Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Fire and Debris-Penetration Hazards; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and Information

Citation86 FR 25817
Record Number2021-09881
Published date11 May 2021
CourtConsumer Product Safety Commission
Federal Register, Volume 86 Issue 89 (Tuesday, May 11, 2021)
[Federal Register Volume 86, Number 89 (Tuesday, May 11, 2021)]
                [Proposed Rules]
                [Pages 25817-25830]
                From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
                [FR Doc No: 2021-09881]
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                CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION
                16 CFR Chapter II
                [Docket No. CPSC-2021-0014]
                Off-Highway Vehicle (OHV) Fire and Debris-Penetration Hazards;
                Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and
                Information
                AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.
                ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
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                SUMMARY: The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or Commission) is
                considering developing a rule to address the risk of injury associated
                with fire and debris-penetration hazards associated with off-highway
                vehicles (OHVs). This advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR)
                initiates a rulemaking proceeding under the Consumer Product Safety Act
                (CPSA). We invite written comments from interested persons concerning
                the risk of injury associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration
                hazards, the regulatory alternatives discussed in this notice, other
                possible means to address this risk, and the economic impacts of the
                various alternatives. We also invite interested persons to submit an
                existing standard, or a statement of intent to modify or develop a
                voluntary standard, to address the risks of injury described in this
                ANPR.
                DATES: Written comments and submissions in response to this notice must
                be received by July 12, 2021.
                ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. CPSC-2021-
                0014, by any of the following methods:
                 Electronic Submissions: Submit electronic comments to the Federal
                eRulemaking Portal at: www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for
                submitting comments. The Commission encourages you to submit electronic
                comments by using the Federal eRulemaking Portal, as described above.
                 Written Submissions: Submit written submissions by mail/hand
                delivery/courier to: Division of the Secretariat, Consumer Product
                Safety Commission, Room 820, 4330 East West Highway, Bethesda, MD
                20814; telephone: (301) 504-7923. Alternatively, as a temporary option
                during the COVID-19 pandemic, you can email such submissions to: [email protected].
                 Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
                and docket number for this document. All comments received may be
                posted without change, including any personal identifiers, contact
                information, or other personal information provided, to
                www.regulations.gov. Do not submit confidential business information,
                trade secret information, or other sensitive or protected information
                that you do not want to be available to the public. If furnished at
                all, such information should be submitted in writing.
                 Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
                comments received, go to www.regulations.gov, and insert the docket
                number CPSC-2021-0014 into the ``Search'' box, and follow the prompts.
                FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Han Lim, Directorate for Engineering
                Sciences, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 5 Research Place,
                [[Page 25818]]
                Rockville, MD 20850; telephone: (301) 987-2327; email: [email protected].
                SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
                A. Background
                 The CPSC is aware of numerous injuries and deaths resulting from
                fire hazards associated with all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), recreational
                off-highway Vehicles (ROVs), and Utility Terrain or Utility Task
                Vehicles (UTVs), and from debris-penetration hazards associated with
                ROVs and UTVs. For the purposes of this rulemaking proceeding, we
                collectively refer to these three vehicle types as off-highway
                vehicles, or OHVs.
                 CPSC staff's review of incident data from January 1, 2003 through
                December 31, 2020 in CPSC's Consumer Product Safety Risk Management
                System (CPSRMS) identified 28 fatalities and 264 injuries from fire-
                related OHV hazards, and 6 fatalities and 20 injuries \1\ from debris-
                penetration OHV hazards. From the National Electronic Injury
                Surveillance System (NEISS) database, CPSC staff estimates there were
                14,200 emergency department-treated injuries from 2007 to 2019 (based
                on a sample size of 282) associated with OHV fire, thermal, and burn
                hazards without indication of a crash or related event.
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                 \1\ Note that two of the 20 injuries related to OHV debris-
                penetration hazards came from the NEISS data.
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                 The current voluntary standards for the three OHV types are:
                 ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 Four-Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--
                Equipment, Configurations, and Performance Requirements developed by
                Specialty Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA) for ATVs and incorporated
                by reference as a mandatory standard in 16 CFR 1420.3;
                 ANSI/ROHVA 1-2016--Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles; and
                 ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016--American National Standard for
                Multipurpose Off-Highway Utility Vehicles.
                 The current voluntary standards for ROVs and UTVs, ANSI/ROHVA-1-
                2016 and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016, respectively, do not have requirements
                that address fire hazards or debris-penetration hazards. The current
                voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, does not include
                requirements that address fire hazards.
                 CPSC staff has met with representatives from ROHVA, SVIA, and OPEI
                on multiple occasions, beginning in September 2018, to discuss the
                development of requirements to address the risk of fire and debris-
                penetration hazards. CPSC staff believes that significant progress has
                been made in discussing possible fire preventative standard
                requirements, but to date the standard development organizations have
                not proposed any fire preventative standard requirements. In addition,
                there has been no discussion on possible debris-penetration mitigation
                standard requirements.
                 The Commission is considering developing a mandatory standard (or
                standards) to reduce the risk of injury associated with OHV fire and
                debris-penetration hazards. Commission staff prepared a briefing
                package to describe the products at issue, assess the relevant incident
                data, describe the hazards, examine relevant voluntary standards, and
                discuss regulatory alternatives for addressing the risk associated with
                OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards. That briefing package is
                available at: https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/Advance-Notice-of-Proposed-Rulemaking-Regarding-Off-Highway-Vehicles.pdf.
                B. Statutory Authority
                 A rulemaking addressing the fire and debris-penetration hazards
                associated with ROVs and UTVs falls under the authority of the CPSA. 15
                U.S.C. 2051-2084. A rulemaking addressing the fire hazards associated
                with ATVs is subject to section 42(b)(3) of the CPSA. Section 42(b)(3)
                provides that for CPSC-initiated changes to the mandatory standard for
                ATVs, 15 U.S.C. 2089, the Commission must make findings required by
                sections 7 and 9 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2056 and 2058. Thus, a
                Commission-initiated rulemaking addressing the fire hazards associated
                with ATVs would also fall under sections 7 and 9 of the CPSA. Because
                of the three vehicle types and two different hazard patterns involved
                in this rulemaking, it is possible the Commission will divide this
                rulemaking into separate rulemakings at the notice of proposed
                rulemaking (NPR) stage.
                 Under section 7 of the CPSA, the Commission may issue a consumer
                product safety standard if the requirements of the standard are
                ``reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of
                injury associated with [a] product.'' 15 U.S.C. 2056(a). The safety
                standard may consist of performance requirements or requirements for
                warnings and instructions. Id. However, if there is a voluntary
                standard that would adequately reduce the risk of injury the Commission
                seeks to address, and there is likely to be substantial compliance with
                that standard, then the Commission must rely on the voluntary standard,
                instead of issuing a mandatory standard. 15 U.S.C. 2056(b)(1). To issue
                a mandatory standard under section 7, the Commission must follow the
                procedural and substantive requirements in section 9 of the CPSA. 15
                U.S.C. 2056(a).
                 Under section 9 of the CPSA, the Commission may begin rulemaking by
                issuing an ANPR. 15 U.S.C. 2058(a). The ANPR must identify the product
                and the nature of the risk of injury associated with it; summarize the
                regulatory alternatives the Commission is considering; and include
                information about any relevant existing standards, and why the
                Commission preliminarily believes those standards would not adequately
                reduce the risk of injury associated with the product. The ANPR must
                also invite comments concerning the risk of injury and regulatory or
                other possible alternatives for addressing the risk, and invite the
                public to submit existing standards or a statement of intent to modify
                or develop a voluntary standard to address the risk of injury. Id.
                 After publishing an ANPR, the Commission may proceed with
                rulemaking by reviewing the comments received in response to the ANPR
                and publishing an NPR. An NPR must include the text of the proposed
                rule, alternatives the Commission is considering, a preliminary
                regulatory analysis describing the costs and benefits of the proposed
                rule and the alternatives, and an assessment of any submitted
                standards. 15 U.S.C. 2058(c). The Commission would then review comments
                on the NPR and decide whether to issue a final rule, along with a final
                regulatory analysis.
                C. The Product
                 For purposes of this rulemaking, OHVs include: ATVs, ROVs, and
                UTVs. The scope of this rulemaking does not include golf cars, personal
                transport vehicles (PTVs), low-speed vehicles, or dune buggies.
                [[Page 25819]]
                1. All-Terrain Vehicles
                 An all-terrain vehicle (ATV) is a motorized vehicle with three or
                four broad, low-pressure tires (less than 10 pounds per square inch), a
                seat designed to be straddled by the operator, handlebars for steering,
                and designed for off-highway use. Since the 1980s, the CPSC has
                addressed ATV safety through various activities, including rulemaking,
                recalls, consumer education, media outreach, and litigation. These
                efforts focused on stability and handling issues related to ATV
                overturn and collisions. Figure 1 shows an example of an ATV.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.000
                 Currently, CPSC regulates ATVs through the incorporation by
                reference of ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 Four-Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--
                Equipment, Configuration, and Performance Requirements as a mandatory
                standard (16 CFR 1420.3(a)).
                2. Recreational Off-Highway Vehicles
                 An ROV is a motorized vehicle having four or more low-pressure
                tires designed for off-highway use and intended by the manufacturer
                primarily for recreational use by one or more persons. Other
                characteristics of an ROV include: A steering wheel for steering
                control, foot controls for throttle and braking, bench or bucket seats,
                rollover protective structure (ROPS), restraint system, and a maximum
                speed greater than 30 miles per hour (mph). ROVs are intended to be
                used on terrain similar to ATVs. ROVs are distinguished from ATVs by
                the presence of a steering wheel, instead of a handle bar for steering;
                bench or bucket seats for the driver and passenger(s), instead of
                straddle seating; foot controls for throttle and braking, instead of
                levers located on the handle bar; and ROPS and restraint systems that
                are not present on ATVs. CPSC staff has worked on stability, handling,
                and occupant protection issues related to ROVs since 2009.\2\ Figure 2
                shows an example of an ROV.
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                 \2\ The NPR for ROVs is available at: 79 FR 68964 (Nov. 19,
                2014); the accompanying briefing package is available at: https://cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/foia_SafetyStandardforRecreationalOff-HighwayVehicles-ProposedRule.pdf.
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                [[Page 25820]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.001
                3. Utility Terrain Vehicles or Utility Task Vehicles
                 For this rulemaking, a UTV is a motorized vehicle having four or
                more low-pressure tires designed for off-highway use with the same
                characteristics as ROVs (bench seating, steering wheel, foot controls,
                ROPS, and seat belts). However, UTVs are intended for utility use, have
                larger cargo beds to accommodate hauling-type tasks, and they generally
                have maximum speeds between 25 and 30 mph. Figure 3 shows an example of
                a UTV.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.002
                D. The Market
                1. Market Size
                 ATV sales have varied over the last 15 years. U.S. ATV sales peaked
                in 2004, at an estimated 812,000 units. Since 2004, ATV sales have
                declined steadily. The Commission estimates approximately 205,000 ATVs
                were sold in the United States in 2018: 177,000 adult models and 77,000
                youth models, with sales revenue of approximately $1.35 billion. The
                Commission identified 13 manufacturers supplying ATVs to the U.S.
                market in 2018, six
                [[Page 25821]]
                from the United States, five from Taiwan, and one each from Japan and
                Mexico. Nine manufacturers were responsible for all ATVs distributed
                into the U.S. market in 2018; four U.S. manufacturers distributed ATVs
                manufactured by Taiwanese firms, in addition to their own. U.S.
                manufacturers accounted for approximately 63 percent of 2018 U.S. ATV
                sales; all ATVs were manufactured and/or distributed by current members
                of the Specialty Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA).
                 Except for 2009, annual U.S. ROV sales have increased steadily,
                from an estimated 2,700 units in 1998, to an estimated 376,000 units in
                2018. The Commission estimates 2018 U.S. ROV sales revenue at
                approximately $5.85 billion. The Commission identified 35 manufacturers
                known to have supplied ROVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 20 from China
                (including Taiwan); 13 from the United States, and 1 each from Mexico
                and South Korea. The Commission identified 53 distributers/brands. CPSC
                staff estimates U.S. manufacturers accounted for approximately 79
                percent of 2018 U.S. ROV sales, and estimates approximately 90 percent
                of ROVs sold in the United States in 2018 were manufactured by current
                members of the Recreational Off-highway Vehicle Association (ROHVA) or
                the Outdoor Power Equipment Institute (OPEI).
                 U.S. UTV sales peaked in 2007, at an estimated 112,000 units,
                before gradually declining. Approximately 76,000 UTVs were sold in the
                United States in 2018, with sales revenue of approximately $700
                million. The Commission identified 22 manufacturers known to have
                supplied UTVs to the U.S. market in 2018, 14 from the United States, 6
                from China (including Taiwan), and 1 each from Canada and South Korea;
                and 27 distributers/brands were identified. The Commission estimates
                U.S. manufacturers accounted for approximately 92 percent of 2018 U.S.
                UTV sales. Current ROHVA and OPEI members accounted for approximately
                90 percent of U.S. 2018 UTV sales.
                 Total U.S. OHV unit sales peaked in 2004, at approximately 937,000.
                OHV sales then declined, to approximately 475,000 by 2011, before
                beginning a partial recovery. Figure 4 illustrates ATV, ROV, UTV, and
                total OHV unit sales from 1998 through 2018. The Commission identified
                as many as 52 manufacturers and 68 distributors/brands of OHVs
                supplying an estimated 657,000 OHVs to the U.S. market in 2018, with
                sales revenue exceeding $7.87 billion. The Commission estimates U.S.
                manufacturers accounted for approximately 75 percent of 2018 U.S. OHV
                sales; SVIA, ROHVA, and OPEI members accounted for approximately 93
                percent of 2018 U.S. OHV sales.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.003
                2. Retail Prices
                 The Commission identified 115 different ATV model variants and
                configurations in two product segments sold in the United States in
                2018: Youth and adult. Youth ATV manufacturer suggested retail prices
                (MSRPs) ranged from a minimum of $1,999, to a maximum of $3,799, with
                an average of approximately $2,650. Adult ATV model MSRPs ranged from a
                minimum of $3,799, to a maximum of $15,349, with a mean of
                approximately $7,400. The mean MSRP for all U.S. ATV sales in 2018 was
                approximately $6,750.\3\
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                 \3\ Unless otherwise noted, OHV product and market information
                is based upon CPSC staff analysis of 1998-2018 sales data provided
                by Power Products Marketing, Minneapolis, MN.
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                 As with ATVs, there is significant variation in ROV design, weight,
                engine displacement, and other characteristics and accessories. The
                Commission identified 396 different ROV model variants and
                configurations that were sold in the United States in 2018. ROV MSRPs
                ranged from a minimum of $3,299, to a maximum of $53,700, with an
                average of approximately $15,400.
                 The Commission identified 138 different UTV model variants and
                configurations that were sold in the United States in 2018. UTV MSRPs
                ranged from a minimum of $3,499 to a maximum of $49,900, with an
                average of approximately $12,000.
                [[Page 25822]]
                3. Number of Off-Highway Vehicles in Use
                 The Commission is unable to provide an accurate estimate of the
                number of OHVs currently in use, due to a lack of reliable estimates of
                ATV, ROV, and UTV product life. Table 1 illustrates a range of
                estimates possible under different assumptions of product life. In each
                case, the estimate is constructed using a gamma distribution, a common
                distribution for estimating failure rates, with shape = 5 and [beta] =
                1, applied to 1998-2018 OHV sales data. Table 1 provides estimates for
                ATVs, ROVs, UTVs, and total OHVs under three product-life assumptions
                (10, 15, and 20 years).\4\
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                 \4\ Implied in the total OHV estimates is the assumption that
                ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs have the same expected product life. This
                assumption likely does not hold, because product life is dependent
                upon annual mileage, terrain driven upon, and other usage
                characteristics, which are not homogenous across OHV categories.
                 Table 1--Estimates of OHVs in Use
                 [Gamma distribution w/shape = 5 and beta = 1]
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                 Life expectancy 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years
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                ATV.................................................... 3,217,376 5,782,667 7,467,359
                ROV.................................................... 2,419,854 2,725,373 2,853,372
                UTV.................................................... 895,474 1,226,299 1,417,666
                 --------------------------------------------------------
                 Total.............................................. 6,532,704 9,734,340 11,738,397
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                4. Small Businesses Subject to Rulemaking
                 OHV manufacturers might be classified in the North American
                Industrial Classification System (NAICS) category 336999 (All Other
                Transportation Equipment Manufacturing), or possibly, 336112 (Light
                Truck and Utility Vehicle Manufacturing), 333111 (Farm Machinery and
                Equipment), 333112 (Lawn and Garden Tractor and Home Lawn and Garden
                Equipment Manufacturing), and 333120 (Construction Machinery
                Manufacturing). According to size standards established by the U.S.
                Small Business Administration (SBA) for these NAICS, firms with fewer
                than 1,000, 1,500, 1,250, 1,500, and 1,250 employees, respectively, are
                considered to be small firms. OHV distributers may be classified in
                NAICS categories 423110 (Automobile and Other Motor Vehicle Merchant
                Wholesalers) or 441228 (Motorcycle, ATV, and All Other Motor Vehicle
                Dealers). The SBA size standard for these NAICS classifications is 500
                employees. The Commission identified eight U.S. OHV manufacturers that
                meet these SBA size standards, nine that do not, and four for which a
                determination could not be made. CPSC staff also identified 27 OHV
                distributors that meet these SBA size standards, 24 that do not, and 17
                for which a determination could not be made.
                E. Risk of Injury
                1. Incident Data
                 CPSC staff conducted a review of incidents, injuries, and
                fatalities associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards. The
                reported incidents from CPSC's Consumer Product Safety Risk Management
                System (CPSRMS) are from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2020; the
                National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS)-based injury
                estimates are from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2019.
                 Fire and debris-penetration hazards are generally unrelated to one
                another. Out of the 4,792 incidents staff identified as related to
                debris-penetration or fire hazards, only two exhibited both debris-
                penetration and fire-related hazards. Table 2 shows the breakout of
                hazards by data sources and severity of incidents.
                 Table 2--Incident Records Relevant to Debris-Penetration and/or Fire Hazards as Presented in This Report
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 CPSRMS (2003-2020) NEISS (2007-
                 ------------------------------------------------ 2019)
                 Relevant hazards Total records Injury No injury ---------------
                 reviewed Fatal reported reported reported Injury cases
                 incidents incidents incidents in sample
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Debris Penetration.............. 107 6 18 81 2
                Fire Hazard (fire, thermal, 4,683 28 264 4,109 282
                 leaks).........................
                Both hazard of Debris- 2 0 1 1 0
                 Penetration and Thermal, Fuel,
                 or Fire-Related Hazards........
                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Total....................... 4,792 34 283 4,191 284
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                Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
                (a) Fire Hazard Incidents
                 CPSC staff's assessment of the fire hazard incidents excludes fires
                ignited by external sources (e.g., overtaken by a controlled burn or
                bonfire, even if the OHV ignites) refueling incidents, and incidents in
                which it is ambiguous about whether the source of the fire may have
                come from a source outside the OHV. The analysis of reported incidents
                in CPSRMS with incident dates from 2003 through 2020 is detailed below.
                [[Page 25823]]
                CPSRMS Incident Data (2003-2020)
                 CPSC staff categorized reports in CPSRMS with incident dates from
                2003 through 2020 into one of several mutually exclusive categories.
                 Sometimes OHV fires occur after a crash, and because these events
                may involve multiple complicating factors, they are set aside in their
                own category. It is very plausible that in some of these instances,
                occupants may still have been injured or killed from the crash, even if
                the vehicle had not ignited. For instances of a fire igniting before or
                without a crash, it is generally clearer to attribute resulting
                injuries or deaths specifically to the fire. In many other instances,
                there may be thermal events that do not involve actual ignition of
                fire; but such events can still be harmful or hazardous. Leaks or
                spraying of oil or fuel do not necessarily constitute a thermal event,
                because these flammable liquids not only have the potential to ignite
                and release thermal energy; but even without ignitions, such leaks can
                present a hazard.
                 Table 3 presents the fire hazard subtypes by the severity of the
                outcome as seen in the CPSRMS incident data.
                 Table 3--Reported Incidents by Fire Hazard Subtype and Severity; 2003-2020
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Reported incident severity
                 Type of fire, thermal, or leak hazard Reported -----------------------------------------------
                 incidents Fatal Injury No injury
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Post-Crash Fire Ignition........................ 51 28 18 5
                Fire Ignited (without/prior to crash)........... 1,626 0 129 1,497
                Thermal Event or burn (without Fire Ignition)... 2,451 0 105 2,346
                Leak or spray of oil or fuel (without other 273 0 12 261
                 burn, thermal event, or fire)..................
                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                 Total....................................... 4,401 28 264 4,109
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Source: CPSRMS.
                NEISS-Based National Injury Estimates (2007-2019)
                 There are an estimated 14,200 (sample size = 282) emergency
                department-treated injuries from 2007 to 2019, associated with OHV
                fire, thermal, and burn hazards without indication of a crash or
                related event. ``Crash-type events'' are defined in this review to
                include vehicle wrecks, rollovers, entrapments, traffic collisions, and
                victims falling or jumping from the vehicle, for example.
                 Although crash-type events coinciding with burns and other thermal-
                , fuel- and fire-related hazards are of concern, such cases were
                already considered and discussed among the reported incidents. For the
                assessment of NEISS injury cases, they are excluded to focus on
                injuries more directly attributable to heat and thermal events. This
                narrowing of scope is not intended to suggest that overheating or other
                malfunctioning of the OHV occurred, or even that other additional
                factors were not involved, but simply to indicate that a burn, or other
                thermal-related event occurred without a crash-type event.
                 Staff is unable to present the annual estimates of the injuries
                over the period from 2007 through 2019, because estimates for many of
                the individual years fall below the NEISS publication criteria.\5\
                However, staff did not see any increasing or decreasing trend in the
                data.
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                 \5\ According to the NEISS publication criteria, an estimate
                must be 1,200 or greater, the sample size must be 20 or greater, and
                the coefficient of variation must be 33 percent or smaller.
                ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 The 14,200 estimated thermal-, fuel-, and fire-related injuries are
                based on a sample size of 282 cases. The vast majority of these
                estimated injuries indicate burns (as the primary diagnosis), without
                necessarily involving the ignition of any fire or flame. Of the
                injuries involving burns, around 12,800 injuries (about 91 percent)
                were classified as thermal burns, while the remainder consisted of
                scald burns, chemical burns, or burns that were not specified. None of
                the incidents reviewed involved any fatalities. Only around 3 percent
                of estimated injuries mentioned any sort of fire ignition. Less than 2
                percent of estimated injuries did not mention burns, but instead
                involved exploding projectiles lacerating or penetrating the body, or a
                gasoline explosion.
                 Most of the injuries were suffered in the lower body, with an
                estimated 5,900 (42%) of injuries affecting the lower leg in
                particular. About 1,800 (13%) of the injuries affected the ankle, foot,
                or toe, and about 1,500 (11%) involved the knee, upper leg and/or lower
                trunk. Many of these injuries suffered at the leg and neighboring body
                parts were described as involving burns from the muffler, exhaust pipe,
                and/or hot exhaust. It was not always clear whether the burns were
                suffered due to direct contact or proximity. An estimated 3,200 (23%)
                of the injuries involved hands and fingers. Injuries between the
                shoulders and wrists (including arms and elbows) were attributed to an
                estimated 1,300 (9%) of the injuries. Several reported injuries also
                occurred on or near the eyes and face, but the sample size is too small
                to project an estimate specific to that region of the body. Table 4
                presents the estimated injuries by body parts grouped as described
                above.
                 Table 4--U.S. Emergency Room-Treated Injuries Related to Fire/Thermal/
                Fuel Hazards Without Indication of Crash-Type Events by Body Parts; 2007-
                 2019
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Percentage of
                 estimated
                 Body part Body parts injuries for
                 group estimate body part group
                 (percent)
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Leg, lower ***...................... 5,900 42
                Ankle;*** Foot; Toe................. 1,800 13
                Trunk, lower; Leg, upper; Knee...... 1,500 11
                [[Page 25824]]
                
                Hand; Finger........................ 3,200 23
                Shoulder; Arm, upper; Elbow; Arm, 1,300 9
                 lower; Wrist.......................
                Eyeball; Face *..................... (**) (**)
                 -----------------------------------
                 Total........................... 14,200 100
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Source: NEISS.
                * ``Face'' includes eyelid, eye area, nose, and forehead.
                ** Sample size is too small to report estimate specific to this group of
                 body parts.
                *** Almost all injuries in this dataset are classified under a single
                 primary (e.g., most severely injured) body part. Only one injury is
                 counted only as a lower leg injury (and not as an ankle injury) which
                 also involved a burn at the lower leg in combination with a ``popped''
                 ankle when the vehicle ``blew out.''
                 An overwhelming majority of the emergency room patients (94%, or an
                estimated 13,500) were treated and released, or released without
                treatment. The remainder were treated and admitted for hospitalization,
                held for observation, or left without treatment or being seen.
                 Although the majority of these injuries appear to have involved
                burns due simply to proximity or contact with heat sources, some other
                relevant hazards are observed among the NEISS cases. There were several
                incidents relating to fuel or gasoline, battery or some form of
                ``explosion''; and as previously mentioned, there were a few incidents
                in which ignition or fire was mentioned. Staff does not have data about
                which burn cases resulted from overheating, as compared to components
                operating at normal hot temperatures. However, given that many of the
                injuries involving the hand and fingers appear to have involved contact
                with components that are expected to be heated at normal operational
                conditions, staff infers that many of the hand burns likely occurred
                without the OHV overheating, or otherwise functioning outside of normal
                design parameters.
                (b) Debris-Penetration Incidents
                 Debris penetration involves debris (usually a tree branch or stick)
                penetrating an OHV (usually the floorboard of underside of an ROV or
                UTV). When such penetration occurs, there is a potential hazard of the
                branch or other debris to penetrate not only the floor or body of the
                OHV, but also occupants of the OHV. None of the incidents staff
                identified were found to involve ATV debris-penetration incidents.
                Given that ATVs lack floorboards, this result was not unexpected; but
                staff did search OHV incidents for this hazard, regardless of whether
                it was indicated to involve an ATV, ROV, UTV, or unknown type of OHV.
                 In the NEISS data, staff identified only two cases with sufficient
                descriptive information to conclude that the injuries were specifically
                associated with a debris-penetration hazard. Due to this small sample
                size, staff cannot report any estimate of injuries. Instead, for the
                debris-penetration-hazard scenario, staff counted the two injuries from
                NEISS with the other reported injuries from CPSRMS.
                 For the six fatal incidents, two involved a passenger's death,
                while the other four involved the driver's death. Four involved a tree
                branch, one a large stick, and the other a 2-inch to 3-inch piece of
                wood. At least three involved penetration of the chest.
                 The list below paraphrases text written by the respective CPSC
                investigators for each of the six fatal incidents:
                 Tree limb penetrated the floor board and struck passenger
                in chest (driven in water);
                 tire over tree limb that pierces fender, nylon mesh door,
                and left side of driver (driven in woods);
                 passed over a large stick that was sticking up in the
                ground, which passed through brake pedal arm through bottom edge of
                seat and into lower abdomen of driver (driven in power line clearing);
                 impaled by a 2- to 3-inch-size piece of wood in upper
                right thigh, causing exsanguination of driver (driven on heavily
                forested public land);
                 branch penetrated UTV bottom and struck passenger in chest
                (driven along trail);
                 ran over large tree branch that struck driver in chest
                (driven in mountains).
                 Table 2 presents the severity of the 20 nonfatal injury incidents
                from debris penetration.
                 Table 5--Debris Penetration by Injury Severity: 2003-2020
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Injury severity Incidents
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Hospital Admission........................................... 4
                Emergency Department Treatment Received...................... 3
                First Aid Received by Non-Medical Professional............... 1
                No First Aid or Medical Attention Received................... 2
                Level of care not known...................................... 10
                 ----------
                 Total Injury Incidents..................................... 20
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Sources: CPSRMS and NEISS.
                2. Hazard Patterns and Analysis of In-Depth Investigations
                (a) Fire Hazard Review and Assessment
                 Since 2018, CPSC staff has collaborated with the three standards
                development organizations (SDOs): ROHVA, OPEI, and SVIA, to examine
                fire hazard causations of OHV-related incidents investigated by CPSC
                staff and reported as in-depth investigations (IDIs). All three vehicle
                types, ROVs, UTVs, and ATVs, were associated with fire hazards. Staff
                provided the SDOs with 121 redacted IDIs related to fire hazards in
                OHVs for review and analysis. These 121 redacted IDIs are a subset of
                the more comprehensive list of IDI data analyzed by the CPSC
                Epidemiology staff and detailed in section E.1 of this preamble. Of the
                121 redacted IDIs, CPSC staff and the SDOs concluded that 84 IDIs
                contained sufficient information to determine cause of fire origin, and
                they agreed to categorize these IDIs. This discussion provides staff's
                insight into this subset of 121 incidents discussed by and the SDOs.
                When cause or categorization of incidents are discussed here, we
                discuss only the 84 incidents for which CPSC staff and SDOs agreed
                there was sufficient information for categorization. Fuel leaks are
                considered fire hazards
                [[Page 25825]]
                because ignition of flammable fluids contributes to the severity of an
                incident. The fire and fuel leak origins identified in the 84 IDIs
                include a breach in the fuel system, electrical component failure,
                exhaust overheat, and debris (grass/dry vegetation) ignition.
                 The majority (44 of the 84) of the causations involved fuel system
                components (29) and exhaust overheat (15). The others involved specific
                electronic components (voltage regulator, wiring harness, electronic
                control module, or battery), debris (grass or dry vegetation) ignition
                from contacting exhaust heat, oil leaks, and unknown causes. Those that
                were deemed unknown involved either two or more possible combined
                causations or instances where causations could not be determined due to
                insufficient information from particular IDIs. Twenty-seven of the 121
                IDIs involved burn injuries when consumers contacted hot surfaces or
                suffered burns from open flames. Neither CPSC staff, nor the SDOs,
                identified any fires due to the lack of a spark arrester.
                 Of the 37 IDIs that had unknown fire causations, 20 involved total-
                OHV losses. A total loss fire refers to an OHV that has been completely
                consumed by the fire, leaving only a metal frame and other non-
                combustible metal parts. A total loss can occur when a smaller fire
                spreads into a fuel-fed fire, so that the entire vehicle becomes
                engulfed in flames. This often makes it difficult to determine the
                origin of the fire. The smaller fire can originate from various
                sources, such as an overheating exhaust that burns a plastic body
                panel, a fuel leak fire, or a fire from an electrical short, where a
                portion of a plastic body panel may catch fire, then that fire can
                spread to the entire vehicle because the majority of the OHV body
                panels are generally made of flammable plastics. Total loss incidents,
                as shown in Figure 5, represent the most severe fire hazard of an OHV.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.004
                 Each OHV is equipped with subsystems that have combustible or
                flammable sources that can lead to fires and/or fire hazards (i.e.,
                fuel leaks). These subsystems are the fuel system (fuel tank, fuel
                pump, fuel rail, fuel filter, hoses, shutoff valves, and fuel caps),
                electrical system (voltage regulator, wire harnesses, battery, fuse
                boxes, and alternator), and the exhaust system (exhaust piping,
                catalytic converter, muffler, and all surrounding componentry).
                 With respect to the fuel system, a breach in the fuel system can
                cause a fuel leak and pose a risk of fire. A breach can be a crack/hole
                in the fuel tank, damaged fuel hose, crack/hole in a fuel filter, or
                unsecured fuel connection to a fuel rail. For example, in one IDI
                involving an ATV, a passenger received second- and third-degree burns
                to the right wrist and right leg when the ATV burst into flames from an
                overheated gasoline line that melted and spilled fuel onto the hot
                engine.
                 Other fuel-related fire hazards can be due to over-pressurization
                of the fuel system and inadequate ventilation. Inadequate ventilation
                and over-pressurization of the fuel system can result in boiling
                gasoline, which can expel abruptly when opening the fuel cap,
                potentially splashing hot gasoline onto consumers. Figure 6 shows an
                example from an IDI of an over-pressurization scenario with an ROV.
                Unbeknownst to the consumer, opening the fuel cap released pressurized
                gasoline and a brief fire resulted. Black soot can be seen surrounding
                the fuel cap.
                [[Page 25826]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.005
                 An electrical failure, such as an electrical short or an electronic
                component overheating, can lead to fires. Figure 7 illustrates a fire
                that started due to an overheated electronic control module (ECM),
                which ignited the ECM and wiring.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.006
                 Excessive exhaust heat near flammable plastics can cause melting
                and subsequently fires, if the exhaust systems do not manage the
                exhaust heat sufficiently, via heat shielding and/or adequate
                ventilation. It is not uncommon for modern ROV exhaust surface
                temperatures to exceed 800 [deg]F. Insufficient heat shielding between
                the exhaust pipes and plastic paneling can cause the plastic to melt.
                Figure 8 illustrates a fire that ignited when melted plastic paneling
                dripped onto the exhaust pipe and burned a hole through the panel.
                 Of the 121 IDIs examined, 27 IDIs involved burned victims. Of these
                27 IDIs, 10 specified first-, second-, and/or third-degree burn
                injuries. The other 17 IDIs did not specify the severity of the burn
                injuries. These burn injuries occurred when victims had direct contact
                with a hot surface or when an open flame burned the victims.
                [[Page 25827]]
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.007
                (b) Debris-Penetration Hazard Review and Assessment
                 Debris-penetration hazards are unique to ROVs and UTVs because the
                wheel-well areas on these vehicles are generally larger and more open,
                compared to ATVs. The larger space exposes more floorboard and wheel-
                well surface to branches that can and do penetrate into the occupant
                compartment. Debris penetration through the floorboard or wheel well
                can impale the occupants of the vehicle and has caused severe injuries
                and deaths. An example of debris penetration is shown in Figure 9. CPSC
                staff did not find any ATV-related debris-penetration incidents in the
                injury/death data searches or debris-penetration recalls.
                [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP11MY21.008
                 CPSC staff shared eight redacted IDIs involving debris penetration,
                which is a subset of the more comprehensive list of IDI data analyzed
                by the CPSC Epidemiology staff, with the SDOs for review and analysis.
                CPSC staff's review revealed four IDIs involved fatal impalement of the
                occupant. A summary of the IDI data shown in Table 6 suggests the
                debris penetrations occurred at relatively low speeds, i.e., 25 mph or
                less.
                [[Page 25828]]
                 Table 6--Summaries of Eight Debris-Penetration IDIs
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Injured body
                 Vehicle Injury type Estimated speed, mph part(s) Description
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                A................... Death........... 25................... heart........... Consumer drove into a creek
                 when water splashed onto the
                 windshield; tree limb broke
                 through the floor and struck
                 passenger who died as a result
                 of the impalement.
                B *................. No Injury....... 5.................... none............ Consumer was driving on a
                 slight hill; rocks punctured
                 the floorboard.
                C................... Death........... 10................... viscera......... Consumer drove on a wooded
                 trail (dirt road) with various
                 debris (rocks and limbs); tree
                 limb pierced fender and nylon
                 mesh door and impaled the
                 driver.
                D **................ Death........... Not available........ no information.. Not available.
                E................... Contusion/No 20................... abdomen......... Consumer drove in the dark
                 Medical (12:30 a.m.) on a leaf covered
                 Attention. trail; tree branch punctured
                 driver's side floor, struck
                 his abdomen, but did not
                 impale the driver due to the
                 driver wearing thick clothing.
                F................... Abrasions....... 25................... ankle........... IDI involved 2 occasions--on
                 one occasion snow was on
                 ground, could not see branches
                 thus a debris penetration
                 occurred; other occasion ROV
                 traveled on paved road and a
                 tree branch punctured rear
                 passenger floor.
                G................... Death........... Not available........ thigh........... Not available.
                H................... Abdomen impaled. 25................... Liver, stomach, Consumer drove on dirt/gravel
                 spleen, road lined with 3-foot-tall
                 pancreas. grass on both sides; when
                 attempting to avoid debris
                 from a downed tree, a branch
                 penetrated passenger side
                 floor, struck passenger and
                 impaled the driver.
                ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                *All vehicles are ROVs, except vehicle B, which is a UTV. Vehicle B involved rocks penetrating the floorboard;
                 all other vehicles involved tree branches penetrating the floorboards.
                ** It is unknown whether vehicle D is an ROV or UTV due to the lack of model information.
                 There were four deaths and three injuries associated with debris
                penetration. Many of these incidents occurred when there was reduced
                visibility or the driver was unable to see the debris (e.g., driving in
                the dark, snow-covered terrain), but overall the incidents occurred
                during what staff considers reasonably foreseeable, normal use of the
                vehicles.
                3. OHV Recalls
                 From 2002 to 2019, there were 68 OHV fire and debris-penetration
                hazard recalls. The fire hazard recalls involved ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs.
                The debris-penetration recalls involved ROVs.
                 CPSC recall data include the number of affected vehicles, number of
                incidents, and injuries associated with the recalls. An incident is
                considered a penetration through the floorboard, an actual fire, a fuel
                leak, or other thermal event (e.g., melted plastic, overheated
                component).
                 There have been 26 ATV fire hazard recalls, of which 18 involved
                fuel system components; 4 involved electronic control modules; 2
                involved oil leaks; 1 involved brake fires due to friction; and 1
                involved inadequate heat shielding. Collectively, there were 462,372
                recalled vehicles, 3,325 incidents, 83 fires, and 24 injuries
                associated with 26 recalls from 2002 to 2018. There were no deaths
                associated with ATV fire hazard recalls.
                 With respect to ROVs, there were 33 ROV fire hazard recalls, of
                which 9 involved fuel system components; 3 involved electrical wiring/
                electrical components; 10 involved exhaust heat-inadequate heat
                shielding; 3 involved grass/dry vegetation debris ignition; 5 involved
                oil leaks; 1 involved improper throttle body installation; and 2
                involved multiple sources (engine misfire, brake fires). Collectively,
                there were 709,886 recalled vehicles, 1,022 incidents, 327 fires, and
                32 injuries associated with 33 recalls from 2008 to 2019. There was one
                death associated with one fire hazard recall.
                 There were 6 UTV fire hazard recalls; 1 involved grass/dry
                vegetation debris ignition; and 5 involved fuel system components.
                Collectively, there were 43,340 recalled vehicles, 144 incidents, and
                11 fires associated with 6 recalls from 2008 to 2017. There were no
                injuries or deaths associated with UTV fire hazard recalls.
                 There were 3 ROV debris penetration hazard recalls. Collectively,
                there were 44,500 recalled vehicles, 630 incidents, and 9 injuries
                associated with three recalls from 2014 to 2016. There were no deaths
                associated with ROV debris penetration hazard recalls.
                F. Existing Standards
                1. ATVs
                 SVIA developed the voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1 Four-
                Wheel All-Terrain Vehicles--Equipment, Configuration, and Performance
                Requirements standard. SVIA published ANSI/SVIA 1 in 1990, and revised
                the standard in 2001, 2007, 2010, and 2017. In 2008, the Consumer
                Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) required the Commission to make
                mandatory the voluntary standard for ATVs, ANSI/SVIA 1-2007. The
                Commission adopted the voluntary standard as a mandatory standard; the
                standard is codified in 16 CFR part 1420. The Commission amended 16 CFR
                part 1420 in 2011 and 2018, to reference the latest revision of ANSI/
                SVIA 1-2010 and ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, respectively.
                 The requirements ANSI/SVIA 1-2017 include warning label
                requirements, various mechanical requirements, such as static
                stability, braking distances, maximum speeds for the various age group
                ATVs, and various component construction requirements such as those for
                handlebars, foot rests, suspension, and most recently, lights.
                2. ROVs
                 The Recreational Off-Highway Vehicle Association (ROHVA) developed
                ANSI/ROHVA 1 American National Standard for Recreational Off-Highway
                Vehicles for recreation-oriented ROVs. The Outdoor Power Equipment
                Institute (OPEI) developed ANSI/OPEI B71.9 American National Standard
                for Multipurpose Off-Highway Utility Vehicles for utility-oriented
                vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9 includes requirements for vehicles that
                exceed 30 mph (and thus meet CPSC's definition of ``ROVs'').
                [[Page 25829]]
                 The ROV requirements in ANSI/ROHVA 1-2016 and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016
                include static and dynamic stability, vehicle handling, ROPS, speed
                limiter function when seat belts are not fastened, and various
                component construction requirements such as for steering, brakes, and
                seat belts.
                3. UTVs
                 OPEI developed ANSI/OPEI B71.9 American National Standard for
                utility-oriented vehicles; ANSI/OPEI B71.9 includes requirements for
                vehicles that exceed 30 mph (and thus meet CPSC definition of
                ``ROVs''). For this rulemaking, the Commission defines ``UTVs'' to have
                maximum speeds below 30 mph. The UTV requirements in ANSI/OPEI B71.9-
                2016 for vehicles with maximum speed below 30 mph include minimum
                static stability, rollover protection structure (ROPS), brake
                configuration and performance, and lighting.
                 All three of these standards reference the U.S. Forest Service
                standard, USDA-FS 5100-1, which requires OHVs to be equipped with spark
                arrestors. A spark arrestor is a metal screen installed in the exhaust
                tail pipe to mitigate sparks exiting the tail pipe to reduce the risk
                of forest fires. This requirement does not address other sources of
                fire hazards to riders and passengers of OHVs; and thus, the Commission
                views this requirement as ineffective to address OHV fire hazards to
                consumers.
                 In addition, the ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016 standard has a general
                requirement that ``all fuel system components shall be located, routed,
                and contained in such a manner as to provide clearance to heat-
                generating components and to avoid damage from obstacles or projections
                that may be encountered during normal operation.'' This requirement
                lacks specificity, and thus, the Commission views this requirement as
                ineffective.
                 The Commission does not believe the two preceding requirements
                adequately address the fire hazards associated with OHVs. The incident
                data and recall data suggest OHV fires due to fire sources, such as
                electrical shorts, exhaust overheat, and fuel leaks cannot be addressed
                by the spark arrestor requirement or the general ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016
                statement regarding fuel system component location. None of the
                aforementioned standards contain requirements to mitigate the debris
                penetration hazard. Thus, the Commission believes additional
                requirements are needed to address OHV fire and debris penetration
                hazards.
                 CPSC staff met with representatives of the three SDOs, ROHVA, SVIA,
                and OPEI on multiple occasions to discuss recall data, categorizing
                IDIs fire causations, and possible requirements for fuel system,
                electrical, and exhaust system requirements to reduce the risk of fire
                hazards. After discussing and categorizing fire causations of IDIs,
                CPSC staff and SDOs initiated discussions of possible fire preventative
                standards requirements starting with the fuel system component
                examination. However, to date, there have been no proposed fire and
                debris-penetration requirements to update the current ANSI/ROHVA 1-
                2016, ANSI/SVIA 1-2017, and ANSI/OPEI B71.9-2016 standards to address
                fire and debris penetration hazards. Thus, the Commission concludes
                that the current OHV standards will not adequately address the deaths
                and injuries associated with OHV fire and debris-penetration hazards.
                G. Regulatory Alternatives
                 The Commission could proceed with rulemaking under the CPSA
                establishing performance requirements and/or warnings and instructions
                for OHVs to address the risks of injury associated with OHV fire and
                debris-penetration hazards. Alternatively, the Commission could
                continue to address the hazards through the voluntary standards, and
                continue to work to develop more effective voluntary standard
                requirements to address the identified hazards, instead of issuing a
                mandatory rule. However, as previously discussed, the Commission
                preliminarily believes that the existing standards do not adequately
                address the risk of injury associated with fire and debris-penetration
                hazards in OHVs. The Commission has recalled OHVs for fire and debris
                penetration hazards. The fire hazard recalls involved ATVs, ROVs, and
                UTVs. The debris-penetration recalls involved ROVs. The Commission
                could continue to conduct recalls, both voluntary and mandatory,
                instead of promulgating a mandatory rule. However, recalls are not
                likely to be as effective at reducing the risk of injury as a mandatory
                standard. Recalls only apply to an individual manufacturer and product
                and do not extend to similar products. Product recalls occur only after
                consumers have purchased and used such products and have been exposed
                to the hazard to be remedied by the recall. Additionally, recalls can
                only address products that are already on the market, and cannot
                prevent unsafe products from entering the market. Finally, the
                Commission could issue news releases warning consumers about the fire
                and debris-penetration hazards association with OHVs. As with recalls,
                this alternative is not likely to be as effective at reducing the risk
                of injury as a mandatory standard.
                H. Request for Information and Comments
                 This ANPR is the first step in a proceeding that could result in a
                mandatory safety standard(s) to address fire and debris-penetration
                hazards associated with OHVs. The Commission requests comments on all
                aspects of this ANPR, but specifically requests comments regarding:
                 1. The risk of injury identified by the Commission, the regulatory
                alternatives being considered, and other possible alternatives for
                addressing the risk;
                 2. Any existing standard or portion of a standard that could be
                issued as a proposed regulation;
                 3. A statement of intention to modify or develop a voluntary
                standard to address the risk of injury discussed in this notice, along
                with a description of a plan (including a schedule) to do so;
                 4. Studies, tests, or surveys performed to analyze fire and/or
                debris penetration hazard injuries, including severity and costs
                associated with injury;
                 5. Studies, tests, or descriptions of technologies or design
                changes that address OHV fire and/or debris penetration hazard, and
                estimates of costs associated with incorporation of the technologies
                and their impact on wholesale or retail prices;
                 6. Information on ATV, ROV, and UTV expected lifespans and/or the
                number of ATVs, ROVs, and UTVs in use;
                 7. Information on the number of hours driven, miles driven, and/or
                other exposure metrics for OHVs;
                 8. Studies, test, or surveys performed to analyze use of
                aftermarket products that address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration
                hazards, and their effectiveness at reducing OHV fire and/or debris-
                penetration hazard injuries, and means by which their use by consumers
                could be increased;
                 9. Information on the expected impact of technologies or design
                changes that address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration hazard injuries
                on manufacturing costs or wholesale prices;
                 10. Information on the potential impact of technologies or design
                changes to address OHV fire and/or debris-penetration hazards on
                consumer utility.
                 Comments and other submissions should be identified by identified
                by Docket No. CPSC-2021-0014 and submitted in accordance with the
                [[Page 25830]]
                instructions provided above. All comments and other submissions must be
                received by July 12, 2021.
                Alberta A. Mills,
                Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
                [FR Doc. 2021-09881 Filed 5-10-21; 8:45 am]
                BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
                

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