The rearward projection begins at the rearmost part of
                the SV side mirror housing and ends at a rearward boundary that is
                dependent on the relative speed between the SV and POV. The blind
                zone is fully described in the test procedure.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 --To pass a test trial: during the converge lane change, the BSW
                alert must be presented by a time no later than 300 ms after any part
                of the POV enters the SV blind zone and must remain on while any part
                of the POV resides within the SV blind zone; and during the diverge
                lane change, the BSW alert may remain active only when the lateral
                distance between the SV and POV is greater than 3 m (9.8 ft.) but less
                than or equal to 6 m (19.7 ft.). The BSW alert shall not be active once
                the lateral distance between the SV and POV exceeds 6 m (19.7 ft.).
                 Straight Lane Pass-by Test--The POV approaches and then
                passes the SV while being driven in an adjacent lane. For each trial,
                the SV is traveling at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) whereas
                the POV is traveling at one of four constant speeds--80.5, 88.5, 96.6,
                or 104.6 kph (50, 55, 60, or 65 mph). The lateral distance between the
                two vehicles, defined as the closest lateral distance between adjacent
                sides of the polygons used to represent each vehicle, shall nominally
                be 1.5 m (4.9 ft.) for the duration of the trial. This test is repeated
                for a POV approach towards the SV from an adjacent lane to the left and
                to the right of the SV.
                 --To pass a test trial, the BSW alert must be presented by a time
                no later than 300 ms after the front-most part of the POV enters the SV
                blind zone and remain on while the front-most part of the POV resides
                behind the front-most part of the SV blind zone. The BSW alert shall
                not be active once the longitudinal distance between the front-most
                part of the SV and the rear-most part of the POV exceeds the BSW
                termination distance specified for each POV speed.
                 For the BSW tests, each scenario is tested using seven repeated
                trials for each combination of approach direction (left and right side
                of the SV) and test speed. This translates to a total of 14 tests
                overall for the Straight Lane Converge and Diverge Test and 56 tests
                overall for the Straight Lane Pass-by Test. NCAP is proposing that to
                pass the NCAP system performance requirements, the SV must pass at
                least five out of seven trials conducted for each approach direction
                and test speed.
                 The proposed BSW tests represent pre-crash scenarios that
                correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and injuries observed
                in real-world lane change crashes. A review of Volpe's 2011-2015 data
                set showed that approximately 28 percent of fatalities and 57 percent
                of injuries in lane change crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds
                of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\86\ For crashes where the travel speed
                was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 14 percent of fatalities
                and 24 percent of injuries occurred at speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or
                lower.\87\ Furthermore, Volpe found that speeding was a factor in only
                18 percent of the fatal lane change crashes and 3 percent of lane
                change crashes that resulted in injuries. This suggests that posted
                speed corresponds well to travel speed in most lane change
                crashes.88 89
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \86\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
                unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of
                lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
                 \87\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
                60 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 68 percent of lane
                change crashes that resulted in injuries.
                 \88\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \89\ It was unknown or not reported whether speeding was a
                factor in 3 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 7 percent of
                lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As noted earlier, market research conducted by Consumer Reports
                (CR) indicated that BSW systems are desirable in consumer interest
                surveys of various ADAS technologies. In fact, CR found not only that
                an overwhelming majority of vehicle owners were satisfied with BSW
                technology, but also that 60 percent of them believed BSW technology
                had helped them avoid a crash. However, in its study to evaluate the
                real-world effectiveness of ADAS technologies in model year 2013-2017
                General Motors' (GM) vehicles, UMTRI found that GM's Side Blind Zone
                Alert produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane change
                crashes. When the Side Blind Zone Alert technology was combined with an
                earlier generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the
                corresponding effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\90\ UMTRI
                attributed this increase to substantially longer vehicle detection
                ranges for the Lane Change Alert with Side Blind Zone Alert system
                compared to GM's earlier generation Side Blind Zone Alert system.\91\
                An Agency study of three BSW-equipped vehicles also showed that that
                currently available BSW systems may likely exhibit differences in
                detection capabilities and operating conditions such that their
                effectiveness estimates could vary significantly.\92\ For instance, one
                vehicle's system may simply augment a driver's visual awareness whereas
                another may effectively prevent crashes by warning of higher speed lane
                change events. In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, Bosch
                provided similar insight. The company stated that some BSW systems may
                only provide benefit for shorter detection distances, such as 7 m (23.0
                ft.) rearward, whereas other systems may provide detection for
                distances up to 70 m (229.7 ft.) rearward, which would help the driver
                avoid collisions with vehicles approaching from the rear in adjacent
                lanes at high speeds. The Agency plans to study these performance
                differences in its testing.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \90\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan, C.
                A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
                production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
                University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
                Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
                 \91\ For GM's Lane Chane Alert systems, sensors in the vehicle's
                rear bumper are utilized to warn the driver of vehicles approaching
                from the rear on either the left or right side.
                 \92\ Forkenbrock, G., Hoover, R.L., Gerdus, E., Van Buskirk,
                T.R., & Heitz, M. (2014, July), Blind spot monitoring in light
                vehicles--System performance (Report No. DOT HS 812 045),
                Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                [[Page 13467]]
                 NHTSA is proposing to conduct BSW tests in NCAP in accordance with
                the Agency's BSW test procedure. The Agency believes that the Straight
                Lane Pass-by Test scenario, which stipulates incrementally higher test
                speeds for the POV, could be used to distinguish between vehicles that
                have basic versus advanced BSW capability. For instance, an SV that can
                only satisfy the BSW activation criteria when the POV approaches with a
                low relative velocity may be considered as having basic BSW capability,
                whereas a vehicle that can look further rearward, to sense a passing
                vehicle travelling at a much higher speed, may be considered to have
                superior BSW capability. NHTSA believes such an assessment is important
                because when one vehicle encroaches into the adjacent lane of the
                other, the crashes associated with higher speed differentials can be
                expected to be more severe than those that occur when the two vehicle
                speeds are more similar. Furthermore, the capability of a vehicle to
                detect when another vehicle has entered an extended rear zone could be
                important for the application of other ADAS technologies such as blind
                spot intervention (BSI) or SAE \93\ Level 2 partial driving automation
                \94\ systems that incorporate automatic lane change features.
                Therefore, the Agency believes that long-range vehicle detection may
                not only increase the effectiveness of blind spot technologies such as
                BSI, but also enhance capabilities and robustness of other ADAS
                applications. For these reasons, NHTSA is proposing (later in this
                notice) the incorporation of BSI technology in NCAP to encourage the
                proliferation of such systems along with sensing strategies that offer
                a greater field of view.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \93\ SAE International (2018), SAE J3016_201806: Taxonomy and
                definitions for terms related to driving automation systems for on-
                road motor vehicles, Warrendale, PA, www.sae.org.
                 \94\ The sustained driving automation system of both the lateral
                and longitudinal vehicle motion control with the expectation that
                the driver supervises the driving automation system.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Commenters to NHTSA's December 2015 notice overwhelmingly supported
                the addition of BSW in NCAP. In fact, many commenters suggested the
                Agency expand the testing requirements to encompass additional test
                targets, such as motorcycles, and test conditions. Several commenters
                also recommended that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test procedure with
                International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards. Each of
                these topics will be discussed below.
                a. Additional Test Targets and/or Test Conditions
                 Commenters, including the ASC, Continental, Bosch, NSC, and others,
                recommended that the Agency expand the BSW testing requirements to
                include motorcycle detection. Delphi, MTS, Medical College of Wisconsin
                (MCW), and CU suggested that NHTSA evaluate a vehicle's ability to
                detect bicycles in addition to motorcycles. Similarly, Subaru suggested
                that changes to the Straight Lane Pass-by Test should be made to
                address motorcycle detection. MTS and MCW added that motorcycle riders
                and bicyclists are more vulnerable to serious and fatal injuries
                compared to occupants of motor vehicles. A few commenters were not
                supportive of adding a motorcycle detection test in NCAP. Global
                Automakers and Hyundai stated that although it was a reasonable goal
                for the future, no standardized test devices currently existed at the
                time. Similarly, Honda and the Alliance recommended that the Agency
                focus on vehicle detection as a first step since no standard test
                procedure exists for motorcycle detection. The Alliance added that
                since the location of a motorcycle within a lane can vary greatly, test
                procedures would need to specify motorcycle behavior and reasonable
                detection distances. Furthermore, MTS stated that the position of the
                motorcycle POV within the lane (near, center, far) should be specified,
                and the radar cross section and projected area of the motorcycle should
                be considered as well.
                 NHTSA agrees that BSW systems capable of detecting motorcycles
                would improve safety. A review of the 2011 through 2015 FARS and GES
                data sets \95\ showed that there were 106 fatal crashes and nearly
                5,100 police-reported crashes annually, on average, for same direction
                lane change crashes involving a vehicle and motorcycle. In comparison,
                as mentioned earlier, there were 542 fatalities and 503,070 police-
                reported crashes annually, on average, for lane change crashes
                involving motor vehicles. These data show that more occupants of motor
                vehicles die in lane changing crashes than do motorcyclists. However,
                the fatality rate for motorcyclists is greater than that for vehicle
                occupants.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \95\ Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., Yanagisawa, M., & Najm, W. (2018,
                September), Pre-Crash Scenario Characteristics of Motorcycle Crashes
                for Crash Avoidance Research (Report No. DOT HS 812 902),
                Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. In
                Press
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 At this time, the Agency has decided to prioritize testing of BSW
                systems on motor vehicles for NCAP. NHTSA believes that performing BSW
                testing on light vehicles, particularly at higher POV closing speeds,
                and for active safety systems (as will be discussed next), should
                encourage development of robust sensing systems, which may improve the
                detection of other objects such as motorcycles. That being said, the
                Agency has planned an upcoming research project designed to address
                injuries and fatalities for other vulnerable road users, specifically
                motorcyclists. The Agency will continue to observe the development of
                BSW technology and is likely to include test procedures for motorcycle
                detection in NCAP at a later date if the technology meets the four
                prerequisites mentioned above.
                 Several commenters offered additional suggestions for ways NHTSA
                could expand the BSW test procedure. MCW suggested that the Agency
                adopt test scenarios that address curved roads and low light
                conditions. CU proposed that the Agency should assess whether BSW
                systems provide a clear indication to the driver that the system is not
                operating since sensors are sometimes rendered inoperable in poor
                weather or when blocked.
                 As with all the ADAS technologies, NHTSA recognizes that there is a
                need to understand and assure crash mitigation performance of BSW
                systems under all practical situations that the driver and vehicle will
                encounter in the real world. However, such comprehensive testing is not
                always practical within the scope of the NCAP program. Thus, for
                technologies that met the four principles for inclusion in NCAP, the
                Agency primarily attempted to address the most frequently occurring,
                most fatal, and most injurious pre-crash scenarios when prioritizing
                tests to add to the program. When ADAS technologies penetrate the fleet
                in sufficient numbers, then the Agency can evaluate how these systems
                are performing in the real world and adjust the system performance
                criteria accordingly to address additional test conditions, such as
                those mentioned by MCW. Regarding CU's suggestion, the Agency believes,
                after reviewing vehicle owner's manuals, that most vehicle
                manufacturers are including provisions in their system designs to
                provide a malfunction indicator to the driver if the system is no
                longer operational because the sensors are blocked or due to severe
                weather conditions.
                 NHTSA has also considered Bosch's request to expand the definition
                of BSW to encourage adoption of systems that provide longer detection
                distances. NHTSA believes, as discussed above,
                [[Page 13468]]
                that by using higher POV closing speeds to assess BSW system
                performance, it may effectively drive enhanced blind spot system
                capabilities such as those required for other rearward-looking ADAS
                applications, like BSI, or automatic lane change functions.
                b. Test Procedure Harmonization
                 Several commenters suggested that NHTSA harmonize its BSW test
                procedure with International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
                standard 17387:2008, Intelligent transport systems--Lane change
                decision aid systems (LCDAS)--Performance requirements and test
                procedures or with various aspects of this standard. Global Automakers
                and Hyundai commented that NHTSA should shift the forward edge of the
                blind zone rearward from the outside rearview mirrors to the eye point
                of a 95th percentile person, as specified in ISO 17387. Hyundai stated
                that the ISO procedure is designed such that when the POV is in-line
                with the SV driver's eye ellipse, the driver's peripheral vision allows
                him/her to see the POV without the assistance of BSW systems. The ASC,
                Continental, and Subaru also suggested that the Agency align the
                warning zones in the Agency's BSW test procedure with those specified
                in ISO 17387.
                 The Agency does not agree with commenters' suggestion to adopt the
                ISO procedure for defining the forward edge of the blind zone as
                measured using the eye ellipse from a seated 95th percentile person.
                NHTSA believes that the blind zone should be defined not by a specific
                seated individual but by the vehicle's characteristics, since a real-
                world blind spot for any particular vehicle would differ depending on
                the size characteristics of the individual driving the vehicle at the
                time. Since people vary in size, they will sit in different seating
                positions and have different seating preferences. For instance, a 95th
                percentile male will be seated more rearward whereas a 5th percentile
                female will be seated more forward. In addition, drivers have personal
                preferences for adjusting their side view mirrors that may not be
                considered optimal and may not provide a full field of view when
                checking the mirrors to make change lanes. For these reasons, the
                Agency tentatively concludes that it is more appropriate and better for
                the safety of consumers to set the forward plane of the blind zone at
                the rearmost part of the side view mirrors, as specified in its BSW
                test procedure. This approach should not only best accommodate a wide
                variety of driver sizes and seating positions, but also reduce test
                complexity when defining the blind zone.
                2. Adding Blind Spot Intervention (BSI)
                 Blind spot intervention (BSI) systems are similar to AEB and LKS
                systems in that they provide active intervention to help the driver
                avoid a collision with another vehicle. BSW systems alert a driver that
                a vehicle is in his/her blind spot, whereas BSI systems activate when
                the BSW alert is ignored, and intervene either by automatically
                applying the vehicle's brakes or providing a steering input to guide
                the vehicle back into the unobstructed lane. With their active
                capability, BSI systems can help a driver avoid collisions with other
                vehicles that are approaching the vehicle's blind spot, in addition to
                preventing crashes with vehicles operating within the vehicle's blind
                spot.
                 Like BSW systems, BSI systems utilize rear-facing sensors to detect
                other vehicles that are next to or behind the vehicle in adjacent
                lanes. Depending on the design of these systems, BSI activation may or
                may not require the driver to operate his/her turn signal indicator
                during a lane change. Furthermore, some BSI systems may only operate if
                the vehicle's BSW system is also enabled.
                 As discussed earlier, UMTRI found that GM's BSW system, Side Blind
                Zone Alert, produced a non-significant 3 percent reduction in lane
                change crashes. However, when Side Blind Zone Alert was combined with a
                later generation technology, GM's Lane Change Alert, the corresponding
                effectiveness increased to 26 percent.\96\ Given BSI is only now
                penetrating the fleet, NHTSA is unaware of any effectiveness studies
                for this technology. However, as discussed earlier, the Agency believes
                that active safety technologies are more effective than warning
                technologies. The UMTRI study concluded that AEB is more effective than
                FCW alone and that LKS is more effective than LDW. The Agency believes
                the same relationship will likely hold true for blind spot systems, and
                that BSI will be more effective than BSW alone. NHTSA also believes, as
                mentioned above, that adopting ADAS technologies such as BSI should
                also encourage development of enhanced BSW system capabilities (e.g.,
                motorcycle and bicycle detection), and may increase the robustness of
                other ADAS applications.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \96\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
                C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
                production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
                University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
                Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA is proposing to use its published draft test procedure
                titled, ``Blind Spot Intervention System Confirmation Test,'' \97\ to
                evaluate the performance of vehicles equipped with BSI technology in
                NCAP. The Agency's test procedure consists of three scenarios: Subject
                Vehicle (SV) Lane Change with Constant Headway, SV Lane Change with
                Closing Headway, and SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False
                Positive Assessment. In the first two scenarios, an SV initiates or
                attempts a lane change into an adjacent lane while a single POV is
                residing within the SV's blind zone (Scenario 1), or is approaching it
                from the rear (Scenario 2). The third scenario is used to evaluate the
                propensity of a BSI system to activate inappropriately in a non-
                critical driving scenario that does not present a safety risk to the
                occupants in the SV. In each of the tests, the POV is a strikeable
                object with the characteristics of a compact passenger car. The system
                performance requirements stipulate that the SV may not contact the POV
                during the conduct of any test trial. NHTSA is requesting comment on
                the number of trials that are appropriate for each test. Each of these
                scenarios, along with the proposed evaluation criteria, is detailed
                below: \98\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \97\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
                 \98\ The Agency notes that these test scenario descriptions
                assume the SV is operating in SAE Automation Level 0 or Level 1
                operation with only the Automatic Cruise Control (ACC) enabled.
                Though the Agency's BSI test procedure has provisions to evaluate
                vehicles operating in SAE Automation Levels 2 or 3. Test scenario
                descriptions for these evaluations are not discussed herein.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 SV Lane Change with Constant Headway--The POV is driven at
                72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane adjacent and to the left of the SV also
                traveling at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with a constant longitudinal offset such
                that the front-most part of the POV is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-
                most part of the SV. After a short period of steady-state driving, the
                SV driver engages the left turn signal indicator at least 3 s after all
                pre-SV lane change test validity criteria have been satisfied. Within
                1.0 0.5 s after the turn signal has been activated, the SV
                driver initiates a manual lane change into the POV's travel lane. The
                SV driver then releases the steering wheel within 250 ms of the SV
                exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius curve during the lane change. To
                meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene so as to
                prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of the
                POV. Additionally, the SV
                [[Page 13469]]
                BSI intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or
                more beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel
                lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the validity
                period.
                 SV Lane Change with Closing Headway Scenario--The POV is
                driven at a constant speed of 80.5 kph (50 mph) towards the rear of the
                SV in an adjacent lane to the left of the SV, which is traveling at a
                constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph). During the test, the SV driver
                engages the turn signal indicator when the POV is 4.9 0.5
                s from a vertical plane defined by the rear of the SV and perpendicular
                to the SV travel lane. Within 1.0 0.5 s after the turn
                signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a manual lane change
                into the POV's travel lane. The SV driver then releases the steering
                wheel within 250 ms of the SV exiting a 800.1 m (2,625 ft.) radius
                curve. To meet the performance criteria, the BSI system must intervene
                to prevent the left rear of the SV from contacting the right front of
                the POV. Additionally, the SV BSI intervention shall not cause the SV
                to travel 1.0 ft. (0.3 m) or more beyond the inboard edge of the lane
                line separating the SV travel lane from the lane adjacent and to the
                right of it within the validity period.
                 SV Lane Change with Constant Headway, False Positive
                Assessment Test--The POV is driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) in a lane that
                is two lanes to the left of the SV's initial travel lane with a
                constant longitudinal offset such that the front-most part of the POV
                is 1 m (3.3 ft.) ahead of the rear-most part of the SV, which is also
                travelling at 72.4 kph (45 mph). The SV driver engages the left turn
                signal indicator at least 3 s after all pre-SV lane change test
                validity criteria have been satisfied. Within 1.0 0.5 s
                after the turn signal has been activated, the SV driver initiates a
                manual lane change into the left adjacent lane (the one between the SV
                and POV). For this test, the driver does not release the steering
                wheel. Since the lane change will not result in an SV-to-POV impact,
                the SV BSI system must not intervene during any valid trials. To
                determine whether a BSI intervention occurred, the SV yaw rate data
                collected during the individual trials performed in this scenario are
                compared to a baseline composite. After being aligned in time to the
                baseline, the difference between the data must not exceed 1 degree/
                second within the test validity period.
                 The proposed crash-imminent BSI test scenarios represent pre-crash
                scenarios that correspond to a substantial portion of fatalities and
                injuries observed in real-world lane change crashes. As discussed in
                the BSW crash statistics section, Volpe showed that approximately 28
                percent of fatalities and 57 percent of injuries in lane change crashes
                occurred on roads with posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\99\
                Furthermore, approximately 14 percent of fatalities and 24 percent of
                injuries were reported for crashes that occurred at known travel speeds
                of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or lower.\100\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \99\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
                unknown in 2 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 18 percent of
                lane change crashes that resulted in injuries.
                 \100\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
                65 percent of fatal lane change crashes and 67 percent of lane
                change crashes that resulted in injuries.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA has conducted a series of tests utilizing its proposed BSI
                test procedure. Since BSI systems are not widely available in the
                fleet, the Agency selected vehicles in order to cover as many
                manufacturers as possible that have implemented this technology. All
                vehicles selected for BSW testing also underwent BSI testing. Test
                reports related to both test programs can be found in the docket for
                this notice. For the purposes of this testing, the Agency used the
                Global Vehicle Target (GVT) Revision G to represent the POV, which is
                specified in the BSI test procedure as a strikeable object.\101\ When
                the BSI technology assessment is incorporated into NCAP, the Agency
                plans to use the GVT Revision G as a strikeable target to be consistent
                with Euro NCAP's ADAS test procedures that specify a strikeable target.
                In the context of testing BSW and BSI technologies in NCAP to address
                lane change crashes, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \101\ The GVT is a three-dimensional surrogate that resembles a
                white hatchback passenger car. It is currently used by other
                consumer organizations, including Euro NCAP, and vehicle
                manufacturers in their internal testing of ADAS technologies. See
                Section III.D.2. of this notice for an expanded discussion of the
                GVT.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal
                indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the
                BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal
                indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible or
                haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a
                visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should it
                continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from the
                blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why not?
                 (17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane
                Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's BSW
                capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings when the
                POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the blind zone) for
                varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
                 (18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test
                procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why or
                why not?
                 (19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently
                contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions (e.g.,
                test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side of the
                SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios and
                test conditions to address the real-world safety problem adequately, or
                could it test only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test
                burden in NCAP? For instance, should the Agency consider incorporating
                only the most challenging test conditions into NCAP, such as the ones
                with the greatest speed differential, or choose to perform the test
                conditions having the lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency
                consider only performing the test conditions where the POV passes by
                the SV on the left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data
                to assure the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system
                performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
                 (20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system
                performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input on
                whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive
                assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer
                satisfaction? Why or why not?
                 (21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each
                test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is this
                an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is the
                appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test scenario,
                and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each of the two
                tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
                 (22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction with
                activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn signal is
                not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated from the
                heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention? Should the SV's
                LKS system be switched off during conduct of the Agency's BSI
                evaluations? Why or why not?
                C. Adding Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking (PAEB)
                 Another important ADAS technology NHTSA proposes to include in its
                upgrade of NCAP is pedestrian automatic emergency braking (PAEB).
                [[Page 13470]]
                PAEB systems function similar to AEB systems but detect pedestrians
                instead of vehicles. PAEB uses information from forward-looking sensors
                to issue a warning and actively apply the vehicle's brakes when a
                pedestrian, or sometimes a cyclist, is in front of the vehicle and the
                driver has not acted to avoid the impending impact. Similar to AEB,
                PAEB systems typically use cameras to determine whether a pedestrian is
                in imminent danger of being struck by the vehicle, but some systems may
                use a combination of cameras, radar, lidar, and/or thermal imaging
                sensors.
                 Many pedestrian crashes occur when a pedestrian is in the forward
                path of a driver's vehicle. Four common pedestrian crash scenarios
                include when the vehicle is:
                 1. Heading straight and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
                 2. Turning right and a pedestrian is crossing the road;
                 3. Turning left and a pedestrian is crossing the road; and
                 4. Heading straight and a pedestrian is walking along or against
                traffic.
                 These four crash scenarios are defined as Scenarios S1-S4,
                respectively, by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership (CAMP) Crash
                Imminent Braking (CIB) Consortium.\102\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \102\ Carpenter, M.G., Moury, M.T., Skvarce, J.R., Struck, M.
                Zwicky, T. D., & Kiger, S.M. (2014, June), Objective tests for
                forward looking pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems: Final
                report (Report No. DOT HS 812 040), Washington, DC: National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Two of these scenarios, S1 and S4, are included in NHTSA's draft
                research PAEB test procedure, published on November 21, 2019, and
                referenced herein as the 2019 PAEB test procedure.\103\ The S1 scenario
                represents a pedestrian crossing the road in front of the vehicle,
                while the S4 scenario represents a pedestrian moving with or against
                traffic along the side of the road in the path of the vehicle. Both
                test scenarios are repeated for multiple pedestrian impact locations.
                The S1 and S4 crash scenarios were chosen for inclusion in NHTSA's 2019
                PAEB test procedure because a review of pedestrian crashes from the
                2011 through 2012 GES and FARS data sets \104\ found that, on average,
                these two pre-crash scenarios (S1 and S4) accounted for approximately
                33,000 (52 percent) of vehicle-pedestrian crashes and 3,000 (90
                percent) fatal vehicle-pedestrian crashes with a light-vehicle striking
                a pedestrian as the first event. Furthermore, these crashes accounted
                for 67 percent of MAIS 2+ and 76 percent of MAIS 3+ injured
                pedestrians.\105\ The 2019 PAEB test procedure only considered daylight
                test conditions for both the S1 and S4 crash scenarios.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \103\ 84 FR 64405 (Nov. 21, 2019).
                 \104\ Yanagisawa, M., Swanson, E., Azeredo, P., & Najm, W.G.
                (2017, April), Estimation of potential safety benefits for
                pedestrian crash avoidance/mitigation systems (Report No. DOT HS 812
                400), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \105\ As explained previously, the Abbreviated Injury Scale
                (AIS) is a classification system for assessing impact injury
                severity. AIS ranks individual injuries by body region on a scale of
                1 to 6 where 1 = minor, 2 = moderate, 3 = serious, 4 = severe, 5 =
                critical, and 6 = maximum (untreatable). MAIS represents the maximum
                injury severity, or AIS level, recorded for an occupant (i.e., the
                highest single AIS for a person with one or more injuries).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency's 2019 PAEB test procedure does not include CAMP
                scenario S2 (vehicle turning right and a pedestrian crossing the road),
                and CAMP scenario S3 (vehicle turning left and a pedestrian crossing
                the road). In response to the December 2015 notice, several commenters
                stated that addressing these scenarios with available technology may
                generate a significant number of false positive detections. Such false
                detections could have the unintended consequences of causing hazardous
                situations (e.g., unexpected sudden braking while turning in traffic)
                that could lead drivers to disable their PAEB systems, or even lead to
                an increase in rear-end collisions. The commenters explained that the
                S2 and S3 test scenarios require more sophisticated algorithms as well
                as more robust test methodologies than those required for scenarios S1
                and S4. However, ZF TRW mentioned that ADAS sensors designed to meet
                Euro NCAP's Vulnerable Road Users test procedures would have increased
                fields of view (FOV), which should improve their effectiveness in
                turning scenarios. Others stated that the articulating mannequins may
                not be representative of a real human for all sensing technologies in
                turning scenarios. Most commenters indicated that it was more
                appropriate to focus on the scenarios affording the most significant
                safety benefits first--S1 and S4. Commenters stated that adding the S2
                and S3 scenarios would be more practical when the technology matures.
                NHTSA will continue to evaluate PAEB systems to assess the feasibility
                of expanding the suite of PAEB tests as technological advancements are
                made. The Agency will consider adding these test scenarios (S2 and S3)
                to NCAP in the future once the Agency has repeatable and reliable test
                data to support their inclusion.
                 In the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the S1 test scenario includes
                seven different test conditions--S1a, S1b, S1c, S1d, S1e, S1f, and S1g.
                For these tests, the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40
                kph (24.9 mph). Additionally, the SV also travels at 16 kph (9.9 mph)
                for test conditions S1a, S1b, S1c, and S1d. A pedestrian mannequin
                crosses perpendicular to the subject vehicle's line of travel at 5 kph
                (3.1 mph) for all test conditions, except for S1e, in which the
                mannequin crosses at 8 kph (5.0 mph). In test condition S1a, the SV
                encounters a crossing adult pedestrian mannequin walking from the
                nearside (i.e., the passenger's side of the vehicle) with 25 percent
                overlap of the vehicle.\106\ In test conditions S1b and S1c, the SV
                encounters a crossing adult pedestrian walking from the nearside with
                50 percent and 75 percent overlap of the vehicle, respectively. In test
                condition S1d, the SV encounters a crossing child pedestrian mannequin
                running from behind parked vehicles from the nearside with 50 percent
                overlap of the vehicle. In test condition S1e, the SV encounters a
                crossing adult pedestrian running from the ``offside'' (i.e., the
                driver's side of the vehicle) with 50 percent overlap of the vehicle.
                In test condition S1f, the SV encounters a crossing adult pedestrian
                walking from the nearside that stops short (-25% overlap) of entering
                the vehicle's path. In test condition S1g, the SV encounters a crossing
                adult pedestrian walking from the nearside that clears the vehicle's
                path (125% overlap).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \106\ Overlap is defined as the percent of the vehicle's width
                that the pedestrian would traverse prior to impact if the vehicle's
                speed and pedestrian's speed remain constant.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The S4 test scenario in the 2019 PAEB test procedure includes three
                different test conditions--S4a, S4b, and S4c. In this test scenario,
                the SV travels in a straight, forward direction at 40 kph (24.9 mph)
                and/or 16 kph (9.9 mph) (for test conditions S4a and S4b) and a
                pedestrian mannequin moves parallel to the flow of traffic at 5 kph
                (3.1 mph) (for test condition S4c) or is stationary (for test condition
                S4a and S4b) in front of the SV. For all S4 test conditions, the SV is
                aligned to impact the pedestrian at 25 percent overlap. In test
                condition S4a, the SV encounters an adult pedestrian standing in front
                of the vehicle on the nearside of the road facing away from the
                approaching SV. In test condition S4b, the SV encounters an adult
                pedestrian standing in front of the vehicle on the nearside of the road
                facing towards the approaching SV. In test condition S4c, the SV
                encounters an adult pedestrian walking in front of the vehicle on the
                nearside of the road facing away from the approaching SV.
                [[Page 13471]]
                 The Agency is proposing to make several changes to the 2019 PAEB
                test procedure for the purpose of adopting it for use in NCAP. These
                changes involve the pedestrian mannequins, test speeds and included
                test conditions, the specified lighting conditions, and the number of
                test trials required to be conducted for each test condition.
                 The first change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB
                test procedure concerns the pedestrian targets. As was recommended by
                several commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice, the
                Agency proposes to utilize state-of-the-art mannequins with
                articulated, moving legs, instead of the posable child and adult
                pedestrian test mannequins specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure.
                NHTSA believes that the articulating pedestrian targets are more
                representative of walking pedestrians and expects that these more
                realistic targets will encourage development of PAEB systems that
                detect, classify, and respond to pedestrians more accurately and
                effectively. In turn, this should allow manufacturers to improve the
                effectiveness of current PAEB systems. The Agency also recognizes that
                adopting the child and adult articulating targets would harmonize with
                other major consumer information-focused entities that use articulating
                mannequins, such as Euro NCAP and IIHS. The Bipartisan Infrastructure
                Law mandated that NHTSA identify opportunities where NCAP would
                ``benefit from harmonization with third-party safety rating programs,''
                and the Agency believes that the pedestrian mannequins represent one
                such opportunity.
                 The second change the Agency is proposing to make to the 2019 PAEB
                test procedure for incorporation into NCAP involves test speeds. The
                test speeds specified in the 2019 PAEB test procedure correspond to a
                relatively small percentage of crashes that result in pedestrian
                injuries and fatalities. Volpe's analysis of 2011-2015 FARS and GES
                crash data sets showed that 9 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 25
                percent of pedestrian injuries resulted from crashes that occurred on
                roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 88
                percent of fatalities and 43 percent of injuries occurred for crashes
                on roadways with posted speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25
                mph).107 108 For crashes that occurred on roadways where the
                travel speed was known, 6 percent of pedestrian fatalities and 19
                percent of pedestrian injuries were reported for travel speeds of 40.2
                kph (25 mph) or less, whereas 36 percent of fatalities and 7 percent of
                injuries occurred for travel speeds greater than 40.2 kph (25
                mph).\109\ NHTSA notes that speeding was a factor in only 5 percent of
                the fatal pedestrian crashes, which suggests that the posted speed
                could correlate closely with the travel speed of the vehicle prior to
                impact with the pedestrian.110 111
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \107\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \108\ The posted speed limit was either not reported or was
                unknown in 4 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 29 percent of
                pedestrian crashes that resulted in injuries.
                 \109\ The travel speed was either not reported or was unknown in
                59 percent of fatal pedestrian crashes and 72 percent of pedestrian
                crashes that resulted in injuries.
                 \110\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \111\ In 4 percent of pedestrian crashes, it was unknown or not
                reported whether speeding was a factor.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As Volpe's analysis focused on 2011-2015 FARS and GES crash data
                sets, it is likely that most vehicles studied were not equipped with
                PAEB systems. Recently, IIHS studied approximately 1,500 police-
                reported crashes involving a wide variety of 2017-2020 model year
                vehicles from various manufacturers to examine the effects of PAEB
                systems on real-world pedestrian crashes.\112\ In this study, the
                Institute found that ``pedestrian AEB was associated with a 32 percent
                reduction in the odds of a pedestrian crash on roads with speed limits
                of 25 mph or less and a 34 percent reduction on roads with 30-35 mph
                limits, but no reduction at all on roads with speed limits of 50 mph or
                higher. . .''. These findings highlight the limitations of existing
                PAEB systems and the importance of adopting higher test speeds for PAEB
                testing (where feasible) to encourage additional safety improvement.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \112\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic
                emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
                Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 To establish feasible speed thresholds for adoption in its PAEB
                test procedure, the Agency conducted a series of tests on a selection
                of MY 2020 vehicles from various manufacturers to assess the
                operational range and performance of current PAEB systems. Vehicles for
                the PAEB characterization tests were selected with the intent of
                testing a variety of vehicle makes, types, sizes; global and domestic
                products; and forward-facing sensor types (camera only, stereo camera,
                fused camera plus radar, etc.) for a given manufacturer and across all
                manufacturers.
                 For the purpose of this study, the Agency used the 2019 PAEB test
                procedure, but employed the articulating mannequins in lieu of the
                posable mannequins and expanded the test procedure specifications to
                include increased vehicle test speeds for the S1b, S1d, S1e, S4a, and
                S4c test conditions. For these tests, the SV speed was incrementally
                increased to identify when each SV reached its operational limits and
                did not respond to the pedestrian target. Before the tests were
                initiated, the maximum test speeds for the S1 and S4 scenarios were set
                to 60 kph (37.2 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph), respectively.\113\ These
                maximum speeds are consistent with Euro NCAP's AEB Vulnerable Road User
                test protocol and correspond to up to 74 percent of fatal pedestrian
                crashes and 65 percent of injurious pedestrian crashes that occurred on
                U.S. roadways, per Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS and GES analysis of posted
                speed data.\114\ When no or late intervention occurred for a vehicle
                and test condition (i.e., combination of test scenario and speed),
                NHTSA repeated the test condition at a test speed that was 5 kph (3.1
                mph) lower. This reduced speed defined the system's upper capabilities.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \113\ These test speeds represent the maximum test speeds
                potentially utilized for a given test condition. The actual speeds
                used for a given combination of vehicle and test condition depended
                on observed PAEB system performance.
                 \114\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). (2019,
                July). TEST PROTOCOL--AEB VRU systems 3.0.2.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 A test matrix of the PAEB characterization study regarding test
                speed is provided below.
                 Full PAEB test series (includes S1 a-g and S4 a-c)
                 Daytime light conditions, articulating dummies, and additional SV
                test speeds in kph (mph) for S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c, as shown in
                Table 4.
                [[Page 13472]]
                 Table 4--Complete Matrix of the PAEB Characterization Study
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Scenario S1a S1b S1c S1d S1e S1f S1g S4a S4b S4c
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph)........... 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
                 40.0/24.9 20.0/12.4 40.0/24.9 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 ......... ......... 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
                 ......... 30.0/18.6 ......... 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 ......... ......... 50.0/31.1 ......... 50.0/31.1
                 ......... 40.0/24.9 ......... 40.0/24.9 ......... ......... ......... 60.0/37.3 ......... 60.0/37.3
                 ......... 50.0/31.1 ......... 50.0/31.1 ......... ......... ......... 70.0/43.5 ......... 70.0/43.5
                 ......... 60.0/37.3 ......... 60.0/37.3 ......... ......... ......... 80.0/49.7 ......... 80.0/49.7
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency's characterization testing showed that many MY 2020
                vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid impacting the pedestrian
                mannequins at higher test speeds than those specified in the 2019 PAEB
                test procedure. In fact, several vehicles repeatably achieved full
                crash avoidance at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) or higher for the
                assessed S1 and S4 test conditions. Test reports related to this
                testing can be found in the docket for this notice.
                 In light of these results, NHTSA is proposing to increase the
                maximum SV test speed from the 40 kph (24.9 mph) specified in the 2019
                PAEB test procedure to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for all PAEB test conditions
                the Agency is proposing to include in NCAP. These include S1a-e and
                S4a-c. The Agency notes that it is not proposing to include PAEB false
                positive test conditions (i.e., S1f and S1g) in NCAP at this time, but
                is requesting comment on whether the omission of these test conditions
                is appropriate. NHTSA also notes that 60 kph (37.3 mph) is the maximum
                vehicle speed Euro NCAP uses to assess PAEB performance for test
                conditions that are similar to, if not identical to, some of those
                proposed for use in NCAP, namely S1a, c, d, and e, and S4c. Adopting
                this higher test speed will also drive improved PAEB system performance
                to address a larger portion of real-world fatalities and injuries.
                 The Agency is also proposing a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2
                mph) for all of the proposed test scenarios. Although this speed is
                lower than the minimum test speed used in the 2019 PAEB test procedure
                and in its characterization testing (i.e., 16 kph (9.9 mph)), it is the
                minimum test speed specified in Euro NCAP's pedestrian tests, with the
                exception of Euro NCAP's Car-to-Pedestrian Longitudinal Adult (CPLA)
                scenario. The minimum vehicle test speed for the CPLA scenario, which
                is similar to the Agency's PAEB S4c test scenario, is 20 kph (12.4
                mph).\115\ As stated earlier, in accordance with the Bipartisan
                Infrastructure Law, the Agency is taking steps to harmonize with
                existing consumer information rating programs where possible and when
                appropriate. NHTSA also believes that reducing the minimum test speed
                to 10 kph (6.2 mph) will assure PAEB system functionality for crashes
                that may still cause injuries.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \115\ One difference in the Agency's proposed S4c test condition
                and Euro NCAP's CPLA test condition is the amount of pedestrian
                overlap with the vehicle at the lower speed (NHTSA uses a 25 percent
                overlap while a 50 percent overlap is used in Euro NCAP's CPLA
                test). NHTSA believes that for the 25 percent overlap condition in
                S4c, a minimum test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) is appropriate and
                does not see a reason to deviate from the minimum test speed (10 kph
                (6.2 mph)) proposed for the other PAEB test conditions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In an effort to harmonize with other consumer information programs
                on vehicle safety, NHTSA is also proposing to adopt Euro NCAP's
                approach to assessing vehicles' PAEB system performance by
                incrementally increasing the SV speed from the minimum test speed for a
                given scenario to the maximum. The Agency is proposing 10 kph (6.2 mph)
                increments for this progression in test speed. In their comments to the
                December 2015 notice, Global Automakers and Mobileye encouraged NHTSA
                to expand the applicability of the PAEB tests, particularly the S1
                scenario, to include a broader range of test speeds because pedestrian
                injuries occurred over a wide range of crash speeds, as the Agency has
                also indicated. The organizations also mentioned that PAEB system
                performance reflects a trade-off between FOV and collision speed/
                detection distance. Systems that have a narrow FOV are more effective
                at addressing higher speed crashes since they can see further, and
                systems that have a wider FOV are more effective at addressing lower
                speed impacts.
                 As its third change to the 2019 PAEB test procedure, the Agency is
                proposing to expand PAEB evaluation to include different lighting
                conditions. NHTSA's PAEB characterization study included performance
                assessments for dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime testing), in
                addition to the daylight conditions specified in the 2019 PAEB test
                procedure, for the same test vehicles. For each vehicle model tested,
                one set of tests was conducted with the pedestrian mannequin
                illuminated only by the vehicle's lower beams and a second set of tests
                with the pedestrian mannequin illuminated by the upper beams. The area
                where the mannequin was located was not provided any additional (i.e.,
                external) light source. This repeat testing was conducted because
                Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that 36 percent of pedestrian
                fatalities occurred in the dark with no overhead lights. Test matrices
                of the PAEB characterization study with respect to dark lighting
                conditions are provided in Tables 5 and 6.
                 PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
                 Dark conditions with lower beams, articulating dummies, and
                additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 5.
                 Table 5--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Lower Beams
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph). 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
                 20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
                 30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1
                 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 .............. 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3
                 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 .............. 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5
                 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 .............. 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                [[Page 13473]]
                 PAEB test series (includes S1b, d, and e, and S4a and c)
                 Dark conditions with upper beams, articulating dummies, and
                additional SV test speeds in kph (mph), are shown in Table 6.
                 Table 6--PAEB Test Series for Dark Conditions With Upper Beams
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Scenario S1b S1d S1e S4a S4c
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Subject Vehicle Speed (kph/mph). 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9 40.0/24.9 16.0/9.9 16.0/9.9
                 20.0/12.4 20.0/12.4 50.0/31.1 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9
                 30.0/18.6 30.0/18.6 60.0/37.3 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1
                 40.0/24.9 40.0/24.9 .............. 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3
                 50.0/31.1 50.0/31.1 .............. 70.0/43.5 70.0/43.5
                 60.0/37.3 60.0/37.3 .............. 80.0/49.7 80.0/49.7
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency's characterization testing (Tables 5 and 6) revealed
                that PAEB system performance generally degraded in dark conditions
                compared to daylight conditions. Additionally, certain test conditions,
                such as S1d and S1e, were particularly challenging in dark conditions,
                especially when the vehicle's lower beams were used. However, a few
                vehicles were able to repeatedly avoid contact with the pedestrian
                mannequins at speeds up to 60 kph (37.3 mph) for certain test
                conditions when the vehicles' lower beams provided the only source of
                light.
                 NHTSA's findings for PAEB system performance during testing align
                generally well with those from IIHS' recent system effectiveness study
                for 2017-2020 model year vehicles. IIHS found that although PAEB
                systems were associated with a 32 percent reduction in pedestrian
                crashes occurring during daylight, and a 33 percent reduction in
                pedestrian crashes for areas with artificial lighting during dawn,
                dusk, or at night, there was no evidence that PAEB systems were
                effective at nighttime without street lighting.\116\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \116\ Cicchino, J.B. (2022, February), Effects of automatic
                emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
                Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Based on the results of the PAEB characterization study and IIHS'
                findings in its recent study, NHTSA is proposing to perform the
                proposed test conditions (S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under daylight conditions
                and under dark conditions with the vehicle's lower beams. NHTSA notes
                that Euro NCAP conducts PAEB testing that is similar to the Agency's
                S4c test condition under dark conditions with vehicles' upper beams in
                use. Because the Agency cannot be assured that a vehicle's upper beams
                are in use during nighttime (i.e., dark lighting conditions) real-world
                driving, NHTSA is proposing only to perform nighttime PAEB assessments
                using vehicles' lower beams for all test conditions included in NCAP at
                this time. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting
                systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive
                driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled to
                automatically engage during the nighttime PAEB assessment. The Agency
                believes this approach covers the two extreme light conditions and as
                such, information regarding performance with the upper beams or under
                infrastructure lighting can be reasonably inferred.
                 The Agency recognizes that Euro NCAP performs testing similar to
                S1a and S1c at speeds of 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph) in dark
                conditions with the SV lower beams in use; however, overhead
                streetlights are also used in these tests to provide additional light
                source. To study potential performance differences attributable to the
                use of overhead lights during dark conditions, NHTSA performed
                additional testing for PAEB scenarios S1 b, d, and e and S4 a and c for
                a subset of test speeds, 16 kph (9.9 mph) and 40 kph (24.9 mph), for
                two of the MY 2020 vehicles used in its initial characterization study.
                This study was performed using the vehicles' lower beams under dark
                conditions with overhead lights. For this limited testing, the Agency
                observed slightly better PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions
                with overhead lights than in dark lighting conditions without overhead
                lights.
                 NHTSA believes that testing with the vehicles' lower beams in dark
                conditions without overhead lights is appropriate, particularly at
                higher test speeds, as it would assure system performance for real-
                world situations where visibility is the most limited. Furthermore, as
                mentioned previously, dark lighting conditions with no overhead lights
                represented 36 percent of pedestrian fatalities and dark lighting
                conditions with overhead lights represented 39 percent of pedestrian
                fatalities in Volpe's 2011-2015 FARS data set. Additionally, PAEB
                systems that meet the performance test specifications under dark
                lighting conditions with no overhead lights are likely to meet the
                performance specifications under dark lighting conditions with overhead
                lights. Thus, the Agency believes assessment of PAEB systems under dark
                conditions with no overhead lights and with the vehicle's lower beams
                will encourage vehicle manufacturers to make design improvements to
                address a significant portion of crashes that currently result in
                pedestrian fatalities.
                 For the PAEB performance criteria, NHTSA is proposing that a
                vehicle must achieve complete crash avoidance (i.e., have no contact
                with the pedestrian mannequin) in order to pass a test trial conducted
                at each specified test speed (i.e., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 kph
                (6.2, 12.4, 18.6, 24.9, 31.1, and 37.3 mph)) for each test condition
                (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). NHTSA believes that this
                approach, used in conjunction with an incremental increase in SV speed,
                should limit damage to the pedestrian mannequin and/or the SV during
                testing.
                 Along these lines, NHTSA is proposing a fourth change to the 2019
                PAEB test procedure regarding the number of test trials conducted for
                each combination of test condition and test speed. The 2019 PAEB test
                procedure specifies seven test trials be conducted for each test speed
                under each test condition. The Agency is proposing, however, to not
                require that more than one test be conducted per test speed and test
                condition combination if certain criteria are met, and is proposing
                that the pass rate for a given test speed will be dependent on whether
                additional test trials are required to be performed.\117\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \117\ This is a divergence from assessment of LKS, BSW, and BSI
                where a vehicle must meet performance requirements for five out of
                seven valid test trials for a particular test condition to pass that
                test condition.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated at the
                10 kph (6.2 mph) minimum speed. To achieve a pass result, the test must
                be valid (i.e., all test specification and tolerances satisfied), and
                the SV must not contact
                [[Page 13474]]
                the pedestrian mannequin. If the SV does not contact the pedestrian
                mannequin during the first valid test, the test speed is incrementally
                increased by 10 kph (6.2 mph), and the next test in the sequence is
                performed. Unless the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, this
                iterative process continues until a maximum test speed of 60 kph (37.3
                mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin, and the
                relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and pedestrian mannequin
                is less than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the
                Agency will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same
                speed for which the impact occurred. The vehicle must not contact the
                pedestrian mannequin for at least three out of the five test trials
                performed at that same speed to pass that specific combination of test
                condition and test speed.\118\ If the SV contacts the pedestrian
                mannequin during a valid test of a test condition (whether it be the
                first test performed for a particular test speed or a subsequent test
                trial at that same speed), and the relative impact velocity exceeds 50
                percent of the initial speed of the SV, no additional test trials will
                be conducted at the given test speed and test condition and the SV is
                considered to have failed the test condition at that specific test
                speed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \118\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e.,
                a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five
                trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition)
                is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for PAEB systems that
                differs from the evaluation criteria proposed for the other four
                proposed ADAS technologies discussed earlier in an attempt to reduce
                test burden, but still ensure that passing systems include robust
                designs that will afford an enhanced level of safety. NHTSA recognizes
                that it is proposing a large number of PAEB test conditions for
                inclusion in NCAP--eight total. The Agency also acknowledges that these
                test conditions must be repeated for multiple test speeds and lighting
                conditions, which inherently imposes additional test burden. Therefore,
                the Agency believes that it is reasonable to reduce the number of test
                trials that must be conducted at a given test speed for a particular
                test condition since the SV's PAEB system will also be assessed at
                subsequent test speeds, which would help system robustness. This would
                further be supported by the Agency's proposal to require that five test
                trials be performed in instances where the SV is unable to meet the no
                contact performance requirement in the initial valid trial for that
                combination of test condition and speed.
                 Although NHTSA believes that the assessment approach for PAEB
                systems proposed herein is the most reasonable one, the Agency is
                requesting comment on whether it should instead pursue an alternative
                approach, such as conducting seven trials for each test condition and
                speed combination, and requiring that five of the seven trials meet the
                no contact performance criterion. Again, this latter approach would be
                similar to the one proposed for the other ADAS technologies discussed
                earlier.
                 Previously, NHTSA noted that it did not conduct the S2 and S3 test
                scenarios as part of the characterization study and is not proposing
                these test scenarios for inclusion in this proposal. The Agency agrees
                with the comments mentioned previously that the majority of vehicles in
                the U.S. fleet are not currently equipped with sensing systems capable
                of detecting pedestrians while a vehicle is turning, as they do not
                have the necessary FOV. The American Automobile Association (AAA) \119\
                recently conducted PAEB tests, including an S2 scenario where the
                vehicle is turning right with an adult pedestrian crossing. The PAEB
                systems in four model year 2019 vehicles that were tested did not react
                to the test targets during a testing scenario that is similar to
                NHTSA's S2 scenario described above, resulting in all test vehicles
                colliding with the pedestrian target. These systems performed better in
                a scenario that was similar to NHTSA's S1; however, the vehicles
                avoided a collision with the pedestrian target 40 percent of the time
                at a 32.2 kph (20 mph) test speed and nearly all the time at a 48.3 kph
                (30 mph) test speed. Furthermore, in its recent study on PAEB system
                effectiveness, IIHS found that while AEB with pedestrian detection was
                associated with significant reductions in pedestrian crash risk (~27
                percent) and pedestrian injury crash risk (~30 percent), there was no
                evidence to suggest that existing systems were effective while the
                PAEB-equipped vehicle was turning.\120\ Considering these findings,
                NHTSA believes that it is more beneficial at this time to focus our
                efforts on performing PAEB testing at higher speeds and with various
                lighting conditions using the proposed S1 and S4 test scenarios.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \119\ American Automobile Association (2019, October), Automatic
                emergency braking with pedestrian detection, https://www.aaa.com/AAA/common/aar/files/Research-Report-Pedestrian-Detection.pdf.
                 \120\ Cicchino, J. B (2022, February), Effects of automatic
                emergency braking systems on pedestrian crash risk, Insurance
                Institute for Highway Safety, https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/bibliography/2243.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In the context of the NCAP PAEB testing program, NHTSA is seeking
                comment on the following:
                 (23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60 kph
                (37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most
                appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
                 (24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4 a-c
                in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all
                test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC notice to
                address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test only certain
                scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but still address an
                adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or why not? If it is not
                necessary for the Agency to perform all test scenarios or test
                conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be assessed? Although
                they are not currently proposed for inclusion, should the Agency also
                adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f and S1g? Why or why not?
                 (25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and
                injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has proposed
                to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e., S1 a-e and
                S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime) in addition to
                daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60
                kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's lower beams would
                provide the source of light during the nighttime assessments. However,
                if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting systems such as
                semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or adaptive driving beam head
                lighting system, they shall be enabled to automatically engage during
                the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach appropriate?
                Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB evaluation tests with
                only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or not use any other
                advanced lighting systems?
                 (26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under dark
                conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If yes,
                should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the proposed
                dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's lower beams
                along with any advanced lighting system enabled to automatically
                engage, or in lieu of the proposed dark testing condition?
                [[Page 13475]]
                Should the Agency also evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting
                conditions with overhead lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios,
                conditions, and speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark
                lighting conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
                 (27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to perform
                one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the vehicle's
                relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the
                subject vehicle for the given test condition. If contact occurs and if
                the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less than or equal to 50
                percent of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed
                and test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at
                the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the
                passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three out
                of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next
                incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess PAEB
                system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test trials
                be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If a certain
                number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test trials should
                be conducted, and why?
                 (28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for
                the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
                should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum
                allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or all of the proposed
                test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If
                yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions,
                what speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum
                allowable impact speed would be appropriate?
                 (29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the initial
                trial for a given test condition and test speed combination, NHTSA
                proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the relative impact
                velocity observed during that trial is less than or equal to 50 percent
                of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed of 60 kph (37.3 mph),
                this maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph),
                and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph), the maximum relative impact
                velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1 mph). Is this an appropriate limit on
                the maximum relative impact velocity for the proposed range of test
                speeds? If not, why? Note that the tests in Global Technical Regulation
                (GTR) No. 9 for pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a
                pedestrian impact at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
                 (30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test
                speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in
                increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test
                conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in a
                total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to
                be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for both
                light conditions. The Agency mentions later, in the ADAS Ratings System
                section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done currently, to
                give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS
                technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test
                requirements for each ADAS technology included in NCAP until it issues
                (1) a final decision notice announcing the new ADAS rating system and
                (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating section of the vehicle
                window sticker (Monroney label). For the purposes of providing credit
                for a technology using check marks, what is an appropriate minimum
                overall pass rate for PAEB performance evaluation? For example, should
                a vehicle be said to meet the PAEB performance requirements if it
                passes two-thirds of the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and
                test speeds for the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique
                combinations of test conditions and test speeds)?
                 (31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3
                scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results of
                AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks comment on
                an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3 scenarios into the
                Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle manufacturers
                information on any currently available models designed to address, and
                ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of, the S2 and S3
                scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future program upgrade.
                 (32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the
                PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
                 (33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions, the
                Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems during
                nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world pedestrian
                fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and information
                available to the public that the Agency can evaluate under nighttime
                conditions?
                 (34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as
                part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
                 (35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test procedure
                that need further refinement or clarification before adoption? If so,
                what additional refinement or clarification is necessary, and why?
                 In addition to the fleet characterization research conducted for
                this upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is conducting additional research that
                may be used to support future program enhancements. One such research
                project is designed to address injuries and fatalities for other
                vulnerable road users, specifically cyclists.\121\ While some PAEB
                systems may be capable of detecting cyclists and activating to avoid a
                crash, NHTSA's current PAEB test procedure does not include a specific
                cyclist component. However, since the number of cyclists killed on U.S.
                roads continues to rise,\122\ the Agency plans to perform research to
                determine the viability of Euro NCAP's AEB cyclist tests. NHTSA will
                then compare test data with preliminary crash populations to assess the
                adequacy of the test procedure for the U.S. vehicle fleet and roadway
                system. The Euro NCAP test includes four test scenarios: One in which
                the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side; one in
                which the cyclist crosses in front of the vehicle from the near-side
                from behind an obstruction; one in which the cyclist crosses in front
                of the vehicle from the far-side; and the other in which the cyclist
                travels in the same direction as the vehicle. The latter test scenario
                is repeated for both 25 percent and 50 percent overlaps, while the
                first three scenarios are conducted at 50 percent overlap (i.e., the
                vehicle strikes the bicyclist at 50 percent of the vehicle's width). In
                all tests, a cyclist target comprised of an articulating dummy, which
                replicates the pedaling action of a cyclist, is seated on a bicycle
                mounted on a moving platform.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \121\ NHTSA notes that this research will also include
                motorcycles.
                 \122\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis (2019, June),
                Bicyclists and other cyclists: 2017 data (Traffic Safety Facts.
                Report No. DOT HS 812 765), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic
                Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA believes that detecting cyclists is technically more
                challenging for vehicle AEB systems than detecting pedestrians since
                cyclists often move at higher speeds. Vehicles must not only be
                equipped with sensors that have wider fields of view (similar to that
                required for the turning PAEB test scenarios), but must also process
                information more quickly as to whether
                [[Page 13476]]
                to alert the driver and/or automatically brake.
                 In the context of this additional research testing, NHTSA requests
                comment on the following:
                 (36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists killed
                on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems in
                detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate
                timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from
                vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models
                that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test
                procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP
                program upgrade.
                 (37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are
                there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash
                population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?
                D. Updating Forward Collision Prevention Technologies
                 As previously mentioned, NHTSA will retain the currently available
                ADAS technologies (forward collision warning, crash imminent braking
                and dynamic brake support) designed to address forward collisions
                (rear-end crashes) in NCAP's crash avoidance program. As discussed in
                NHTSA's March 2019 study, these technologies have the potential to
                prevent or mitigate eight rear-end pre-crash scenarios, which
                represented approximately 1.70 million crashes annually, on average, or
                29.4 percent of all crashes that occurred on U.S. roadways. As shown in
                Table A-1, these crashes resulted in 1,275 fatalities, on average, and
                883,386 MAIS 1-5 injuries annually, which represented 3.8 percent of
                all fatalities and 31.5 percent of all injuries, respectively.\123\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \123\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653). Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 FCW technology evaluations were introduced into NCAP starting with
                model year 2011 vehicles,\124\ while CIB and DBS systems (referred to
                collectively as Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)) were added to the
                program starting with model year 2018 vehicles.\125\ These technologies
                are not being offered as standard equipment on all passenger vehicles,
                so it remains important for NCAP to recommend the technologies and
                inform shoppers which vehicles have the technologies. Further, NHTSA
                observed performance test failures for each of these technologies
                during NCAP's model year 2019 vehicle performance verification testing;
                \126\ thus, NCAP should continue to inform shoppers as to which systems
                perform to NHTSA's benchmark. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in the
                next few sections, NHTSA believes there are opportunities for updating
                the current NCAP performance requirements for these three technologies.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \124\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008).
                 \125\ 80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                 \126\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket Nos. NHTSA-2010-0093
                and NHTSA-2015-0006. (Only one test failure was observed for FCW.)
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                1. Forward Collision Warning (FCW)
                 An FCW system is an ADAS technology that monitors a vehicle's
                speed, the speed of the vehicle in front of it, and the distance
                between the two vehicles. If the FCW system determines that the
                distance from the driver's vehicle to the vehicle in front of it is too
                short, and the closing velocity between the two vehicles is too high,
                the system warns the driver of an impending rear-end collision.
                 Typically, FCW systems are comprised of two components: A sensing
                system, which can detect a vehicle in front of the driver's vehicle;
                and a warning system, which alerts the driver to a potential crash
                threat. The sensing portion of the system may consist of forward-
                looking radar, lidar, camera systems, or a combination of these. The
                warning system may provide drivers with a visual display, such as a
                light on the dash, an audible signal (e.g., buzzer or chime), and/or a
                haptic signal that provides tactile feedback to the driver (e.g., rapid
                vibrations of the seat pan or steering wheel) to alert the driver of an
                impending crash so that they may manually intervene (e.g., apply the
                vehicle's brakes or make an evasive steering maneuver) to avoid or
                mitigate the crash.
                 Currently, NCAP's FCW test procedure \127\ consists of three
                scenarios that simulate the most frequent types of rear-end crashes.
                These include: Lead vehicle stopped (LVS), lead vehicle decelerating
                (LVD), and lead vehicle moving (LVM) scenarios. In each scenario, the
                vehicle being evaluated is the SV, and the vehicle positioned directly
                in front of the SV, a production mid-size passenger car, is the POV.
                The time-to-collision (TTC) criteria prescribed for each scenario
                represent the time needed for a driver to perceive an impending rear-
                end crash, decide the corrective action, and respond with the
                appropriate mitigating action. The TTC for each scenario is calculated
                by considering the speed of the SV relative to the POV at the time of
                the FCW alert. If the FCW system fails to provide an alert within the
                required time during testing, the professional test driver brakes or
                steers away to avoid a collision. A short description of each test
                scenario and the requirements for a passing result based on TTC is
                provided below:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \127\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2013,
                February). Forward collision warning system confirmation test.
                https://www.regulations.gov. Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0134.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 LVS--The SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road.
                The SV is moving at 72.4 kph (45 mph), and the POV is stationary. To
                pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least
                2.1 s.
                 LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
                deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
                are both driven at 72.4 kph (45 mph) with an initial headway of 30.0 m
                (98.4 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
                deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. To pass this test, the SV must
                issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least 2.4 s.
                 LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
                front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV are driven at constant
                speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. To
                pass this test, the SV must issue an FCW alert when the TTC is at least
                2.0 s.
                 Each scenario is conducted up to seven times. To pass the NCAP
                system performance criteria, the SV must pass at least five out of
                seven trials \128\ for each of the three test scenarios.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \128\ As noted in the Agency's 2015 AEB final decision notice
                (80 FR 68618 (Nov. 5, 2015)), the Agency believes passing five out
                of seven tests successfully discriminates between functional systems
                versus non-functional systems. To date, the Agency allows two
                failures out of seven attempts to afford some flexibility in
                including emerging technologies into the NCAP program. Furthermore,
                NHTSA test laboratories have experienced unpredictable vehicle
                responses due to the vehicle algorithm designs. Test laboratories
                have observed systems that improve their performance with use,
                systems degrading and shutting down when they do not see other
                vehicles, and systems failing to re-activate if the vehicle is not
                cycled through an ignition cycle.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NCAP's FCW test scenarios are directly related to real-world crash
                data. From its analysis of 2011 to 2015 FARS and GES data, the Agency
                found that crashes analogous to the LVS test scenario, where a struck
                vehicle was stopped at the time of impact, occurred in 65 percent of
                the rear-end crashes studied.\129\ The LVD scenario, in which
                [[Page 13477]]
                the struck vehicle was decelerating at the time of impact, occurred in
                22 percent of the rear-end crashes, and the LVM scenario, in which the
                struck vehicle was moving at a constant, but slower, speed compared to
                the striking vehicle at impact, occurred in 10 percent of the rear-end
                crashes. Collectively, these test scenarios represented 97 percent of
                rear-end crashes. With respect to test speed, in its independent review
                of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe concluded that 28
                percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 63 percent of all rear-end
                crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 72.4 kph (45
                mph) or less.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \129\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Currently, NHTSA gives credit on its website by assigning a check
                mark to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that send visual, audible,
                and/or haptic alerts and meet the TTC requirements. However, the
                Agency's research has shown that presenting drivers with an audible
                warning in medium or high urgency situations significantly reduced
                crash severity relative to visual and tactile (or haptic) warnings,
                which did not differ.\130\ This being said, in a large-scale field test
                of FCW and LDW systems on model year 2013 Chevrolet and Cadillac
                vehicles, the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute
                (UMTRI) and GM found that GM's Safety Alert Seat, which provides haptic
                seat vibration pulses, increased driver acceptance of both FCW and LDW
                systems compared to audible alerts.\131\ The study concluded that the
                FCW system was turned off 6 percent of the time when the Safety Alert
                Seat was selected (rather than audible alerts), whereas it was turned
                off 17 percent of the time when only audible alerts were available. In
                light of these findings, the Agency seeks comment on whether to give
                credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that only provide a
                passing audible alert, or whether it should also give credit to those
                systems that only provide passing haptic alerts.\132\ If the Agency
                elects to give credit to vehicles with haptic alerts, are there certain
                haptic alert types that should be excluded from consideration (e.g.,
                because they may be such a nuisance to drivers that they may be more
                likely to disable the system)? NHTSA also seeks comment on whether it
                should no longer give credit to FCW-equipped vehicles that offer only
                visual FCW alerts.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \130\ Lerner, N., Robinson, E., Singer, J., Jenness, J., Huey,
                R., Baldwin, C., & Fitch, G. (2014, September), Human factors for
                connected vehicles: Effective warning interface research findings
                (Report No. DOT HS 812 068), Washington, DC: National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \131\ Flannagan, C., LeBlanc, D., Bogard, S., Nobukawa, K.,
                Narayanaswamy, P., Leslie, A., Kiefer, R., Marchione, M., Beck, C.,
                and Lobes, K. (2016, February), Large-scale field test of forward
                collision alert and lane departure warning systems (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 247), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \132\ The Agency would give credit to FCW systems that have both
                passing audible and haptic alerts if both alert types were
                available. However, if a vehicle with such a system provided only a
                passing haptic alert and the Agency decided only to give credit to
                systems that provided passing audible alerts, then the vehicle would
                not receive credit as having met the Agency's FCW test requirements.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NCAP's current FCW test procedure states that if an FCW system
                provides a warning timing adjustment setting for the driver, at least
                one timing setting must meet the TTC warning criteria specified in the
                procedure. Therefore, if a vehicle is equipped with a warning timing
                adjustment, only the most conservative (i.e., earliest) warning setting
                is tested. Selecting the most conservative setting is beneficial for
                track testing where the driver of the SV must steer and/or brake to
                avoid a crash with the POV after the FCW alert is issued. However, the
                Agency is concerned that many consumers may not adjust the warning
                timing setting for FCW alerts. Furthermore, consumers that choose to
                adjust the alert timing may be unlikely to select the earliest setting,
                as this setting is most likely to result in false positive alerts
                (i.e., nuisance alerts) during real-world operation.\133\ The Agency
                also recognizes that the earliest FCW setting can be used to pass the
                NCAP test--essentially allowing a vehicle to get NCAP credit even
                though it may not otherwise earn credit if the later warning settings
                are tested. Therefore, by testing the earliest timing adjustment
                setting, the Agency's FCW performance assessment may not be indicative
                of many drivers' real-world experiences.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \133\ Nodine, E., Fisher, D., Golembiewski, G., Armstrong, C.,
                Lam, A., Jeffers, M.A., Najm, W., Miller, S., Jackson, S., and
                Kehoe, N. (2019, May), Indicators of driver adaptation to forward
                collision warnings: A naturalistic driving evaluation (Report No.
                DOT HS 812 611), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 This concern was previously addressed in NHTSA's 2015 AEB final
                decision notice, but the Agency has not since made updates to its FCW
                test procedure.\134\ In that notice, the Agency stated that because
                NCAP is a consumer information program, it should test vehicles as
                delivered, using the factory default FCW warning adjustment setting for
                FCW and AEB testing, including PAEB. Although the Agency believes there
                is still merit to testing the default setting, NHTSA tentatively
                believes testing the middle alert setting may be more appropriate.
                Selection of the middle or next latest alert setting for testing would
                harmonize with Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol, thus
                potentially driving costs down for manufacturers and attempting to
                ensure that consumers in both the U.S. and European markets benefit
                from similar FCW system settings.\135\ Harmonization was a common theme
                among commenters responding to NCAP's December 2015 notice, with most
                vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and other industry groups requesting
                that NHTSA harmonize test procedures, test targets, and test
                requirements with other NCAPs around the world, particularly Euro NCAP.
                As mentioned earlier, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also required
                that NHTSA consider harmonization with third-party safety rating
                programs when possible. In light of these considerations, the Agency is
                proposing that it is most appropriate to test the middle (or next
                latest) FCW system setting in lieu of the default setting when
                performing FCW, CIB, DBS, and PAEB NCAP tests on vehicles that offer
                multiple FCW timing adjustment settings.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \134\ 80 FR 68614 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                 \135\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (2019,
                July), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.2. See
                section 7.4.1.1.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 FCW systems have been recognized as the first generation of ADAS
                technologies designed to help drivers avoid an impending rear-end
                collision. In 2008, when NHTSA decided to include ADAS in the NCAP
                program, FCW was selected because the Agency believed (1) this
                technology addressed a major crash problem; (2) system designs existed
                that could mitigate this safety problem; (3) safety benefit projections
                were assessed; and (4) performance tests and procedures were available
                to ensure an acceptable performance level.\136\ At the time, the Agency
                estimated that FCW systems were 15 percent effective in preventing
                rear-end crashes. More recently, in a 2017 study, IIHS \137\ found that
                FCW systems may be more effective than NHTSA's initial estimates. IIHS
                found that FCW systems reduced rear-end crashes by 27 percent.
                Moreover, consumers have shown favorable acceptance of these systems.
                For instance, in a 2019 survey of more than 57,000 Consumer Reports
                subscribers, 69 percent of vehicle owners reported that they were
                satisfied with their
                [[Page 13478]]
                vehicle's FCW technology, 38 percent of vehicle owners said that it had
                helped them avoid a crash, and 54 percent of them remarked that they
                trust the system to work every time.\138\ As consumer acceptance has
                been positive, and system performance has improved over the years,
                fitment rates have also increased. As mentioned previously, less than
                0.2 percent of model year 2011 vehicles were equipped with FCW systems
                compared to 38.3 percent of model year 2018 vehicles.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \136\ 73 FR 40033 (July 11, 2008).
                 \137\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
                collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
                reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
                Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
                 \138\ Consumer Reports (2019, August 5), Guide to forward
                collision warning: How FCW helps drivers avoid accidents, https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/forward-collision-warning-guide/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 One limitation of FCW systems is that they are designed to warn the
                driver, but not to provide significant automatic braking of the vehicle
                (some FCW systems use haptic brake pulses to alert the driver of a
                crash-imminent driving situation, but they are not intended to
                effectively slow the vehicle). Since the introduction of FCW systems
                into NCAP, active safety systems, such as those with automatic braking
                capability (i.e., AEB), have entered the marketplace. In a recent study
                sponsored by GM \139\ to evaluate the real-world effectiveness of ADAS
                technologies (including FCW and AEB) on 3.8 million model year 2013-
                2017 GM vehicles, UMTRI found that, for frontal collisions, camera-
                based FCW systems produced an estimated 21 percent reduction in rear-
                end striking crashes, while the AEB systems studied (which included a
                combination of camera-only, radar-only, and fused camera-radar systems)
                produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in the same crash type.\140\
                Similarly, in a 2017 study, IIHS found that vehicles equipped with FCW
                and AEB showed a 50 percent reduction for the same crash type.\141\
                NHTSA is drawing from these research studies, generally, since each has
                limitations and deviations from how NHTSA might evaluate fleet-wide
                \142\ system effectiveness.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \139\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
                C.A. (2019), Analysis of the field effectiveness of General Motors
                production active safety and advanced headlighting systems, The
                University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and General
                Motors LLC. UMTRI-2019-6.
                 \140\ The Agency notes that the FCW effectiveness rate (21%)
                observed by UMTRI is similar to that observed by IIHS in its 2019
                study (27%). Differences in data samples and vehicle selection may
                contribute to the specific numerical differences. Regardless, the
                AEB effectiveness rate observed by UMTRI (46%) was significantly
                higher than the corresponding FCW effectiveness rate observed in
                either the IIHS or UMTRI study.
                 \141\ Low-speed AEB showed a 43% reduction.
                 \142\ The UMTRI study was limited to GM vehicles.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 From a functional perspective, research suggests that active
                braking systems, such as AEB, provide greater safety benefits than
                corresponding warning systems, such as FCW. However, NHTSA has found
                that current AEB systems often integrate the functionalities of FCW and
                AEB into one frontal crash prevention system to deliver improved real-
                world safety performance and high consumer acceptance. Consequently,
                the Agency believes that this system integration may have implications
                for NCAP FCW testing because current NCAP FCW requirements were
                developed at a time when FCW and AEB functionalities were not always
                linked. As will be detailed later in this notice, NHTSA believes that
                FCW could now be considered a component of AEB and PAEB such that FCW
                operation could be evaluated using NCAP's AEB and PAEB tests.
                2. Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB)
                 To address the rear-end crash problem further, in November 2015,
                NHTSA published a final decision notice announcing the addition of two
                AEB technologies, CIB and DBS, into NCAP effective with model year 2018
                vehicles.\143\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \143\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015). CIB and DBS together are
                considered Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Unlike FCW systems, AEB systems (i.e., CIB and DBS), are designed
                to help drivers actively avoid or mitigate the severity of rear-end
                crashes. CIB systems provide automatic braking when forward-looking
                sensors indicate that a crash is imminent and the driver has not
                braked, whereas DBS systems provide supplemental braking when sensors
                determine that driver-applied braking is insufficient to avoid an
                imminent crash.
                 In Consumer Reports' 2019 subscriber survey, 81 percent of vehicle
                owners reported that they were satisfied with AEB technology, 54
                percent said that it had helped them avoid a crash, and 61 percent
                stated that they trusted the system to work every time.\144\
                Furthermore, IIHS found in its 2017 study that rear-end collisions
                decreased by 50 percent for vehicles equipped with AEB and FCW.\145\
                Similarly, as mentioned earlier, UMTRI \146\ found that AEB systems
                produced an estimated 46 percent reduction in applicable rear-end
                crashes when combined with a forward collision alert, which alone
                showed only a 21 percent reduction.\147\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \144\ Consumer Reports, (2019, August 5), Guide to automatic
                emergency braking: How AEB can put the brakes on car collisions,
                https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/automatic-emergency-braking-guide/.
                 \145\ Cicchino, J.B. (2017, February), Effectiveness of forward
                collision warning and autonomous emergency braking systems in
                reducing front-to-rear crash rates, Accident Analysis and
                Prevention, 2017 Feb;99(Pt A):142-152, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2016.11.009.
                 \146\ Leslie, A.J., Kiefer, R.J., Meitzner, M.R., & Flannagan,
                C.A. (2019, September), Analysis of the field effectiveness of
                General Motors production active safety and advanced headlighting
                systems, The University of Michigan Transportation Research
                Institute and General Motors LLC, UMTRI-2019-6.
                 \147\ The AEB systems studied by UMTRI consisted of camera-only,
                radar-only, and fused camera-radar AEB systems, the latter two
                systems of which also included adaptive cruise control
                functionality.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 A recent IIHS study \148\ of 2009-2016 crash data from 23 States
                suggested that the increasing effectiveness of AEB technology in
                certain crash situations is changing the rear-end crash problem. The
                Institute's analysis provided insight into the performance of current
                AEB systems and future opportunities for improvement. The study
                identified the types of rear-end crashes in which striking vehicles
                equipped with AEB were over-represented compared to those without
                AEB.\149\ For instance, IIHS found that striking vehicles involved in
                the following rear-end crashes were more likely to have AEB: (1) Where
                the striking vehicle was turning relative to when it was moving
                straight; (2) when the struck vehicle was turning or changing lanes
                relative to when it was slowing or stopped; (3) when the struck vehicle
                was not a passenger vehicle or was a special use vehicle relative to a
                passenger car; (4) on snowy or icy roads; or (5) on roads with speed
                limits of 112.7 kph (70 mph) relative to those with 64.4 to 72.4 kph
                (40 to 45 mph) speed limits. Overall, the study found that 25.3 percent
                of crashes where the striking vehicle was equipped with AEB had at
                least one of these over-represented characteristics, compared with 15.9
                percent of impacts by vehicles that were not equipped with AEB.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \148\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
                Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
                with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019,
                VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118 https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
                 \149\ In this instance, over-represented means a higher
                frequency as a percentage for AEB-equipped vehicles versus non-AEB-
                equipped vehicles on a normalized basis.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 These results suggest that the tests used to evaluate the
                performance of AEB systems by the Agency's NCAP and other consumer
                information programs are influencing the development of countermeasures
                capable of minimizing the crash problems that they were intended to
                address. However, the results also imply that AEB systems have not yet
                provided their full crash reduction potential. While they are effective
                at addressing the most common rear-end crashes, they are less effective
                at addressing those crashes that
                [[Page 13479]]
                are more atypical. IIHS found that in 2016, nearly 300,000 (15 percent)
                of the police reported two-vehicle rear-end crashes involved one of the
                rear-end crashes mentioned above. The Institute suggested that vehicle
                manufacturers would be encouraged to improve AEB system designs for
                situations where AEB was over-represented if consumer programs
                incorporated tests that replicate these rear-end crash events, such as
                an angled target vehicle that simulates a struck vehicle changing
                lanes. IIHS cautioned (and NHTSA agrees) that new testing protocols
                should not drive performance degradation in more typical crash
                situations, create unintended safety consequences, or adversely affect
                AEB use due to nuisance activations.
                 While these recent studies suggest that AEB systems (i.e., CIB and
                DBS) have collectively been effective in reducing rear-impact crashes,
                it is not clear how effective each of these systems are as standalone
                systems, and whether their individual effectiveness may change for
                certain crash scenarios, environmental conditions, or driver factors
                (e.g., poor judgement, distraction, etc.). Furthermore, the Agency is
                not aware of any studies of current-generation AEB systems that have
                determined the extent to which CIB and DBS individually contributes to
                crash reduction.
                 Prior to considering adopting AEB into NCAP, NHTSA conducted a
                review of 2003-2009 National Automotive Sampling System Crashworthiness
                Data System (NASS CDS) data to define the target population for rear-
                end crashes.\150\ At the time of the analysis, the Agency concluded
                that CIB and DBS target crash populations were mutually exclusive. In
                other words, they included crashes in which the driver either did not
                brake (CIB) or braked (DBS). The analysis of the crash data showed that
                the driver braked in approximately half of the crashes and did not
                brake in the other half. However, in its analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS
                and GES data sets, Volpe found much more conservative brake rates. The
                organization found that the driver braked in just 8 percent of rear-end
                crashes involving fatalities and 20 percent of those crashes involving
                injuries. The study also showed that the driver made no attempt to
                avoid the crash (e.g., no braking, steering, accelerating) for 56
                percent of the crashes involving fatalities and for 21 percent of those
                involving injuries.\151\ It is possible that the brake rate differed
                for the two studies because of the target crash population refinements
                made for NHTSA's original analysis and because of difference in data
                collection methods between the crash databases. For instance, high-
                speed crashes were excluded from NHTSA's target crash population review
                because the AEB systems tested at the time had limited speed reduction
                capabilities.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \150\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2012,
                June), Forward-looking advanced braking technologies research
                report, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0001.
                 \151\ The Agency notes that for the rear-end pre-crash scenario
                group, the driver avoidance maneuver was unknown in 25 percent and
                54 percent of the FARS and GES crashes, respectively.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 From the refined target crash population, NHTSA computed
                preliminary safety benefits for both CIB and DBS from a limited number
                of CIB- and DBS-equipped vehicles subjected to early versions of the
                Agency's test procedures based upon speed reduction capabilities.\152\
                The Agency recognized that CIB and DBS systems available at the time
                had limited capabilities and could not address serious crashes where
                fatalities were likely to occur. Nevertheless, the Agency tentatively
                found that if a CIB system alone was equipped on all light vehicles, it
                could potentially prevent approximately 40,000 minor/moderate injuries
                (AIS 1-2), 640 serious-to-critical injuries (AIS 3-5), and save
                approximately 40 lives, annually. If a DBS system alone was equipped on
                all light vehicles, it could potentially prevent approximately 107,000
                minor/moderate injuries (AIS 1-2), 2,100 serious-to-critical injuries
                (AIS 3-5), and save approximately 25 lives, annually. These safety
                benefits from CIB and DBS were considered incremental to the benefits
                stemming from an FCW alert.\153\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \152\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2014,
                August), Automatic emergency braking system (AEB) research report,
                https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2012-0057-0037.
                 \153\ FCW, CIB, and DBS combined on all light vehicles could
                potentially prevent approximately 200,000 minor/moderate injuries
                (AIS 1-2), 4,000 (AIS 3-5) serious injuries, and save approximately
                100 lives annually.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA's analysis showed there was merit to performing testing to
                assess vehicle performance in situations where a driver either does not
                brake (CIB) or brakes (DBS). Volpe's recent analysis on braking
                behavior/rate further validates the need to assess CIB and DBS
                separately. Considering this and the fact that NHTSA cannot currently
                differentiate the individual effectiveness of CIB and DBS systems,
                NHTSA tentatively believes NCAP should continue to assess CIB and DBS
                system performance individually. However, the Agency acknowledges that,
                because it believes AEB systems have advanced significantly in recent
                years, it is appropriate at this time to consider revising performance
                envelopes and dynamic scenarios in NCAP to acknowledge and encourage
                such advances.
                 The following sections discuss in detail CIB and DBS systems, and
                more specifically, NCAP's current test procedures and a potential
                updated test program for modern AEB systems. The Agency seeks comment
                on how NCAP can encourage the maximum safety benefits of AEB and
                potentially reduce the number of tests conducted. Comments are also
                sought on future suggestions for AEB beyond any near-term upgrade.
                a. Dynamic Brake Support (DBS)
                 In response to an FCW alert or a driver noticing an imminent crash
                scenario, a driver may initiate braking to avoid a rear-end crash. In
                situations where the driver's braking is insufficient to prevent a
                collision, DBS can automatically supplement the driver's braking action
                to prevent or mitigate the crash. Similar to FCW and CIB systems, DBS
                systems employ forward-looking sensors such as radar, lidar, and/or
                vision-based sensors to detect vehicles in the path directly ahead and
                monitor a vehicle's operating conditions such as speed or brake
                application. However, DBS systems can actively supplement braking to
                assist the driver whereas FCW systems serve only to warn the driver of
                a potential crash threat, and CIB systems are activated when a rear-end
                crash is imminent, but the driver has not manually applied the
                vehicle's brakes.\154\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \154\ DBS systems differ from traditional brake assist systems
                used with the vehicle's foundation brakes. Whereas both systems rely
                on brake pedal application rate to determine whether supplemental
                braking is required, DBS has a lower activation threshold since it
                also uses information from the aforementioned sensors to verify that
                more braking is needed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NCAP's current DBS test procedure \155\ consists of the same three
                rear-end crash scenarios specified in the FCW system performance test
                procedure--LVS, LVD, and LVM, but most of the test speed combinations
                specified in the DBS test procedure differ (the single exception is
                that the FCW and DBS test procedures both use an LVM test performed
                with SV and POV speeds of 72.4 and 32.2 kph (45 and 20 mph),
                respectively). In addition,
                [[Page 13480]]
                the DBS performance assessment includes a Steel Trench Plate (STP)
                false positive suppression test, which is conducted at two test speeds.
                This fourth test scenario is used to evaluate the propensity of a
                vehicle's DBS system to activate inappropriately in a non-critical
                driving scenario that would not present a safety risk to the vehicle's
                occupants. For the first three test scenarios, where braking is
                expected, the SV must provide enough supplemental braking to avoid
                contact with the POV to pass a trial run. In the case of the DBS false
                positive test scenario, the performance criterion is minimal to no
                activation for both test speeds.\156\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \155\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2015,
                October), Dynamic brake support performance evaluation confirmation
                test for the New Car Assessment Program, http://www.regulations.gov,
                Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0006-0026.
                 \156\ Minimal activation is defined as a peak SV deceleration
                attributable to DBS intervention that is less than or equal to 1.25
                times the average of the deceleration recorded for the vehicle's
                foundation brake system alone during its approach to the steel
                trench plate. The 1.25 multiplier serves to provide some system
                flexibility, meaning a mild DBS intervention is acceptable, but one
                where the vehicle thinks it must respond to the STP as if it was a
                real vehicle is not.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As in the FCW system performance tests, the vehicle that is
                subjected to the DBS test scenarios is the SV. The FCW test procedure
                (which uses professional drivers for acceleration, braking, and
                steering during test conduct) stipulates that a mid-size passenger car
                serve as the POV during testing. The DBS test procedure (which relies
                solely on the use of a programmable brake controller and the vehicle's
                DBS system for braking), however, utilizes a surrogate (i.e., target
                vehicle) to limit the potential for damage to the SV and/or test
                equipment in the event of a collision.
                 The target vehicle presently used as the POV by NCAP for the
                Agency's DBS testing is known as the Subject Surrogate Vehicle, or SSV.
                The SSV, developed by NHTSA for the purpose of track testing, appears
                as a ``real'' vehicle to the camera, radar, and lidar sensors used by
                existing AEB systems. The SSV system is comprised of (a) a shell,\157\
                which is a visually and dimensionally accurate representation of a
                passenger car; (b) a slider and load frame assembly to which the shell
                is attached, (c) a two-rail track on which the slider operates, (d) a
                road-based lateral restraint track, and (e) a tow vehicle, which pulls
                the SSV and its peripherals down the test track during trials where the
                POV (i.e., SSV) must be in motion. A brief discussion on the use of the
                GVT, discussed earlier in the BSI section, as an alternative to the SSV
                for future DBS and CIB testing, is included later in this notice.\158\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \157\ The shell is constructed from lightweight composite
                materials with favorable strength-to-weight characteristics,
                including carbon fiber, Kevlar[supreg], phenolic, and Nomex
                honeycomb. It is also wrapped with a commercially available vinyl
                material to simulate paint on the body panels, rear bumper, and a
                tinted glass rear window. A foam bumper having a neoprene cover is
                attached to the rear of the SSV to reduce the peak forces realized
                immediately after an impact from a test vehicle occurs.
                 \158\ If the Agency decides to assess FCW in separate tests to
                that for DBS and CIB, those FCW tests would also be conducted using
                GVT.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 A short description of each DBS system performance test scenario,
                and the requirements for a passing result, is provided below:
                 Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS)--The SV encounters a stopped
                POV on a straight road. The SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the
                POV is stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the
                SV issues an FCW alert, and the SV brake is applied at a TTC of 1.1 s
                (i.e., at a nominal headway of 12.2 m (40 ft.)). To pass this test, the
                SV must not contact the POV.
                 Lead Vehicle Decelerating (LVD)--The SV encounters a POV
                slowing with constant deceleration directly in front of it on a
                straight road. The SV and POV are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with
                an initial headway of 13.8 m (45.3 ft.). The POV brakes are then
                applied at a constant deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV. The SV
                throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert,
                and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1.4 s (i.e., at a nominal
                headway of 9.6 m (31.5 ft.)). To pass this test, the SV must not
                contact the POV.
                 Lead Vehicle Moving (LVM)--The SV encounters a slower-
                moving POV directly in front of it on a straight road. In the first
                test, the SV and POV are driven on a straight road at a constant speed
                of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second
                test, the SV and POV are driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45
                mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph), respectively. In both tests, the SV
                throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert,
                and the SV brakes are applied at a TTC of 1 s (i.e., at a nominal
                headway of 6.7 m (22 ft.) in the first test, and 11.3 m (37 ft.) in the
                second test). To pass these tests, the SV must not contact the POV.
                 Steel Trench Plate (STP) test (to assess false positive
                suppression)--The SV is driven over a 2.4 m x 3.7 m x 25.4 mm (8 ft. x
                12 ft. x 1 in.) steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and 72.4 kph
                (45 mph). If no FCW alert is issued by a TTC of 2.1 s, the SV throttle
                is released within 500 ms of a TTC of 2.1 s, and the SV brakes are
                applied at a TTC of 1.1 s (i.e., at a nominal distance of 12.3 m (40
                ft.) from the edge of the STP at 40.2 kph (25 mph), or 22.3 m (73 ft.)
                at 72.4 kph (45 mph)). To pass this test, the performance criteria is
                non-activation, as defined above.
                 To pass NCAP's DBS system performance criteria, the SV must
                currently pass five out of seven trials for each of the six test
                conditions.
                 As previously mentioned, NCAP's LVS, LVM, and LVD test scenarios
                for its DBS evaluations are similar to those for the FCW assessments
                and therefore correspond well with real-world crash data and have
                similar target crash populations. NHTSA's analysis of the 2011-2015
                rear-end crash data from FARS and GES showed target crash populations
                of 65 percent for the LVS scenario, 22 percent for the LVD scenario,
                and 10 percent for the LVM scenario.\159\ Furthermore, Volpe's
                independent review of the 2011-2015 data sets showed that for rear-end
                crashes that occurred on roadways with posted speeds of 40.2 kph (25
                mph) or less, 56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less,
                the fatality rate was 2 percent, 11 percent, and 28 percent,
                respectively. Additionally, MAIS 1-5 injuries were observed in 6
                percent of all rear-end crashes that occurred on roadways with posted
                speeds of 40.2 kph (25 mph) or less, 30 percent with posted speeds of
                56.3 kph (35 mph) or less, and 63 percent with posted speeds of 72.4
                kph (45 mph) or less.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \159\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. Crash Imminent Braking (CIB)
                 If a driver does not take any action to brake when a rear-end crash
                is imminent, CIB systems utilize the same types of forward-looking
                sensors used in DBS systems to apply the vehicle's brakes automatically
                to slow or stop the vehicle. The amount of braking applied varies by
                manufacturer, and several systems are designed to achieve maximum
                vehicle deceleration just prior to impact. In reviewing model year
                2017-2019 NCAP CIB test data, NHTSA observed a deceleration range of
                0.31 to 1.27g during test trials that provided speed reductions capable
                of satisfying the CIB performance criteria for a given test condition.
                Unlike DBS systems, which only provide additional braking to supplement
                the driver's brake input, CIB systems activate when the driver has not
                applied the brake pedal.
                 The Agency's current CIB test procedure \160\ is comprised of the
                same
                [[Page 13481]]
                four test scenarios (LVS, LVD, LVM, and the STP false positive
                suppression test) and accompanying test speeds as set forth in the DBS
                test procedure. However, the performance criteria vary slightly. The
                LVM 40.2 kph/16.1 kph (25 mph/10 mph) test condition stipulates that
                the SV may not contact the POV. The LVS, LVD, and the LVM 72.4 kph/32.2
                kph (45 mph/20 mph) test conditions permit SV-to-POV contact but
                require minimum reductions in the SV speed. In the case of the CIB
                false positive tests, the performance criterion is little-to-no
                activation. Similar to NCAP's DBS tests, the SSV is the POV presently
                used in the program's CIB testing. A short description of each test
                scenario and the requirements for a passing result is provided below:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \160\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2015,
                October). Crash imminent brake system performance evaluation for the
                New Car Assessment Program. http://www.regulations.gov. Docket No.
                NHTSA-2015-0006-0025.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 LVS--SV encounters a stopped POV on a straight road. The
                SV is moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph) and the POV (i.e., the SSV) is
                stationary. The SV throttle is released within 500 ms after the SV
                issues an FCW alert. To pass this test, the SV speed reduction
                attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
                 LVD--The SV encounters a POV slowing with constant
                deceleration directly in front of it on a straight road. The SV and POV
                are both driven at 56.3 kph (35 mph) with an initial headway of 13.8 m
                (45.3 ft.). The POV then decelerates, braking at a constant
                deceleration of 0.3g in front of the SV, after which the SV throttle is
                released within 500 ms after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass this
                test, the SV speed reduction attributable to CIB intervention must be
                >=16.9 kph (10.5 mph).
                 LVM--The SV encounters a slower-moving POV directly in
                front of it on a straight road. In the first test, the SV and POV are
                driven on a straight road at a constant speed of 40.2 kph (25 mph) and
                16.1 kph (10 mph), respectively. In the second test, the SV and POV are
                driven at a constant speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and 32.2 kph (20 mph),
                respectively. In both tests, the SV throttle is released within 500 ms
                after the SV issues an FCW alert. To pass the first test, the SV must
                not contact the POV. To pass the second test, the SV speed reduction
                attributable to CIB intervention must be >=15.8 kph (9.8 mph).
                 STP test (to assess false positive suppression)--The SV is
                driven towards a steel trench plate at 40.2 kph (25 mph) in one test
                and 72.4 kph (45 mph) in the other test. If an FCW alert is issued, the
                SV throttle is released within 500 ms of the alert. If no FCW alert is
                issued, the throttle is not released until the test's validity period
                (the time when all test specifications and tolerances must be
                satisfied) has passed. To pass these tests, the SV must not achieve a
                peak deceleration equal to or greater than 0.5g at any time during its
                approach to the steel trench plate.
                 To pass NCAP's CIB system performance criteria, the SV must pass
                five out of seven trials for each of the six test conditions.
                 Similar to FCW and DBS, NCAP's CIB test scenarios correlate to the
                dynamically distinct rear-end crash data discussed earlier. The
                Agency's analysis of the 2011-2015 crash data showed that the LVS, LVD,
                and LVM scenarios represented 65 percent, 22 percent, and 10 percent,
                respectively, of all rear-end crashes.\161\ With respect to test speed,
                in its independent review of 2011-2015 FARS and GES data sets, Volpe
                concluded that 2 percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 6 percent of all
                rear-end crashes occurred on roadways with posted speed limits of 40.2
                kph (25 mph) or less. Eleven percent of fatal rear-end crashes and 30
                percent of all rear-end crashes occurred on roads with posted speeds of
                56.3 kph (35 mph) or less. For posted speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or
                less, these statistics are 28 percent and 63 percent, respectively.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \161\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. Current State of AEB Technology
                 When NHTSA's CIB test scenarios were developed, relatively few
                vehicles were equipped with this technology, and those that were
                equipped had systems with limited capabilities. Since then, fitment
                rates for CIB systems have increased significantly. The increased
                fitment was due in part to an industry voluntary commitment made in
                March 2016. At that time, 20 vehicle manufacturers, representing more
                than 99 percent of light motor vehicle sales in the U.S., voluntarily
                committed to install AEB systems on light motor vehicles.\162\ Pursuant
                to this voluntary commitment, the manufacturers would make FCW and CIB
                standard on virtually all light-duty vehicles with a gross vehicle
                weight rating (GVWR) of 3,855.5 kg (8,500 pounds) or less beginning no
                later than September 1, 2022, and all trucks with a GVWR between
                3,856.0 and 4,535.9 kg (8,501 and 10,000 pounds) beginning no later
                than September 1, 2025. Conforming vehicles must be equipped with (1)
                an AEB system that earns at least an ``advanced'' rating from IIHS in
                its front crash prevention track tests and (2) an FCW system that meets
                the performance requirements specified in two of NCAP's three FCW test
                scenarios.\163\ The manufacturers further pledged to submit annual
                progress reports, which IIHS and NHTSA agreed to publish. In 2017, the
                first reporting year, approximately 30 percent of the fleet was
                equipped with CIB systems (though many of those systems were not
                designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds), whereas
                participating manufacturers equipped 75 percent of their fleet in
                2019.\164\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \162\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17),
                U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to
                make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
                 \163\ To achieve an advanced rating in IIHS' front crash
                prevention track tests, a vehicle's AEB system must show a speed
                reduction of at least 16.1 kph (10 mph) in either the Institute's
                19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 or 25 mph) tests, or a speed reduction of 8.0
                kph (5 mph) in both of these tests. https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
                 \164\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
                December 17), NHTSA announces update to historic AEB commitment by
                20 automakers, https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/nhtsa-announces-update-historic-aeb-commitment-20-automakers.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 While the voluntary commitment worked to increase fitment rates,
                the stringency included in the agreement for AEB systems is lower than
                that included in NCAP. The voluntary commitment included front crash
                prevention track tests that differed in stringency from the NCAP
                performance thresholds, and in number. The Agency was aware of those
                differences at the time, but considered the voluntary commitment to be
                a path toward greater fleet penetration.\165\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \165\ The Agency also believes that its recommendation of AEB
                systems (i.e., CIB and DBS) that meet NCAP performance criteria on
                its website since the 2018 model year has further encouraged
                adoption of these technologies.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 As fitment has increased, the sensor technology for CIB systems has
                also advanced significantly. For instance, in 2017, many systems were
                not designed to meet the voluntary commitment thresholds, whereas in
                2019, most vehicles with FCW and CIB systems were able to pass all
                relevant NCAP test scenarios. NHTSA notes that NCAP's CIB test
                requirements currently require a speed reduction of at least 15.8 kph
                (9.8 mph) in the program's LVS test. These test requirements are more
                stringent than those required by the voluntary commitment, which allow
                a
                [[Page 13482]]
                vehicle to comply with the memorandum for a speed reduction of 8.0 kph
                (5 mph) in the IIHS 19.3 or 40.2 kph (12 and 25 mph) LVS tests.\166\
                For the 2021 model year, the pass rate (as reported by vehicle
                manufacturers) for NCAP's FCW and CIB tests for vehicles \167\ equipped
                with these technologies and for which manufacturers submitted data was
                88.8 percent and 69.5 percent, respectively.\168\ Furthermore, NHTSA
                found that 63 percent of model year 2017 vehicles did not contact the
                POV in the LVS scenario during the Agency's testing, whereas 100
                percent of model year 2021 vehicles did not make contact with the POV
                when tested.\169\ As such, the Agency believes current CIB system
                performance far exceeds NCAP's current testing requirements, such that
                it is feasible to update the program's CIB test conditions to further
                safety improvements. Recent NHTSA research supports this assertion.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \166\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (2016, March 17),
                U.S. DOT and IIHS announce historic commitment of 20 automakers to
                make automatic emergency braking standard on new vehicles, https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/u-s-dot-and-iihs-announce-historic-commitment-of-20-automakers-to-make-automatic-emergency-braking-standard-on-new-vehicles.
                 \167\ In this instance, ``vehicles'' refers to the total number
                of vehicles in the 2021 fleet, and not the total number of vehicle
                models for that year.
                 \168\ These values assume a fifty percent take rate for vehicles
                having optional equipment.
                 \169\ No contact was assumed if the test vehicle did not contact
                the POV in 5 or more of the 7 required trial runs.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                d. NHTSA's CIB Characterization Study
                 Similar to the fleet testing performed for PAEB, the Agency
                conducted a series of CIB characterization tests using a sample of MY
                2020 NCAP test vehicles from various manufacturers. The goal of this
                testing was to quantify the performance of current CIB systems using
                the previously defined LVS and LVD test scenarios, but with an expanded
                set of input conditions. Testing was conducted in accordance with the
                CIB test procedure prescribed above; however, several scenarios were
                then repeated to assess how specific procedural changes (i.e.,
                increases in test speed and deceleration magnitude) affected CIB system
                performance.
                 For the additional LVS tests, the Agency incrementally
                increased the vehicle speed for the LVS test scenario (from 40.2 to
                72.4 kph (25 to 45 mph) in 8.0 kph (5 mph) increments), as shown in
                Table 2 below, to identify when/if the vehicle reached its operational
                limits and/or did not react to the POV ahead. When insufficient
                intervention occurred for a given vehicle, the Agency repeated the test
                scenario at a test speed that was 4.0 kph (2.5 mph) lower.\170\ This
                reduced speed was used to define the system's upper capabilities for
                the LVS scenario.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \170\ Insufficient intervention was defined as a maximum (peak)
                deceleration of less than 0.5g.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 For the additional LVD tests, the Agency evaluated how
                changes made to either the vehicles' speed (72.4 kph versus 56.3 kph
                (45 mph versus 35 mph)) or deceleration magnitude (0.5g versus 0.3g)
                affected CIB performance, as shown in Table 3 below.
                 Details of NHTSA's CIB characterization study are provided below
                (with speeds given in kph (mph)):
                 Table 2--Nominal LVS Matrix
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 POV speed,
                 SV speed, (kph/mph) (kph/mph)
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                40.2/25................................................. 0/0
                48.3/30................................................. 0/0
                56.3/35................................................. 0/0
                64.4/40................................................. 0/0
                72.4/45................................................. 0/0
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table 3--Nominal LVD Matrix
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Peak Minimum
                 SV speed, (kph/mph) POV speed, deceleration distance,
                 (kph/mph) (g) (mft.)
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                56.3/35......................................................... 56.3/35 0.3 13.8/45.3
                56.3/35......................................................... 56.3/35 0.5 13.8/45.3
                72.4/45......................................................... 72.4/45 0.3 13.8/45.3
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 No additional LVM or STP false positive assessments were conducted
                as part of the Agency's CIB characterization study. There were several
                reasons for this. First, in its review of the 2011-2015 FARS and GES
                rear-end crash data sets, NHTSA showed that LVS and LVD rear-end
                scenarios resulted in the highest number of crashes and MAIS 1-5
                injuries. As shown in Table A-1, there were 1,099,868 LVS, 374,624 LVD,
                and 174,217 LVM crashes annually.\171\ Furthermore, there were 561,842
                MAIS 1-5 injuries resulting from the LVS crash scenario, 196,731 for
                LVD, and 97,402 for LVM. The LVS scenario also had the second highest
                number of fatalities. Secondly, it was unclear whether performing a set
                of additional STP false positive tests would provide useful data. When
                the STP test was initially developed, many AEB systems relied solely on
                radar for lead vehicle detection. Today, most vehicles utilize camera-
                only or fused systems that rely on both camera and radar. Although the
                Agency has observed instances of false positive test failures during
                CIB and DBS NCAP evaluations performed with radar-only systems, none
                have been observed when camera-only or fused systems were evaluated in
                the program. While some radar-only systems have had difficulty
                classifying the STP correctly, camera-only and fused (i.e., camera plus
                radar) systems have not exhibited this issue.\172\ For these reasons,
                the Agency believes it may be appropriate to remove the false positive
                STP assessments from NCAP's AEB evaluation matrix in this NCAP update
                and is seeking comment in that regard.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \171\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \172\ This is not to suggest that camera systems are superior to
                radar systems in all tests.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency chose to increase the test speeds of the scenarios
                included in its CIB characterization study because, in its independent
                analysis of the 2011-2015 FARS data set, Volpe found that speeding was
                a factor in 42 percent of the fatal rear-end crashes.\173\ A review of
                Volpe's analysis also showed that approximately 28 percent of
                fatalities and 63 percent of injuries in rear-end crashes occurred when
                the posted speed on roadways is 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less. When the
                travel speed was reported in FARS and GES, approximately 7 percent of
                fatal and 34 percent of the police reported real-end crashes resulting
                in injuries occurred at
                [[Page 13483]]
                speeds of 72.4 kph (45 mph) or less.\174\ These data suggested that
                there was merit to assessing the capabilities of newer vehicles using
                LVS tests performed at higher speeds since this would allow the Agency
                to gauge the ability of current-generation CIB systems to address a
                greater number of rear-end crashes, particularly those that produce the
                most serious and fatal injuries. The Agency also reasoned that it was
                most appropriate to increase the test speed in NCAP's LVS scenario, in
                particular, since this scenario has the potential to require the
                greatest speed reduction authority to realize potential safety
                benefits. Historically, it has also been a difficult scenario for
                forward-looking sensing systems to address, especially at high vehicle
                speeds.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \173\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \174\ For this crash mode, 62 and 67 percent of the travel speed
                data is not reported in FARS and GES, respectively.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Although NHTSA acknowledges that the majority of fatal rear-end
                crashes (72 percent) occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding
                72.4 kph (45 mph), these higher speeds were not assessed as part of the
                Agency's characterization testing. Prior to testing, the Agency had
                safety concerns with conducting LVS tests at speeds of 80.5 kph (50
                mph) or more due to test track length limitations, inherent safety
                considerations for laboratory personnel, and potential damage to either
                the SV or test equipment. That said, as will be discussed later in this
                section, data collected during the Agency's testing showed that higher
                test speeds may be feasible, as several vehicles provided complete
                crash avoidance at 72.4 kph (45 mph).
                 NHTSA's intent in evaluating a modified LVD scenario was to
                document the performance of current-generation CIB systems using more
                demanding LVD-based driving situations. The Agency also planned to use
                these test results to determine the feasibility of increasing the
                stringency of NCAP's LVD test. Compared to the LVD test conditions
                presently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, the modified LVD
                tests, as shown in Table 3, either (1) maintained the existing 13.8 m
                (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway and 0.3g POV deceleration profile, but
                increased the travel speed of both the POV and SV from 56.3 to 72.4 kph
                (35 to 45 mph), or (2) maintained the existing 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-
                POV headway and existing 56.3 kph (35 mph) POV and SV speeds, but
                increased the average POV deceleration magnitude to 0.5g.
                 NHTSA's interest in the first LVD procedural change aligned with
                that mentioned for the LVS scenario changes--a significant number of
                injuries and fatalities in rear-end crashes occurred at higher speeds.
                The second change was made to address situations where the driver of a
                lead vehicle brakes aggressively, causing the driver of the following
                vehicle to have even less time to avoid or mitigate the crash than had
                the lead vehicle braking been at the 0.3g level presently specified.
                The Agency reasoned that implementing these changes for the LVD
                scenario would introduce a more stringent scenario than that which is
                currently prescribed in NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and would thus help
                the Agency understand the capabilities of current CIB systems more
                comprehensively.
                 Test reports related to NHTSA's CIB characterization testing can be
                found in the docket for this notice.
                e. Updates to NCAP's CIB Testing
                 In general, this study has allowed NHTSA to assess the performance
                of current CIB systems and evaluate the technology's future potential
                for the new model years' vehicle fleet. The study showed that many
                vehicles in today's fleet were able to repeatedly provide complete
                crash avoidance at higher test speeds, shorter SV-to-POV headways, and
                generally more aggressive conditions than those specified in the
                Agency's current NCAP CIB test procedure. This study has also provided
                the Agency with new ways to consider differentiating CIB systems'
                performance for NCAP ratings purposes in the future. Furthermore, it
                has provided the Agency with the underlying support necessary for NCAP
                to propose adjustments to the current CIB performance requirements to
                address rear-end crashes that are causing a greater number of injuries
                and fatalities in the real world. Accordingly, the Agency is proposing
                to make several changes to its CIB test procedure for this NCAP
                upgrade. These changes are outlined below for each test scenario. For
                the LVS scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
                 Increased SV test speeds and an assessment methodology
                that is similar to that which it proposed to assess PAEB system
                performance. CIB system performance for the LVS scenario will be
                assessed over a range of test speeds. The Agency is proposing a minimum
                SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is similar to that currently
                specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure--40.2 kph (25 mph), and a
                maximum SV test speed of 80.0 kph (49.7 mph). The Agency is proposing
                to increase the subject vehicle test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph)
                increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed for
                the LVS assessment.
                 The Agency's characterization testing showed that it is feasible to
                raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVS test to encourage improved performance
                of CIB systems. In fact, several vehicles repeatably afforded full
                crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) at speeds up to 72.4 kph (45 mph)
                for the LVS test scenario. Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP
                performs its Car-to-Car Rear stationary (CCRs) scenario, which is
                comparable to the Agency's LVS tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7
                mph) for those systems that offer AEB, which also suggests that higher
                test speeds are practicable.\175\ As such, NHTSA believes that it is
                appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum LVS test speed
                of 80 kph (49.7 mph), as this should better address the higher
                severity, high-speed crash problem and, in turn, further reduce
                fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol
                prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 10 kph (6.2 mph) for the CCRs
                scenario for AEB systems that also offer FCW, the Agency does not see a
                reason to perform its LVS test at a speed that is less than that which
                is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)).
                Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect
                to the minimum required test speed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \175\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
                2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
                section 8.2.3.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 A revised performance requirement. In lieu of a speed
                reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for
                the LVS scenario, the SV must avoid making contact with the POV target
                to pass a test trial. Similar to PAEB, this should limit damage to the
                SV and POV target during testing and reduce chances that results are
                questioned or invalidated.
                 Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVS
                scenario. Currently, NHTSA's CIB test procedure requires that a vehicle
                meet the performance criteria (i.e., specified speed reduction) for
                five out of seven trials. However, similar to that proposed by NHTSA
                for its PAEB assessment, the Agency is proposing that only one test
                trial will be conducted per test speed assessed (i.e., 40, 50, 60, 70,
                and 80 kph or 24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) if the SV does not
                contact the POV target during the first valid trial for each of the
                test speeds. For a given test condition, the test sequence is initiated
                at the 40 kph (24.9 mph) minimum
                [[Page 13484]]
                speed. To achieve a passing result, the test must be valid (i.e., all
                test specifications and tolerances satisfied), and the SV must not
                contact the POV. If the SV does not contact the POV during the first
                valid test, the test speed is incrementally increased by 10 kph (6.2
                mph), and the next test in the sequence is performed. Unless the SV
                contacts the POV, this iterative process continues until a maximum test
                speed of 80 kph (31.1 mph) is evaluated. If the SV contacts the POV,
                and the relative longitudinal velocity between the SV and POV is less
                than or equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, the Agency
                will perform four additional (repeated) test trials at the same speed
                for which the impact occurred. The SV must not contact the POV for at
                least three out of the five test trials performed at that same speed to
                pass that specific combination of test condition and test speed.\176\
                If the SV contacts the POV during a valid test of a test condition
                (whether it be the first test performed for a particular test speed or
                a subsequent test trial at that same speed), and the relative impact
                velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV, no
                additional test trials will be conducted at the given test speed and
                test condition and the SV is considered to have failed the test
                condition at that specific test speed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \176\ The Agency notes that a similar pass/fail criterion (i.e.,
                a vehicle must meet performance requirements for three out of five
                trials for a particular test condition to pass the test condition)
                is included in its LDW test procedure, as referenced earlier.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency is pursuing an assessment approach for the LVS CIB test
                scenario that is similar to that proposed for PAEB systems in order to
                reduce test burden, given that additional test speeds are being
                proposed. NHTSA believes that this alternative approach will continue
                to ensure that passing CIB systems represent robust designs that will
                offer a higher level of performance and safety.
                 For the LVD scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
                 A reduction in SV and POV test speeds. NHTSA's CIB test
                procedure currently prescribes a test speed of 56 kph (34.8 mph) for
                the SV and POV in the LVD scenario. Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems
                test protocol, Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the Car-to-Car rear
                braking (CCRb) specifies an SV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). For this
                upgrade of NCAP, the Agency is proposing to reduce the test speed for
                the SV and POV to 50 kph (31.1 mph) to harmonize with Euro NCAP.\177\
                Given additional changes proposed for the SV-to-POV headway and
                deceleration magnitude (discussed next), NHTSA does not believe the
                proposed reduction in test speed will lead to an overall reduction in
                test stringency or loss of safety benefits.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \177\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
                2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
                section 8.2.5.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency is also requesting comment on whether it is appropriate
                to incorporate additional SV test speeds for the LVD test scenario,
                specifically 60, 70, and 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph) or,
                alternatively, whether testing at only 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph
                (49.7 mph) would be sufficient. As mentioned earlier, Volpe's analysis
                of the 2011-2015 FARS data set showed that the majority of crashes
                occurred on roads with posted speeds exceeding 72.4 kph (45 mph),
                suggesting that testing at higher speeds for all CIB test scenarios may
                be warranted. The Agency has simply not performed testing at 80 kph
                (49.7 mph) to date because of concerns surrounding laboratories'
                abilities to safely execute such tests and limited available testing
                real estate, as this test scenario requires that both the SV and POV be
                travelling at the same speed at the onset of the test validity period.
                That being said, NHTSA believes that, (1) given the results from its
                characterization study, and in particular, the braking performance
                demonstrated in the LVS tests, (2) the fact that tested vehicles may
                have higher POV classification confidence for the LVD test compared to
                the LVS test since the POV is always in motion during the LVD test, and
                (3) the POV will be the GVT, which relies on a robotic platform for
                movement, rather than the SSV which must be towed along a monorail
                secured to the test track, vehicles in the current fleet will likely
                also perform well in higher speed LVD tests. To validate this
                assumption, NHTSA will be conducting research next year to assess
                vehicle performance at speeds ranging from 50 kph (31.1 mph) to 80 kph
                (49.7 mph) for 12 and 40 m (39.4 and 131.2 ft.) headways and POV
                deceleration magnitudes of 0.4 and 0.5 g for the LVD CIB test scenario.
                Pending the outcome of that research, the Agency may consider adopting
                additional higher tests speeds (i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3,
                43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the LVD test scenario in NCAP. The Agency
                requests comment on what SV-to-POV headway and deceleration
                magnitude(s) would be appropriate if the Agency was to adopt any or all
                of these additional test speeds. If additional test speeds are adopted,
                the Agency would implement an assessment methodology similar to that
                proposed for the CIB LVS test scenario, whereby NHTSA would increase
                the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the minimum test
                speed to the maximum test speed for the LVD assessment.
                 A reduction in SV-to-POV headway. NHTSA's CIB test
                procedure currently specifies a 13.8 m (45.3 ft.) SV-to-POV headway for
                the LVD scenario. The Agency is proposing to reduce the prescribed
                headway to 12 m (39.4 ft.) to harmonize with Euro NCAP's CCRb scenario.
                Given the proposed test speed reduction, the Agency believes it is
                appropriate to also reduce the headway to maintain similar stringency
                with its current LVD test condition. Whereas Euro NCAP also specifies
                an additional SV-to-POV headway of 40 m (131.2 ft.), the Agency is not
                proposing to conduct this additional assessment as part of this
                proposal. NHTSA does not believe there would be a safety benefit to
                adopting 40 m (131.2 ft.) as an additional, and less stringent,
                headway. Therefore, it would serve to increase the test burden
                unnecessarily.
                 An increase in deceleration magnitude. The Agency is
                proposing to increase the POV deceleration magnitude currently
                specified in its CIB test procedure for the LVD scenario from 0.3 g to
                0.5 g. In the Agency's CIB characterization study, some vehicles
                repeatably afforded full crash avoidance (i.e., no contact) for all
                trials when the POV executed a 0.5 g braking maneuver in the LVD
                condition with a SV test speed of 35 mph and SV-to-POV headway of 13.8
                m (45.3 ft.). Although the test speed used in the Agency's study was
                slightly lower than that which the Agency is proposing for the LVD test
                condition, and the SV-to-POV headway was slightly longer, NHTSA
                believes that it is reasonable to adopt a higher POV deceleration
                magnitude for its future LVD testing. The Agency notes that a
                deceleration of 0.5 g falls within the range of deceleration magnitudes
                prescribed by Euro NCAP in its AEB Car-to-Car systems test protocol,
                Version 3.0.3, dated April 2021 for the CCRb scenario. In its CCRb
                test, Euro NCAP specifies POV deceleration magnitudes of 2 m/s\2\ and 6
                m/s\2\ (approximately 0.2 to 0.6 g) for an SV-to-POV headway of 12 m
                (39.4 ft.) and SV test speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph). As the Agency has
                proposed this reduced headway and test speed for its LVD testing, it
                reasons that adopting a 0.5 g POV deceleration magnitude is also
                practicable. The Agency is not proposing 0.6 g as the POV deceleration
                magnitude in its LVD
                [[Page 13485]]
                test because it has observed instances where the tires on the POV
                target developed flat spots during research testing conducted with the
                Guided Soft Target (GST) system \178\ to assess Traffic Jam Assist
                (TJA) systems. The TJA testing required a braking maneuver for the lead
                vehicle decelerates, accelerates, then decelerates (LVDAD) scenario
                that is similar to that specified in the Agency's CIB LVD test.\179\
                During this testing, NHTSA also found that it was more difficult to
                achieve and accurately control deceleration when braking maneuvers
                higher than 0.5 g were used.\180\ Extensive tuning efforts related to
                the GST brake applications were made in an attempt to rectify the
                problems encountered, but these adjustments were unable to consistently
                satisfy the test tolerances associated with 0.6 g POV deceleration for
                the LVDAD test and a recommendation was made to reduce the maximum
                nominal POV deceleration from 0.6 g to 0.5 g for future testing. In its
                report findings, the Agency also noted that a deceleration of 0.6 g is
                not only very close to the maximum braking capability of the GST's
                robotic platform used by the Agency, it is also very close to the
                default magnitude used by the LPRV during an emergency stop (maximum
                deceleration). As such, the Agency concluded that a decrease in maximum
                POV deceleration should also reduce equipment wear, particularly for
                the system's tires and braking components, thus improving test
                efficiency. This being said, the Agency acknowledges that newer robotic
                platforms designed to provide greater capabilities, are now becoming
                available, which may resolve the issues observed in the Agency's TJA
                testing. As such, the Agency is requesting comment on whether it is
                feasible to adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g in lieu of 0.5
                g, as proposed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \178\ The GST system is comprised of two main parts--a low
                profile robotic vehicle (LPRV), and a global vehicle target (GVT),
                which is secured to the top of the LPRV.
                 \179\ Fogle, E.E., Arquette, T.E. (TRC), and Forkenbrock, G.J.
                (NHTSA), (2021, May), Traffic Jam Assist Draft Test Procedure
                Performability Validation (Report No. DOT HS 812 987), Washington,
                DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \180\ From Section 4.1 of DOT HS 812 987--``POV deceleration
                validity check failures occurred during six trials of the eight
                LVDAD trials performed. Four of the seven 0.6 g failures were
                because the POV was unable to achieve the minimum deceleration
                threshold of 0.55 g. The remaining three 0.6 g failures were because
                the POV was unable to maintain a minimum average deceleration of at
                least 0.55 g.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 An alternative performance criterion. In lieu of a speed
                reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test procedure for
                the LVD scenario, the vehicle must avoid making contact with the POV
                target to pass a test trial.
                 Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVD
                scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that
                is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario,
                regardless of the number of test speeds adopted (i.e., one speed, 50
                kph (31.1 mph); two speeds, 50 kph (31.1 mph) and 80 kph (49.7 mph); or
                four speeds, 50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)).
                If only one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion, the Agency
                is seeking comment on whether it is more appropriate to alternatively
                require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5 out of the 7
                trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance criterion.
                 For the LVM scenario, the Agency is proposing the following:
                 Increased SV test speeds. NHTSA is proposing to assess CIB
                system performance for the LVM scenario over a range of test speeds,
                similar to that proposed for the LVS scenario. The Agency is proposing
                a minimum SV test speed of 40 kph (24.9 mph), which is nearly
                equivalent to the 40.2 kph (25 mph) test speed currently specified in
                NHTSA's CIB test procedure, and a maximum SV test speed of 80 kph (49.7
                mph), which is slightly higher than the 72.4 kph (45 mph) specified for
                the second LVM test condition in NHTSA's current CIB test procedure.
                The Agency is proposing to increase the SV test speed in 10 kph (6.2
                mph) increments from the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed
                for the LVM assessment.
                 The Agency did not perform additional LVM testing as part of its
                CIB characterization study. Nonetheless, NHTSA believes that it is
                feasible to raise the SV speed in NCAP's LVM test to encourage improved
                performance of CIB systems, as the Agency's current CIB LVM tests
                (conducted with an SV speed of 72.4 kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2
                kph (20 mph)) have shown that many vehicles are able to stop without
                contacting the POV target for each of the required test trials.
                Furthermore, NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP performs its Car-to-Car
                Rear moving (CCRm) scenario, which is comparable to the Agency's LVM
                tests, at speeds as high as 80 kph (49.7 mph), which also suggests that
                higher SV test speeds are practicable.\181\ As such, NHTSA believes
                that it is appropriate to harmonize with Euro NCAP on the maximum SV
                test speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph) in the Agency's LVM test, as this
                should also address high-speed crashes and thus further reduce
                fatalities and serious injuries. Although Euro NCAP's protocol
                prescribes a minimum SV test speed of 30 kph (18.6 mph) for the CCRm
                scenario for vehicles that have AEB systems,\182\ the Agency does not
                see a reason to perform its LVM test at a speed that is less than that
                which is specified in its existing test procedure (40.2 kph (25 mph)).
                Therefore, it is not proposing to harmonize with Euro NCAP with respect
                to the minimum required test speed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \181\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
                2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
                section 8.2.3.
                 \182\ The Agency notes that the minimum SV test for vehicles
                equipped with only FCW (and no AEB) is 50 kph (31.1 mph).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 An alternative POV test speed for all test conditions.
                While the Agency's CIB test procedure currently specifies a POV test
                speed of 16.1 kph (10 mph) when the SV speed is 40.2 kph (25 mph) and a
                POV test speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph) when the SV speed is 72.4 kph (45
                mph), the Agency is proposing to use a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4
                mph) for every SV test speed that will be assessed for the LVM
                scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph), increased in 10.0 kph (6.2
                mph) increments. NHTSA recognizes that Euro NCAP's CCRm protocol
                specifies a POV test speed of 20 kph (12.4 mph), and this POV speed is
                stipulated for similar testing conducted by various other vehicle
                safety ratings programs. With this proposed NCAP upgrade, NHTSA sees no
                reason to deviate from the other testing organizations with respect to
                the POV speed for its LVM test.
                 A performance criterion of ``no contact''. In lieu of a
                speed reduction, as is currently specified in NHTSA's CIB test
                procedure for the Agency's higher speed LVM scenario (i.e., POV of 72.4
                kph (45 mph) and POV speed of 32.2 kph (20 mph)), the SV must avoid
                making contact with the POV target to pass a test trial for each test
                speed assessed for the LVM scenario; 40 to 80 kph (24.9 to 49.7 mph),
                increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments.
                 Changes to the number of test trials required for the LVM
                scenario. NHTSA is adopting an approach to conducting test trials that
                is identical to that described above for the CIB LVS scenario. For the
                proposed CIB LVM tests, the Agency would require one test trial per SV
                speed increment, and four repeat trials in the event of a test failure
                for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at impact that is
                equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed.
                 NHTSA has chosen to harmonize with Euro NCAP in many respects since
                it
                [[Page 13486]]
                recognizes that the rear-end crash problem, as defined by the most
                frequently occurring and dynamically distinct pre-crash scenarios,
                could be changing as AEB-equipped vehicles become more prolific in the
                fleet. Accordingly, the Agency believes that it is beneficial to
                standardize the current CIB test specifications with other consumer
                information programs and focus resources on emerging trends.\183\
                However, the Agency also notes that it will consider making additional
                updates to its CIB test evaluation as the crash problem evolves.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \183\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
                Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
                with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention, 2019,
                VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                f. Updates to NCAP's DBS Testing
                 NHTSA did not conduct any testing, as part of its characterization
                study, to evaluate DBS system performance capabilities beyond what is
                currently stipulated in NCAP's DBS test procedure. However, the Agency
                notes that its CIB and DBS test procedures are currently aligned with
                respect to test scenarios, test speeds, headways, etc. Differences
                exist only with respect to the use of an SV manual brake application
                (i.e., for DBS) and most performance criterion. NHTSA's DBS test
                procedure currently specifies ``no contact'' as the performance
                criterion for all DBS test conditions, whereas the Agency's CIB test
                procedure currently requires a specified speed reduction for each of
                the CIB test conditions (with the exception of the lower speed LVM
                condition where the POV speed is 16.1 kph (10 mph) and the SV speed is
                40.2 kph (25 mph), which requires ``no contact''). Therefore, NHTSA
                believes it is reasonable to adopt the CIB test conditions (i.e., test
                speeds, headways, etc.) for the comparable DBS test conditions.
                However, given the Agency's proposal to embrace the more stringent ``no
                contact'' performance criterion for each of the CIB test conditions,
                and for the additional reasons mentioned previously, the Agency also
                believes, as suggested prior, that there may be merit to removing the
                DBS test conditions from NCAP entirely to reduce test burden and the
                associated cost.
                 In its comments to the NCAP's December 2015 notice, the Alliance
                \184\ stated that since crash avoidance (i.e., no vehicle contact) is
                the desired outcome for all imminent rear-end crash events, if an SV
                avoids contact with the POV in all CIB tests, DBS testing should not be
                necessary. Although NHTSA agrees with the Alliance's rationale in
                principle, the Agency also believes there is merit to ensuring that
                both AEB systems perform as designed and help the driver to mitigate or
                prevent the crash. The Agency reasons that it is possible for the
                driver to apply the brakes, but with a magnitude that does not result
                in achieving the vehicle's maximum crash avoidance potential (i.e.,
                deceleration). In the past, some manufacturers assumed the driver was
                in control when the brake pedal was depressed and would not override
                the driver's input when necessary to avoid a crash. Accordingly, NHTSA
                hesitates to assume that if CIB systems work effectively during
                testing, then DBS systems will automatically do so as well.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \184\ The Agency notes that the Alliance of Automobile
                Manufacturers (The Alliance) merged with Global Automakers in
                January 2020 to create the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto
                Innovators). Both automotive industry groups separately submitted
                comments to the December 2015 notice.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In light of these considerations, the Agency is tentatively
                proposing to retain both CIB and DBS system performance tests in NCAP,
                and to align all test conditions for comparable test scenarios (e.g.,
                SV and POV test speeds, headway, etc.) to evaluate whether the DBS
                system will provide supplemental braking if the driver brakes but
                additional braking is warranted. For this testing, the Agency is
                proposing to adopt an assessment approach for DBS that is identical to
                that described previously for PAEB and CIB. The Agency would require
                one test trial per speed for each test scenario, and four repeated
                trials for any specific test condition and speed combination that
                results in a test failure and where the SV has a relative velocity at
                impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial speed.
                Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from the
                minimum test speed to the maximum test speed. However, the Agency is
                also requesting comment on whether removal of the DBS test scenarios
                from NCAP would be more appropriate.
                 As an alternative to retaining all DBS tests in NCAP, or removing
                the DBS performance evaluations from NCAP entirely, the Agency believes
                it may be more reasonable to conduct only the LVS and LVM tests at the
                highest two test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
                mph)--to ensure system functionality and that the SV will not suppress
                AEB operation when the driver applies the vehicle's foundation brakes.
                The Agency would also consider conducting the LVD DBS test at 70 and 80
                kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph) if the Agency decides to also adopt these test
                speeds for the related CIB test. Comments are requested on this
                alternative proposal and whether an alternative assessment method would
                be more appropriate if any or all of the DBS test scenarios were
                conducted only at the two highest test speeds. For a more limited speed
                assessment of the two highest test speeds, 70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
                mph), instead of up to four test speeds (50, 60, 70, and 80 kph (31.1,
                37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVD, or five test speeds (40, 50, 60,
                70, and 80 kph (24.9, 31.1, 37.3, 43.5, and 49.7 mph)) for LVS and
                LVM), should the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e.,
                align with the assessment method outlined for the other AEB test
                conditions) or multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required,
                how many would be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass
                rate?
                 If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, it also
                proposes to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
                initiated. The current DBS test procedure prescribes this shall occur
                at specific TTCs per test scenario: 1.1 seconds (LVS), 1.0 seconds
                (LVM), and 1.4 second (LVD). The proposed revision would initiate
                manual braking at a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW
                alert is issued for all DBS test scenario and speed combinations,
                regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW alert but
                before initiation of the manual brake application. The Agency reasons
                that this change is more representative of real-world use and driving
                conditions, and is in basic agreement with the approach specified for
                FCW performance evaluations in Euro NCAP's AEB Car-to-Car systems test
                protocol.\185\ Alternatively, the Agency requests comment on
                appropriate TTCs for the modified test conditions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \185\ European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) (April
                2021), Test Protocol--AEB Car-to-Car systems, Version 3.0.3. See
                Annex A.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                g. Updates to NCAP's FCW Testing
                 As mentioned earlier, NHTSA is proposing to consolidate its FCW and
                CIB tests such that the CIB tests will be used as an indicant of FCW
                operation. The Agency is also proposing to similarly assess FCW in the
                context of its PAEB tests. NHTSA believes there is merit to assessing
                the presence of an FCW alert within the CIB and PAEB test because
                operation of FCW and AEB/PAEB systems, in the test scenarios to be used
                by NCAP, are complementary
                [[Page 13487]]
                and fundamentally intertwined. Also, combining the Agency's FCW tests
                with those used to assess AEB system performance would reduce test
                burden. The Agency proposes that it would evaluate the presence of a
                vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
                accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert
                is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
                accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset
                of CIB system braking.\186\ Here, the onset of CIB activation is taken
                to be the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g. If no FCW
                alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any
                braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior
                to impact with the POV. The Agency is also proposing to make similar
                procedural changes to its PAEB test procedure. NHTSA is seeking comment
                as to whether the proposed FCW assessment method is reasonable.
                Furthermore, given that most FCW systems are currently able to pass all
                relevant NCAP test scenarios, as mentioned earlier, the Agency believes
                that, as an alternative to integrating the assessment of FCW into the
                Agency's CIB tests, it may be feasible for NCAP to perform one FCW test
                that could serve as an indicant of FCW system performance (while still
                retaining the previously-stated accelerator pedal release timing to
                ensure CIB activation is not unintentionally suppressed). This would
                also reduce test burden. If the Agency were to choose one of the
                proposed CIB test scenarios to adopt for an FCW test to assess the
                performance of FCW systems, which CIB test scenario do commenters
                believe would be most appropriate and why?
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \186\ Previous NHTSA research indicates that human drivers are
                capable of releasing the accelerator pedal within 500 ms after
                returning their eyes to a forward-facing viewing position in
                response to an FCW alert. Forkenbrock, G., Snyder, A., Hoover, R.,
                O'Harra, B., Vasko, S., Smith, L. (2011, July), A Test Track
                Protocol for Assessing Forward Collision Warning Driver-Vehicle
                Interface Effectiveness (Report No. DOT HS 811 501), Washington, DC:
                National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency notes that if it maintains any or all of the FCW test
                scenarios that are currently included in its FCW test procedure, it
                proposes to align the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV speeds,
                headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as applicable, with the
                included CIB tests, similar to that which it has proposed for the DBS
                tests. Accordingly, the Agency would adopt the following for the FCW
                tests:
                 LVS--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV is stationary.
                 LVD--SV and POV speed of 50 kph (31.1 mph) or up to 80 kph
                (49.7 mph), depending on the final test speed adopted for the CIB LVD
                scenario; a 12 m (39.4 ft.) SV-to-POV headway; and a POV deceleration
                magnitude of 0.5 g.
                 LVM--SV speed of 80 kph (49.7 mph); POV speed of 20 kph
                (12.4 mph).
                 If the Agency continues to conduct separate FCW assessments, it
                will need to revise the prescribed TTCs currently used to assess FCW
                performance to align with the revised test scenario and speed
                combinations.\187\ Given the Agency's thoughts about FCW-AEB
                integration and the revised test conditions that would be adopted for
                any future FCW tests, NHTSA requests comment on what TTC would be
                appropriate for each test scenario. Although the Agency is proposing to
                adopt an assessment approach for FCW that is identical to that
                described previously for PAEB, CIB, and DBS,\188\ it is also requesting
                comment on whether an alternative assessment method would be
                appropriate in instances where it retains one or more FCW scenarios
                that are performed at a single test speed. In such instances, should
                the Agency require one trial per test condition (i.e., align with the
                assessment method outlined for the other AEB test conditions) or
                multiple trials? If multiple trials were to be required, how many would
                be appropriate, and what would be an acceptable pass rate?
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \187\ To pass a test trial, the vehicle must issue the FCW alert
                on or prior to the prescribed time-to-collision (TTC) specified for
                each of the three FCW test scenarios.
                 \188\ In essence, the Agency would require one test trial per
                speed for each test scenario and four repeat trials in the event of
                a test failure for instances where the SV has a relative velocity at
                impact that is equal to or less than 50 percent of the initial
                speed. Speeds will be increased in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments from
                the minimum test speed to the maximum test speed.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                h. Regenerative Braking
                 In addition to the FCW alert setting, discussed earlier, there are
                additional system settings that the Agency must now consider during its
                AEB and PAEB testing. One such setting is that for regenerative
                braking. Regenerative braking, which has become more common as electric
                vehicles have begun to proliferate the fleet, can slow the vehicle when
                the throttle is released. As such, when the throttle is fully released
                upon the issuance of the FCW alert in the Agency's AEB and PAEB
                testing, vehicle speed can reduce significantly prior to the onset of
                braking associated with these technologies, particularly in instances
                where the FCW alert is issued early. For vehicles with regenerative
                braking that have multiple settings (e.g., nominal, more aggressive,
                less aggressive), the Agency is proposing to use the ``off'' setting or
                the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator
                is fully released in its AEB and PAEB tests.\189\ Although NHTSA
                reasons that the nominal setting may be the setting most commonly
                chosen by a typical driver, it prefers the least aggressive setting, as
                it would be more indicative of ``worst case''. Selecting a setting that
                affords the lowest deceleration allows the vehicle to travel faster at
                the onset of braking associated with AEB and PAEB. This approach would
                produce a situation that is more comparable to that for vehicles that
                do not have regenerative braking.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \189\ The Agency does not plan to make any procedural
                modifications for vehicles that have regenerative braking that
                cannot be switched off or adjusted, as those vehicles should operate
                similarly in the real world.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Agency believes that regenerative braking may also introduce
                complications for the Agency's DBS tests (if the DBS tests are retained
                in NCAP). NHTSA reasons that some vehicles may offer regenerative
                braking that is already so high that there would be only a relatively
                small boost in braking from the braking actuator (acting to provide a
                combined 0.4 g deceleration). For instance, if the regenerative braking
                from simply releasing the accelerator pedal results in 0.3 g braking,
                the additional braking required to get to 0.4 g from the actuator would
                be a very low force and/or brake pedal displacement. The Agency is
                requesting comment on whether regenerative braking may introduce
                additional testing issues and on any recommendations for test
                procedural changes to rectify possible testing issues related to
                regenerative braking.
                 With respect to FCW, CIB, and DBS testing in NCAP, NHTSA is seeking
                comment on the following:
                 (38) For the Agency's FCW tests:
                --If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should it
                award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide
                a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider awarding credit to
                vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide passing haptic alerts?
                Are there certain haptic alert types that should be excluded from
                consideration (if the Agency was to award credit to vehicles with
                haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because they may be a nuisance to
                drivers such that they are more likely to disable the system? Do
                commenters
                [[Page 13488]]
                believe that haptic alerts can be accurately and objectively assessed?
                Why or why not? Is it appropriate for the Agency to refrain from
                awarding credit to FCW systems that provide only a passing visual
                alert? Why or why not? If the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the
                FCW alert in the context of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW
                alert(s) would be acceptable for use in defining the timing of the
                release of the SV accelerator pedal, and why?
                --Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW system
                setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW and AEB
                (including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple FCW timing
                adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use setting would be
                most appropriate?
                --Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such
                that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW
                operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it combines
                the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a vehicle's FCW system
                during its CIB tests by requiring the SV accelerator pedal be fully
                released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is issued. If no FCW alert
                is issued during a CIB test, the SV accelerator pedal will be fully
                released within 500 ms after the onset of CIB system braking (as
                defined by the instant SV deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no
                FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any
                braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior
                to impact with the POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed
                these test procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this
                assessment method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
                --If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB,
                how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be amended
                if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test speeds, POV
                speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude, etc., as
                applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What assessment
                method should be used--one trial per scenario, or multiple trials, and
                why? If multiple trials should be required, how many would be
                appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass rate, and
                why?
                --Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead of
                the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test procedure),
                conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed, POV speed, SV-to-
                POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration magnitude, etc. of the
                proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of FCW system performance? If
                so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW test procedure is appropriate?
                --Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test conditions
                that the Agency should consider incorporating into the FCW test
                procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than those proposed
                for the CIB tests, or those having increased complexity? If so, should
                the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario
                specifications be amended, and to what extent?
                 (39) For the Agency's CIB tests:
                --Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration magnitude,
                etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests appropriate? Why or
                why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s), deceleration magnitude(s) are
                appropriate, and why? Should the Agency adopt a POV deceleration
                magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why
                or why not?
                --Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds
                (i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the CIB
                (and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not? If
                additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration magnitude
                would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and why?
                --Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the
                proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
                should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a maximum
                allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the proposed test
                conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed combination)? If yes,
                why, and for which test conditions? For those test conditions, what
                speed reductions would be appropriate? Alternatively, what maximum
                allowable impact speed would be appropriate?
                 (40) For the Agency's DBS tests:
                --Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or why
                not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and LVM tests
                at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and 80 kph (43.5
                and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also adopted these higher
                tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)) for the LVD CIB test,
                should it also conduct the LVD DBS test at these same speeds? Why or
                why not?
                --If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it
                appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
                initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW alert
                is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after the FCW
                alert but before initiation of the manual brake application)? If not,
                why, and what prescribed TTC values would be appropriate for the
                modified DBS test conditions?
                 (41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and
                DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of 10
                kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in the
                event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an
                alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required
                instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how many
                would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an acceptable pass
                rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is appropriate, it is
                acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only one or two test
                speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more appropriate to
                alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed, and require that 5
                out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no contact'' performance
                criterion?
                 (42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB tests
                such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW
                operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM, and
                potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2 for
                LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a total of
                20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds to be
                evaluated for AEB. If the Agency uses check marks to give credit to
                vehicles that (1) are equipped with the recommended ADAS technologies,
                and (2) pass the applicable system performance test requirements for
                each ADAS technology included in NCAP until such time as a new ADAS
                rating system is developed and a final rule to amend the safety rating
                section of the Monroney label is published, what is an appropriate
                minimum pass rate for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a
                vehicle is considered to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-
                thirds of the 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
                (i.e., passes 14 unique combinations of test conditions and test
                speeds).
                 (43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming
                more
                [[Page 13489]]
                prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed any
                instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB or DBS
                testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP assessments
                from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in this NCAP
                update? Why or why not?
                 (44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting
                options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or the
                setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the accelerator is
                fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also applies to the
                Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings appropriate? Why or why
                not? Will regenerative braking introduce additional complications for
                the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and how could the Agency best
                address them?
                 (45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its
                current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If
                so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be
                modified?
                 (46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or DBS
                test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification? If so,
                what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
                3. FCW and AEB Comments Received in Response to 2015 RFC Notice
                 NHTSA received several comments in response to the December 2015
                notice pertaining to NCAP's DBS and CIB tests. These included comments
                on FCW effective time-to-collision (TTC), false positive test
                scenarios, procedure clarifications, expanding testing, and the AEB
                strikeable target. These will be discussed over the next few sub-
                sections.
                a. Forward Collision Warning (FCW) Effective Time-To-Collision (TTC)
                 In its response to NCAP's December 2015 notice, BMW suggested that
                the Agency adopt an ``effective TTC'' for NCAP's FCW test that differs
                from the ``absolute TTC'' currently stipulated in the associated test
                procedure. The manufacturer contended that the deceleration due to an
                activated AEB system effectively prolongs the reaction time for the
                driver such that ``an FCW warning with AEB intervention at an absolute
                TTC of 2.0 seconds is assumed to show an equal or greater effectiveness
                in comparison to an FCW warning at 2.4 seconds without AEB
                intervention.'' BMW suggested that if AEB functionality is intrinsic to
                the frontal crash prevention system, the assessment of the warning TTC
                in the FCW performance test should consider the time gained by AEB
                deceleration and therefore the Agency should assess the ``effective
                TTC,'' not an ``absolute TTC.''
                 The Agency agrees with BMW that FCW and AEB are interrelated and is
                thus proposing to assess the presence of an FCW alert as an integral
                component of the CIB test. To assess the adequacy of the FCW alert in
                that context, the Agency has proposed to evaluate the presence of a
                vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
                accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert
                is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
                accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the onset
                of CIB system braking. If no FCW alert is issued and the vehicle's CIB
                system does not offer any braking, release of the SV accelerator pedal
                will not be required prior to impact with the POV. The Agency believes
                that this proposal is philosophically aligned with BMW's request, as it
                would no longer require the direct assessment of FCW timing relative to
                an ``absolute TTC.'' Rather, FCW timing, and how it relates to the
                intended onset of CIB activation, would be at the discretion of the
                vehicle manufacturer (who will have explicit knowledge of how the
                operation of their vehicles' CIB systems affect the ``effective TTC'').
                That said, the Agency continues to believe that well-designed FCW
                alerts can provide significant safety benefits in crash-imminent rear-
                end crash scenarios, and encourages vehicle manufactures to present
                them such that the driver may be able to respond with sufficient time
                to avoid a crash (i.e., not to solely rely on CIB activation for crash
                avoidance). If a vehicle manufacturer chooses to issue an FCW alert in
                a way that assumes a CIB intervention will effectively extend the
                precrash timeline, but then the AEB system does not activate under
                real-world driving conditions, or activates late, drivers may not have
                enough time to react to avoid an impending crash.
                b. False Positive Test Scenarios
                 Citing the potential for redundancy with the three active/
                supplemental braking scenarios for systems exhibiting lower
                deceleration rates, Mobileye suggested that the Agency impose a maximum
                speed reduction of 2 kph (1.24 mph) for the CIB and DBS tests, or a
                maximum duration of braking over the maximum allowable deceleration
                threshold for the false positive tests. The STP test is designed to
                provide an indication as to whether a vehicle's AEB system may have a
                false activation problem. Some vehicles use haptic braking and/or low-
                level braking as part of their FCW alert strategy. These brake
                activations are not intended to slow the vehicle significantly; rather,
                they attempt to get the driver's attention so that he/she will respond
                to the crash-imminent situation. That said, it is quite possible that
                FCW-based braking could reduce speed more than the 2 kph (1.24 mph)
                threshold suggested by Mobileye.
                 Recognizing the potential problem for a vehicle to fail the CIB
                false positive test as a consequence of how its FCW system was designed
                to work, NHTSA built some flexibility into the assessment criteria used
                to evaluate how the subject vehicle (SV) responds to the STP. In the
                CIB test, activations can produce peak decelerations of up to 0.5g,
                which was beyond any FCW-based level at the time. In the DBS test, the
                peak deceleration of a given test trial must not exceed 150 percent of
                the average peak deceleration calculated for the baseline test series
                performed at the same nominal SV speed. These provisions are intended
                to tolerate small levels of deceleration, but not the larger magnitudes
                indicative of an AEB intervention.
                 BMW objected to the inclusion of the false positive test scenario
                in general for both DBS and CIB systems and raised concerns that such
                tests ``can incentivize vehicle manufacturers to focus on one
                artificial situation, instead of considering the myriad of potential
                real-world traffic situations.'' The manufacturer suggested that if
                this test scenario remains for DBS, then the Agency should allow
                manufacturers to specify a brake pedal application rate limit beyond
                279 mm/s (11 in./s) and up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) for the false
                positive test scenario, to harmonize with Euro NCAP requirements. BMW
                further stated that limiting the rate to 279 mm/s (11 in./s) could
                increase a DBS system's sensitivity, and thereby increase the
                likelihood of additional false activation events in the real world. The
                manufacturer mentioned that as more frontal crash prevention systems
                combine both FCW and AEB functionalities, speed should reduce for all
                pedal application speeds.
                 Regarding BMW's objection to continuing with the false positive
                test scenario for CIB and DBS in NCAP, NHTSA notes that it has
                requested comment on whether eliminating the false positive tests would
                be appropriate at this time. As discussed previously, the Agency has
                not observed false positive test failures in CIB or DBS testing since
                these ADAS technologies were added to NCAP.
                 If NHTSA decides it is appropriate to keep the false positive test
                scenario for DBS, BMW requested that
                [[Page 13490]]
                manufacturers should be permitted to specify a brake pedal application
                rate up to 400 mm/s (16 in./s) since this is the upper brake
                application rate limit established by Euro NCAP. In its November 2015
                final decision notice for AEB, NHTSA addressed a similar request from
                the Alliance, which suggested that the Agency harmonize with Euro
                NCAP's brake application rate range of 200 to 400 mm/s (8 to 16 in./
                s).\190\ At the time, the Agency stated that it would retain its
                proposed brake application rate of 254 25.4 mm/s (10
                 1 in./s) in the DBS system performance test. In justifying
                this decision, NHTSA contended that the current application rate value
                is well within the range of the Euro NCAP specification. Also, NHTSA
                reasoned that the current application rate appears to be a feasible
                representation of the activation of DBS systems. DBS systems are
                designed to stop rather than slow down, but not too fast like
                conventional brake assist systems, which typically address emergency
                panic stop situations where the brake application rate exceeds 360 mm/s
                (14.2 in./s). For NHTSA to focus on evaluating system performance for
                DBS technology (not conventional brake technology), the Agency plans to
                retain the current brake pedal application rate of 254
                25.4 mm/s (10 1 in./s) for the DBS test.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \190\ 80 FR 68608 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                c. Procedure Clarifications
                 In response to the November 2015 final decision notice, Mobileye
                asked NHTSA to clarify the process of releasing the accelerator pedal
                within 500 ms of the FCW alert prior to braking. The commenter
                questioned whether the throttle was gradually released over 500 ms, or
                abruptly released over 50 ms. Mobileye also asked that the Agency
                clarify how braking is affected if there is no FCW alert, or if the FCW
                alert occurs very close to the brake activation.
                 NHTSA notes that the throttle pedal release rate is not restricted
                in NCAP's CIB test procedure. The test procedure requires only that the
                SV throttle be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is
                issued. As previously mentioned, as part of the Agency's proposed
                changes to the CIB tests, it also intends to include test procedure
                language stating that if no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the
                SV accelerator pedal will be released within 500 ms after the onset of
                CIB system braking, and that if no FCW alert is issued and the
                vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the SV
                accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the POV.
                 With respect to how SV braking is affected, if there is no FCW
                alert, or if the alert happens very close to brake activation,
                different steps are taken for the crash imminent braking (CIB) and
                dynamic brake support (DBS) tests.
                 In the existing DBS tests, the test procedure states that the
                accelerator pedal must be released within 500 ms after the FCW alert is
                issued, but prior to the onset of the manual SV brake application by a
                robotic brake controller. The Agency recognizes that this can create an
                issue if no FCW alert occurs because the throttle may still be
                depressed (since no warning was issued) while the SV brakes are applied
                by the robot at the prescribed TTC. The Agency has documented this
                possibility where the SV throttle and brake pedals are applied at the
                same time and provided a recommendation that up to a 250 ms overlap be
                allowed.\191\ In other words, once the SV driver detects that the robot
                has applied the brakes, the driver will have 250 ms to release the
                accelerator fully. The test would not be valid unless this criterion is
                met.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \191\ Forkenbrock, G.J., & Snyder, A.S. (2015, June), NHTSA's
                2014 automatic emergency braking test track evaluations (Report No.
                DOT HS 812 166), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Although the Agency has proposed to revise when the manual
                (robotic) brake application is initiated to a time that corresponds to
                1.0 second after the FCW alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB
                activation occurs after the FCW alert but before initiation of the
                manual brake application) if it continues to perform DBS testing in
                NCAP, it has also requested comment on appropriate TTCs for the
                modified DBS test conditions as an alternative to this proposal.
                Therefore, NHTSA is also requesting comment on the following:
                 (47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal
                application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been
                issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert
                occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is not
                acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
                d. Expand Testing
                 Magna suggested that NHTSA expand testing to encompass low light
                and inclement weather situations. The Agency's proposal for PAEB
                systems includes testing under less-than-ideal environmental conditions
                (specifically at nighttime). The Agency notes that approximately half
                (51 percent) of fatalities caused by rear-end crashes and most MAIS 1-5
                injuries (80 percent) occurred under daylight conditions. Furthermore,
                nearly all fatalities (92 percent) and injuries (88 percent) stemming
                from rear-end collisions occurred in clear weather.\192\ Having said
                that, IIHS's review of 2009-2016 rear-end crash data suggested that
                AEB-equipped vehicles are over-represented for crashes occurring in
                certain weather conditions, such as snow and ice.\193\ Therefore, NHTSA
                is requesting comment on the following:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \192\ Swanson, E., Foderaro, F., Yanagisawa, M., Najm, W.G., &
                Azeredo, P. (2019, August), Statistics of light-vehicle pre-crash
                scenarios based on 2011-2015 national crash data (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                 \193\ Cicchino, J.B. & Zuby, D.S. (2019, August),
                Characteristics of rear-end crashes involving passenger vehicles
                with automatic emergency braking, Traffic Injury Prevention. 2019,
                VOL. 20, NO. S1, S112-S118, https://doi.org/10.1080/15389588.2019.1576172.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess AEB
                system performance under less than ideal environmental conditions? If
                so, what environmental conditions would be appropriate?
                e. AEB Strikeable Target
                 Numerous commenters recommended that NHTSA harmonize its Strikeable
                Surrogate Vehicle (SSV) with the test target used by other testing
                organizations such as IIHS and Euro NCAP. The commenters reasoned that
                harmonization would further advance the implementation of AEB
                technology by reducing the development and testing burden and thereby
                result in lower-cost systems. Mercedes recommended that NHTSA recognize
                other targets as being equivalent devices to the SSV and requested that
                NHTSA allow vehicle manufacturers the option to choose which target is
                used for testing.
                 Currently, NHTSA uses the SSV as the principal other vehicle (POV)
                in NCAP testing of DBS and CIB systems. The SSV is a target vehicle
                modeled after a small hatchback car and fabricated from light-weight
                composite materials including carbon fiber and Kevlar[supreg].\194\
                Using this target imposes certain limitations, most importantly the
                maximum speed it can be operated at, or be struck by, the SV. Due to
                its material properties, the SSV can inflict damage to vehicles that
                impact it at higher speeds.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \194\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Another target, the Global Vehicle Target (GVT), which was
                referenced earlier with respect to BSI (blind spot intervention)
                testing, resembles a white hatchback passenger car. This three-
                [[Page 13491]]
                dimensional surrogate is currently used by other consumer
                organizations, including Euro NCAP. It is also used by many vehicle
                manufacturers in their internal testing to NCAP test specifications,
                and by NHTSA to facilitate ADAS research using pre-crash scenarios
                beyond those included in the Agency's FCW, CIB, and DBS test
                procedures.\195\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \195\ Currently, manufacturers use test results from their
                internal testing and submit them to NHTSA for NCAP's recommendation
                of vehicles that pass its performance testing requirements.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The GVT consists of 39 vinyl-covered foam pieces (held together
                with hook and loop fasteners) that form the structure the outer skins
                are attached to. It is secured to the top of a Low-Profile Robotic
                Vehicle (LPRV) using hook and loop fasteners, which separate upon an
                SV-to-GVT collision. When the GVT is hit at low speed, it is typically
                pushed off the LPRV but remains assembled. At higher impact speeds, the
                GVT breaks apart as the SV essentially drives through it, and can then
                be reassembled on top of the LPRV.
                 The use of this surrogate vehicle would allow the Agency to perform
                tests at higher speeds, thus increasing safety benefits. For this
                reason, the Agency used the GVT in its characterization study for CIB
                testing at higher speeds. The SSV initially limited the test speeds the
                Agency could adopt for CIB and DBS testing because of concerns over
                potential damage to the testing equipment and test vehicle. Using the
                GVT significantly reduces that possibility for the test speeds
                proposed. Also, as future upgrades for NCAP are planned, the GVT can be
                used to evaluate more challenging crash scenarios, such as those
                required for other ADAS technologies (Intersection Safety Assist and
                Opposing Traffic Safety Assist). NHTSA has recently docketed draft
                research test procedures for these technologies.\196\ \197\ If, in the
                future, the Agency was to consider adopting other test procedures
                requiring a strikeable target, incorporating the GVT would allow
                harmonization across the program.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \196\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
                September), Intersection safety assist system confirmation test:
                Working draft, http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
                0102-0006.
                 \197\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2019,
                September), Opposing traffic safety assist system confirmation test:
                Working draft. http://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2019-
                0102-0008.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA has conducted vehicle testing to evaluate the FCW alert and
                CIB intervention onset timing observed using the GVT Revision E and
                compared that with the timing recorded for identical tests performed
                with NHTSA's SSV benchmark.\198\ Three light vehicles and three rear-
                end crash scenarios were used for this evaluation. A secondary
                objective of this study was to assess the characteristics and
                durability of the GVT for various test track configurations,
                specifically its dynamic stability and in-the-field reconstruction time
                after being struck by a test vehicle. GVT stability was evaluated using
                straight line and curved path maneuvers at various speeds and lateral
                accelerations. Reconstruction times of the GVT after impact were
                examined using different impact speeds, directions of impact, and
                assembly crew sizes.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \198\ Snyder, A.C., Forkenbrock, G.J., Davis, I.J., O'Harra,
                B.C., & Schnelle, S.C. (2019, July), A test track comparison of the
                global vehicle target and NHTSA's strikeable surrogate vehicle
                (Report No. DOT HS 812 698), Washington, DC: National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Overall, the results from the study suggested that the onset timing
                of FCW and CIB systems observed during rear-end tests performed with
                the GVT was similar to that recorded for the SSV.\199\ The GVT was also
                found to be physically stable and remained affixed to the robotic
                platform used to facilitate its movement during the high-speed
                longitudinal tests as well as those performed at the limit of the
                platform's lateral road holding capacity. Although the time between
                test trials was longer than that associated with use of the SSV, GVT
                reassembly tests demonstrated that the GVT could be reconstructed in a
                reasonable time between tests after being struck. However, the physical
                reconstruction time is one of three considerations when determining the
                time between tests when the GVT is used. After being reassembled and
                secured to the top of the robotic platform, the platform must re-
                establish its communication with the other equipment needed to perform
                the tests, and a ``zero-offset'' check is used. This check not only
                ensures the GVT orientation relative to the platform remains consistent
                for all tests, but also confirms the distance from the SV to the GVT at
                the point of impact is accurately reported as zero when the two first
                make contact.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \199\ Comparable observations were made upon review of test data
                from the Agency's CIB characterization testing. Upon review of test
                data from the Agency's CIB characterization testing, FCW and CIB
                onset timings for identical vehicles were highly comparable
                regardless of whether the SSV or GVT Revision G targets were used.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA proposes to use the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future NCAP
                testing. Similar to that noted earlier regarding the use of the
                articulated pedestrian mannequins, the use of the GVT provides another
                opportunity for NHTSA to harmonize with other consumer information
                safety rating programs as mandated by the Bipartisan Infrastructure
                Law. Comments are sought on its adoption regardless of whether
                modifications are made to test speeds, deceleration, test scenarios,
                combining test procedures, et cetera, as has been discussed.
                 The Agency also recognizes that there have been ongoing revisions
                to the GVT to address its performance in other crash modes that
                exercise different ADAS applications. At this time, NHTSA believes the
                latest Revision G is appropriate for testing in NCAP. However, for the
                purpose of AEB testing only, NHTSA is proposing to accept manufacturer
                verification data for AEB tests conducted using GVT Revision F.\200\
                \201\ It is the Agency's understanding that Revision G incorporates
                changes to the front, side, and oblique aspects of Revision F.\202\
                NHTSA believes that modifications implemented for Revision G have not
                altered the physical characteristics of the rear of the target such
                that a vehicle's performance in the rear-end crash mode would be
                impacted. The Agency requests comment on:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \200\ While the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative
                testing with the SSV, and it believes that no significant
                differences exist between Revision E and Revision F that would
                affect AEB test results, the Agency does not believe it is necessary
                to accept from vehicle manufacturers AEB test data that was derived
                using Revision E because Revision E is no longer in production.
                Therefore, the Agency believes that any OEM data that is submitted
                should reflect the use of GVT Revision F or Revision G.
                 \201\ Although the Agency used GVT Revision E in its comparative
                testing with the SSV, the Agency does not believe that modifications
                made for Revision F would have changed the results of that testing.
                It is the Agency's understanding that several modifications were
                made to the rear of Revision E, which included adding additional
                radar material to the bottom skirt of the target to attenuate
                internal reflections, and reducing the slope of the rear top portion
                of the hatchback to increase the power of the radar return.
                 \202\ To improve the real-world characteristics from the front
                and side of the target, several changes to the radar treatment were
                integrated into the components of the GVT body for Revision G
                compared to Revision F, including changes to the skin and wheel
                treatment. There were also some minor shape changes to the front of
                the GVT body to improve front radar return and to the side to
                improve the ability to hold its shape. http://www.dynres.com/2020/02/25/the-new-global-vehicle-target-gvt-has-arrived/.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (49) The use of the GVT in lieu of the SSV in future AEB NCAP
                testing,
                 (50) whether Revisions F and G should be considered equivalent for
                AEB testing, and
                 (51) whether NHTSA should adopt a revision of the GVT other than
                Revision G for use in AEB testing in NCAP.
                [[Page 13492]]
                 With respect to Mercedes' request that NHTSA consider several
                targets and allow manufacturers the option to choose which target is
                used for testing, the Agency does not believe such an approach is
                feasible. The Agency currently accepts and uses, for recommendation
                purposes on www.NHTSA.gov, data submitted by vehicle manufacturers for
                internal CIB and DBS testing that was conducted using a target other
                than the SSV, such as the Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e.V
                (ADAC) target, which was previously used by Euro NCAP and IIHS.\203\
                However, during its system performance verification testing, the Agency
                has observed several test failures, which may be attributed to
                differences in target designs.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \203\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In NHTSA's November 2015 AEB final decision notice,\204\ NHTSA
                stated that manufacturers do not need to use the SSV to generate and
                submit self-reported test data in support of their AEB systems that
                pass NCAP's system performance requirements and are recommended to
                consumers on the Agency's website. However, if the vehicle does not
                pass NCAP's system performance criteria for AEB systems during the
                program's random system performance verification testing, the Agency
                would remove the recommendation from its website. To uphold the
                credibility of the program and reasonably assure that consumers are
                receiving vehicles that meet a specified minimum performance threshold,
                NHTSA believes that it is critical to accept self-reported data from
                manufacturers that was obtained using tests conducted in accordance
                with NHTSA test procedures. As such, NHTSA is proposing not to accept
                vehicle manufacturer test data that was derived from an alternative
                test target other than that which is specified in NCAP's test
                procedures.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \204\ 80 FR 68607 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                IV. ADAS Rating System
                 NHTSA is planning to create a rating system based on assessments
                related to the performance of ADAS technologies, including, but not
                necessarily limited to, the technologies already part of the program
                and others proposed above. Currently, NCAP places a check mark by the
                relevant ADAS technology on NHTSA's website, www.nhtsa.gov, if two
                conditions are met: (1) A vehicle is equipped with the safety
                technology recommended by NHTSA; and (2) the system meets NCAP's
                performance specifications. Consumers are encouraged to look for
                vehicles equipped with ADAS that meet NCAP's performance tests, which
                are intended to establish a minimum level of performance on which
                consumers can rely and compare among vehicles equipped with similar
                technologies.
                 In the Agency's December 2015 notice, NHTSA discussed a series of
                point values for the ADAS technologies at that time. These points would
                have been used in a star rating system for these technologies. Vehicles
                with ADAS that met the criteria set forth in the Agency's test
                procedures would earn full points if offered as standard equipment on a
                particular model and half points if offered only as optional equipment
                for that model. In response to that proposal, commenters provided mixed
                support regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of developing
                such an ADAS rating system versus the current process of just
                identifying the presence of recommended technologies with check
                marks.\205\ Proponents of a rating system were generally supportive of
                the broad concept of rating ADAS, but did not propose specific
                suggestions for how the Agency could develop such a rating system. Some
                commenters responded that ADAS technologies have not yet matured to the
                point that a rating system would be appropriate, while others believed
                that one could be developed. In the responses for the October 1, 2018
                public meeting, support still varied, even when the discussion was more
                focused on how the FAST Act mandate to provide crash avoidance
                information on the Monroney label might be fulfilled in the context of
                an ADAS rating system.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \205\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                A. Communicating ADAS Ratings to Consumers
                 As mentioned previously, NHTSA's current method of providing ADAS
                information to consumers conveys which systems meet NCAP's system
                performance requirements, but provides no overall ADAS technology
                rating for the vehicle. However, as more emerging ADAS technologies are
                available in the market, the Agency believes that a rating mechanism
                for these systems would be more beneficial for consumers because it
                could better distinguish the technologies, including different levels
                of system performance and the technologies' life-saving potential,
                rather than simply listing how many technologies a given vehicle is
                equipped with that meet NCAP's system performance requirements. As will
                be discussed in the sections that follow, ADAS ratings could be
                communicated to consumers using stars, medals, points, or other means,
                thereby allowing them to make better-informed decisions. Also, the
                ratings could be based on the safety benefit potential afforded by
                vehicles' ADAS technologies and system performance. In addition, NHTSA
                plans to explore several approaches on how to present such rating
                information in the Agency's planned consumer research. In this RFC,
                NHTSA is soliciting input solely on the creation of an ADAS rating
                system, not the visual representation or placement of that rating
                system at points of sale. As described in greater detail below, issues
                related to the visual representation and placement of the rating system
                at points of sale will be a topic covered in future notices and
                research.
                1. Star Rating System
                 NCAP currently uses 1 to 5 stars to communicate vehicle
                crashworthiness ratings to consumers, with both ratings for the
                individual tests and an overall rating. Given the familiarity that
                consumers have with NHTSA's current 5-star ratings system, the Agency
                could also consider the use of stars for a future ADAS rating system.
                However, the Agency has some reservations about pursuing such an
                approach.
                 A future star-based ADAS rating system could produce lower ratings
                for technologies than consumers are accustomed to seeing in
                crashworthiness and rollover resistance tests, and may cause
                unnecessary consumer confusion about the additional safety the
                technology on their vehicle provides. For instance, although NHTSA
                believes ADAS could potentially add significant safety benefits in
                addition to the crashworthiness protection afforded on vehicles, the
                Agency questions whether consumers would interpret 1- and 2-star ADAS
                ratings as conveying added benefits beyond the crashworthiness
                protection offered by a vehicle. In addition, vehicles that do not have
                any ADAS ratings could mistakenly be interpreted to have an advantage
                (i.e., additional safety benefits) over those that have low ADAS star
                ratings. Thus, vehicles that have low ADAS star ratings could
                inadvertently discourage consumers from considering ADAS in their
                purchasing decisions, when in fact, those vehicles with 1- and 2-stars
                may offer significant safety benefits over their unrated peers.
                 Given these concerns, the Agency could consider reserving star
                ratings to convey crashworthiness results only and distinguish ADAS
                ratings by using another visualization approach, such as a medals
                system or points-based system.
                [[Page 13493]]
                2. Medals Rating System
                 Another potential method of presenting ADAS rating information to
                consumers could be a three-tiered award system similar in concept to
                Olympic medals. Presumably, most consumers are already familiar with
                the designations of bronze, silver, and gold as increasingly more
                prestigious levels of achievement.
                 Using an awards system (e.g., medals) rather than stars to
                represent NCAP's rating of ADAS technologies would not only distinguish
                ADAS grades from crashworthiness ratings, but also visually communicate
                that the two ratings are conveying different types of vehicle safety
                information. However, it could cause consumer confusion by having two
                separate rating systems that consumers would need to consider and, to
                the extent there is a divergence between the two systems, potentially
                weigh against one another for a given vehicle.
                3. Points-Based Rating System
                 NHTSA could use points to convey ADAS rating information. Points
                could be used in lieu of stars or medals or in addition to these
                alternative rating communication concepts, and they may serve as the
                basis for any of the potential rating system approaches discussed in
                the sections that follow. One advantage of a points-based system is
                that it can provide improved delineation in ratings, thus benefiting
                consumers who may want to compare ratings between several vehicle
                models. However, the inherent granularity of a points-based system may
                cause consumer confusion if conveyed in addition to another, coarser,
                communication rating concept, such as stars or medals. As mentioned
                previously, NHTSA plans to conduct consumer research surrounding the
                concept of an overall NCAP rating that would combine results from
                crashworthiness, rollover resistance, and ADAS technology testing.
                4. Incorporating Baseline Risk
                 Another consideration for the Agency that may add value to an ADAS
                rating system is the notion of conveying a vehicle's performance
                relative to the baseline (or average) performance observed for today's
                vehicle fleet. As detailed later in this notice, this concept is
                currently an element of NCAP's crashworthiness rating system. Star
                ratings generated in NCAP today are a measure of how much more (or
                less) occupant protection (in terms of injury risk) a given vehicle
                affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle. The Agency could
                consider incorporating the baseline concept when developing an ADAS
                rating system as well. For instance, today's ``average'' vehicle may
                achieve 60 out of a possible 100 points (or 3 out of 5 stars) during
                NCAP's testing. This score (or rating) may translate to a 30 percent
                reduction in the risk of crashes, injuries, deaths, etc. Scores (or
                ratings) for future vehicles, which could also potentially be tied to a
                percent reduction in crashes, could be compared relative to the
                baseline rating of today's fleet, thus affording consumers the
                opportunity to compare scores (or ratings) for vehicles spanning
                different model years.
                B. ADAS Rating System Concepts
                 Just as there are several ways to communicate ADAS ratings to
                consumers, there are also several ways to rate ADAS technologies, a few
                of which are discussed below. As each of these rating system concepts
                center around vehicle performance in NCAP tests, it was necessary to
                consider the primary components of these tests during concept
                development.
                1. ADAS Test Procedure Structure and Nomenclature
                 As discussed extensively in this notice, each ADAS technology and
                associated test procedure the Agency is considering for inclusion in
                NCAP has the potential to address a real-world safety problem. Each
                test procedure is designed to replicate certain injurious and fatal
                real-world events (termed ``scenarios'' in this new rating concept)
                that can be approximated in a laboratory setting to assess the
                capabilities of a given ADAS. Within each scenario, the Agency defines
                test conditions to replicate types of real-world incidents. Within each
                test condition, one or more test variants (as illustrated in Figures 1
                and 2 below) that assess the limitations of each ADAS technology under
                that test condition is also defined.\206\ Finally, for each test
                variant, the technology would have to pass a certain number of trials
                to receive credit for that part of the ADAS rating. Figure 1
                illustrates a generic structure for describing a given ADAS test
                procedure and its nomenclature in NCAP.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \206\ In certain test conditions that do not have a multitude of
                assessments (e.g., test condition variants), the test condition and
                assessment would be one and the same.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
                [[Page 13494]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.002
                 The above methodology and diagram can be illustrated further using
                one of the ADAS technologies discussed in this document, PAEB. PAEB is
                intended to address a real-world safety issue involving vulnerable road
                users, like pedestrians. The current test procedure is designed to
                replicate S1 and S4 scenarios (vehicle heading straight with a
                pedestrian crossing the road, and a vehicle heading straight with a
                pedestrian walking along or against traffic, respectively). Within each
                scenario, one or more test conditions are defined. For example, within
                the S1b test scenario (as previously discussed), several test condition
                variants are defined. In this case, the same test condition would have
                to be executed at various speeds (test condition variants). Finally,
                NHTSA would prescribe the number of trials for which the system would
                have to exhibit conformance to receive credit for these particular test
                condition variants and, in turn, scenario. Figure 2 illustrates this
                example.
                [[Page 13495]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.003
                 To illustrate further the multitude of assessments simplified in
                Figure 1, certain test scenarios only include one test condition and
                one test variant. A specific example of this would be the previously
                mentioned Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) scenario, evaluated as part of the
                Crash Imminent Braking (CIB) test procedure, where the Subject Vehicle
                (SV) encounters a stopped Principal Other Vehicle (POV) on a straight
                road moving at 40.2 kph (25 mph). This example is illustrated in Figure
                3.
                [[Page 13496]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.004
                BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
                2. Percentage of Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 1
                 Given the test procedures' structure, an ADAS rating system could
                be designed with standards of increasing stringency that must be
                achieved to receive higher award levels (as shown in Table 7 below). In
                such a system, different ADAS technologies, each with a related test
                procedure (e.g., FCW, CIB, LKS), are combined into categories where
                each technology addresses a similar crash problem. For instance, ADAS
                Category 1 in Table 7 could represent the Forward Collision Prevention
                category that would be comprised of the three forward collision
                prevention technologies, FCW, CIB, and DBS. Vehicles would have to meet
                increasing numbers of test conditions across all test procedures in
                that particular ADAS category (i.e., three test procedures for the
                example given) to achieve higher ratings (e.g., medals, stars, points).
                For the example rating system concept shown in Table 7, 50 percent of
                test conditions would have to be met to achieve a bronze award, 75
                percent to achieve a silver award, and 100 percent to achieve a gold
                award for each ADAS category.\207\ The lowest ADAS rating among the
                categories could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary rating is
                established across all included ADAS technologies. Alternatively, an
                overall ADAS award could reflect the average ADAS rating amongst the
                technology categories.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \207\ When `Did not meet' is listed for an ADAS category, the
                vehicle failed to pass the requirements for the test condition/
                variant when tested. `Did not run' may be used to signify that the
                vehicle is not equipped with the technology to pass the related test
                procedure(s), and as such, the tests were not conducted.
                 Table 7--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 1
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 All test procedures & conditions in ADAS category
                 ------------------------------------------------------------
                 Bronze (50% of Silver (75% of ADAS category
                 test conditions test conditions Gold (100% of test award
                 met) met) conditions met)
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                ADAS Category 1................. Meets............. Did not meet...... Did not run....... Bronze.
                ADAS Category 2................. Meets............. Meets............. Meets............. Gold.
                ADAS Category 3................. Meets............. Did not meet...... Did not run....... Bronze.
                ADAS Category 4................. Meets............. Meets............. Did not meet...... Silver.
                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Overall ADAS Award.......... Bronze
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                3. Select Test Conditions To Meet--Concept 2
                 Table 8 demonstrates another possible NCAP ADAS rating system
                concept. As with Concept 1, ADAS technologies are grouped into
                categories that address similar crash problems. Instead of having to
                meet a percentage of all test conditions, NCAP could specifically
                require certain test conditions to be met for each of three award
                levels. These award levels could be based on the following increasingly
                challenging delineations:
                [[Page 13497]]
                 (1) Bronze (Basic performers)--test conditions that are achievable
                for current systems to meet;
                 (2) Silver (Advanced performers)--test conditions that are more
                difficult for current systems to meet but are more easily achievable
                than the current known system limitations; and
                 (3) Gold (Highest performers)--test conditions that approach the
                current limits of system testing feasibility, vehicle operations, and
                event extremes.
                 Depending on a given technology's test procedure, the number of
                test conditions, test condition variants, and trial passes necessary to
                meet the Agency's requirements could vary. Thus, the ADAS performance
                requirements necessary for reaching each subsequent award level could
                be based on meeting a single test condition variant or meeting a number
                of test conditions. To explain further in the context of Table 8, ADAS
                Group 1 could be the Lane Keeping Assistance (LKA) technology category,
                where technology 1 could be LDW, and technology 2 could be LKS. In this
                example, the vehicle's LDW system meets all applicable test conditions
                (bronze, silver, gold). However, its LKS system fails to meet the test
                conditions required for silver, but meets the test conditions to earn
                bronze. Therefore, the highest award this vehicle could achieve for the
                LKA category would be bronze, as it is the highest award achieved by
                both of the technologies (LDW and LKS) included in the LKA category.
                Similar to Concept 1, the lowest or average ADAS rating amongst the
                category groups could serve as the overall ADAS award if a summary
                rating is established across all included ADAS technologies.
                 Table 8--3-Tier ADAS Rating System Concept 2
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Bronze test..... Silver test..... Gold test....... ADAS group award
                 conditions...... conditions...... conditions......
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                ADAS Group 1................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Bronze.
                 Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... ................ Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
                 Tech 2................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... Did not run..... .............
                ADAS Group 2................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Gold.
                 Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
                 Tech 2................... Meets........... ................ ................ Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... .............
                ADAS Group 3................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Bronze.
                 Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... Did not run..... Did not run..... .............
                ADAS Group 4................. 1............... 2............... 3............... 1............... 2............... 1............... Silver.
                 Tech 1................... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Meets........... Did not meet.... .............
                 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Overall ADAS Award... Bronze
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
                 A more detailed example of this ADAS rating system concept, which
                uses some of the test conditions and test condition variants discussed
                in this document (distinguished by variables such as speed), is shown
                below in Table 9. In this example, check marks are used to indicate
                that the vehicle's ADAS technology has met the requirements for a given
                test procedure's conditions and test condition variants. An ``X''
                symbol is used to indicate where vehicles did not meet the test
                condition and/or variants, either because the vehicle was not equipped
                with the technology and therefore could not be tested, or because the
                vehicle's technology was tested, but failed to meet the test procedure
                requirements. Units are in kph unless otherwise noted.
                 To further explain the three-tier rating system illustrated in
                Table 9 with context, ADAS Group 3 in the example utilizes Blind Spot
                Detection (BSD) to demonstrate multiple test conditions and test
                condition variants. BSW (categorized as Technology 1 for the BSD
                grouping) has five test condition variants, and BSI (categorized as
                Technology 2 for the BSD grouping) includes three test condition
                variants. In order for BSD to achieve a bronze award in this example,
                the BSW system must meet the three test condition variants included for
                this technology under the `Bronze Test Conditions/Variants' heading. No
                BSI test conditions, or test condition variants, must be met. In order
                for BSD to achieve a silver award, BSW must meet two test conditions
                (comprised of five test condition variants) and BSI must meet two test
                conditions, both of which are included under the `Silver Test
                Conditions/Variants' heading. If the vehicle was also able to meet the
                third test condition included in the BSI test procedure, `SV Lane
                Change w/Closing Headway 72.4/80.5', which is included under the `Gold
                Test Conditions/Variants' heading in Table 9, the vehicle would earn a
                gold award. In the Table 9 example, however, BSI does not meet one of
                the silver test conditions/variants (`SV Lane Change w/Constant Headway
                72.4/72.4'). Consequently, in this example, BSD achieves the next
                lowest award--bronze.
                [[Page 13498]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.005
                [[Page 13499]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN09MR22.006
                BILLING CODE 4910-59-C
                [[Page 13500]]
                 The approach presented in Tables 8 and 9 would address the Agency's
                desire to introduce a dynamic ADAS rating system. As technologies
                become more mature, the Agency expects ADAS system performances will
                begin to exceed NCAP testing requirements, and as such, systems will
                have an easier time meeting the required test conditions across all
                test procedures. The Agency could begin providing information on higher
                performing systems by periodically increasing the stringency of
                requirements to achieve the highest NCAP ratings. Lower award levels
                could be reserved for test conditions that are easily achieved by ADAS
                in the current vehicle fleet. Higher award levels could be reserved for
                test conditions that current ADAS have difficulty achieving, or for new
                test scenarios (e.g., PAEB S2 or S3), conditions (e.g., using a
                motorcycle or cyclist as the POV), or variants (e.g., increased SV/POV
                speeds, decreased headways, additional weather conditions, varying
                deceleration rates) that are added to the program over time. This
                approach is expected to continue to provide consumers information on
                vehicle safety designs that introduce truly exceptional ADAS
                performance compared to their peers. It should also incentivize vehicle
                manufacturers to improve their ADAS capabilities to meet consumers'
                expectations for system performance.
                 Along these lines, NHTSA could also introduce a slight deviation to
                rating system Concept 2. In this deviation, not only would vehicles
                have to meet the most demanding requirements across all ADAS test
                procedures to receive higher ratings, but also the Agency could set the
                performance target for the highest level rating (gold, 5 stars, maximum
                points, etc.) for those test conditions that are required for an ADAS
                technology that is just emerging in the marketplace, such as
                Intersection Safety Assist (ISA), mentioned later in this notice. In
                doing so, consumers could be assured that purchasing a vehicle that
                earns the highest award level would offer the most advanced ADAS
                capabilities available at that time.
                4. Weighting Test Conditions Based on Real-World Data--Concept 3
                 The Agency believes it is important to develop an ADAS rating
                system that is not only flexible (i.e., one that can adapt or change
                over time) to keep pace with advancements in technologies, but also
                effective in providing consumer information that encourages the
                proliferation of life-saving technology. As such, a third rating system
                concept that the Agency could consider would be one which weights the
                technology groups based on the target population data and effectiveness
                attributable to each technology to derive the overall ADAS award. In
                essence, the more critical, more lifesaving, and/or more advanced/
                effective technology systems would have more contribution (i.e., be
                worth more) in the rating system. Furthermore, for a given technology
                group, the Agency could weight the test conditions that approximate
                more frequent or injurious real-world events so that they have more
                influence in the rating for that group. The selected evaluation method
                could be normalized in such a way that the results of each test
                condition within a scenario could be appropriately combined and
                concisely presented for consumer information or ratings purposes. Such
                an approach could also be incorporated for either Concept 1 or Concept
                2, discussed above.
                 Utilizing real-world data to inform the structure of a future ADAS
                rating system is challenging for several reasons. For one, there is no
                single metric (such as target crash populations, fatalities, or
                injuries) that can be used to weight every technology appropriately in
                a rating system when both the related real-world safety problem and
                meaningful influence are considered. In an effort to correlate rating
                system weights directly with potential real-world safety benefits, too
                little weight may be assigned to technologies that have lower target
                populations (such as those for Blind Spot Detection) compared to
                technologies that have much higher target populations (such as those
                for Forward Collision Prevention). Thus, the Agency is concerned that
                it may be possible for manufacturers to offer one or two ADAS systems
                that perform well in the NCAP tests, if those technologies with higher
                target populations are apportioned significant weight in a rating
                system, while choosing not to include the other, lower-weighted
                technologies on their vehicles, or opting to include them even if the
                systems perform poorly. Therefore, the Agency believes that it is
                critical to find an acceptable balance between weights dictated solely
                by real-world data and those that ensure each component provides a
                meaningful contribution to the rating system. In essence, each
                technology should be apportioned within the rating system such that it
                provides a significant contribution while also reflecting the relative
                safety improvement that each technology may afford consumers.
                 Changes in target population data (based on real-world crashes) and
                improvements made to ADAS technologies over time pose additional
                challenges for the Agency in using real-word data and system
                effectiveness estimates to inform appropriate weights or proportions to
                assign to the individual test conditions or the corresponding test
                condition variants in an ADAS rating system.\208\ As technology systems
                improve to meet NCAP test scenarios/conditions, system effectiveness
                estimates may increase. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this
                notice, the real-world crash data may change as technologies are
                designed to address certain crash scenarios, but not others. Ideally,
                the Agency would adjust rating system weights to keep pace with these
                changes, as this would align with NHTSA's goal of developing a flexible
                ADAS rating system that can respond appropriately to improvements or
                changes seen for the fleet. Unfortunately, real-world data for system
                performance advancements is not always readily available to support
                dynamic program upgrades, as the crash data, which takes time to
                reflect changes in the vehicle fleet accurately, lags system updates
                and deployments.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \208\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Having said that, the Agency sees merit in using available real-
                world data, specifically target populations, to determine which ADAS
                technologies should be considered for inclusion in the program. The
                additional time between technology development and NHTSA's ability to
                collect real-world data on target populations has proven in the past to
                be sufficient to ensure that the technology is mature prior to
                considering it in NCAP. As mentioned previously, the four ADAS
                technologies discussed in this proposal focus on the most frequently
                occurring and/or most severe crash types, which the Agency believes is
                a feasible and prudent approach to use when considering whether an ADAS
                technology should be incorporated into NCAP. NHTSA will continue to
                leverage all information and safety studies on ADAS technologies, such
                as those cited in this notice, to support the Agency's proposal. In
                addition, NHTSA plans to leverage all available data to assess real-
                world insights into advanced safety technology performance.
                5. Overall Rating
                 As discussed herein, there are many considerations when developing
                a potential ADAS rating system. These include: (1) What type of system
                to
                [[Page 13501]]
                adopt; (2) whether to use points, medals, or awards to convey ratings;
                and (3) whether to weight system components based on real-world data.
                Another consideration is whether to have an overall rating. Although
                the concepts discussed thus far have included an overall rating, NHTSA
                could also simply list individual ratings for the included ADAS
                technologies, but not adopt an overall rating. NHTSA believes that
                consumers may have preferences as to which specific ADAS technologies
                they would or would not want on their vehicles and may be interested
                only in how those individual technologies perform in the Agency's
                testing, not in how the vehicle systems perform overall. The Agency
                notes that the assignment of ratings for individual technologies could
                simply supplement the NCAP program's existing list approach, or
                individual technology ratings could be listed concurrently with an
                overall rating. Thus, the Agency requests comment on whether an overall
                rating system is necessary and, if so, whether it should replace or
                simply supplement the existing list approach.
                 With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks
                comments on the following:
                 (52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating
                system,
                 (53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed
                appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in order
                to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
                 (54) the appropriateness of using target populations and technology
                effectiveness estimates to determine weights or proportions to assign
                to individual test conditions, corresponding test combinations, or an
                overall ADAS award,
                 (55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/ratings,
                 (56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS
                testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries,
                deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most
                appropriate,
                 (57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so,
                whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list
                approach, and
                 (58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the
                appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu of,
                or in addition to, a star rating system.
                 In responding to these approaches, or in developing new approaches
                for consideration, NHTSA requests that commenters consider a potential
                ADAS rating system that would allow flexibilities for continuous
                improvements to the program and cross-model year comparisons. In this
                notice, the Agency is seeking feedback on the appropriateness of the
                test scenarios, test conditions, test condition variants, and number of
                trials within each test variant for the four proposed technologies
                (PAEB, LKS, BSW, and BSI) discussed in this RFC, in addition to the
                four technologies currently included in NCAP. After NHTSA reviews
                comments in response to this notice, particularly those in response to
                questions raised within each of the ADAS technology sections and the
                rating system concepts discussed herein, the Agency anticipates
                finalizing the related test procedures and would then develop the
                selected ADAS rating system based on the technologies, test scenarios,
                test conditions, etc. that have support for incorporation into the
                program. Until NHTSA issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the
                new ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating
                section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label), the Agency
                plans to continue assigning NCAP credit, using check marks on
                www.nhtsa.gov, to vehicles that (1) are equipped with its recommended
                ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system performance test
                requirements.
                V. Revising the Monroney Label (Window Sticker)
                 The third part to this notice relates to the Fixing America's
                Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which includes a section that
                requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance
                information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on
                window stickers (also known as Monroney labels) placed on motor
                vehicles by their manufacturers.\209\ At the time of the FAST Act,
                NHTSA was already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present
                many proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new
                ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \209\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the
                ``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA currently requires vehicle manufacturers to include safety
                rating information, obtained from NHTSA under its NCAP program, on the
                Monroney labels of all new light vehicles manufactured on or after
                September 1, 2007 (49 CFR part 575). This requirement was mandated by
                Section 10307 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
                Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). The purpose
                of the law is to ensure that vehicle manufacturers provide consumers
                with relevant vehicle safety ratings information on all new light
                vehicles at the point of sale so that they can make informed purchasing
                decisions.
                 Although the safety rating information included on the Monroney
                label has provided consumers with valuable information at the point of
                sale, there are limitations with the current label for NCAP. For
                instance, currently the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney
                label only includes vehicle performance information for the
                crashworthiness program in NCAP (known as the 5-star safety ratings),
                which is comprised of a full-frontal impact test, a side impact barrier
                test, a side impact pole test, a static measurement of the vehicle's
                stability factor, and a dynamic assessment of the vehicle's risk to
                rollover in a single-vehicle crash. The other consumer information
                program in NCAP, which is the ADAS technologies assessment, is not
                included in the current vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney
                label. This information is only available on www.nhtsa.gov, along with
                the 5-star safety ratings information.\210\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \210\ 49 CFR part 575, Section 302, ``Vehicle labeling of safety
                rating information (compliance required for model year 2012 and
                later vehicles manufactured on or after January 31, 2012),''
                specifies that the safety ratings information landscape should be at
                least 4.5 in. wide and 3.5 in. tall or cover at least 8 percent of
                the total area of the Monroney label--whichever is larger.
                Currently, any change that requires modification of the safety
                rating information presented on the Monroney label would require a
                notice and comment rulemaking action pursuant to the Administrative
                Procedure Act.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Thus, NHTSA plans to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
                in 2023 to include ADAS performance information from NCAP in the
                vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label, as mandated by the
                FAST Act. However, NHTSA seeks a flexible means to keep pace with the
                technological advancement and the frequent development of new ADAS
                technologies while also providing adequate public participation and
                transparency. NHTSA would like to develop a way to allow the Agency
                both to convey NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety rating
                section of the Monroney label and minimize the number of rulemaking
                actions needed each time the Agency incorporates a new technology in
                NCAP.
                 At this time, NHTSA believes it may be able to achieve these goals
                by adopting all or some combination of the following three main
                categories for the
                [[Page 13502]]
                safety rating section of the Monroney label: (1) Crash protection
                information--which would be comprised of a rating (possibly one which
                maintains the Agency's 5-star ratings brand) that is tied to a
                vehicle's performance in NCAP crashworthiness and rollover testing; (2)
                safety technology information--which could be comprised of a rating
                (possibly one that uses the Agency's 5-star ratings brand, a three-tier
                medal award system, or points) that is tied to a vehicle's ability to
                avoid a crash based on its performance in ADAS testing conducted by
                NCAP; and (3) overall vehicle safety performance information--which
                could give recognition to vehicles that are top performers in both the
                crash protection and safety technology information categories for a
                given model year.
                 NHTSA believes that efforts to develop a label that incorporates
                these three main overarching categories--crash protection information,
                safety technology information, and overall vehicle safety performance
                information--should also strive to reduce the need to update the
                Monroney label by way of rulemaking when future changes are made to the
                NCAP program.
                 NHTSA intends to develop potential label changes by conducting
                consumer research. In the past, NCAP has benefitted from research on
                the illustration of NCAP vehicle safety information in the safety
                rating section of the Monroney label. NHTSA plans to conduct
                qualitative and quantitative consumer market research to: (1) Evaluate
                the overall appeal of the safety rating label concept mentioned above
                and identify specific likes and dislikes associated with each of the
                three main categories on the label; (2) measure the ease of
                comprehension for the safety rating label concept and understand which
                visual and text features are most effective at conveying vehicle safety
                information; (3) assess the distinctiveness of how the information is
                displayed and understand how best to make the vehicle safety
                information stand out on the Monroney label; and (4) identify
                additional areas of improvement related to the three potential main
                label categories relating to crash protection information, safety
                technology information, and overall vehicle performance
                information.\211\ NHTSA plans to use the results of this research to
                determine how best to convey safety rating information to the public.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \211\ NHTSA published a notice on April 28, 2020, seeking public
                comment on the information collection aspect of the consumer market
                research.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
                 The fourth part to this notice discusses, for the first time in
                NCAP, a roadmap that sets forth NHTSA's plans for upgrading NCAP over
                the next several years. As mentioned at the beginning of this notice,
                the Agency's efforts outlined herein include both NHTSA's near- and
                long-term strategies for upgrading NCAP.
                 Fulfillment of the roadmap will involve NHTSA's issuing planned
                proposed upgrades in phases as vehicle safety-related systems and
                technologies mature and data about their use and efficacy become known.
                The systems and technologies would include new vehicle-based
                crashworthiness and crash avoidance systems as well as systems-based
                improvements, such as occupant restraints and headlamp system
                performance upgrades. NHTSA would issue a final decision document
                following an RFC that responds to comments and provides appropriate
                lead time. This phased process allows stakeholders to provide data and
                views on proposed program updates, and allows NHTSA more flexibility to
                pursue program updates quicker.
                 Since 2015, NHTSA has worked to finalize its research on pedestrian
                crash protection (head, and upper and lower leg impact tests), advanced
                anthropomorphic test devices (crash test dummies) in frontal and side
                impact tests, a new frontal oblique crash test, and an updated rollover
                risk curve. NHTSA has included these initiatives in the mid-term
                component of the 10-year roadmap because the Agency reasonably believes
                they would meet the four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.\212\
                Initiatives in the mid-term component of the 10-year roadmap identify
                and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that are practical
                and for which objective tests and criteria, and other consumer data
                exist.\213\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \212\ The four requisites are: (1) The technology addresses a
                safety need; (2) system designs exist that can mitigate the safety
                problem; (3) the technology provides the potential for safety
                benefits; and (4) a performance-based objective test procedure
                exists that can assess system performance.
                 \213\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In addition to the items in the roadmap discussed below, NHTSA is
                taking an unprecedented step to consider expanding NCAP to include
                safety technologies that may have the potential to help drivers make
                safe driving choices, as discussed in the next section. This aspect of
                NCAP would focus on the relationship between technology and behavioral
                safety, and would provide comparative information on devices that can
                shift driver behavior that contribute to crashes (e.g., speeding, and
                drowsy-, impaired- and distracted-driving). Initiatives on these
                technologies could be woven into both the first and second half (i.e.,
                long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether the
                technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently
                developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
                Initiatives in the long-term component of the roadmap include an
                identification of any safety opportunity or technology not included in
                the mid-term component for a variety of reasons, and those initiatives
                that would most benefit from stakeholder input and comments from the
                public. The Agency believes the plans outlined below would fulfill the
                requirements set forth in Section 24213 of the Bipartisan
                Infrastructure Law for the 10-year New Car Assessment Program roadmap
                once this RFC is finalized.
                 The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law requires that NHTSA establish a
                roadmap for the implementation of NCAP not later than one year after
                the law's enactment.\214\ This roadmap must cover a term of ten years,
                consisting of a mid-term component and a long-term component.\215\ This
                roadmap aligns with relevant Agency priorities, performance plans,
                agendas, and any other relevant NHTSA plans.\216\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \214\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(b).
                 \215\ Id.
                 \216\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(2)(A).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Additionally, the contents of the roadmap must include a plan for
                any changes for NCAP, which includes descriptions of actions to be
                carried out and shall, as applicable, incorporate objective criteria
                for evaluating safety technologies and reasonable time periods for
                changes to NCAP that include new or updated tests.\217\ NHTSA has long-
                established criteria for evaluating safety technologies for inclusion
                in NCAP, which is discussed in detail earlier in this notice and in
                several previous notices. NHTSA also uses the notice and comment period
                to ensure the time periods for changes to NCAP are reasonable, and the
                Agency expects this practice to continue. As part of the Agency's
                development of next steps for NCAP, NHTSA regularly evaluates other
                rating systems within the United States and abroad, including whether
                there are safety benefits of consistency with those other rating
                [[Page 13503]]
                systems.\218\ There are other benefits for being consistent, but safety
                is NHTSA's, and thus, NCAP's, top priority.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \217\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(1)(A).
                 \218\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(4).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Next, the roadmap shall include key milestones, including the
                anticipated start of an action, completion of an action, and effective
                date of an update.\219\ While NHTSA can reasonably anticipate when the
                start of actions may occur in the mid-term portion of the roadmap, many
                technologies in the long-term portion of the roadmap will require
                additional research, test procedure development, product development
                and maturity, and a number of other factors that prevent the Agency
                from providing more detail on the anticipated start of an action. As
                such, NHTSA can only provide the estimated start date of 2025-2031.
                Completion of action is highly dependent upon the notice and comment
                process, and the effective date would be highly dependent on the
                completion of an action. Completion dates are dependent on the number
                and depth of the comments received in response to an RFC, along with
                the technical research necessary to resolve any challenging issues in
                the comments. Effective dates are dependent on completion dates. As
                such, NHTSA cannot reasonably anticipate those timelines in advance.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \219\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(1)(B).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law also requires that the mid-term
                portion of the roadmap identify and prioritize safety opportunities and
                technologies that are practical and for which objective rating tests,
                evaluation criteria, and other consumer data exist.\220\ In the mid-
                term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA has included only those technologies
                that are practical and that otherwise meet the requirements in the law.
                With respect to the long-term portion of the roadmap, NHTSA must
                identify and prioritize safety opportunities and technologies that
                exist or are in development.\221\ NHTSA has met both of these
                requirements in the following sections, prioritizing safety
                opportunities and technologies that are practical and for which
                objective rating tests, evaluation criteria, and other consumer data
                exist in the mid-term portion, and identifying safety opportunities and
                technologies that exist or are in development in the long-term portion.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \220\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(2)(A).
                 \221\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(2)(B).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Any safety opportunity or technology not included in this roadmap
                was omitted because NHTSA is not considering inclusion in NCAP at this
                time.\222\ In the next five years, addition of other technologies or
                opportunities to the roadmap would be subject to NHTSA's four
                prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP, the requirements of the Bipartisan
                Infrastructure Law for inclusion in any part of the roadmap, and the
                appropriateness of the technology or opportunity for a consumer
                information program.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \222\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C.
                32310(c)(3).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Per Sec. 24213(c), NHTSA must request comment on the roadmap and
                review and incorporate these comments, as appropriate.\223\ This RFC
                requests comments from the public on the roadmap. NHTSA considers the
                notice and comment process to be the primary form of stakeholder
                engagement, though the Agency reserves the right to conduct other forms
                of engagement to ensure that input received represents a diversity of
                technical background and viewpoints.\224\ With regard to a roadmap,
                NHTSA requests feedback on the following:
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \223\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(e).
                 \224\ Public Law 117-58, Sec. 24213(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. 32310(d).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in
                development that could be included in future roadmaps,
                 (60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or harmonization
                with other rating programs, and
                 (61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.
                2021-2022 Timeframe
                 As discussed in detail in this notice, NHTSA proposes to
                add four new ADAS technologies (LKS, BSD, BSI, and PAEB) in NCAP.
                 In addition to improving the safety and protection of
                motor vehicle occupants, NHTSA continues its efforts and focus to
                improve the safety of pedestrians and vulnerable road users. NHTSA
                plans to propose a crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing
                program in NCAP in 2022. The pedestrian protection program would
                incorporate three crashworthiness tests (i.e., head-to-hood, upper leg-
                to-hood leading edge, and lower leg-to-bumper) discussed in the
                December 2015 RFC.\225\ A crashworthiness pedestrian protection testing
                program would measure how well passenger cars, trucks, and sport
                utility vehicles protect pedestrians in the event of a crash. The
                program would further complement the safety achieved by pedestrian
                automatic emergency braking by measuring the safety performance of new
                vehicles to pedestrian impacts and encouraging safer vehicle designs
                for pedestrians.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \225\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pp. 78547-78550.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                2022-2023 Timeframe
                 NHTSA plans to propose using the THOR-50M in NCAP's full
                frontal impact tests and the WorldSID-50M in the program's side impact
                barrier and side impact pole tests soon after work commences to add the
                dummies to 49 CFR part 572 and FMVSSs.\226\ The Agency would inform the
                public (in request for comment notices) how these crash test dummies
                would be utilized in various NCAP test modes.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \226\ NHTSA included new rulemakings in the Spring 2020
                Regulatory Agenda that would adopt the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M
                into NHTSA's regulation for anthropomorphic test devices, 49 CFR
                part 572 (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM20 and https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM22, respectively). NHTSA also included
                rulemakings that would adopt use of the THOR-50M and WorldSID-50M at
                the manufacturers' option in NHTSA compliance tests for FMVSS No.
                208, ``Occupant crash protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN
                2127-AM21) and FMVSS No. 214, ``Side impact protection,'' (https://www.reginfo.gov, RIN 2127-AM23), respectively.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In the December 2015 notice, NHTSA announced it would like
                to include a frontal oblique crash test in NCAP.\227\ In response to
                that notice, commenters requested that the Agency provide the public
                with additional information on the target population as well as costs
                and benefits. They also argued that countermeasure studies have not
                been completed and questioned the repeatability and reproducibility of
                both the test procedure and the oblique moving deformable barrier.
                NHTSA has continued its frontal oblique research and kept the public
                informed of its findings.\228\ A cornerstone of the procedure is the
                use of THOR-50M dummies in the driver and right front passenger
                positions. NHTSA plans to determine in 2022 whether this new crash test
                mode is appropriate for inclusion in an FMVSS and/or NCAP. If
                [[Page 13504]]
                a determination is made to include the test in NCAP, the notice and
                comment process would follow soon thereafter.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \227\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015), pages 78530 through 78531;
                https://one.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crashworthiness/Small%20Overlap%20and%20Oblique%20Testing.
                 \228\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2020-0016 for
                document Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving
                Deformable Barrier Test Procedure (Saunders 2018); Saunders, J. and
                Parent, D., ``Repeatability and Reproducibility of Oblique Moving
                Deformable Barrier Test Procedure,'' SAE Technical Paper 2018-01-
                1055, 2018, doi:10.4271/2018-01-1055; https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/41934 Structural Countermeasure Research Program; https://www.nhtsa.gov/crash-simulation-vehicle-models Vehicle Interior and
                Restraint Modeling and Structural Countermeasure Research Program
                sections.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA will consider incorporating several additional
                advanced crash avoidance technologies including lighting systems for
                improved nighttime pedestrian visibility into NCAP in the near future,
                and will be announcing next steps during this timeframe. These include:
                (1) Adaptive driving beam headlights; (2) upgraded lower beam
                headlighting; (3) semiautomatic headlamp beam-switching; and (4) rear
                automatic braking for pedestrian protection.
                2023-2024 Timeframe
                 A multi-year consumer research effort is underway to
                modernize the vehicle safety rating section of the Monroney label. Once
                the consumer research is complete, the Agency plans to begin a
                rulemaking action in 2023 to update the Monroney label with a new
                labeling concept.
                 Also in 2023, NHTSA plans to commence revising its 5-star
                safety ratings system. The Agency has sought comment on several
                approaches to provide consumers with vehicle safety ratings that
                provide more meaningful safety information and discriminate performance
                of vehicles among the fleet. NHTSA discusses this issue in detail in a
                section below.
                2025-2031 Timeframe
                 In NHTSA's long-term component of the roadmap, NHTSA includes a
                variety of technologies and foci that attempt to overcome many safety
                challenges for which the technologies available may not be as mature or
                may warrant additional study from NHTSA. NHTSA is seeking stakeholder
                input on the appropriateness of each of these technologies for the
                program and whether commenters believe that these technologies will
                meet the program's four prerequisites within the next 5- or 10-year
                time frame.
                 NHTSA will be further assessing and developing tests for the
                following crash avoidance technologies: (1) Intersection safety assist;
                (2) opposing traffic safety assist; and (3) automatic emergency braking
                for all vulnerable road users (including bicyclists and motorcyclists)
                in all major crash scenarios including when the vehicle is turning left
                or right. NHTSA will also be assessing the effectiveness of systems
                that are or will become available in the fleet. The Agency hopes that
                information will be available that would support a proposal in 2025 or
                beyond to include these three technologies in NCAP.
                 Based on comments received from stakeholders, if a technology
                development is mature and the available data in the next several years
                meet the Agency's four prerequisites, NHTSA would issue a proposal for
                inclusion in NCAP during the five-year mid-term timeline.
                VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
                 NCAP has traditionally focused on crashworthiness technologies that
                protect the vehicle occupants in the event of a collision. The more
                advanced ADAS technologies that are the focus of this notice take the
                next step and provide technologies that can assist drivers, or in
                certain cases correct drivers' action in ways that can avoid or
                mitigate crashes. NHTSA has also begun to consider ways NCAP could be
                used to encourage technologies that protect road users other than the
                vehicles occupants, such as pedestrians and pedalcyclists.
                 As beneficial as these technologies may be, NHTSA recognizes that
                risky driving behaviors and poor driver choices continue to amplify
                crash, injury, and fatality risks on our roadways. Accordingly, NHTSA
                is interested in safety technologies that have the ability to address
                the prevalent driver behaviors that contribute to roadway fatalities.
                For example, there are several available and emerging safety
                technologies that have the potential to address speeding and drowsy-,
                impaired-, distracted-, and unbelted-driving, thereby reducing the risk
                of crashes that lead to injury or death, which are the subjects of
                analysis, research, and examination.
                 NHTSA is exploring opportunities to encourage the development and
                deployment of these technologies. While more must be known about the
                effectiveness and consumer acceptance of these systems, NHTSA strongly
                believes that these technologies will mature and show efficacy. In the
                nearer term, then, the Agency sees potential in highlighting vehicles
                equipped with these technologies on its website, and possibly
                elsewhere, to improve public awareness, and encourage vehicle
                manufacturer development and adoption. NHTSA will conduct research to
                develop objective test procedures and criteria to evaluate the
                performance and effectiveness of these technologies. Initiatives on
                these technologies would be woven into both the first and second half
                (i.e., long-term portion) of the 10-year roadmap, depending on whether
                the technologies and objective tests and criteria are sufficiently
                developed to meet NHTSA's four prerequisites for inclusion in NCAP.
                A. Driver Monitoring Systems
                 Driver monitoring systems use a variety of sensors and software to
                detect and/or infer driver state based on estimation approaches. For
                example, certain types of driver monitoring systems have shown promise
                in detecting the state of a driver's drowsiness.\229\ As vehicle
                technologies have evolved, driver monitoring systems have been more
                commonly introduced and applied to various driver states, particularly
                as one of the countermeasures against potential misuse of ADAS.
                Currently, there are varied approaches to driver monitoring across
                vehicle and equipment manufacturers.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \229\ Brown, T., Lee, J., Schwarz, C., Fiorentino, D., McDonald,
                A., Traube, E., Nadler, E. (2013). Detection of Driver Impairment
                from Drowsiness. 23rd Enhanced Safety of Vehicles Conference, Seoul,
                Republic of Korea. May 2013. Paper Number 13-0346.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA is considering adding driver monitoring systems as an NCAP
                technology to encourage further deployment of effective driver
                monitoring systems into vehicles. NHTSA seeks comment on the following
                to help the Agency determine whether to implement driver monitoring
                systems in NCAP:
                 (62) What are the capabilities of the various available approaches
                to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel sensors, eye
                tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different driver state
                measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention, drowsiness, medical
                incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated confidence or reliability in
                detecting or inferring such driver states and what supporting data
                exist?
                 (63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken
                based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state.
                What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions, and
                other mitigation strategies that are most effective for different
                driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical, distraction)? What
                research data exist that substantiate effectiveness of these
                interventions?
                 (64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for performance
                (e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that would warrant
                some type of NCAP credit?
                 (65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and
                intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide
                within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities and
                [[Page 13505]]
                tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is not
                conclusive are of specific interest.
                 (66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g., consumer
                interest or feedback data) are available or are foreseen for
                implementation of different types of driver monitoring systems and
                associated mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or
                visual inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related
                privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a
                selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers (e.g.,
                for teen drivers by their parents)?
                B. Driver Distraction
                 According to NHTSA's statistics, driver distraction resulted in at
                least 3,000 known deaths in 2019.\230\ Often discussions regarding
                distracted driving center around cell phone use and texting, but
                distracted driving also includes other activities such adjusting the
                radio or climate controls or accessing other in-vehicle systems. In-
                vehicle devices and Human-Machine Interfaces (HMI) can be strategically
                designed to avoid or limit opportunities for driver distraction.\231\
                Easy access to manual controls in traditional or expected locations can
                minimize the amount of time a driver's eyes are off the road and hands
                are off the steering wheel, as well as the time needed for the driver
                to activate the control quickly in time-critical traffic conflict
                scenarios (e.g., a driver reaches to activate the horn button in a
                crash-imminent situation, but finds that the control of horn activation
                is not in the expected, typical location).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \230\ National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (2020,
                December). Overview of Motor Vehicle Crashes in 2019. (Traffic
                Safety Facts. Report No. DOT HS 813 060). Washington, DC: National
                Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \231\ In 2013, NHTSA published ``Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver
                Distraction Guidelines for In-Vehicle Electronic Devices.'' These
                voluntary guidelines apply to original equipment in-vehicle
                electronic devices used by the driver to perform secondary tasks
                (communications, entertainment, information gathering, navigation
                tasks, etc. are considered secondary tasks) through visual-manual
                means. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2013/04/26/2013-09883/visual-manual-nhtsa-driver-distraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronic-devices.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
                 (67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be most
                helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of use? What
                research data exist to support objectively characterizing ease of use
                for vehicle controls and displays?
                 (68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate
                driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness metrics
                that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the NCAP program?
                Methods may include driver monitoring and action strategies, HMI design
                considerations, expanded in-motion secondary task lockouts, phone
                application/notification limitations while paired with the vehicle,
                etc.
                 (69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered for
                NCAP credit?
                C. Alcohol Detection
                 Alcohol-impaired driving continues to be a pervasive contributing
                factor to roadway fatalities, with over 10,000 deaths in the U.S. in
                2019.\232\ NHTSA has explored many ways in which alcohol-impaired
                driving risks can be effectively mitigated both through vehicle
                technologies and strategic public outreach and enforcement.\233\ In
                2020, NHTSA published a Request for Information notice seeking input on
                Impaired Driving Technologies in the Federal Register.\234\
                Specifically, the notice requested information on available or late
                stage technology under development for impaired driving detection and
                mitigation. A total of 12 comments were received.\235\ Comments were
                submitted about emerging technologies that can directly measure
                impairment though blood alcohol concentration at the beginning of a
                trip as well as technologies that infer alcohol impairment through a
                combination of driver monitoring and other vehicle sensors tracking
                during the course of a trip.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \232\ Ibid.
                 \233\ NHTSA has researched the Driver Alcohol Detection System
                for Safety (DADSS) program.
                 \234\ 85 FR 71987 (November 12, 2020).
                 \235\ https://www.regulations.gov/document/NHTSA-2020-0102-0001/comment.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA seeks comment on the following aspects of alcohol detection
                systems:
                 (70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment
                technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests could
                be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be positively
                influenced through NCAP credit?
                 (71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms that
                could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection systems and
                inference systems? Are there particular challenges with any approach
                that may need special considerations? What supporting research data
                exist that document relevant performance factors such as sensing
                accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
                 (72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course of
                a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What are
                the safety considerations related to various options that manufacturers
                may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing a safe stop,
                pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should various actions be
                considered for NCAP credit?
                 (73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
                impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may that
                differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus estimation
                techniques using a driver monitoring system? What consumer interest or
                feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are there privacy concerns
                or privacy protection strategies with various approaches? What are the
                related privacy protection strategies?
                D. Seat Belt Interlocks
                 Seat belt use in passenger vehicles saved an estimated 14,955 lives
                in 2017.\236\ The national seat belt use rate in the United States was
                90.7 percent in 2019.\237\ Among the 22,215 passenger vehicle occupants
                killed in 2019, almost half (47 percent) were unrestrained. For those
                passenger vehicle occupants who survived crashes where someone else
                died, only 14 percent were unrestrained compared to 47 percent of those
                who died.\238\ \239\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \236\ DOT HS 812 683. Latest agency estimate available.
                 \237\ DOT HS 812 875.
                 \238\ DOT HS 813 060.
                 \239\ Based on known restraint use. Restraint use was unknown
                for 8.7 percent of passenger vehicle occupant fatalities in 2019.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Currently, NHTSA uses an array of countermeasures, including the
                Click It or Ticket campaign and State primary enforcement laws, to
                encourage seat belt use. The Agency requires seat belt reminders for
                the driver's seat.\240\ As of the 2018 model year, about 95 percent of
                vehicles voluntarily offer front passenger warnings. NHTSA also informs
                consumers searching for vehicle ratings on www.NHTSA.gov as to the
                availability of optional front passenger and rear seat belt reminder
                systems, which typically provide a visual and auditory warning to the
                driver at the onset of a trip and if a passenger unbuckles during a
                trip.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \240\ 49 CFR 571.208.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Methods for detecting seat belt misuse have advanced in recent
                years. A 2018 NHTSA report, ``Performance Assessment of Prototype Seat
                Belt Misuse Detection System,'' showed that
                [[Page 13506]]
                the system correctly identified seat belt misuse in 95 percent of
                trials on average across multiple common seat belt misuse
                scenarios.\241\ This type of seat belt misuse or non-use detection
                could be coupled with various types of seat belt interlock systems to
                encourage seat belt use. Although NHTSA is not aware of any such system
                being currently in production, various prototype systems have been
                developed by manufacturers.\242\ These systems could include
                transmission interlock, ignition interlock, and entertainment system
                interlock. Such systems could prevent drivers from shifting into gear,
                starting their vehicle, or using their vehicle's entertainment system,
                respectively, if the driver and/or front passenger is unbelted. Another
                potential strategy could be speed limiter interlock systems. Such a
                system could first issue a seat belt reminder warning if the driver
                begins driving and is unbelted, and then automatically reduce vehicle
                speed to a very low speed after a certain warning period if the driver
                remains unbelted.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \241\ DOT HS 812 496.
                 \242\ ``NHTSA' Research on Seat Belt Interlocks,'' SAE
                Government Industry Meeting, January 24-26, 2018.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA requests comment on the following related to seat belt
                interlock systems:
                 (74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system
                with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease
                until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second
                FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support associated
                effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics more
                effective than others?
                 (75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock
                assessment in NCAP?
                 (76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock adoption
                through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be considered, or
                only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics could be evaluated
                for each? Should differing credit be applied depending upon interlock
                system approach?
                 (77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating
                positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an
                opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
                 (78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent
                seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or
                feedback data exist on this topic?
                 (79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature
                that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen
                mode'' feature?
                E. Intelligent Speed Assist
                 Speeding continues to be one of the critical factors in fatal
                crashes on American roadways. Specifically, driving too fast for
                conditions and exceeding the posted limit are two prevalent factors
                that contribute to traffic crashes. For more than two decades, NHTSA
                has identified speed as being a factor in at least nearly one-third of
                all motor vehicle related fatalities. For example, in 2019, of the
                36,096 traffic-related fatalities occurred on U.S. roadways, 9,478 of
                those were positively identified as speeding-related.\243\ These totals
                may underreport speeding, potentially to a significant degree, as they
                are based on whether any driver in the crash was charged with a
                speeding-related offense or if a police officer indicated that racing,
                driving too fast for conditions, or exceeding the posted speed limit
                was a contributing factor in the crash. As this reporting is based on
                aggregated police actions rather than an engineering analysis of
                individual crashes, it may tend to underestimate the presence of
                speeding, particularly in crashes where the speeding was not clearly
                obvious but still a factor in either the occurrence or severity of the
                crash.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \243\ Traffic Safety Facts 2019 ``A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
                Crash Data.'' U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Too few drivers view speeding as an immediate risk to their
                personal safety or the safety of others, including pedestrians and
                vulnerable road users. Yet, the consequences of speeding include:
                Greater potential for loss of vehicle control; reduced effectiveness of
                occupant protection equipment; increased stopping distance after the
                driver perceives a danger; increased degree of crash severity leading
                to more severe injuries; economic implications of a speed-related
                crash; and increased fuel consumption and cost. The probability of
                death, disfigurement, or debilitating injury grows with higher speed at
                impact.
                 NHTSA engages with State and local jurisdictions as well as
                national law enforcement partners to provide funding and educational
                materials which address speeding. Speed limiter features, which prevent
                a vehicle from traveling over a certain speed by limiting engine power,
                are available in the U.S. market and widely used in heavy-duty tractor-
                trailers and other fleet-based vehicles. In addition, nearly all
                vehicles are equipped with a mechanism that limits their top-end speed,
                even if that speed is quite high. These systems either prevent a
                vehicle from exceeding a preset specific speed regardless of location,
                or they use GPS and/or camera data to determine the speed limit of the
                current road and apply mitigation measures to reduce speeding. Vehicles
                equipped with an intelligent speed assist system can display the
                current speed limit to the driver at all times. Should the driver
                exceed the speed limit for the road, the system can provide a visual or
                auditory alert or actively slow the vehicle to an appropriate speed.
                Typically, many existing intelligent speed assist systems can be
                temporarily overridden by the driver by depressing the accelerator
                pedal firmly.
                 NHTSA is committed to addressing this important safety issue to
                further reduce fatalities and injuries. NHTSA requests comment on the
                following aspects of intelligent speed assist systems in passenger
                vehicles as well as other approaches that are not discussed in this
                notice.
                 (80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as
                intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed limits
                and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed accordingly?
                Should there be a differentiation between warning and intervention type
                intelligent speed assist systems in this consideration? Should systems
                that allow for some small amount of speeding over the limit before
                intervening be treated the same or differently than systems that are
                specifically keyed to a road's speed limit? What about for systems that
                allow driver override versus systems that do not?
                 (81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
                evaluating speed assist system functionality?
                 (82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What consumer
                interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
                 (83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to
                prevent excessive speeding?
                F. Rear Seat Child Reminder Assist
                 Data indicate that since 1998, nearly 900 children (an average of
                38 per year) have died in the U.S. of hyperthermia (vehicular
                heatstroke) because they were left or became trapped in a hot vehicle.
                2018 and 2019 saw a record number of vehicular heatstroke related
                deaths at 53
                [[Page 13507]]
                each year.\244\ Children were in the vehicles due to a variety of
                circumstances--some gain entry to a parked vehicle, whereas over 50
                percent are forgotten in the vehicle by caregivers.\245\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \244\ www.noheatstroke.org.
                 \245\ Id.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 To address these tragedies, many companies have developed
                aftermarket devices to remind parents and caregivers that a child may
                be left inside the vehicle. NHTSA has assessed several products and
                developed a test methodology for evaluating future products.\246\ NHTSA
                subsequently opened a public docket inviting all interested parties to
                submit information regarding efforts or technological innovations to
                help prevent vehicular heatstroke.\247\ Also, NHTSA has media
                campaigns, such as ``Where's Baby? Look Before You Lock,'' to raise
                awareness to parents and caregivers on the dangers of vehicular
                heatstroke.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \246\ Rudd, R., Prasad, A., Weston, D., & Wietholter, K. (2015,
                July). Functional assessment of unattended child reminder systems.
                (Report No. DOT HS 812 187). Washington, DC: National Highway
                Traffic Safety Administration.
                 \247\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2019-0126.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In recent years, in-vehicle rear seat child reminder technology has
                been introduced into a number of vehicle makes and models. Many of
                these technological solutions utilize ``door logic'' to determine if
                there is potentially a child in the rear seat of the vehicle. The
                vehicle door logic checks to see if the rear seat doors were opened and
                closed at the start of the trip and then displays a reminder in the
                dash board with an audio cue for the driver to check the back seat when
                the vehicle is turned off. In September 2019, the Alliance of
                Automobile Manufacturers and the Association of Global Automakers (now
                collectively known as the Alliance for Automotive Innovation) announced
                that a voluntary agreement had been formed by its member companies to
                incorporate rear seat child reminder systems into their vehicles as
                standard equipment no later than the 2025 model year.\248\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \248\ https://www.autosinnovate.org/safety/heatstroke/Automakers%20Commit%20to%20Helping%20Combat%20Child%20Heatstroke.pdf.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA requests comment on the following issues related to rear seat
                child reminder systems designed to prevent vehicular heatstroke.
                 (84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP, are
                door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider systems
                that detect the presence of a child?
                 (85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in
                effectiveness of these system types?
                 (86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
                evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
                 (87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems in
                vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
                VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
                 NHTSA is seeking comment on several approaches to provide consumers
                with vehicle safety ratings that provide more meaningful safety
                information and provide consumers with more ways to determine relative
                performance of vehicles among the fleet. In the current 5-star safety
                ratings system, as described in detail in the July 2008 final decision
                notice, injury readings recorded from crash test dummies used in NCAP's
                frontal impact, side impact barrier, and side impact pole tests are
                assessed using injury risk curves designed to predict the chance of a
                vehicle's occupant receiving similar injuries.\249\ For each occupant
                in each crash test, the risks of injury to each body region assessed
                are combined to produce a combined probability of injury to each
                occupant. The combined probabilities of injury for each occupant are
                divided by a predetermined baseline risk of injury. This baseline risk
                of injury approximates the fleet average injury risk for each crash
                test. Dividing each combined occupant probability of injury by the
                baseline risk of injury results in a relative assessment of that
                occupant's combined injury risk versus a known fleet average. These
                calculations result in six summary scores for each vehicle representing
                the relative risk of injury for the following occupants: (1) The driver
                and front seat passenger in the frontal impact test; (2) the driver and
                rear seat passenger in the side impact barrier test; (3) the driver in
                the side impact pole test; and (4) the relative risk for all occupants
                in rollovers with respect to a baseline injury risk. These relative
                risks are then converted to star ratings to help consumers make
                informed vehicle purchasing ddecisions.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                \249\ 73 FR 40016 (July 11, 2008), http://regulations.gov,
                Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555-0114.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA seeks public comment on a few potential concepts it could use
                to develop a new 5-star safety ratings system in the future. Some areas
                of consideration discussed below could be used in conjunction with one
                another, while others could work better as standalone options. Ideally,
                any future 5-star safety ratings system should not only fulfill the
                program mission, but also be sufficiently flexible to allow for
                continuing updates to NCAP to encourage further vehicle safety
                improvements.
                A. Points-Based Ratings System Concept
                 NHTSA is seeking comment on the use of a potential points-based
                system to calculate future 5-star safety ratings for the
                crashworthiness testing program when the Agency decides to update that
                program. In this system, star ratings could be assigned directly from
                point values related to the results from crash test dummies. The
                current system is based on a linear combination of the probability of
                injury for multiple body regions, some at different severity levels,
                which can result in some body regions being overlooked. A point-based
                system, on the other hand, would provide more flexibility to target
                injury criteria more representative of real-world injury incidence. The
                Agency believes that this potential method would provide more
                flexibility in the future when updating the program through a phased
                approach. For instance, new testing devices (e.g., crash test dummies),
                procedures, injury measurements, or other criteria could be added to
                the 5-star-ratings system. Points could be based on critical injury
                risk curve values or on criteria, such as reference values from
                existing Federal regulations or other Agency data.
                 This points-based rating system approach would be similar to those
                used in other vehicle safety consumer information programs such as IIHS
                and Euro NCAP. Upper and lower performance targets would be established
                for each test dummy body region assessed in crash tests. Maximum points
                would be awarded if Injury Assessment Reference Values (IARVs) meet the
                lower target or better. A linearized number of points would be awarded
                for injury assessment values that are between the lower and upper
                targets. No points would be assigned for those that exceed the upper
                target for the respective body region (or perhaps the entire occupant).
                Risk curves would no longer be used exclusively to calculate a combined
                injury probability from the various body regions and ultimately star
                ratings. Critical risk curve values, IARVs, or other accepted injury
                limits would be used to establish performance targets and related
                points assignments.
                [[Page 13508]]
                 In addition to the injury criteria currently included in the 5-star
                safety ratings system, data to support several other injury criteria
                are collected for Agency monitoring and consumer information on the
                respective NCAP dummies (Hybrid III and ES-2re 50th percentile males,
                Hybrid III and SID-IIs 5th percentile females). NHTSA is seeking
                comment on whether any additional measurements that are not part of the
                existing 5-star ratings system are appropriate for use in a points-
                based calculation of the future star ratings.
                 Currently, if measurements of certain injury criteria that are
                included in related FMVSSs exceed standard limits, the Agency would
                assign a ``safety concern'' designation on its website and on the
                vehicle window sticker (Monroney label).\250\ If measurements of
                certain injury criteria that are not part of FMVSSs exceed established
                limits, the Agency highlights those on its website (but not on the
                Monroney label) with footnotes. In both of these cases, the Agency
                seeks to inform consumers of potentially higher injury risks in body
                regions that are not captured by the existing 5-star safety ratings
                system. The Agency recognizes that consumer confusion may result from
                the presentation of a vehicle with high (4- or 5-star) ratings that is
                also assigned a safety concern or injury-related footnote. One
                potential solution to reduce confusion would be to implement a points-
                based system that allows the Agency to include the assessment of all
                injuries within the calculation of the star rating, even those that may
                not have associated risk curves. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on
                the appropriate method.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \250\ Id.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Furthermore, NHTSA is exploring several options regarding the
                distribution of points across a potential points-based ratings system.
                Real-world data could be used to apportion the total number of
                available points to each crash mode, dummy, and/or injury value
                according to severity or prevalence in the field. Alternatively, each
                dummy or injury value could be allotted the same number of points,
                effectively normalizing each dummy or injury.
                B. Baseline Risk Concept
                 Support for adjusting the baseline risk value associated with 5-
                star safety ratings has been mixed in the past, with some in favor and
                others advising against it.\251\ As mentioned earlier, the Agency is
                again seeking comment on whether the baseline risk concept should be
                preserved when considering updates to its 5-star safety ratings system
                in the future.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \251\ This is based on comments by participants in the October
                1, 2018 public meeting and respondents to the related docket https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA-2018-0055.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 With the July 2008 final decision establishing the existing 5-star
                safety ratings system, the concept of a relative star rating system was
                introduced for the first time.\252\ As discussed previously, after
                injury readings from various body regions are converted to combined
                probabilities of injury risks, those combined probabilities are divided
                by a baseline (or average) risk of injury that is an approximation of
                the vehicle fleet average injury risk. Star ratings generated in NCAP
                today are a measure of how much more (or less) occupant protection the
                vehicle affords when compared to an ``average'' vehicle.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \252\ Prior to the 2010 program enhancements, NCAP star ratings
                were based on an absolute, independent scale of combined injury
                probability. That is, the combined probability of injury from a
                given occupant was converted directly into a star rating with no
                intermediate calculation except rounding.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The intent of the baseline risk as described in the July 2008
                notice was to update its value at regular intervals so that, as the
                average risk of injury decreased over time, ratings could become more
                stringent without changing the underlying criteria. In practice, the
                baseline risk has never been adjusted, which results in recent star
                ratings being assigned using an older benchmark less representative of
                current vehicle safety levels.\253\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \253\ Park, B., Rockwell, T., Collins, L., Smith, C., Aram, M.
                (2015), The enhanced U.S. NCAP: Five years later. 24th Enhanced
                Safety of Vehicles Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2015, Paper
                Number 15-0314.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                C. Half-Star Ratings
                 In the December 2015 notice, the Agency sought comments on the
                merits of providing ratings to consumers in half-star increments.
                Commenters were generally supportive of the notion. In this notice,
                NHTSA continues to seek comment on whether the Agency should
                disseminate its 5-star safety ratings with half-star increments. This
                approach could allow better discrimination of vehicle performance for
                consumer information purposes by creating additional levels within the
                existing 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-star levels. Though the Agency has not
                conducted consumer research on this potential approach, NHTSA believes
                that the public is familiar with the general impression of half-star
                ratings as it is commonly found in other consumer product rating
                schemes.
                 Future crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings systems most likely
                would contain more elements on which vehicles are assessed. Thus, NHTSA
                believes that using half-star increments may be necessary in future
                rating systems because they allow better discrimination of vehicle
                safety performance. The half-star increments, depending on future
                Agency decisions, could create anywhere from 9 to 11 levels \254\ of
                discrimination for use in rating vehicles.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \254\ Depending on possible rating scales from 0-5 stars, 0.5-5
                stars, or 1-5 stars, the amount of total distinct ratings available
                would vary.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 NHTSA could design any half-star rating system to require a vehicle
                to reach the minimum threshold for receiving that rating level. Ratings
                in a system such as this would be ``rounded down'' to the nearest half-
                or whole-star rating and would not be ``rounded up'' to the next half-
                or whole-star rating.
                D. Decimal Ratings
                 NHTSA is also seeking comments on whether it should consider
                assigning star ratings using a decimal format in addition to or in
                place of assigning whole- or half-star ratings. The decimal rating
                could be based on a conversion of NCAP test results by using a linear
                function approach. For instance, in the current 5-star safety ratings
                system, this could be achieved by relating a linear function to the VSS
                calculation and its associated ranges. In a potential future 5-star
                safety ratings system, like one where the previously discussed points-
                based concept is used, a decimal value could also be easily integrated.
                Providing NCAP ratings in decimal format could provide consumers with
                an additional, high delineation method of discriminating vehicle
                performance among the fleet for purchasing reasons.
                 Considering these ongoing Agency initiatives currently being
                pursued for future NCAP upgrades, NHTSA requests comment on the
                following:
                 (88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers with
                vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and
                discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
                 Specifically with regard to a points-based rating system, the
                Agency seeks comment on the following:
                 (89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that are
                not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for use in a
                points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some injury criteria
                do not have associated risk curves. Are these regions appropriate to
                include, and if so, what is the appropriate method by which to include
                them?
                 Regarding the baseline risk concept and the general concept of
                relative
                [[Page 13509]]
                ratings, NHTSA is seeking comment on the following:
                 (90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system continue
                to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or expected fleet
                average performer, or should it return to an absolute system of rating
                vehicles?
                 (91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings system
                (combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target populations
                for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well as other
                potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a points-based
                system, what would the best method of calculating the vehicle fleet
                average performance be?
                 (92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at
                regular intervals, and if so, how often?
                 (93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these updates
                or changes to the public?
                 Considering a change in approach to how to present star ratings to
                the public, NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
                 (94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
                star increments?
                 (95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal format
                in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?
                E. Rollover Resistance Testing Program
                 Currently, there are two rollover resistance tests that the Agency
                conducts and are part of the existing 5-star safety ratings system. The
                first component of this assessment is the static measurement of the
                vehicle's center of gravity height and the track width to determine the
                vehicle's static stability factor. The second component of this
                assessment is the dynamic rollover test (Fishhook test) that simulates
                a driver taking a panic steering action in a loss-of-control situation.
                The Agency uses two formulas (no tip-up and tip-up results) for
                calculating the risk of rollover and then assigns a rollover rating
                based on the risk. NHTSA sought comment on the approach published in
                the December 2015 notice to recalculate its current rollover risk curve
                given the full implementation of electronic stability control (ESC)
                systems as standard equipment in all vehicles manufactured on or after
                September 1, 2011. Commenters who responded to the December 2015 notice
                were generally supportive of the Agency's desire to update the rollover
                risk curve to reflect the role of ESC deployment. However, few specific
                comments on the appropriateness of the approach that was described in
                the notice were received at the time.
                 NHTSA is not proposing changes to its two existing rollover
                resistance tests at this time. However, when the Agency proposes
                changes to the existing 5-star ratings system, it may be feasible to
                consider an update to how it assesses the rollover resistance testing
                component. Thus, the Agency is seeking comment on whether any future
                overall vehicle ratings should continue to include rollover resistance
                evaluations. Also, if the Agency updates the rollover risk curve,
                suggestions on how to transition that data into a future overall
                vehicle rating would be encouraged. The Agency expects that any future
                overall vehicle ratings would, at minimum, require reweighting the
                contribution of each test mode to that overall rating and thus the need
                to determine the most appropriate program area to include the rollover
                resistance tests.
                 (96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance
                evaluations in its future overall ratings?
                IX. Other Activities
                A. Programmatic Challenges With Self-Reported Data
                 Since model year 2011, vehicle manufacturers have been reporting to
                NHTSA their internal test data that show whether vehicles equipped with
                the recommended ADAS technologies pass NCAP's system performance test
                requirements in order to receive credit from the Agency. NHTSA assesses
                the information provided and then assigns check marks for systems whose
                conformance with NCAP's performance test requirements are supported by
                the data. As the Agency stated in its July 2008 final decision notice,
                commenters were generally supportive of NHTSA's plan to use self-
                reported data from the vehicle manufacturers, in conjunction with its
                own spot-check verification testing, to determine whether vehicles met
                NCAP's system performance test requirements.\255\ The process by which
                the Agency has accepted self-reported ADAS technology data for
                recommended technologies has been crucial to the successful
                administration of the program.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \255\ 72 FR 3473 (Jan. 25, 2007), Docket No. NHTSA-2006-26555.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 However, this process has not been without challenges. Throughout
                the administration of the ADAS assessment program in NCAP, NHTSA has
                identified inconsistencies in vehicle manufacturers' self-reported data
                submissions. The Agency has determined that many of these
                inconsistencies stem from unfamiliarity with NCAP's system performance
                test procedures, including the use of test targets and other
                parameters.
                 It is critical to maintain program credibility and public trust
                when accepting manufacturers' ADAS self-reported data and disseminating
                it to the public. One approach to addressing some of the aforementioned
                challenges is to encourage all vehicle manufacturers to provide NHTSA
                with ADAS self-reported data from an independent test facility that
                meets criteria demonstrating competence in NCAP testing protocols. For
                instance, NHTSA's rigorous procurement process for awarding contracts
                to test laboratories provides that qualified laboratories meet specific
                competence requirements.
                 To address the challenges mentioned above, NHTSA is considering
                refusing to accept self-reported data and not posting recommendations
                for the vehicle's systems on its website, when:
                 Manufacturers' self-reported ADAS test data is provided
                from a test facility that is not designated as NHTSA's contracted test
                laboratory, or
                 The corresponding ADAS tests are not conducted in
                accordance with NCAP's testing protocols (including test devices).
                 NHTSA seeks comment on the following:
                 (97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity of
                the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is
                generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test
                laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most relevant
                for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably conduct ADAS
                performance tests for NCAP such that the program's credibility is
                upheld?
                 (98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in
                the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test
                procedures, what other means would best address the following program
                challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data integrity and
                public trust, and managing test failures, particularly during
                verification testing?
                B. Website Updates
                 NHTSA uses its website and the safety rating section of the
                Monroney label to convey to consumers vehicle safety information
                provided by NCAP. Although the Monroney label is an important tool
                NHTSA uses to communicate vehicle safety ratings to consumers at the
                point of sale, it has limitations:
                [[Page 13510]]
                 (1) The Agency must undergo a rulemaking action to change any of
                its content, including minor and non-substantive changes.\256\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \256\ The Agency implemented the Monroney label requirement by
                regulation (49 CFR 575.302) pursuant to Section 10307 of the Safe,
                Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act; A Legacy
                for Users (SAFETEA-LU).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 (2) The label is limited to a certain size, only some of which is
                dedicated to NCAP information, which only allows for the communication
                of limited safety information.
                 (3) By virtue of being posted on individual vehicles, the label
                provides limited utility as a comparative shopping tool unless compared
                to labels on vehicles in the same physical location.
                 Thus, NHTSA uses its website to communicate a wealth of information
                about vehicle safety beyond what is displayed on the Monroney label.
                NHTSA has structured the information displayed on its website to align
                with the structure of the Monroney label. The same crashworthiness and
                rollover star ratings are shown on both the label and the website.
                However, crash avoidance (ADAS technologies) recommendations are not
                included on the Monroney label because they were too new to be included
                at the time of the most recent Monroney label update, whereas they are
                provided on the website.
                 In light of the Monroney label limitations, increasingly complex
                vehicle ratings and results, and NHTSA's desire to communicate safety
                information as timely as possible, NHTSA is considering enhancing the
                information on its website. However, some of these enhancements may
                necessitate that the information provided on the Monroney label and
                website deviate from one another in structure or in content. There are
                limitations on the amount of information that can be usefully conveyed
                on the Monroney label, so NHTSA is currently considering placing some
                information on the website alone. However, while it makes sense to
                provide additional information and comparative tools on the website,
                NHTSA is concerned that consumers could be confused if the information
                in both places is not presented in the same manner. For example, the
                Monroney label is currently limited to displaying whole star ratings.
                If, as a result of this RFC, NHTSA decides to improve the
                differentiation between vehicles by displaying star ratings on its
                website using new methods like a decimal equivalent value or half-
                stars, such a discrepancy between the Monroney label and the website
                may confuse consumers.
                 During the October 2018 public meeting, Consumers Union suggested
                that NHTSA could provide ratings on its website in a ``more granular,
                sortable and readily comparable manner.'' Currently, the website's
                functionality allows for users to input limited search terms. For
                instance, a consumer may search for all vehicles in a given model year,
                all vehicles of a specific make, or vehicles with a specific model
                name. Consumers may then filter these results by body style, but the
                current body style categories are very broad and can encompass hundreds
                of models. Consumers are currently limited to viewing ten vehicle
                models at a time in search results, meaning that they may need to sift
                through many pages of results if they are simply browsing and do not
                have a particular make or model in mind. NHTSA plans to address these
                issues by improving the organization and versatility of the safety
                ratings data presented to the public.
                 Once a consumer selects a vehicle for further details, they may
                choose to compare up to three vehicles, but they must input the year,
                make, and model of the vehicles to be compared. NHTSA intends to make
                changes to its www.nhtsa.gov user interface to allow for simpler
                comparisons between vehicle manufacturers and types. For example, when
                a consumer searches for safety rating information for a particular make
                and model, similar vehicles could also be shown. These vehicles could
                be classified according to body style. The Agency expects to make other
                changes to NHTSA.gov to increase the comparability of safety
                information.
                 NHTSA continues to seek comment on the following aspects of vehicle
                information provided on its website:
                 (99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information on
                the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this
                confusion be lessened?
                 (100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their
                search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with
                different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport
                utility)?
                 (101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do consumers
                have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are seeking
                information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to identify
                vehicles they may wish to purchase?
                 (102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of
                classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a
                passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or are
                they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset of
                passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
                 (103) Within the context of the updates considered in this notice,
                what is the most important top-level safety-related information that
                consumers should be able to compare amongst vehicles? Which of these
                pieces of information should consumers be able to use to sort and
                filter search results?
                C. Database Changes
                 NHTSA wishes to take this opportunity to inform the public about
                other ways the Agency is significantly enhancing the NCAP program. We
                have undertaken a considerable developmental effort to modernize the
                OEM submission process and our processing of data, so that consumer
                information can be provided to consumers quickly and accurately. We are
                not requesting comment in this section but are presenting this
                information for the benefit of the reader.
                 Each year NHTSA requests vehicle manufacturers to submit new model
                year vehicle information voluntarily on new passenger cars and light
                trucks with gross vehicle weight ratings of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or
                less. This information is used by NCAP primarily for consumer
                information on the Agency's website, presentation on the vehicle window
                stickers, and for the selection of new model year vehicles to be tested
                under NCAP.
                 The manner in which NHTSA and vehicle manufacturers communicate
                information has changed over the years--from mailed letters and faxes
                to spreadsheets and emails. However, NHTSA realized a modernized
                process of data submission, collection, analysis, and dissemination is
                necessary due to the ever-growing list of data elements needed to
                support an evolving test portfolio and diverse vehicle fleet. In the
                last model year alone, more than 400 makes and models of passenger
                vehicles were sold in the United States, thus requiring vehicle
                manufacturers not only to assemble detailed new vehicle data and submit
                them to NHTSA, but also NHTSA to collect, sort, and analyze tremendous
                amounts of information.
                 Managing this data has become more complex, utilizing electronic
                spreadsheets and email. In addition to processing spreadsheets from
                more than 20 organizations, maintaining version control, checking data
                for accuracy, clarifying ambiguities, sending ratings letters, and
                processing requests have limited the ability of the Agency's current IT
                systems in storing and
                [[Page 13511]]
                analyzing data. These limitations have been exacerbated by the
                incorporation of ADAS assessments into NCAP, which accepts self-
                reported test data from vehicle manufacturers. Historically, these ADAS
                technologies have been available in a mix of vehicles within a
                technology package or trim line at the make and model level, which can
                cause consumer confusion as to which vehicles have the technologies.
                Furthermore, as NCAP is only able to offer consumer information details
                at the make and model level, the additional complexity of parsing trim
                lines and technology packages has been overly burdensome given NHTSA's
                current resources and limitations.
                 NHTSA is mindful that any expansion in NCAP's ADAS assessment
                program will create a long-term need to collect considerably more data
                elements from vehicle manufacturers. The current data collection
                process of spreadsheets and emails will not suffice to fulfill this
                need. To that end, NHTSA has undertaken a multi-year, multi-phase
                project to modernize the way in which NCAP communicates with and
                receives data from relevant stakeholders. NHTSA is currently developing
                a new, secure online web portal and database that will be used to send,
                receive, track, store, and process program data elements and
                communications.
                 The first phase of this online portal and database development
                focuses on the data submission process from the vehicle manufacturers
                to NHTSA. The online web portal would allow designated representatives
                from each vehicle manufacturer to submit data and correspondence by
                secure and trackable means. Vehicle manufacturers would be able to have
                multiple representatives contribute to and approve the data
                submissions, and submissions could be done in a more dedicated and
                focused manner than is currently feasible with conventional
                spreadsheets. The data submission application would include business
                rules to help vehicle manufacturers identify invalid data or
                typographical errors. The database portion of the project would allow
                NHTSA not only to capture and store data more efficiently, but also to
                manage program functions more quickly--such as faster posting of NCAP
                ratings to the Agency's website. In addition, it would allow NCAP to
                determine twin and carryover status in a timelier manner. Furthermore,
                the database is significantly more flexible and robust than existing
                spreadsheets and would allow more accurate processing of manufacturers'
                self-reported data submitted for the ADAS assessment program as well as
                the side air bag out-of-position testing program. In addition, this
                database would allow NCAP to review vehicle fleet trends and easily
                compare and track changes in individual vehicle models from one model
                year to the next. This phase of the project has already produced a
                prototype, and NHTSA has received preliminary feedback from initial
                beta testing.
                 A second phase of the project will focus on data and correspondence
                between NHTSA and its test laboratories. NCAP collects vehicle-specific
                test setup information from the vehicle manufacturer and separately
                transmits this data to its designated test laboratory. This phase of
                the project would streamline the way in which the program communicates
                its day-to-day operations that include the review, transmission, and
                archive of test data. The result of these upgrades would allow NCAP to
                schedule tests, review test data, analyze test anomalies and failures,
                respond to manufacturer contests, and publish safety ratings in a
                timelier manner.
                X. Economic Analysis
                 The various changes in NCAP discussed in this proposal all enable a
                rating system that improves consumer awareness of ADAS safety features,
                and encourages manufacturers to accelerate their adoption. This
                accelerated adoption of ADAS would drive any economic and societal
                impacts that result from these changes, and are thus the focus of this
                discussion of economic analysis. Hence, the Agency has considered the
                potential economic effects for ADAS technologies proposed for inclusion
                in NCAP and the potential benefit of introducing a rating system for
                ADAS technologies.
                 Unlike crashworthiness safety features, where safety improvements
                are attributable to improved occupant protection when a crash occurs,
                the impact that ADAS technologies have on fatality and injury rates is
                a direct function of their effectiveness in preventing crashes or
                reducing the severity of the crashes they are designed to mitigate.
                This effectiveness is typically measured by using real-world
                statistical data, laboratory testing, or Agency expertise.
                 With respect to vehicle safety, the Agency believes, as discussed
                in detail in this notice, the four proposed ADAS technologies have the
                potential to reduce vehicle crashes and injury severities further. As
                cited in this notice, researchers have conducted preliminary studies to
                estimate the effectiveness of ADAS technologies. Although these studies
                have been limited to certain models or manufacturers, which may not
                represent the entire fleet, they do illustrate how these systems can
                provide safety benefits. Thus, although the Agency does not have
                sufficient data to determine the monetized safety impacts resulting
                from these technologies in a way similar to that frequently done for
                mandated technologies--when compared to the future without the proposed
                update to NCAP, NHTSA expects that these changes would likely have
                substantial positive safety effects by promoting earlier and more
                widespread deployment of these technologies.
                 NCAP also helps address the issue of asymmetric information (i.e.,
                when one party in a transaction is in possession of more information
                than the other), which can be considered a market failure.\257\
                Regarding consumer information, the introduction of a potential new
                ADAS rating system is anticipated to provide consumers additional
                vehicle safety information (e.g., rating based on ADAS performance and
                capability as well as the types of ADAS in vehicles) as opposed to the
                information provided in the current program (e.g., check mark based on
                ADAS performance as pass/fail) to help them make more informed
                purchasing decisions by better presenting the relative safety benefits
                of different ADAS technologies. NHTSA believes that the future ADAS
                rating would increase consumer awareness and understanding of the
                safety benefits in these technologies, and, in turn, incentivize
                vehicle manufacturers to offer the ADAS technologies that lead to
                higher ratings across a broader selection of their vehicles.
                Furthermore, as these ADAS technologies mature and become more reliable
                and efficient, a large portion of vehicles equipped with such systems
                would achieve higher ADAS ratings, and in turn consumers would have an
                increasing number of safer vehicles to choose from. There is an
                unquantifiable value to consumers in receiving accurate and comparable
                performance information about those technologies among manufacturers,
                makes, and models.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \257\ See.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 According to NHTSA sponsored research,\258\ IIHS/HLDI predicted
                that the number of vehicles equipped with ADAS technologies, including
                BSW and Lane Keeping Warning, will increase
                [[Page 13512]]
                substantially from 2020 to 2030 and reach near full market penetration
                in 2050. Although the Agency has limited data on costs of ADAS
                technologies to consumers, assuming consumer demand for safety remains
                high, the future ADAS rating system would likely accelerate the full
                adaptation of the four technologies included in this RFC--not to
                mention the four existing ones. Nevertheless, the Agency does not have
                sufficient data, such as unit cost and information on how soon the full
                adaptation will be reached with the ADAS rating, to predict the net
                increase in cost to consumers, with a high degree of certainty.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \258\ See https://www.iihs.org/media/9517c308-c8d5-42e6-80fd-a69ecd9d2128/3aaYqQ/HLDI%20Research/Bulletins/hldi_bulletin_37-11.pdf. Bulletin Vol. 34, No. 28: September 2017, ``Predicted
                availability and fitment of safety features on registered
                vehicles,'' Highway Loss Data Institute.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                XI. Public Participation
                 Interested parties are strongly encouraged to submit thorough and
                detailed comments relating to each of the relevant areas discussed in
                this notice. Please see Appendix B for a summarized list of specific
                questions that have been posed in this notice. Comments submitted will
                help the Agency make informed decisions as it strives to advance NCAP
                by encouraging continuous safety improvements for new vehicles and
                enhancing consumer information.
                 How do I prepare and submit comments?
                 To ensure that your comments are filed correctly in the docket,
                please include the docket number of this document in your comments.
                 Your comments must not be more than 15 pages long (49 CFR 553.21).
                NHTSA established this limit to encourage you to write your primary
                comments in a concise fashion. However, you may attach necessary
                additional documents to your comments. There is no limit on the length
                of the attachments.
                 Please submit one copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand
                delivery) of your comments, including the attachments, to the docket
                following the instructions given above under ADDRESSES. Please note, if
                you are submitting comments electronically as a PDF (Adobe) file, NHTSA
                asks that the documents submitted be scanned using an Optical Character
                Recognition (OCR) process, thus allowing the Agency to search and copy
                certain portions of your submissions.
                 How do I submit confidential business information?
                 If you wish to submit any information under a claim of
                confidentiality, you should submit three copies of your complete
                submission, including the information you claim to be confidential
                business information, to the Office of the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the
                address given above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. In addition,
                you may submit a copy (two copies if submitting by mail or hand
                delivery), from which you have deleted the claimed confidential
                business information, to the docket by one of the methods given above
                under ADDRESSES. When you send a comment containing information claimed
                to be confidential business information, you should include a cover
                letter setting forth the information specified in NHTSA's confidential
                business information regulation (49 CFR part 512).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \259\ Wang, J.-S. (2019, March), Target crash population for
                crash avoidance technologies in passenger vehicles (Report No. DOT
                HS 812 653), Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety
                Administration.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Will the Agency consider late comments?
                 NHTSA will consider all comments received before the close of
                business on the comment closing date indicated above under DATES. To
                the extent possible, the Agency will also consider comments received
                after that date. Please note that even after the comment closing date,
                we will continue to file relevant information in the docket as it
                becomes available. Accordingly, we recommend that interested people
                periodically check the docket for new material. You may read the
                comments received at the address given above under ADDRESSES. The hours
                of the docket are indicated above in the same location. You may also
                see the comments on the internet, identified by the docket number at
                the heading of this notice, at www.regulations.gov.
                XII. Appendices
                Appendix A. Target Population Statistics for Crash Scenarios
                259
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \260\ The crash scenarios referenced for the FCW/CIB/DBS target
                population are those that comprise the subset of the 84 mutually
                exclusive pre-crash scenarios analyzed by VOLPE (Report No. DOT HS
                812 745) that were considered relevant for the forward collision
                prevention crash category (Report No. DOT HS 812 653). Each of the
                84 scenarios is assigned a pre-assigned number and is followed by a
                brief description.
                 Table A-1--Target Population Statistics, FCW/CIB/DBS
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios \260\ Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle (LV) Stopped........ 1,099,868 474 561,842 1,719,177
                2001 Rear-End, LV Slower........................ 174,217 527 97,402 252,341
                2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated................... 374,624 155 196,731 587,031
                2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher 598 3 273 829
                 Speed..........................................
                2009 Rear-End, Other/Unspecified................ 50,105 70 24,951 77,034
                2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 1,842 37 839 2,510
                 Stopped........................................
                2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 813 6 486 1,063
                 Slower.........................................
                2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle 1,475 3 860 1,900
                 Decelerated....................................
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Combined Total.............................. 1,703,541 1,275 883,386 2,641,884
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percent of Total Crashes.................... 29.4 3.8 31.5 36.3
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table A-2--Target Population for LDW/LKA/LCA
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                100 1V Rollover 1st Event....................... 4,411 63 3,155 2,104
                150 2+V Rollover 1st Event...................... 243 3 337 197
                1000 1V, Roadway Departure (RD)................. 966,709 9,751 359,238 679,402
                1050 2+V, Roadway Departure..................... 43,957 1,021 32,069 55,856
                [[Page 13513]]
                
                1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median................. 8,560 75 2,910 6,214
                1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median................ 3,427 106 2,678 4,239
                3000 ST Opposite Dir(OD), Head-On............... 32,751 2,761 37,848 23,992
                3009 ST OD Forward Impact, Other................ 115 11 69 135
                3100 ST OD, Angle Sideswipe..................... 62,214 1,042 38,655 86,054
                3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching 4,008 11 2,979 5,019
                 OD.............................................
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Combined Total.............................. 1,126,397 14,844 479,939 863,213
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percent of Total Crashes.................... 19.4 44.3 17.1 11.9
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table A-3--Target Population for BSD/BSI/LCM
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                8000 LCM in Rear End............................ 48,749 128 26,040 71,977
                8001 LCM in ST SD Forward Impact................ 212 4 62 371
                8002 LCM in ST SD AS............................ 371,504 332 129,595 651,962
                8003 LCM CT VT SD............................... 58,389 40 20,685 99,476
                8004 LCM Other.................................. 24,216 38 11,924 36,940
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Combined Total.............................. 503,070 542 188,304 860,726
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percent of Total Crashes.................... 8.7 1.6 6.7 11.8
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table A-4--Target Population for PAEB
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                300 1V2Ped RD, Forward Impact................... 60,322 3,264 57,480 1,836
                309 1V2Ped, Other............................... 306 26 264 0
                350 2+V2Ped..................................... 511 259 452 0
                400 1V2Cyc RD, Forward Impact................... 50,094 531 45,529 4,910
                409 1V2Cyc, Other/Unspecified................... 175 4 172 0
                450 2+V2Cyc..................................... 234 23 169 239
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Combined Total.............................. 111,641 4,106 104,066 6,985
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percent of Total Crashes.................... 1.9 12.3 3.7 0.1
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table A-5--Target Population for RAB/RvAB/RCTA Technologies
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 MAIS 1-5
                 Crash scenarios Crashes Fatalities injuries PDOVs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                302 1V2Ped, Backup.............................. 2,811 44 2,590 88
                402 1V2Cyc, Backup.............................. 439 3 407 48
                602 1V2ParkedV, Backup.......................... 41,957 2 5,293 40,389
                802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup..................... 1,824 2 217 1,732
                6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object............... 101,503 23 26,761 189,059
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Combined Total.............................. 148,533 74 35,268 231,317
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percent of Total Crashes.................... 2.6 0.2 1.3 3.2
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Table A-6--Mapping of Crash Scenarios With Safety Systems
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Crash scenarios 1 FCW/CIB/DBS 2 LDW/LKA/LCA 3 BSD/BSI/LCM 4 PAEB 5 RAB/RvAB/RTA
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                100 1V Rollover 1st Event.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                150 2+V Rollover 1st Event......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                200 1V Jackknife 1st Event......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                250 2+V Jackknife 1st Event........................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                300 1V2Pedestrian Roadway Departure, Forward Impact................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                302 1V2 Pedestrian, Backup......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                [[Page 13514]]
                
                309 1V2 Pedestrian, Specifics Other/Unknown........................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                350 2+V2 Pedestrian................................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                400 1V2Cyclist Roadway Departure, Forward Impact................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                402 1V2Cyclist, Backup............................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                409 1V2Cyclist, Specifics Other/Unknown............................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                450 2+V2Cyclist.................................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                500 1V2Animal Roadway Departure, Avoid Animal...................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                502 1V2Animal, Backup.............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                509 1V2Animal, Specifics Other/Unknown............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                550 2+V2Animal..................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                600 1V2Parked Vehicle Roadway Departure, Forward Impact............ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                602 1V2Parked Vehicle, Backup...................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                609 1V2Parked Vehicle, Specifics Other/Unknown..................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                650 2+V2Parked Vehicle............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                700 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact.... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                701 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss..... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                702 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Backup.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                709 1V2Other Non-Fixed Object, Other............................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                750 2+V2Other Non-Fixed Object..................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                800 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Forward Impact.............. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                801 1V2Fixed Object Roadway Departure, Traction Loss............... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                802 1V2Fixed Object, Backup........................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                809 1V2Fixed Object, Other......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                850 2+V2Fixed Object............................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1000 1V, Roadway Departure......................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1001 1V RD, Traction Loss.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1002 1V RD, Avoid Vehicle/Pedestrian/Animal........................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1003 1V Forward Impact, Ped or Animal.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1004 1V Forward Impact, End Departure.............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1005 1V Forward Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown.................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1009 1V Other/No Impact............................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1050 2+V, Roadway Departure........................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1100 1V Cross Centerline/Median.................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                1150 2+V Cross Centerline/Median *................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2000 Rear-End, Lead Vehicle Stopped................................ ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2001 Rear-End, LV Slower........................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2002 Rear-End, LV Decelerated...................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2003 Rear-End, Other In-lane Vehicle Higher Speed.................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2009 Rear-End, Specifics Other/Unknown............................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2101 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Loss Control... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2102 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Impact, Avoid Vehicle.............................................
                2103 Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward Impact, Avoid Objects.. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2109 Rear-End Possible, Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Impact, Specifics Other/Unknown...................................
                2200 Same Trafficway Same.......................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                Direction, Angle-Sideswipe.........................................
                2300 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Stopped.............. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2301 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Slower............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                2302 Rear-End Possible, Other In-lane Vehicle Decelerated.......... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                3000 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Head-On................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                3001 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Traction ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Loss..............................................................
                3002 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Vehicle...........................................................
                3003 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Avoid ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Object............................................................
                3009 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction Forward Impact, Other...... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                3100 Same Trafficway Opposite Direction, Angle Sideswipe........... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                3200 Head-On Possible, Other Vehicle Encroaching Opposite Direction ............... ............... ............... ...............
                [[Page 13515]]
                
                4000 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Opposite Direction................................................
                4001 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Initial ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Same Direction....................................................
                4009 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Across Path, Specifics ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Other/Unknown.....................................................
                4100 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into Same ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Direction.........................................................
                4101 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Into ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Opposite Direction................................................
                4109 Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning, Turn Into Path, Specifics ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Other/Unknown.....................................................
                5000 Intersect Paths, Straight Across Path......................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                5009 Intersect Paths, Straight Path, Specifics, Specifics Other/ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Unknown...........................................................
                6000 Backing Up to Vehicle/Object.................................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                7000 1V Negotiating a Curve........................................ ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                7050 2+V Negotiating a Curve....................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                8000 Lane Change/Merge Before Rear-End............................. ............... ............... ............... ...............
                8001 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Forward ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Impact............................................................
                8002 Lane Change/Merge in Same Trafficway Same Direction Angle ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Sideswipe.........................................................
                8003 Lane Change/Merge in Change Trafficway Vehicle Turning Initial ............... ............... ............... ...............
                 Same Direction....................................................
                8004 Lane Change/Merge Other....................................... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9000 Equipment Failure............................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9020 Loss of Control Due to Tire/Engine/Poor Road.................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9030 2+V, Left/Right Turn, Unspecified............................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9040 2+V U-Turn.................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9050 2+V Backing to Moving Vehicle................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9060 2+V No Impact................................................. ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9070 2+V Other..................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                9999 2+V Unknown................................................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............
                --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Appendix B. Questions Asked Throughout This Notice
                III. ADAS Performance Testing Program
                 (1) Should the Agency award credit to vehicles equipped with LDW
                systems that provide a passing alert, regardless of the alert type?
                Why or why not? Are there any LDW alert modalities, such as visual-
                only warnings, that the Agency should not consider acceptable when
                determining whether a vehicle meets NCAP's performance test
                criteria? If so, why? Should the Agency consider only certain alert
                modalities (such as haptic warnings) because they are more effective
                at re-engaging the driver and/or have higher consumer acceptance? If
                so, which one(s) and why?
                 (2) If NHTSA were to adopt the lane keeping assist test methods
                from the Euro NCAP LSS protocol for the Agency's LKS test procedure,
                should the LDW test procedure be removed from its NCAP program
                entirely and an LDW requirement be integrated into the LKS test
                procedure instead? Why or why not? For systems that have both LDW
                and LKS capabilities, the Agency would simply turn off LKS to
                conduct the LDW test if both systems are to be assessed separately.
                What tolerances would be appropriate for each test, and why?
                 (3) LKS system designs provide steering and/or braking to
                address lane departures (e.g., when a driver is distracted). To help
                re-engage a driver, should the Agency specify that an LDW alert must
                be provided when the LKS is activated? Why or why not?
                 (4) Do commenters agree that the Agency should remove the Botts'
                Dots test scenario from the current LDW test procedure since this
                lane marking type is being removed from use in California? If not,
                why?
                 (5) Is the Euro NCAP maximum excursion limit of 0.3 m (1.0 ft.)
                over the lane marking (as defined with respect to the inside edge of
                the lane line) for LKS technology acceptable, or should the limit be
                reduced to account for crashes occurring on roads with limited
                shoulder width? If the tolerance should be reduced, what tolerance
                would be appropriate and why? Should this tolerance be adopted for
                LDW in addition to LKS? Why or why not?
                 (6) In its LSS Protocol, Euro NCAP specifies use of a 1,200 m
                (3,937.0 ft.) curve and a series of increasing lateral offsets to
                establish the desired lateral velocity of the SV towards the lane
                line it must respond to. Preliminary NHTSA tests have indicated that
                use of a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius provides a clearer
                indication of when an LKS intervention occurs when compared to the
                baseline tests performed without LKS, a process specified by the
                Euro NCAP LSS protocol. This is because the small curve radius
                allows the desired SV lateral velocity to be more quickly
                established; requires less initial lateral offset within the travel
                lane; and allows for a longer period of steady state lateral
                velocity to be realized before an LKS intervention occurs. Is use of
                a 200 m (656.2 ft.) curve radius, rather than 1,200 m (3,937.0 ft.),
                acceptable for inclusion in a NHTSA LKS test procedure? Why or why
                not?
                 (7) Euro NCAP's LSS protocol specifies a single line lane to
                evaluate system performance. However, since certain LKS systems may
                require two lane lines before they can be enabled, should the Agency
                use a single line or two lines lane in its test procedure? Why?
                 (8) Should NHTSA consider adding Euro NCAP's road edge detection
                test to its NCAP program to begin addressing crashes where lane
                markings may not be present? If not, why? If so, should the test be
                added for LDW, LKS, or both technologies?
                 (9) The LKS and ``Road Edge'' recovery tests defined in the Euro
                NCAP LSS protocol specify that a range of lateral velocities from
                0.2 to 0.5 m/s (0.7 to 1.6 ft./s) be used to assess system
                performance, and that this range is representative of the lateral
                velocities associated with unintended lane departures (i.e., not an
                intended lane change). However, in the same protocol, Euro NCAP also
                specifies a range of lateral velocities from 0.3 to 0.6 m/s (1.0 to
                2.0 ft./s) be used to represent unintended lane
                [[Page 13516]]
                departures during ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Oncoming vehicle'' and
                ``Emergency Lane Keeping--Overtaking vehicle'' tests. To encourage
                the most robust LKS system performance, should NHTSA consider a
                combination of the two Euro NCAP unintended departure ranges,
                lateral velocities from 0.2 to 0.6 m/s (0.7 to 2.0 ft./s), for
                inclusion in the Agency's LKS evaluation? Why or why not?
                 (10) As discussed above, the Agency is concerned about LKS
                performance on roads that are curved. As such, can the Agency
                correlate better LKS system performance at higher lateral velocities
                on straight roads with better curved road performance? Why or why
                not? Furthermore, can the Agency assume that a vehicle that does not
                exceed the maximum excursion limits at higher lateral velocities on
                straight roads will have superior curved road performance compared
                to a vehicle that only meets the excursion limits at lower lateral
                velocities on straight roads? Why or why not? And lastly, can the
                Agency assume the steering intervention while the vehicle is
                negotiating a curve is sustained long enough for a driver to re-
                engage? If not, why?
                 (11) The Agency would like to be assured that when a vehicle is
                redirected after an LKS system intervenes to prevent a lane
                departure when tested on one side, if it approaches the lane marker
                on the side not tested, the LKS will again engage to prevent a
                secondary lane departure by not exceeding the same maximum excursion
                limit established for the first side. To prevent potential secondary
                lane departures, should the Agency consider modifying the Euro NCAP
                ``lane keep assist'' evaluation criteria to be consistent with
                language developed for NHTSA's BSI test procedure to prevent this
                issue? Why or why not? NHTSA's test procedure states the SV BSI
                intervention shall not cause the SV to travel 0.3 m (1 ft.) or more
                beyond the inboard edge of the lane line separating the SV travel
                lane from the lane adjacent and to the right of it within the
                validity period. To assess whether this occurs, a second lane line
                is required (only one line is specified in the Euro NCAP LSS
                protocol for LKS testing). Does the introduction of a second lane
                line have the potential to confound LKS testing? Why or why not?
                 (12) Since most fatal road departure and opposite direction
                crashes occur at higher posted and known travel speeds, should the
                LKS test speed be increased, or does the current test speed
                adequately indicate performance at higher speeds, especially on
                straight roads? Why or why not?
                 (13) The Agency recognizes that the LKS test procedure currently
                contains many test conditions (i.e., line type and departure
                direction). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
                conditions to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP
                test only certain conditions to minimize test burden? For instance,
                should the Agency consider incorporating the test conditions for
                only one departure direction if the vehicle manufacturer provides
                test data to assure comparable system performance for the other
                direction? Or, should the Agency consider adopting only the most
                challenging test conditions? If so, which conditions are most
                appropriate? For instance, do the dashed line test conditions
                provide a greater challenge to vehicles than the solid line test
                conditions?
                 (14) What is the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for
                each LKS test condition, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass
                rate for the LKS tests, and why?
                 (15) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current LDW or proposed LKS
                test procedure that need further refinement or clarification? Is so,
                what additional refinements or clarifications are necessary?
                 (16) Should all BSW testing be conducted without the turn signal
                indicator activated? Why or why not? If the Agency was to modify the
                BSW test procedure to stipulate activation of the turn signal
                indicator, should the test vehicle be required to provide an audible
                or haptic warning that another vehicle is in its blind zone, or is a
                visual warning sufficient? If a visual warning is sufficient, should
                it continually flash, at a minimum, to provide a distinction from
                the blind spot status when the turn signal is not in use? Why or why
                not?
                 (17) Is it appropriate for the Agency to use the Straight Lane
                Pass-by Test to quantify and ultimately differentiate a vehicle's
                BSW capability based on its ability to provide acceptable warnings
                when the POV has entered the SV's blind spot (as defined by the
                blind zone) for varying POV-SV speed differentials? Why or why not?
                 (18) Is using the GVT as the strikeable POV in the BSI test
                procedure appropriate? Is using Revision G in NCAP appropriate? Why
                or why not?
                 (19) The Agency recognizes that the BSW test procedure currently
                contains two test scenarios that have multiple test conditions
                (e.g., test speeds and POV approach directions (left and right side
                of the SV)). Is it necessary for the Agency to perform all test
                scenarios and test conditions to address the real-world safety
                problem adequately, or could it test only certain scenarios or
                conditions to minimize test burden in NCAP? For instance, should the
                Agency consider incorporating only the most challenging test
                conditions into NCAP, such as the ones with the greatest speed
                differential, or choose to perform the test conditions having the
                lowest and highest speeds? Should the Agency consider only
                performing the test conditions where the POV passes by the SV on the
                left side if the vehicle manufacturer provides test data to assure
                the left side pass-by tests are also representative of system
                performance during right side pass-by tests? Why or why not?
                 (20) Given the Agency's concern about the amount of system
                performance testing under consideration in this RFC, it seeks input
                on whether to include a BSI false positive test. Is a false positive
                assessment needed to insure system robustness and high customer
                satisfaction? Why or why not?
                 (21) The BSW test procedure includes 7 repeated trials for each
                test condition (i.e., test speed and POV approach direction). Is
                this an appropriate number of repeat trials? Why or why not? What is
                the appropriate number of test trials to adopt for each BSI test
                scenario, and why? Also, what is an appropriate pass rate for each
                of the two tests, BSW and BSI, and why is it appropriate?
                 (22) Is it reasonable to perform only BSI tests in conjunction
                with activation of the turn signal? Why or why not? If the turn
                signal is not used, how can the operation of BSI be differentiated
                from the heading adjustments resulting from an LKS intervention?
                Should the SV's LKS system be switched off during conduct of the
                Agency's BSI evaluations? Why or why not?
                 (23) Is the proposed test speed range, 10 kph (6.2 mph) to 60
                kph (37.3 mph), to be assessed in 10 kph (6.2 mph) increments, most
                appropriate for PAEB test scenarios S1 and S4? Why or why not?
                 (24) The Agency has proposed to include Scenarios S1 a-e and S4
                a-c in its NCAP assessment. Is it necessary for the Agency to
                perform all test scenarios and test conditions proposed in this RFC
                notice to address the safety problem adequately, or could NCAP test
                only certain scenarios or conditions to minimize test burden but
                still address an adequate proportion of the safety problem? Why or
                why not? If it is not necessary for the Agency to perform all test
                scenarios or test conditions, which scenarios/conditions should be
                assessed? Although they are not currently proposed for inclusion,
                should the Agency also adopt the false positive test conditions, S1f
                and S1g? Why or why not?
                 (25) Given that a large portion of pedestrian fatalities and
                injuries occur under dark lighting conditions, the Agency has
                proposed to perform testing for the included test conditions (i.e.,
                S1 a-e and S4 a-c) under dark lighting conditions (i.e., nighttime)
                in addition to daylight test conditions for test speed range 10 kph
                (6.2 mph) to 60 kph (37.3 mph). NHTSA proposes that a vehicle's
                lower beams would provide the source of light during the nighttime
                assessments. However, if the SV is equipped with advanced lighting
                systems such as semiautomatic headlamp beam switching and/or
                adaptive driving beam head lighting system, they shall be enabled
                during the nighttime PAEB assessment. Is this testing approach
                appropriate? Why or why not? Should the Agency conduct PAEB
                evaluation tests with only the vehicle's lower beams and disable or
                not use any other advanced lighting systems?
                 (26) Should the Agency consider performing PAEB testing under
                dark conditions with a vehicle's upper beams as a light source? If
                yes, should this lighting condition be assessed in addition to the
                proposed dark test condition, which would utilize only a vehicle's
                lower beams along with any advanced lighting system enabled, or in
                lieu of the proposed dark testing condition? Should the Agency also
                evaluate PAEB performance in dark lighting conditions with overhead
                lights? Why or why not? What test scenarios, conditions, and
                speed(s) are appropriate for nighttime (i.e., dark lighting
                conditions) testing in NCAP, and why?
                 (27) To reduce test burden in NCAP, the Agency proposed to
                perform one test per test speed until contact occurs, or until the
                vehicle's relative impact velocity exceeds 50 percent of the initial
                speed of the subject vehicle for the given test condition. If
                contact occurs and if the vehicle's relative impact velocity is less
                than or equal to 50 percent
                [[Page 13517]]
                of the initial SV speed for the given combination of test speed and
                test condition, an additional four test trials will be conducted at
                the given test speed and test condition, and the SV must meet the
                passing performance criterion (i.e., no contact) for at least three
                out of those five test trials in order to be assessed at the next
                incremental test speed. Is this an appropriate approach to assess
                PAEB system performance in NCAP, or should a certain number of test
                trials be required for each assessed test speed? Why or why not? If
                a certain number of repeat tests is more appropriate, how many test
                trials should be conducted, and why?
                 (28) Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate
                for the proposed PAEB test conditions? Why or why not?
                Alternatively, should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or
                specify a maximum allowable SV-to-mannequin impact speed for any or
                all of the proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test
                speed combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For
                those test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate?
                Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be
                appropriate?
                 (29) If the SV contacts the pedestrian mannequin during the
                initial trial for a given test condition and test speed combination,
                NHTSA proposes to conduct additional test trials only if the
                relative impact velocity observed during that trial is less than or
                equal to 50 percent of the initial speed of the SV. For a test speed
                of 60 kph (37.3 mph), this maximum relative impact velocity is
                nominally 30 kph (18.6 mph), and for a test speed of 10 kph (6.2
                mph), the maximum relative impact velocity is nominally 5 kph (3.1
                mph). Is this an appropriate limit on the maximum relative impact
                velocity for the proposed range of test speeds? If not, why? Note
                that the tests in Global Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 9 for
                pedestrian crashworthiness protection simulates a pedestrian impact
                at 40 kph (24.9 mph).
                 (30) For each lighting condition, the Agency is proposing 6 test
                speeds (i.e., those performed from 10 to 60 kph (6.2 to 37.3 mph) in
                increments of 10 kph (6.2 mph)) for each of the 8 proposed test
                conditions (S1a, b, c, d, and e and S4a, b, and c). This results in
                a total of 48 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
                to be evaluated per lighting condition, or 96 total combinations for
                both light conditions. The Agency mentions later in the ADAS Ratings
                System section, that it plans to use check marks, as is done
                currently, to give credit to vehicles that (1) are equipped with the
                recommended ADAS technologies, and (2) pass the applicable system
                performance test requirements for each ADAS technology included in
                NCAP until it issues (1) a final decision notice announcing the new
                ADAS rating system and (2) a final rule to amend the safety rating
                section of the vehicle window sticker (Monroney label). For the
                purposes of providing credit for a technology using check marks,
                what is an appropriate minimum overall pass rate for PAEB
                performance evaluation? For example, should a vehicle be said to
                meet the PAEB performance requirements if it passes two-thirds of
                the 96 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds for
                the two lighting conditions (i.e., passes 64 unique combinations of
                test conditions and test speeds)?
                 (31) Given previous support from commenters to include S2 and S3
                scenarios in the program at some point in the future and the results
                of AAA's testing for one of the turning conditions, NHTSA seeks
                comment on an appropriate timeframe for including S2 and S3
                scenarios into the Agency's NCAP. Also, NHTSA requests from vehicle
                manufacturers information on any currently available models designed
                to address, and ideally achieve crash avoidance during conduct of
                the S2 and S3 scenarios to support Agency evaluation for a future
                program upgrade.
                 (32) Should the Agency adopt the articulated mannequins into the
                PAEB test procedure as proposed? Why or why not?
                 (33) In addition to tests performed under daylight conditions,
                the Agency is proposing to evaluate the performance of PAEB systems
                during nighttime conditions where a large percentage of real-world
                pedestrian fatalities occur. Are there other technologies and
                information available to the public that the Agency can evaluate
                under nighttime conditions?
                 (34) Are there other safety areas that NHTSA should consider as
                part of this or a future upgrade for pedestrian protection?
                 (35) Are there any aspects of NCAP's proposed PAEB test
                procedure that need further refinement or clarification before
                adoption? If so, what additional refinement or clarification is
                necessary, and why?
                 (36) Considering not only the increasing number of cyclists
                killed on U.S. roads but also the limitations of current AEB systems
                in detecting cyclists, the Agency seeks comment on the appropriate
                timeframe for adding a cyclist component to NCAP and requests from
                vehicle manufacturers information on any currently available models
                that have the capability to validate the cyclist target and test
                procedures used by Euro NCAP to support evaluation for a future NCAP
                program upgrade.
                 (37) In addition to the test procedures used by Euro NCAP, are
                there others that NHTSA should consider to address the cyclist crash
                population in the U.S. and effectiveness of systems?
                 (38) For the Agency's FCW tests:
                --If the Agency retains one or more separate tests for FCW, should
                it award credit solely to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that
                provide a passing audible alert? Or, should it also consider
                awarding credit to vehicles equipped with FCW systems that provide
                passing haptic alerts? Are there certain haptic alert types that
                should be excluded from consideration (if the Agency was to award
                credit to vehicles with haptic alerts that pass NCAP tests) because
                they may be a nuisance to drivers such that they are more likely to
                disable the system? Do commenters believe that haptic alerts can be
                accurately and objectively assessed? Why or why not? Is it
                appropriate for the Agency to refrain from awarding credit to FCW
                systems that provide only a passing visual alert? Why or why not? If
                the Agency assesses the sufficiency of the FCW alert in the context
                of CIB (and PAEB) tests, what type of FCW alert(s) would be
                acceptable for use in defining the timing of the release of the SV
                accelerator pedal, and why?
                --Is it most appropriate to test the middle (or next latest) FCW
                system setting in lieu of the default setting when performing FCW
                and AEB (including PAEB) NCAP tests on vehicles that offer multiple
                FCW timing adjustment settings? Why or why not? If not, what use
                setting would be most appropriate?
                --Should the Agency consider consolidating FCW and CIB testing such
                that NCAP's CIB test scenarios would serve as an indicant of FCW
                operation? Why or why not? The Agency has proposed that if it
                combines the two tests, it would evaluate the presence of a
                vehicle's FCW system during its CIB tests by requiring the SV
                accelerator pedal be fully released within 500 ms after the FCW
                alert is issued. If no FCW alert is issued during a CIB test, the SV
                accelerator pedal will be fully released within 500 ms after the
                onset of CIB system braking (as defined by the instant SV
                deceleration reaches at least 0.5g). If no FCW alert is issued and
                the vehicle's CIB system does not offer any braking, release of the
                SV accelerator pedal will not be required prior to impact with the
                POV. The Agency notes that it has also proposed these test
                procedural changes for its PAEB tests as well. Is this assessment
                method for FCW operation reasonable? Why or why not?
                --If the Agency continues to assess FCW systems separately from CIB,
                how should the current FCW performance criteria (i.e., TTCs) be
                amended if the Agency aligns the corresponding maximum SV test
                speeds, POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, POV deceleration magnitude,
                etc., as applicable, with the proposed CIB tests, and why? What
                assessment method should be used--one trial per scenario, or
                multiple trials, and why? If multiple trials should be required, how
                many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an
                acceptable pass rate, and why?
                --Is it desirable for NCAP to perform one FCW test scenario (instead
                of the three that are currently included in NCAP's FCW test
                procedure), conducted at the corresponding maximum SV test speed,
                POV speed, SV-to-POV headway (as applicable), POV deceleration
                magnitude, etc. of the proposed CIB test to serve as an indicant of
                FCW system performance? If so, which test scenario from NCAP's FCW
                test procedure is appropriate?
                --Are there additional or alternative test scenarios or test
                conditions that the Agency should consider incorporating into the
                FCW test procedure, such as those at even higher test speeds than
                those proposed for the CIB tests, or those having increased
                complexity? If so, should the current FCW performance criteria
                (i.e., TTCs) and/or test scenario specifications be amended, and to
                what extent?
                 (39) For the Agency's CIB tests:
                --Are the SV and POV speeds, SV-to-POV headway, deceleration
                magnitude, etc. the Agency has proposed for NCAP's CIB tests
                [[Page 13518]]
                appropriate? Why or why not? If not, what speeds, headway(s),
                deceleration magnitude(s) are appropriate, and why? Should the
                Agency adopt a POV deceleration magnitude of 0.6 g for its LVD CIB
                test in lieu of 0.5 g proposed? Why or why not?
                --Should the Agency consider adopting additional higher tests speeds
                (i.e., 60, 70, and/or 80 kph (37.3, 43.5, and/or 49.7 mph)) for the
                CIB (and potentially DBS) LVD test scenario in NCAP? Why or why not?
                If additional speeds are included, what headway and deceleration
                magnitude would be appropriate for each additional test speed, and
                why?
                --Is a performance criterion of ``no contact'' appropriate for the
                proposed CIB and DBS test conditions? Why or why not? Alternatively,
                should the Agency require minimum speed reductions or specify a
                maximum allowable SV-to-POV impact speed for any or all of the
                proposed test conditions (i.e., test scenario and test speed
                combination)? If yes, why, and for which test conditions? For those
                test conditions, what speed reductions would be appropriate?
                Alternatively, what maximum allowable impact speed would be
                appropriate?
                 (40) For the Agency's DBS tests:
                --Should the Agency remove the DBS test scenarios from NCAP? Why or
                why not? Alternatively, should the Agency conduct the DBS LVS and
                LVM tests at only the highest test speeds proposed for CIB--70 and
                80 kph (43.5 and 49.7 mph)? Why or why not? If the Agency also
                adopted these higher tests speeds (70 and 80 kph (43.5 and 49.7
                mph)) for the LVD CIB test, should it also conduct the LVD DBS test
                at these same speeds? Why or why not?
                --If the Agency continues to perform DBS testing in NCAP, is it
                appropriate to revise when the manual (robotic) brake application is
                initiated to a time that corresponds to 1.0 second after the FCW
                alert is issued (regardless of whether a CIB activation occurs after
                the FCW alert but before initiation of the manual brake
                application)? If not, why, and what prescribed TTC values would be
                appropriate for the modified DBS test conditions?
                 (41) Is the assessment method NHTSA has proposed for the CIB and
                DBS tests (i.e., one trial per test speed with speed increments of
                10 kph (6.2 mph) for each test condition and repeat trials only in
                the event of POV contact) appropriate? Why or why not? Should an
                alternative assessment method such as multiple trials be required
                instead? If yes, why? If multiple trials should be required, how
                many would be appropriate, and why? Also, what would be an
                acceptable pass rate, and why? If the proposed assessment method is
                appropriate, it is acceptable even for the LVD test scenario if only
                one or two test speeds are selected for inclusion? Or, is it more
                appropriate to alternatively require 7 trials for each test speed,
                and require that 5 out of the 7 trials conducted pass the ``no
                contact'' performance criterion?
                 (42) The Agency's proposal to (1) consolidate its FCW and CIB
                tests such that the CIB tests would also serve as an indicant of FCW
                operation, (2) assess 14 test speeds for CIB (5 for LVS, 5 for LVM,
                and potentially 4 for LVD), and (3) assess 6 tests speeds for DBS (2
                for LVS, 2 for LVM, and potentially 2 for LVD), would result in a
                total of 20 unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds
                to be evaluated for AEB. What is an appropriate minimum pass rate
                for AEB performance evaluation? For example, a vehicle is considered
                to meet the AEB performance if it passes two-thirds of the 20 unique
                combinations of test conditions and test speeds (i.e., passes 14
                unique combinations of test conditions and test speeds).
                 (43) As fused camera-radar forward-looking sensors are becoming
                more prevalent in the vehicle fleet, and the Agency has not observed
                any instances of false positive test failures during any of its CIB
                or DBS testing, is it appropriate to remove the false positive STP
                assessments from NCAP's AEB (i.e., CIB and DBS) evaluation matrix in
                this NCAP update? Why or why not?
                 (44) For vehicles with regenerative braking that have setting
                options, the Agency is proposing to choose the ``off'' setting, or
                the setting that provides the lowest deceleration when the
                accelerator is fully released. As mentioned, this proposal also
                applies to the Agency's PAEB tests. Are the proposed settings
                appropriate? Why or why not? Will regenerative braking introduce
                additional complications for the Agency's AEB and PAEB testing, and
                how could the Agency best address them?
                 (45) Should NCAP adopt any additional AEB tests or alter its
                current tests to address the ``changing'' rear-end crash problem? If
                so, what tests should be added, or how should current tests be
                modified?
                 (46) Are there any aspects of NCAP's current FCW, CIB, and/or
                DBS test procedure(s) that need further refinement or clarification?
                If so, what refinements or clarifications are necessary, and why?
                 (47) Would a 250 ms overlap of SV throttle and brake pedal
                application be acceptable in instances where no FCW alert has been
                issued by the prescribed TTC in a DBS test, or where the FCW alert
                occurs very close to the brake activation. If a 250 ms overlap is
                not acceptable, what overlap would be acceptable?
                 (48) Should the Agency pursue research in the future to assess
                AEB system performance under less than ideal environmental
                conditions? If so, what environmental conditions would be
                appropriate?
                 (49) The Agency requests comment on the use of the GVT in lieu
                of the SSV in future AEB NCAP testing,
                 (50) The Agency requests comment on whether Revisions F and G
                should be considered equivalent for AEB testing.
                 (51) The Agency requests comment on whether NHTSA should adopt a
                revision of the GVT other than Revision G for use in AEB testing in
                NCAP.
                IV. ADAS Rating System
                 With regard to a future ADAS rating system, the Agency seeks
                comments on the following:
                 (52) The components and development of a full-scale ADAS rating
                system,
                 (53) the aforementioned approaches as well as others deemed
                appropriate for the development of a future ADAS rating system in
                order to assist the Agency in developing future proposals,
                 (54) the appropriateness of using target populations and
                technology effectiveness estimates to determine weights or
                proportions to assign to individual test conditions, corresponding
                test combinations, or an overall ADAS award,
                 (55) the use of a baseline concept to convey ADAS scores/
                ratings,
                 (56) how best to translate points/ratings earned during ADAS
                testing conducted under NCAP to a reduction in crashes, injuries,
                deaths, etc., including which real-world data metric would be most
                appropriate,
                 (57) whether an overall rating system is necessary and, if so,
                whether it should replace or simply supplement the existing list
                approach, and
                 (58) effective communication of ADAS ratings, including the
                appropriateness of using a points-based ADAS rating system in lieu
                of, or in addition to, a star rating system.
                VI. Establishing a Roadmap for NCAP
                 With regard to a roadmap, NHTSA requests feedback on the
                following:
                 (59) Identification of safety opportunities or technologies in
                development that could be included in future roadmaps,
                 (60) opportunities to benefit from collaboration or
                harmonization with other rating programs, and
                 (61) other issues to assist with long-term planning.
                VII. Adding Emerging Vehicle Technologies for Safe Driving Choices
                 (62) What are the capabilities of the various available
                approaches to driver monitoring systems (e.g., steering wheel
                sensors, eye tracking cameras, etc.) to detect or infer different
                driver state measurement or estimations (e.g., visual attention,
                drowsiness, medical incapacity, etc.)? What is the associated
                confidence or reliability in detecting or inferring such driver
                states and what supporting data exist?
                 (63) Of further interest are the types of system actions taken
                based on a driver monitoring system's estimate of a driver's state.
                What are the types and modes of associated warnings, interventions,
                and other mitigation strategies that are most effective for
                different driver states or impairments (e.g., drowsy, medical,
                distraction)? What research data exist that substantiate
                effectiveness of these interventions?
                 (64) Are there relevant thresholds and strategies for
                performance (e.g., alert versus some degree of intervention) that
                would warrant some type of NCAP credit?
                 (65) Since different driver states (e.g., visual distraction and
                intoxication) can result in similar driving behaviors (e.g., wide
                within-lane position variability), comments regarding opportunities
                and tradeoffs in mitigation strategies when the originating cause is
                not conclusive are of specific interest.
                 (66) What types of consumer acceptance information (e.g.,
                consumer interest or
                [[Page 13519]]
                feedback data) are available or are foreseen for implementation of
                different types of driver monitoring systems and associated
                mitigation strategies for driver impairment, drowsiness, or visual
                inattention? Are there privacy concerns? What are the related
                privacy protection strategies? Are there use or preference data on a
                selectable feature that could be optionally enabled by consumers
                (e.g., for teen drivers by their parents)?
                 (67) What in-vehicle and HMI design characteristics would be
                most helpful to include in an NCAP rating that focuses on ease of
                use? What research data exist to support objectively characterizing
                ease of use for vehicle controls and displays?
                 (68) What are specific countermeasures or approaches to mitigate
                driver distraction, and what are the associated effectiveness
                metrics that may be feasible and appropriate for inclusion in the
                NCAP program? Methods may include driver monitoring and action
                strategies, HMI design considerations, expanded in-motion secondary
                task lockouts, phone application/notification limitations while
                paired with the vehicle, etc.
                 (69) What distraction mitigation measures could be considered
                for NCAP credit?
                 (70) Are there opportunities for including alcohol-impairment
                technology in NCAP? What types of metrics, thresholds, and tests
                could be considered? Could voluntary deployment or adoption be
                positively influenced through NCAP credit?
                 (71) How can NCAP procedures be described in objective terms
                that could be inclusive of various approaches, such as detection
                systems and inference systems? Are there particular challenges with
                any approach that may need special considerations? What supporting
                research data exist that document relevant performance factors such
                as sensing accuracy and detection algorithm efficacy?
                 (72) When a system detects alcohol-impairment during the course
                of a trip, what actions could the system take in a safe manner? What
                are the safety considerations related to various options that
                manufacturers may be considering (e.g., speed reduction, performing
                a safe stop, pulling over, or flasher activation)? How should
                various actions be considered for NCAP credit?
                 (73) What is known related to consumer acceptance of alcohol-
                impaired driving detection and mitigation functions, and how may
                that differ with respect to direct measurement approaches versus
                estimation techniques using a driver monitoring system? What
                consumer interest or feedback data exist relating to this topic? Are
                there privacy concerns or privacy protection strategies with various
                approaches? What are the related privacy protection strategies?
                 (74) Should NCAP consider credit for a seat belt reminder system
                with a continuous or intermittent audible signal that does not cease
                until the seat belt is properly buckled (i.e., after the 60 second
                FMVSS No. 208 minimum)? What data are available to support
                associated effectiveness? Are certain audible signal characteristics
                more effective than others?
                 (75) Is there an opportunity for including a seat belt interlock
                assessment in NCAP?
                 (76) If the Agency were to encourage seat belt interlock
                adoption through NCAP, should all interlock system approaches be
                considered, or only certain types? If so, which ones? What metrics
                could be evaluated for each? Should differing credit be applied
                depending upon interlock system approach?
                 (77) Should seat belt interlocks be considered for all seating
                positions in the vehicle, or only the front seats? Could there be an
                opportunity for differentiation in this respect?
                 (78) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of seat belt interlock systems and/or persistent
                seat belt reminder systems in vehicles? What consumer interest or
                feedback data exist on this topic?
                 (79) Could there be an NCAP opportunity in a selectable feature
                that could be optionally engaged such as in the context of a ``teen
                mode'' feature?
                 (80) Should NHTSA take into consideration systems, such as
                intelligent speed assist systems, which determine current speed
                limits and warn the driver or adjust the maximum traveling speed
                accordingly? Should there be a differentiation between warning and
                intervention type intelligent speed assist systems in this
                consideration? Should systems that allow for some small amount of
                speeding over the limit before intervening be treated the same or
                differently than systems that are specifically keyed to a road's
                speed limit? What about for systems that allow driver override
                versus systems that do not?
                 (81) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
                evaluating speed assist system functionality?
                 (82) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of intelligent speed assist systems? What
                consumer interest or feedback data exist on this topic?
                 (83) Are there other means that the Agency should consider to
                prevent excessive speeding?
                 (84) If NHTSA considers this technology for inclusion in NCAP,
                are door logic solutions sufficient? Should NHTSA only consider
                systems that detect the presence of a child?
                 (85) What research data exist to substantiate differences in
                effectiveness of these system types?
                 (86) Are there specific protocols that should be considered when
                evaluating these in-vehicle rear seat child reminder systems?
                 (87) What information is known or anticipated with respect to
                consumer acceptance of integrated rear seat child reminder systems
                in vehicles? What consumer interest or feedback data exist on this
                topic?
                VIII. Revising the 5-Star Safety Rating System
                 (88) What approaches are most effective to provide consumers
                with vehicle safety ratings that provide meaningful information and
                discriminate performance of vehicles among the fleet?
                 (89) Is the use of additional injury criteria/body regions that
                are not part of the existing 5-star ratings system appropriate for
                use in a points-based calculation of future star ratings? Some
                injury criteria do not have associated risk curves. Are these
                regions appropriate to include, and if so, what is the appropriate
                method by which to include them?
                 (90) Should a crashworthiness 5-star safety ratings system
                continue to measure a vehicle's performance based on a known or
                expected fleet average performer, or should it return to an absolute
                system of rating vehicles?
                 (91) Considering the basic structure of the current ratings
                system (combined injury risk), the potential overlapping target
                populations for crashworthiness and ADAS program elements, as well
                as other potential concepts mentioned in this document such as a
                points-based system, what would the best method of calculating the
                vehicle fleet average performance be?
                 (92) Should the vehicle fleet average performance be updated at
                regular intervals, and if so, how often?
                 (93) What is the most appropriate way to disseminate these
                updates or changes to the public?
                 (94) Should the Agency disseminate its 5-star ratings with half-
                star increments?
                 (95) Should the Agency assign star ratings using a decimal
                format in addition to or in place of whole- or half-stars?
                 (96) Should the Agency continue to include rollover resistance
                evaluations in its future overall ratings?
                IX. Other Activities
                 (97) Considering the Agency's goal of maintaining the integrity
                of the program, should NHTSA accept self-reported test data that is
                generated by test laboratories that are not NHTSA's contracted test
                laboratories? If no, why not? If yes, what criteria are most
                relevant for evaluating whether a given laboratory can acceptably
                conduct ADAS performance tests for NCAP such that the program's
                credibility is upheld?
                 (98) As the ADAS assessment program in NCAP continues to grow in
                the future to include new ADAS technologies and more complex test
                procedures, what other means would best address the following
                program challenges: Methods of data collection, maintaining data
                integrity and public trust, and managing test failures, particularly
                during verification testing?
                 (99) What is the potential for consumer confusion if information
                on the Monroney label and on the website differs, and how can this
                confusion be lessened?
                 (100) What types of vehicles do consumers compare during their
                search for a new vehicle? Do consumers often consider vehicles with
                different body styles (e.g., midsized sedan versus large sport
                utility)?
                 (101) When searching for vehicle safety information, do
                consumers have a clear understanding for which vehicles they are
                seeking information, or do they browse through vehicle ratings to
                identify vehicles they may wish to purchase?
                 (102) When classifying vehicles by body style, what degree of
                classification is most appropriate? For example, when purchasing a
                passenger vehicle, do consumers consider all passenger vehicles, or
                are they inclined to narrow their searches to vehicles of a subset
                [[Page 13520]]
                of passenger vehicles (e.g., subcompact passenger vehicle)?
                 (103) Within the context of the updates considered in this
                notice, what is the most important top-level safety-related
                information that consumers should be able to compare amongst
                vehicles? Which of these pieces of information should consumers be
                able to use to sort and filter search results?
                Appendix C. History of Relevant Events and Documents Pertaining to This
                Notice
                A. April 5, 2013 Request for Comments
                 On April 5, 2013, NHTSA published an RFC notice \261\ asking the
                public to ``help identify the potential areas of study for
                improvement to the program that have the greatest potential for
                producing safety benefits.'' Specifically, NHTSA requested comments
                on areas in which the Agency believed enhancements to NCAP could be
                made either in the short term or over a longer period of time.
                Several ADAS applications were discussed for possible future
                inclusion in the crash avoidance program in NCAP, including blind
                spot warning, lane keeping assistance, crash imminent braking,
                dynamic brake support, and pedestrian detection and intervention
                systems.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \261\ 78 FR 20597 (Apr. 55, 2013).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                A total of 68 organizations or individuals submitted comments in
                response to the April 2013 notice. The comments received from
                stakeholders, though generally supportive of making improvements to
                NCAP's crash avoidance program by including assessment of additional
                ADAS technologies, exhibited disagreement about how and when a
                particular technology should be added to the program. Specifically,
                these disagreements included the conditions under which these
                technologies should be incorporated into NCAP.
                 Generally, most commenters supported the assessment of ADAS
                technologies, such as CIB, DBS, and rearward pedestrian detection,
                in NCAP. There was also support from commenters on the addition of
                pedestrian safety assessment in NCAP. However, opinions varied
                regarding whether an active and/or passive pedestrian safety program
                should be included in NCAP. Moreover, consumer demand for blind spot
                warning technology resulted in many commenters recommending the
                technology for inclusion in NCAP.
                 Many commenters encouraged NHTSA to ensure that any program area
                considered for inclusion in NCAP should have the necessary
                supporting data (e.g., safety benefits) and address a safety need.
                Furthermore, many commenters (including both vehicle manufacturers
                and safety advocate groups) asked the Agency to also consider a
                regulatory, as well as a non-regulatory (NCAP) approach, for any
                vehicle safety improvements--especially regarding the introduction
                of new advanced crash test dummies. Vehicle manufacturers requested
                that the Agency consider providing sufficient lead time for
                implementation of any program update. Lastly, many commenters
                recommended harmonizing test procedures, test requirements, test
                devices, and the like with other government agencies and standards
                development organizations, such as the International Organization
                for Standardization (ISO), SAE International (SAE), and other
                consumer information programs worldwide.
                B. January 28, 2015 Request for Comment and November 5, 2015 Final
                Decision
                 On January 28, 2015, in response to favorable feedback received
                on crash imminent braking (CIB) and dynamic brake support (DBS)
                through the 2013 RFC, NHTSA published an RFC proposing to add these
                technologies to NCAP.\262\ On November 5, 2015, NHTSA issued the
                final decision to include these technologies, which became effective
                for model year 2018 vehicles.\263\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \262\ 80 FR 4630 (Jan. 28, 2015).
                 \263\ 80 FR 68604 (Nov. 5, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                C. December 4, 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act
                 On December 4, 2015, the President signed the Fixing America's
                Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, which included a section that
                requires NHTSA to promulgate a rule to ensure crash avoidance
                information is displayed along with crashworthiness information on
                window stickers placed on motor vehicles by their
                manufacturers.\264\ At the time the FAST Act was enacted, NHTSA was
                already in the process of developing an RFC notice to present many
                proposed updates to NCAP, including the evaluation of several new
                ADAS and a corresponding update of the Monroney label.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \264\ Section 24321 of the FAST Act, otherwise known as the
                ``Safety Through Informed Consumers Act of 2015.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                D. December 16, 2015 Request for Comments
                 On December 16, 2015, NHTSA published a broad RFC notice seeking
                comment on using enhanced tools and techniques for evaluating the
                safety of vehicles, generating star ratings, and stimulating further
                vehicle safety developments.\265\ On the crashworthiness front, the
                RFC sought comment on establishment of a new frontal oblique test
                and use of the more advanced crash test dummies in all tests. The
                RFC also sought comment on creation of a new crash avoidance rating
                category and included nine advanced crash avoidance technologies.
                Additionally, the RFC sought comment on creation of a new pedestrian
                protection rating category involving the use of adult and child
                head, upper leg, and lower leg impact tests and two new pedestrian
                crash avoidance technologies. The RFC sought comment on combining
                the three categories into one overall 5-star rating.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \265\ 80 FR 78521 (Dec. 16, 2015).
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In response to the notice, NHTSA received more than 300
                comments, more than 200 of which were from individuals supporting
                comments made by the League of American Bicyclists. More than 30
                individuals filed comments addressing a specific program area or
                several topics in the RFC.
                 The Agency also received responses to the notice at two public
                hearings, one in Detroit, Michigan, on January 14, 2016, and the
                second at the U.S. DOT Headquarters in Washington, DC, on January
                29, 2016. By request, NHTSA also held several meetings with
                stakeholders.\266\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \266\ See www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0119 for a
                full listing of the commenters and the comments they submitted, as
                well as records of the public hearings and smaller meetings relating
                to the RFC that occurred.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 In response to the notice, commenters raised many issues
                involving both supporting data for the proposed changes and
                procedural concerns. Commenters stated that the public comment
                period was inadequate for purposes of responding because of the
                complexity of the program described in the RFC, and claimed that the
                technical information supporting the notice was not sufficient to
                allow a full understanding of the contemplated changes. According to
                the commenters, this hindered their ability to prepare substantive
                comments in response to the notice. In addition, most vehicle
                manufacturers stated that the significant cost burden associated
                with fitment of the proposed new technologies and the inclusion of a
                new crash test and new test dummies would increase the price of new
                vehicles. Manufacturers also noted that the advanced crash test
                dummies described in the RFC were not yet standardized and needed
                additional work. Manufacturers, along with safety advocates, further
                expressed the need for data demonstrating that each proposed program
                change would provide sufficient safety improvement to warrant its
                inclusion in NCAP. In addition, several commenters suggested that
                NHTSA develop near-term and long-term roadmaps for NCAP and revise
                NCAP in a more gradual, ``phased'' approach.\267\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \267\ For example, one commenter, the Alliance of Automobile
                Manufacturers, recommended ``that NHTSA revise NCAP in phases to
                maintain a data-driven, science-based foundation for the program by,
                in part, completing the standardization, federalization, and
                docketing of all ATDs and test fixtures to be used in NCAP.''
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                E. October 1, 2018 Public Meeting
                 In response to the issues raised by those who commented on the
                December 2015 notice and in light of the FAST Act mandate \268\
                NHTSA issued a notice announcing its plan to host a public meeting
                to re-engage stakeholders and seek up-to-date input to help the
                Agency plan the future of NCAP. Interested parties were also able to
                submit written comments to the docket.\269\
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 \268\ Section 24322 ``Passenger Motor Vehicle Information'' of
                this Act requires the Secretary of the Department of Transportation
                to issue a rule no later than 1 year after the enactment of this Act
                ``to ensure that crash avoidance information is indicated next to
                crashworthiness information on stickers placed on motor vehicles by
                their manufacturers.''
                 \269\ https://www.regulations.gov, Docket No. NHTSA-2018-0055.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Thirty-five parties participated in the public meeting, 32 of
                which submitted written comments to the docket. Additional written
                comments were submitted by others who did not attend the public
                meeting. These commenters included: Automobile manufacturers,
                consumer organizations, suppliers, industry associations, academia,
                individuals, and other organizations. A large
                [[Page 13521]]
                number of individuals submitted comments requesting that NCAP
                account for pedestrians and bicyclists in its rating system, as
                members of the League of American Bicyclists.
                 Many commenters said an update to NCAP was taking too long. The
                prominent theme from the commenters included the request for an NCAP
                roadmap that lays out planned changes to the program and details
                when those changes are likely to occur. Some commenters pointed to
                the roadmaps of Euro NCAP. In addition, many of the comments focused
                on ADAS and the need for NCAP to stimulate further the incorporation
                of these technologies on vehicles. While supporting an overall
                rating, many commenters stated that the individual ratings for the
                crashworthiness and ADAS programs should be part of the new ratings
                system and be made available to consumers. Automaker commenters
                suggested that any changes to NCAP should allow adequate time for
                manufacturers to incorporate vehicle design changes in response to
                NCAP updates. Some commenters suggested that a vehicle's attributes
                and status following a crash (e.g., notifying appropriate
                authorities) should be part of NCAP ratings as well.
                 Several commenters said changes to NCAP should be supported by
                sound science and data and address the safety problem with potential
                effectiveness of any countermeasure being rated. Some commenters
                also suggested that NCAP's promotion of ADAS technologies will lay
                the groundwork for automated driving systems (ADS). Several
                commenters suggested that there should be as much harmonization as
                possible with related global vehicle rating programs to minimize the
                cost and testing burden on vehicle manufacturers. Most commenters
                supported the idea that NHTSA continue to accept manufacturer-
                conducted, self-reported test results as evidence that the vehicles
                are equipped with one or more NCAP-recommended technologies (i.e.,
                that the Agency does not need to verify that the ADAS meet the NCAP
                system performance requirements).
                 Some commenters noted that NHTSA has yet to implement the
                requirement of the 2015 FAST Act to provide crash avoidance
                information on the Monroney label. Those who commented on this issue
                generally supported moving forward and completing this as soon as
                possible. A few additional commenters addressed the issue of
                possible new crash test dummies used in NCAP, but indicated that any
                new dummies should be ``Federalized'' by adding the dummies into 49
                CFR part 572, ``Anthropomorphic test devices,'' before incorporating
                them into NCAP.
                 Regarding the dissemination and promotion of NCAP's vehicle
                safety information, some of the commenters urged the expanded use of
                new media and other technological approaches to communicating NCAP
                vehicle safety information. Others recommended that there should be
                traditional public information ``campaigns'' to make the public more
                aware of NCAP. Commenters requested a more robust search capability
                on NHTSA's website, particularly to facilitate consumer comparisons
                of vehicles within a class.
                 Among those addressing the utility and effectiveness of the 5-
                star ratings system, all supported the continued use of star ratings
                with some suggesting that the use of half-star increments would be a
                way to introduce more differentiation between vehicles and provide
                an incentive for manufacturers to improve vehicle safety in
                situations where doing so would result in an additional half star.
                One commenter suggested a 10-star rating system.
                 Comments were split on the question of whether new crash tests
                should be added to NCAP. Some supported adjusting the baseline
                injury risks associated with crashworthiness ratings. One commenter
                stated that NCAP should not pursue differentiation just for the sake
                of differentiation, instead suggesting that the highest priority
                should be to examine the correlation and validity of the current
                star rating system with real-world injury data. Several commenters
                suggested that there be a silver star rating as part of NCAP that
                would highlight safety aspects of vehicles that are of importance to
                older drivers. Others who commented on providing vehicle safety
                information for specific demographic groups either opposed the idea
                of information directed at demographic groups, expressed concerns,
                or said additional research is needed.
                 Issued in Washington, DC, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
                1.95 and 501.5.
                Steven S. Cliff,
                Deputy Administrator.
                [FR Doc. 2022-04894 Filed 3-8-22; 8:45 am]
                BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
                

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