Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions
| Court | Safety And Environmental Enforcement Bureau |
| Citation | 88 FR 57334 |
| Published date | 23 August 2023 |
| Record Number | 2023-17847 |
| Section | Rules and Regulations |
Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 162 (Wednesday, August 23, 2023)
[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 23, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57334-57348]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-17847]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
30 CFR Part 250
[Docket ID: BSEE-2022-0009; EEEE500000 234E1700D2 ET1SF0000.EAQ000]
RIN 1014-AA52
Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-
Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions
AGENCY: Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Interior.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Department of the Interior (DOI or Department), through
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), is revising
certain regulatory provisions published in the 2019 final well control
rule for drilling, workover, completion, and decommissioning
operations. BSEE is finalizing these revisions to clarify blowout
preventer (BOP) system requirements and to modify certain specific BOP
equipment capability requirements. This final rule will provide
consistency and clarity to industry regarding the BOP equipment and
associated operational requirements necessary for BSEE review and
approval and will further ensure operations are conducted safely and in
an environmentally responsible manner.
DATES: This final rule is effective on October 23, 2023. However, BSEE
will defer the compliance date for the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV)
intervention open functionality provision at 30 CFR 250.734(a)(4) until
August 22, 2024. The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this final
rule as of July 15, 2019.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions, contact Kirk Malstrom,
Regulations and Standards Branch, (202) 258-1518, or by email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
This final rule revises certain regulatory provisions that were
published in the 2019 final rule entitled, ``Oil and Gas and Sulfur
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and
Well Control Revisions,'' 84 FR 21908 (May 15, 2019) (2019 WCR). On
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet:
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other
policy goals identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019
WCR contains many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated
outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted
safely and in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this
final rule addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and
as authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), will
further promote the objectives of E.O. 13990. At this time, BSEE is
finalizing narrowly focused revisions to improve operations that use a
BOP, certain BOP capabilities and functionalities, and BSEE oversight
of such operations. The final rule:
Clarifies the general BOP system expectations,
Modifies the timeframes for commencing a failure analysis,
Requires submission of independent third-party
qualifications,
Establishes dual shear ram requirements for surface BOPs
on existing floating production facilities when an operator replaces an
entire surface BOP stack,
Requires Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) open functions on
subsea BOPs, and
Requires submittal of certain BOP test results if BSEE is
unable to witness the testing.
BSEE will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2019 WCR
and all BSEE regulations for any necessary and appropriate rulemakings
in the future.
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. BSEE Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities
B. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking
II. Discussion of Compliance Dates for the Final Rule
III. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule
IV. Section-By-Section Summary and Responses to Comments on the
Proposed Rule
[[Page 57335]]
V. Procedural Matters
I. Background
A. BSEE Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities
BSEE's authority for this rule flows from OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1331-
1356a. OCSLA, enacted in 1953 and substantially revised in 1978,
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to lease the OCS
for mineral development and to regulate oil and gas exploration,
development, and production operations on the OCS. The Secretary has
delegated authority to perform certain of these functions to BSEE.
To carry out its responsibilities, BSEE regulates offshore oil and
gas operations to: enhance the safety of exploration for and
development of oil and gas on the OCS, ensure that those operations
protect the environment, and implement advancements in technology. BSEE
also conducts onsite inspections to ensure compliance with regulations,
lease terms, and approved plans and permits. Detailed information
concerning BSEE's regulations and guidance to the offshore oil and gas
industry may be found on BSEE's website at: https://www.bsee.gov/guidance-and-regulations.
BSEE's regulatory program covers a wide range of OCS facilities and
activities--including drilling, completion, workover, production,
pipeline, and decommissioning operations--that offshore operators \1\
perform throughout the OCS. This rule is applicable to these listed
operational activities (e.g., drilling, completion and workovers) that
involve certain BOP operations, capabilities, or functionalities.
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\1\ BSEE's regulations at 30 CFR part 250 generally apply to ``a
lessee, the owner or holder of operating rights, a designated
operator or agent of the lessee(s)'' (30 CFR 250.105 (definition of
``you'') and ``the person actually performing the activity to which
the requirement applies'' (30 CFR 250.146(c)). For convenience, this
preamble will refer to these regulated entities as ``operators''
unless otherwise indicated.
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B. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking
After the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010, BSEE adopted several
recommendations from multiple investigation teams to improve the safety
of offshore operations. Subsequently, on April 29, 2016, BSEE published
the 2016 Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Final Rule (81 FR
25888) (2016 WCR). The 2016 WCR consolidated the equipment and
operational requirements for well control into one part of BSEE's
regulations; enhanced BOP and well design requirements; modified well-
control requirements; and incorporated certain industry technical
standards. Most of the 2016 WCR provisions became effective on July 28,
2016.
Although the 2016 WCR addressed a significant number of issues that
were identified during the analyses of the Deepwater Horizon incident,
BSEE recognized that BOP equipment and systems continue to improve and
that well control processes also evolve. Therefore, after the 2016 WCR
took effect, BSEE continued to engage with the offshore oil and gas
industry, Standards Development Organizations (SDOs), and other
stakeholders. During these engagements, BSEE identified issues, and
stakeholders expressed a variety of concerns regarding the
implementation of the 2016 WCR. BSEE completed a review of the 2016 WCR
and, on May 15, 2019, published the 2019 WCR in the Federal Register
(84 FR 21908). The 2019 WCR left most of the 2016 WCR unchanged.
Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet:
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other
policy goals identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019
WCR contains many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated
outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted
safely and in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this
final rule addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and
as authorized by the OCSLA, will further promote the objectives of E.O.
13990. At this time, BSEE is finalizing narrowly focused revisions to
improve operations that use a BOP, certain BOP capabilities and
functionalities, and BSEE oversight of such operations.
II. Discussion of Compliance Dates for the Final Rule
BSEE considered the public comments on the proposed rule (87 FR
56354, September 14, 2022), as well as relevant information gained
during BSEE's interactions with stakeholders, involvement in
development of industry standards, and evaluation of current
technology. Based on its analysis, BSEE is setting an effective date of
60 days following publication of the final rule, by which time
operators will be required to comply with most of the final rule's
provisions. BSEE determined, however, that it is appropriate to defer
the compliance requirements in Sec. 250.734(a)(4) until one year after
this rule is published. In this final rule, BSEE is requiring operators
to equip subsea BOP stacks with the ROV intervention capability to both
open and close each shear ram, ram locks, and one pipe ram. (Current
regulations require only closure capability.) BSEE is allowing a 1-year
deferred compliance date, from the date of publication of this final
rule, to allow operators to make the required equipment modifications
to enable the ROV intervention capability to open the specified
components. Detailed explanations for the requirements associated with
this compliance date are provided in section IV of this preamble.
III. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule
In response to the proposed rule, BSEE received 26 sets of
submitted comments containing general statements, specific comments on
the proposed provisions, and discussions of provisions not included in
the proposed rule. Comments included submittals from the following
entities: 13 companies, 2 industry organizations, 4 non-governmental
organizations, 1 State government, 1 member of academia, 2 private
citizens, and 3 anonymous submitters. All relevant comments are posted
at the Federal eRulemaking portal: https://www.regulations.gov. To
access the comments at that website, enter BSEE-2022-0009 in the Search
box. BSEE reviewed all comments submitted, and this section of this
preamble contains brief summaries of the relevant comments as well as
BSEE's responses.
BSEE received multiple comments expressing general support for the
proposed rule. BSEE received supporting comments from, but not limited
to, oil and gas companies, industry trade groups, private citizens, and
non-governmental organizations. Some of the commenters expressing
general support for the proposed rule also provided specific detailed
comments, addressed further below. While these commenters voiced
support broadly for certain proposed changes, some of them also
disagreed with other specific proposals and provided suggested
revisions. Many of the commenters who expressed general
[[Page 57336]]
support for the rule also recommended that BSEE continue to evaluate
other provisions of the 2019 WCR and provide stakeholders with further
opportunities to continue discussions on the topics covered in the
previous WCRs.
Multiple commenters provided statements or comments that were not
relevant to the scope of the proposed rule, and therefore BSEE is not
addressing them in this final rule.
Comments on the Initial Regulatory Impact Analysis (IRIA)
Summary of comments: A commenter suggested that BSEE should
quantitatively and/or qualitatively describe the full range of harms
that the Bureau expects to avoid by decreasing the risk of well
blowouts, which include fatalities, negative health impacts on coastal
populations, and the destruction of fragile ecosystems.
Response: BSEE appreciates the comment that BSEE should account for
the full range of benefits associated with decreasing the risk of well
blowouts. In the Final RIA, BSEE has added a qualitative summary of the
types of benefits the rule will provide; however, BSEE has elected not
to provide a quantitative accounting of the benefits as this rule is
not a significant regulatory action as defined under Executive Order
12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory
Review,'' 88 FR 21879 (April 6, 2023)).
Summary of comments: A commenter suggested that BSEE should also
conduct a break-even analysis to support its finding that the proposed
rule's benefits justify its costs.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. Executive Orders 12866
and 14094 require agencies to conduct such analyses only for
significant regulatory actions, and this rule is not a significant
regulatory action, as demonstrated in the cost section of the RIA.
Miscellaneous Comments
Summary of comments: One commenter suggested that BSEE hold
periodic workshops and smaller WCR updates to encourage ongoing
discussions on this topic.
Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter and will continue
to look for ways to engage with all stakeholders on the provisions
associated with the WCRs and WCR-related topics.
Summary of Comments: Source Control and Containment Equipment (SCCE)
Mandatory Equipment--30 CFR 250.462(b)
A commenter stated that the 2019 WCR changed a ``must'' to a
``may'' in 30 CFR 250.462(b), thereby eliminating the requirement that
an operator have access to all the identified SCCE. The commenter
suggested that the regulations should establish a default ``must''
requirement for all equipment, and clearly articulate the specific
conditions under which BSEE would allow an operator an exemption for
one or more pieces of equipment. The commenter suggested that BSEE
should make access to all the listed equipment a requirement for all
operators under all conditions unless provided for under a clearly
articulated exception.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. Under both the 2016
WCR and the 2019 WCR, the regulations make it mandatory for operators
to have access to and the ability to deploy appropriate SCCE necessary
for regaining control of the well at issue. In the 2019 WCR, BSEE
clarified that there are different categories of SCCE (e.g., supporting
equipment, co-located equipment) that warrant distinct treatment.
Accordingly, BSEE revised the list of SCCE found in 30 CFR 250.462(b)
and clarified that the SCCE required for any given situation ``may
include, but is not limited to'' the items on that list. The intent of
this revision was to clarify that the analysis required in 30 CFR
250.462(a) should be used to determine which SCCE an operator must have
access to for its operations, and that the list in 30 CFR 250.462(b)
provides examples of SCCE types that may be deemed appropriate, and
thus required, based on the analysis of the particular well scenario.
The SCCE that is necessary and appropriate to regain well control may
vary based on the circumstances of the drilling operations (e.g., well
design and integrity, nature and structure of facility and associated
infrastructure), even across distinct wells within one region (e.g.,
Gulf of Mexico). BSEE intends to ensure the use of a consistent,
objective review of the operator's ability to respond to a blowout
based on actual conditions, as opposed to rote application of a fixed
checklist of equipment, some of which may be inappropriate or
incompatible depending on the specific circumstances. The 2019 WCR
removed the potential suggestion that every possible type of SCCE--
regardless of relevance, necessity, or compatibility under the
circumstances--must be maintained for every well (which was never the
intent) and replaced that suggestion with the more streamlined
requirement that operators must have available SCCE appropriate for the
specific operations. The requested changes are not necessary, as the
regulations continue to require that operators ``must have access to
and the ability to deploy'' the SCCE necessary to regain control of the
well.
Summary of Comments: Cement Evaluation Logs for Complex Wells
A commenter requested that BSEE provide studies that show all well
blowouts with failed cement and include a comparison of a pressure test
versus the use of cement evaluation tools, the number of wells that
require a pressure test and evaluation logs, and the number of wells
that have remedial cement repairs as a result of cement evaluation
logs. The commenter requested that BSEE revise its regulations to make
cement evaluation logs mandatory for all offshore wells, and, in
particular, for complex wells or wells in environmentally sensitive
locations, to determine cement placement and quality and to verify
cement repairs.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the suggestion that it would be
necessary or appropriate to require cement evaluation logs for every
well, as there are other viable indicators of successful cement
placement and well integrity. These include tests required under
existing regulations, such as pressure integrity testing required under
30 CFR 250.427 and the requirement to locate the top of cement
(including through use of cement logs) and take remedial actions (per
30 CFR 250.428(c), (d)) where those tests provide indications of an
inadequate cement job. BSEE has the discretion to require additional
analysis, including cement logs, if warranted.
Summary of Comments: Mechanical Integrity Assessment (MIA) Report--30
CFR 250.732(d)
A commenter suggested that BSEE should restore the MIA Report
requirements from the 2016 WCR that were eliminated in the 2019 WCR.
The commenter asserted that BSEE now allows for industry self-
regulation instead of independent third-party review that was required
with the MIA Report.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that it is necessary or
appropriate to restore the MIA Report requirements from the 2016 WCR.
The regulations, taken as a whole, ensure proper mechanical integrity
of equipment (e.g., specific BOP requirements of 30 CFR part 250,
[[Page 57337]]
subparts G through S). All of the material informational requirements
in the former MIA Reports continue to be captured in the regulations
following the 2019 WCR. While those requirements are more dispersed
throughout the regulations, BSEE has experienced no informational
disadvantage or reduction based on the elimination of the cumulative
MIA Report requirement.
Summary of Comments: BOP 5-Year Complete Breakdown--30 CFR 250.739
A commenter suggested that BSEE should issue guidance to explain
how far the BOP must be broken down to meet an acceptable BOP ``major,
detailed'' 5-year inspection. The commenter also suggested that BSEE
restore the requirement for the independent third-party expert to be
present at the 5-year BOP inspection.
Response: As BSEE explained in response to questions surrounding
implementation of the 2016 WCR, BOP equipment must be broken down to
allow for an appropriately detailed physical inspection. BSEE did not
intend for this requirement to mean that each component must be
dismantled to its smallest possible part. (See 2019 WCR, 84 FR 21961)
Operators may use original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-approved
methods (e.g., x-ray or ultrasonic) to assist in the detailed
inspection. BSEE disagrees with the commenter's suggestion that the
independent third party must be present at the 5-year BOP inspection,
as there are other means for independent third-party verifications and
certifications that help ensure that the BOP is fit for service at a
specific location for its intended use. For example, the regulations
require that an independent third party review the inspection
documentation and compile a detailed inspection report, which allows
the independent third party to compare the design data with the current
status of the equipment and accomplishes BSEE's goal of verifying that
the well control system components are fit for service and within
design tolerances to be utilized for specific well conditions. BSEE's
experience reviewing these inspection reports since 2019 has indicated
no material change or reduction in the comprehensiveness or
effectiveness of its oversight.
Summary of Comments: BOP Testing Frequency--30 CFR 250.737(b)
Multiple commenters recommended that BSEE remove the 21-day BOP
testing interval option (even if supported by a BOP health monitoring
plan required under Sec. 250.737(a)(4)) and instead retain the 14-day
test interval requirement for all BOPs and also require the BOP health
monitoring plan for all BOPs.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' recommendations to
remove the 21-day BOP testing frequency alternative. Since promulgation
of the 2016 WCR, BSEE has obtained and considered additional data
relevant to the effects of different BOP testing intervals, including
from the 2017 SafeOCS report \2\ regarding BOP equipment failure,
operator-submitted BOP health monitoring plan information (as required
by 30 CFR 250.737(a)(4)(i) through (iv)), the 2019 Argonne National
Laboratory research report,\3\ international experience with 21-day
testing cycles, and the results of a two-year pilot program examining
BOP testing frequency and associated BOP health monitoring data. BSEE
has found that the BOP health monitoring plans provide relevant data on
BOP equipment operation throughout the equipment's lifecycle and
provide sufficient additional assurance of successful functioning and
oversight of BOP equipment to support a 21-day testing interval. Based
on this data, BSEE has concluded that BOP reliability is not reduced by
permitting a 21-day testing frequency that includes BOP health
monitoring. BSEE continues to evaluate the BOP testing frequency to
ensure proper equipment functionality. BSEE will also continue to
evaluate the information gathered under the BOP health monitoring plans
to determine if it would be appropriate to apply the health monitoring
plan requirement to all BOPs.
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\2\ https://safeocs.gov/file/2017_WCR_Annual_Report_v4.pdf.
\3\ https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/examination-of-blowout-preventer-pressure-test-frequency.pdf.
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Summary of Comments: Real-Time Monitoring (RTM) Transmission--30 CFR
250.724
A commenter suggested that BSEE should make clear in the regulation
that transmission from one computer to another on the same rig or
platform or having ``qualified personnel'' on the same rig or platform
would not satisfy the 2019 WCR.
Response: BSEE does not permit RTM under Sec. 250.724 to be
conducted by personnel located on the same rig or facility where the
activities being monitored are taking place. Offsite personnel must
conduct the monitoring. BSEE does not believe that a regulatory
revision is necessary, as the commenter's suggestion reflects BSEE's
position under existing regulations.
Summary of Comments: Use of API Bulletin 92L Related to Drilling
Margin--30 CFR 250.427(b)
A commenter expressed concerns about operators relying on API
Bulletin 92L in situations where the Bulletin does not provide adequate
methods to address lost circulation events. The commenter also
requested that BSEE issue guidance to address what those situations are
and how they should be handled.
Response: Since 2019, BSEE's experience with application of API
Bulletin 92L relative to ongoing operations has confirmed its
successful use for lost circulation events. BSEE believes the Bulletin
adequately addresses how to proceed in the event of lost circulation
and how to diagnose associated well stability issues safely and
appropriately. The Bulletin provides operators with flow charts to use
for evaluating what is happening in the well during lost circulation
events and determining how to respond accordingly (e.g., stopping
drilling to run casing or drilling ahead a short distance to a safe
stopping point). There are circumstances where limited drilling forward
is safer than immediately halting operations in response to a lost
circulation or drilling margin event. However, BSEE and API Bulletin
92L recognize that there are situations where it is not appropriate to
continue operations when there are indications of lost circulation, and
the Bulletin does not contemplate drilling ahead under those
circumstances. For example, an operator may not continue operations
with inadequate mud volume on location if the mud weight is
insufficient to control expected pore pressure or when the open hole
formation integrity test is below predicted equivalent circulating
density. Accordingly, the Bulletin adequately identifies those
circumstances where continued operations are not appropriate and, in
those circumstances, the regulation requires the operator to obtain
BSEE's approval before it may proceed. Regulatory changes are not
needed. BSEE will continue to consider the extent to which guidance may
be appropriate to provide additional clarity around these subjects.
Summary of Comments: Ensuring Adequate Cement Job--30 CFR 250.423(a)
and (b)
A commenter recommended that this regulation should be revised to
clarify that latching mechanisms need to be engaged upon successful
installation and cementing of casing strings or liners for the purpose
of ensuring that casing
[[Page 57338]]
and liners are properly secured for wellbore integrity, or
alternatively the latching or lock down mechanism must engage
automatically upon installing the string or casing, prior to cementing.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that clarification is
needed for this associated regulation. BSEE requires the latching or
lock down mechanisms to be engaged upon successfully installing the
casing or liner.
Summary of Comments: Effective Seal--30 CFR 250.731(a)(5)
A commenter asserted that the 2019 WCR's revisions to the language
of this provision from ``achieve an effective seal'' to ``close''
imposes a lesser standard, as closing does not necessarily mean there
is an effective seal. The commenter recommended that the regulations
should be revised to clearly specify which ram types must meet an
``effective seal'' standard.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. As previously stated
in the 2019 WCR, the requirements of paragraph (a)(5) relate only to
the regulator set points used to activate the rams and do not alter any
of the ram operational requirements contained in Sec. Sec. 250.733 and
250.734 for surface and subsea BOPs, respectively. Those provisions
continue to require that BOP systems contain rams that, when activated,
are capable of ``sealing the wellbore after shearing,'' and other rams
``capable of closing and sealing'' on downhole equipment. Some rams are
not designed or intended to seal, such as the casing shear ram. BSEE
uses the data obtained through this provision in the permit application
to evaluate ram closing and sealing capabilities. The word
``effective'' in this context is not necessary and does not provide any
supplemental regulatory standard.
Summary of Comments: Test Demonstration Time--30 CFR 250.732(a)(2)(ii)
A commenter expressed concerns that the 5-minute testing time is
insufficient. This commenter suggested that BSEE should not abandon the
30-minute test protocol and that BSEE must provide supporting rationale
for adopting anything other than the recommended pressure time.
Response: BSEE is unaware of any data indicating BOP pressure
testing failures between 5 and 30 minutes, such that extending test
length would capture additional relevant data. In developing the 2019
WCR, BSEE considered and reevaluated the 2016 WCR requirements
regarding BOP testing done in laboratories or test facilities against
historical data and the past application of that data. Based on the
historical data, BSEE found that the 5-minute pressure integrity
testing timeframe was well established and adequate to demonstrate
effective sealing. This conclusion was bolstered through increased and
ongoing interactions with testing facilities, through which BSEE was
kept apprised of new test protocols and test data and what they
indicated regarding appropriate test period length. In reviews of
historical lab testing data as well as permits issued since 2010, BSEE
found no indications of failures between the 5-minute and 30-minute
marks. BSEE also reviewed publicly available incident data and did not
identify any past incidents involving failure of equipment after
successfully sealing a well. Accordingly, BSEE views the 5-minute
pressure integrity test hold time to provide sufficient confirmation of
the required capabilities, and more prolonged tests do not provide
material safety gains.
Summary of Comments: Shear Ram Capability--30 CFR 250.734(a)(6)(vi)
A commenter expressed concerns that the 2019 WCR removed the 2016
WCR ``fail safe'' requirement that the control systems for certain
emergency functions be a failsafe design once activated, and
recommended that BSEE restore that language in the regulations.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter's recommendation, as
the relevant systems already function as fail-safe designs once
activated, and adding that language would not alter the required
emergency functionality. BSEE removed this language in the 2019 WCR
because certain required emergency functions, such as the autoshear/
deadman systems, are already considered fail-safe systems (i.e., they
will fail in the mode that results in activation of the emergency
function). They are designed to function automatically in emergency
situations and do not require intervention by surface personnel to
function. Existing regulatory requirements maintain these inherently
fail-safe emergency functions (e.g., autoshear/deadman systems)
adequately and ensure that the required emergency systems function in a
fail-safe manner, without the commenter's proposed language change.
IV. Section-by-Section Summary and Responses to Comments on the
Proposed Rule
BSEE is finalizing revisions to the following regulations:
Subpart G--Well Operations and Equipment
What are the general requirements for BOP systems and system
components? (Sec. 250.730)
This section of the existing regulations includes requirements for
the design, installation, maintenance, inspection, repair, testing, and
use of BOP systems and system components. This section also requires
compliance with certain provisions of API Standard 53 and several
related industry standards, and requires operators to use failure
reporting procedures.
Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (a):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (a) by modifying the current
requirement that the ``BOP system must be capable of closing and
sealing the wellbore in the event of flow due to a kick, including
under anticipated flowing conditions for the specific well
conditions,'' to a requirement that the ``BOP system must be capable of
closing and sealing the wellbore at all times to the well's maximum
kick tolerance design limits.'' Additional minor, non-substantive
wording and grammatical changes were proposed for readability to
accommodate this proposed revision.
Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (a):
Based upon comments received, BSEE is revising paragraph (a) to
state that the ``BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing the
wellbore to the well's [maximum anticipated surface pressure] at all
times, except as otherwise specified in the BOP system requirements of
this subpart.'' These revisions will help ensure there is a consistent
and proven approach for BOP system design criteria and will also
provide clarity for operators to ensure the BOP system meets the
requirements of the regulations at all times.
Summary of comments to proposed paragraph (a):
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns with
the inclusion of the well's maximum kick tolerance design limit and
suggested that the use of the maximum anticipated surface pressure
(MASP) is a more appropriate and conservative design criteria.
Response: BSEE agrees that the maximum anticipated surface
pressure, in this case, is a better design criterion than the maximum
kick tolerance design limit. MASP is used extensively in the
requirements for design and operation of multiple pieces of equipment
across BSEE regulations. Industry has substantial experience in
calculating MASP, while experience
[[Page 57339]]
with the methods for determining the maximum kick tolerance is less
extensive and consistent. BSEE also recognizes that there may be
circumstances where the use of MASP as a design parameter for
identifying and sizing appropriate well control equipment would require
more equipment capabilities than use of the maximum kick tolerance.
Therefore, BSEE is revising the proposed provision to replace the
reference to maximum kick tolerance design limit as the capability
threshold with a reference to MASP to ensure consistency for
calculating the design criteria and utilization of the most
conservative design parameter.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed general support
for the use of the maximum kick tolerance design limit. However, the
commenters also expressed concerns that the maximum kick tolerance
design limit is unclear and suggested that BSEE define and clarify the
term.
Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' concerns about the
clarity of using the maximum kick tolerance design limit as a standard.
The maximum kick tolerance design limit concept is not referenced in
the current BSEE regulations, so there is no clear experience from
which a general consistent approach for calculating the maximum kick
tolerance design limit can be developed. In response to comments, BSEE
will not finalize the use of the maximum kick tolerance design limit as
the applicable threshold and will instead require the use of a well-
established design parameter: the well's MASP. The MASP is a commonly
used design criterion referenced throughout the BSEE regulations. It is
thoroughly understood and provides a comparable, and often more
conservative, standard to ensure adequate BOP capability.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters recommended that BSEE
clarify that BOP systems must close and seal the wellbore at all times
to the requirements of the regulations.
Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' assertion that BOP
systems must properly function at all times to the requirements of the
regulations. Therefore, BSEE is revising the proposed provision to
state that the BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing the
wellbore to MASP at all times, except as otherwise specified in the
regulations (such as in Sec. Sec. 250.730(a)(3); 250.732(a)(1)(i),
(iii), and (v); and 250.733(a)(1)). BSEE's regulations include
requirements related to BOP system design, fabrication, operation,
maintenance, and testing, as well as independent validation and
certification for ensuring the BOP was designed, tested, and maintained
to perform under the maximum environmental and operational conditions
anticipated to occur at the well. As a whole, the BOP system regulatory
requirements help ensure that the BOP systems are appropriate for their
intended use at all times and provide regulatory certainty to
stakeholders for compliance and, if necessary, BSEE enforcement.
Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that this
paragraph does not go far enough to ensure that the BOP system is
capable of closing and sealing the wellbore at all times based on
existing exclusions in the current regulations. The commenter suggested
revising the paragraph to specify that the BOP system must be capable
of closing and sealing on all tubulars, including tool joints, drill
collars, slip-proof sections, bottom hole assemblies, heavy casing, and
pipe under compression, and under the maximum flowing conditions. The
commenter also asserted that their trademarked technology is the only
system able to meet the standard reflected in their suggested
revisions.
Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter's assertion that
technology can help drive improvements to existing BOP system
capabilities. However, at this time and based on existing knowledge,
data, and experience, there is not adequate data demonstrating that the
referenced equipment is necessary or proven for general adoption or
implementation. In the context of existing proven and available
technologies, imposition of an ``at all times'' mandate without further
context would not accurately recognize prevailing operational
realities. A BOP functions as a mitigation device, designed to backstop
other prevention mechanisms to keep a well from progressing to a full
blowout; its purpose is not to halt a full blowout once it has
commenced. Operators must ensure ram closure time and sealing integrity
within the operational and mechanical design limits of proven and
available equipment that are reflected in the equipment capability
requirements of the regulations. The changes in the final rule further
support and reflect the totality of improved BOP equipment, procedures,
and testing, while acknowledging the safe and appropriate purpose and
function of the BOP, clarifying these requirements from the 2016 and
2019 WCRs. BSEE regulations accommodate use of new or unusual
technology to demonstrate improvements that can influence development
of regulatory requirements. BSEE will continue to evaluate, and, if
appropriate, allow the use of new technology, including the commenter's
cited technology, while responsibly overseeing developments in the
field through regulations designed to ensure safety and environmental
protection. BSEE will also continue to evaluate the BOP system
regulations to ensure they are appropriate and effective, and, if
necessary, revise the regulations based on proven improved technology.
BSEE believes that the existing cited regulatory standards are
consistent with the capabilities of currently proven technologies and
the purpose and intended functions of BOPs.
Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that industry
is not currently using BOP systems properly to ensure well control. The
commenter stated that, during certain stripping operations, industry is
using subsea BOP elastomeric elements in a manner that may not
constitute ``proper use'' of the equipment under Sec. 250.730(a). The
commenter asserted that their company-specific technology would
eliminate the concerns related to stripping operations.
Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter's assertion that
BOP systems need to be properly used. However, the commenter's
discussion of stripping operations does not pertain to any of the
proposals promulgated through the proposed rule and is therefore
outside the scope of this final rule. Further, BSEE would not codify a
requirement to use a specific company's product. BSEE will continue to
review and evaluate existing stripping operations and their effects on
the associated equipment.
Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (c):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (c) by removing, throughout the
paragraph, the option to submit failure reports to a designated third
party. BSEE also proposed to revise paragraph (c)(2) to ensure that the
operator starts a failure investigation and analysis within 90 days of
the failure instead of within 120 days.
Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (c):
Based on comments received, BSEE is requiring throughout paragraph
(c) that the failure reporting must be sent to BSEE's Office of
Offshore Regulatory Programs Chief, any BSEE-designated third party to
collect failure data, and the manufacturer of the equipment. BSEE also
received and considered comments on the proposed provisions in
paragraph (c)(2) that would require the investigation and failure
analysis to
[[Page 57340]]
be started within 90 days of the failure, and BSEE includes the
proposed language in the final rule without change.
Summary of Comments on paragraph (c)--Submission of Failure
Reporting to a Designated Third Party:
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters strongly opposed the
removal of BSEE's ability to use a third party to collect failure data.
The commenters expressed their concerns that the proposed revisions may
discourage the same level of details currently submitted to the third
party, which includes confidential data, commercially sensitive
information, and operators' internal processes. The commenters also
cited the value of utilizing the third party, including the prevention
of disclosure of proprietary and confidential data under the
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act
(CIPSEA). The commenters suggested that BSEE retain the language in the
current regulations and continue to allow the use of a designated third
party. The commenters also suggested that BSEE work with the designated
third party to establish increased reporting protocols to facilitate
BSEE's timely review of failure data, identify trends, and respond
appropriately.
Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenters' suggestion to
retain the use of a designated third party to collect failure data.
However, this final rule also requires submittal of the failure data to
BSEE. BSEE continues to find value in using the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) for monitoring failure analysis and
compiling and analyzing trend data, but this reporting arrangement
limits BSEE's ability to efficiently and effectively address all of the
issues associated with certain failures. Receiving failure reports
directly will facilitate BSEE's timely review of the failure data to
help more quickly identify trends and respond to systemic issues
falling within BSEE's regulatory authority. BSEE also agrees with the
commenters' suggestion to establish an increased reporting protocol
from the third party (or parties) to BSEE. BSEE is in discussions with
the currently designated third party to establish a monthly dashboard,
as well as additional tools that would enhance BSEE's ability to review
data and take appropriate action if necessary. BSEE does not want to
disrupt the reporting process and the detailed data collected under
CIPSEA. Furthermore, BSEE will protect confidential, proprietary, or
sensitive information to the extent permitted by law, similar to its
treatment of similar information submitted regularly to BSEE through
the permitting process and other regulatory processes.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters support the proposed
revision to remove the option to use a third party for failure data
collection and explained that the revisions would enable BSEE to review
and respond to the failure information quickly and efficiently.
Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenters that BSEE's
timely review and response to the failure data is important.
Accordingly, BSEE is now requiring the failure data to be submitted to
BSEE in addition to the designated third party. Furthermore, BSEE is in
discussions with the current designated third party to establish a
monthly dashboard as well as additional tools that would enhance BSEE's
ability to review data and to take additional action if necessary.
These revisions will allow BSEE to continue to use BTS for monitoring
failure analysis and trend data while also facilitating BSEE's access
to and timely review of the relevant failure data for the purposes
discussed in the prior response.
Summary of Comments on paragraph (c)(2)--Timeframe to Start a
Failure Analysis:
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns about
shortening the timeframe for starting the failure analysis due to the
time it takes to transport the equipment from remote offshore locations
to various onshore equipment manufacturers' locations. The commenters
recommended that BSEE keep the timeframe as in the existing
regulations.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the recommendation to keep the
timeframe in the existing regulations. BSEE understands the need to
allow for transportation of the equipment, but experience indicates
that 90 days is enough time to ensure proper transport, if necessary,
under most circumstances, as discussed in the proposed rule. The
regulations allow for BSEE approval of alternate procedures if
necessary and justified under the regulatory standards.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that
BSEE did not provide adequate justification to support the change of
the failure analysis paradigm from the 2016 WCR to the 2019 WCR and
that shortening the timeframe in this rule is still inadequate. The
commenters suggested that the timeframe should revert to the 2016 WCR
standard of 120 days to start and complete the failure analysis.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' request to revert to
the 2016 WCR timeframe and is finalizing the timeframe as proposed. The
commenters did not proffer new data that would call into question the
justifications provided for the changes made in the 2019 WCR, including
the operational safety and practical issues implicated by the prior
timelines. As discussed in the proposed rule, based in part on
experience gathered through implementation of the 2019 WCR, the
selected timeframe allows for sufficient time to commence the analysis
without jeopardizing safety or compromising investigation resources,
while acknowledging that certain timeframes established in the 2016 WCR
were inconsistent with some operational realities.
Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that, in
certain circumstances, operations are allowed to continue during an
investigation. The commenter requested that BSEE provide a list of
planned exemptions and rationale for each exemption and expressed
concern with using a BOP with known failures.
Response: Other BSEE regulations specify the required actions to be
taken when there are certain failures, including suspending operations
as appropriate (e.g., Sec. 250.738), and establish the substantive
requirements for BOP capabilities during operations (e.g., Sec. Sec.
250.730, 250.733, 250.734). Paragraph (c)(2) refers to the failure
investigation and reporting requirements, not the equipment operational
or functional requirements. Regulatory revisions are not required to
address this concern.
What are the independent third party requirements for BOP systems and
system components? (Sec. 250.732)
This section of the existing regulations describes the required
qualifications of an independent third party. It also identifies the
circumstances in which an operator must use an independent third party
to satisfy certification, verification, or reporting requirements.
Summary of proposed revisions to paragraph (b):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (b) by adding that an independent
third party must be accredited by a qualified standards development
organization and that BSEE may review the independent third party
accreditation and qualifications to ensure that it has sufficient
capabilities to perform the required functions.
Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (b):
[[Page 57341]]
Based on comments received, BSEE is not finalizing the proposed
revision to paragraph (b) that would have stated that the independent
third party must be accredited by a qualified standards development
organization (SDO). BSEE will instead require the operator to submit
the independent third party's qualifications to BSEE with the
associated permit application. This final rule will also add
clarification that BSEE will evaluate the submitted qualifications to
ensure they meet the regulatory requirements for permit approval. This
revision will ensure that BSEE receives the third party qualifications
and has the ability to evaluate the qualifications in connection with
the permit review and approval process. This revision will also provide
BSEE with an additional tool to increase oversight of the independent
third party qualifications and ensure properly qualified entities
perform the required verifications and certifications.
Summary of Comments:
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that it
was unclear who or what SDO would provide the proposed accreditation,
and that no accreditation process currently exists to satisfy the
proposed requirement. The commenters asserted that the regulatory
framework has successfully incorporated use of independent third
parties for many years and that the proposed accreditation requirements
would disrupt those established systems without contributing materially
to independent third party accountability. These commenters suggested
keeping the existing regulations unchanged.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' suggestion to keep
the existing requirements unchanged, which would not achieve the
desired improvement for BSEE's oversight of the independent third party
qualifications. BSEE does agree in part with the commenters' assertion
that the proposed SDO process and the expectations for the
accreditation of the independent third parties through that process
were unclear. BSEE understands that there are many SDOs that provide
many different types of accreditations. BSEE also understands that
there is no regulated entity in a position to provide consistency with
an accreditation process under these circumstances. Therefore, BSEE is
not finalizing the proposed requirement for SDO accreditation and is
instead requiring operators to submit the independent third party's
qualifications directly to BSEE with the associated permit application.
In considering whether to approve the permit application, BSEE will
evaluate whether the identified qualifications satisfy the regulatory
requirement to use an independent third party with the mandated
credentials and ``capable of providing the required certifications and
verifications.'' This will achieve the appropriate enhancement of
oversight for the qualifications of independent third parties providing
the required verifications, while avoiding the ambiguity and
uncertainty surrounding the proposed SDO accreditation requirement.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters suggested that BSEE should
restore the BSEE approved verification organizations (BAVO) process
established in the 2016 WCR.
Response: BSEE disagrees that the BAVO process is necessary. As
discussed, BSEE is taking alternative steps to review and ensure
independent third party qualifications to perform the necessary
verification functions by requiring submission of their qualification
for review with the associated permit application (e.g., Application
for Permit to Drill (APD) and Application for Permit to Modify (APM)).
These qualifications would be fully considered as part of the permit
review and associated permit approval process. BSEE would identify any
gaps in the potential qualifications of the independent third parties
and address any issues related to adequate oversight. This is similar
to the functions BSEE anticipated performing through its BAVO approval
process. The Department does not perceive meaningful gains in
accountability or vetting from implementing the additional layer of
administrative certification of the former BAVO framework, which never
went into effect and was replaced based on BSEE's positive experiences
interacting and attending inspections and testing with independent
third parties in its stead.
Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that BSEE should take a
larger role in oversight of the independent third party qualifications
and should require review of the qualifications in the regulations.
Response: BSEE agrees with the commenter and is requiring in this
final rule the submission of the independent third party's
qualifications with the associated permit application (e.g., APD and
APM). BSEE will fully review these qualifications during the permit
review and associated permit approval process to ensure that the
regulatory requirement to use independent third parties with the
identified credentials and necessary capabilities has been met. BSEE
will use those reviews to identify any gaps in the potential
qualifications and address any issues related to the validity or
reliability of the associated verifications. If BSEE determines that
the submitted third party qualifications do not meet the regulatory
requirements, then BSEE would not approve the associated permit
application.
Summary of comments: A commenter disagreed with the third party
review concept and suggested that BSEE use an auditing process similar
to that applied in the Safety and Environmental Management Systems
Program. The commenter also suggested that BSEE study the effects of
accreditation and third party review.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the suggested use of an auditing
process to review the third party qualifications or in lieu of using
independent third parties. Similar to the issues identified above
regarding the proposed imposition of an SDO accreditation requirement,
BSEE is not aware of existing organizations or systems with the
frameworks currently in place to implement an audit process that would
adequately replace the important functions currently served by
independent third party verifications and certifications or that would
be materially superior to the enhanced BSEE oversight of those
functions facilitated by this final rule. BSEE will continue to
evaluate the appropriateness of an auditing process for future
potential rulemaking.
What are the requirements for a surface BOP stack? (Sec. 250.733)
This section of the existing regulations describes the capability,
type, and number of BOPs required when an operator uses a surface BOP
stack for drilling or for conducting operations.
This section also describes the requirements for the risers and BOP
stack when a surface BOP is used on a floating production facility.
Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (b)(1):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (b)(1) by adding that an operator
must also follow the BOP requirements of Sec. 250.734(a)(1) when
replacing an entire surface BOP stack on an existing floating
production facility. That provision requires dual shear rams for
applicable BOP stacks.
Summary of final rule revisions:
BSEE received and considered comments on the proposed revisions and
includes the proposed revisions in the final rule without change.
Summary of Comments:
[[Page 57342]]
Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that consideration should
be given to the extent to which this revision might create a
disincentive for replacing old BOP stacks.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the assertion that the provision
might create a disincentive for replacing old BOP stacks. BSEE is aware
of every facility and BOP stack that does not have dual shear rams and
the potential constraints on a complete BOP stack replacement. If a BOP
stack reaches the point of needing immediate replacement, the operator
would not realistically have the option to neglect that action to avoid
meeting the dual shear ram requirements. If a stack needs to be
entirely replaced, the operator would likely have no choice but to
replace the BOP stack to remain in compliance with the general
regulatory requirements of part 250, subpart G. BSEE has identified
only seven facilities potentially implicated by this provision and will
work with the operators on a case-by-case basis to ensure appropriate
action is taken without creating a disincentive to make the upgrades.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that
the proposed rule is unclear and could require significant (and perhaps
infeasible) modifications to be made to existing facilities on the OCS,
and that this rulemaking does not fully account for these impacts. The
commenters suggested that BSEE engage with industry to determine how to
achieve the intent of the proposed provision and then repropose a
modified provision in a later rulemaking. The commenters suggested that
BSEE should keep the existing regulations unchanged.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' suggestion to keep
the existing regulations unchanged. BSEE is working to ensure that all
BOPs have dual shear rams. However, BSEE recognizes that the existing
facilities without the dual shear rams must complete the upgrades at an
appropriate time. BSEE is aware of every facility and BOP stack that
does not have dual shear rams and the potential constraints on a
complete BOP stack replacement. If there is an immediate need to
replace the entire BOP stack, beyond routine maintenance, those
circumstances are serious enough to warrant the upgrade of the BOP
stack to meet the dual shear ram requirements. BSEE has identified only
seven facilities potentially implicated by this provision and will work
with the operators on a case-by-case basis to ensure appropriate action
is taken without creating unnecessary and potentially hazardous
modifications to the associated facility to ensure regulatory
compliance.
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for
requiring dual shear rams to be installed whenever the BOP stack is
replaced, not merely on new facilities.
Response: BSEE agrees with these commenters in part and is
finalizing the proposed provisions to require that certain facilities
upgrade their BOP stacks to include dual shear rams at an appropriate
time.
Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that all existing
facilities should have dual shear rams and opined on the importance of
redundancy.
Response: BSEE generally agrees and is working to ensure that all
BOPs have dual shear rams, within operational, practical, and safety
constraints. The provisions of the final rule advance those efforts.
Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that the
financial impact is grossly underestimated, as requiring operators to
raise the substructure of existing platform rigs to accommodate a
taller BOP system after adding another BOP cavity would result in
massive structural impacts. The commenter asserts this could have the
effect of rendering some leases and projects uneconomic.
Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that it has
underestimated the economic impacts of this provision. BSEE has
identified only seven existing facilities using BOP stacks that would
potentially be subject to the requirements of this revision, most of
which are located in depleted fields and only one of which is projected
to replace its entire BOP stack over the next ten years. If an operator
of such a facility has determined an immediate need to replace the
entire BOP stack, beyond routine maintenance, those circumstances are
serious enough that the operation would be necessary for the operator
to comply with the general regulatory requirements of part 250, subpart
G. Irrespective of this change, replacement of an entire BOP stack
would entail rig downtime and require such facilities to take a number
of actions to accommodate the new BOP stack, i.e., such replacement
would be an appropriate time to accommodate the dual shear rams.
Furthermore, potential facility modifications can be conducted
simultaneously with anticipated rig down time for replacement of the
entire BOP stack to help minimize overall rig down time. BSEE
anticipates that any facility modifications and burdens associated with
that replacement would be incurred because of the otherwise-required
stack replacement itself, and that this particular element of that
substantial undertaking is unlikely to contribute significantly to the
overall costs. See the accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis for more
detailed discussion of estimated costs. BSEE is not requiring all
remaining surface BOP stacks to be immediately upgraded and is allowing
completion of the upgrades at an appropriate time when other facility
modifications would be necessary. BSEE will work with the operators on
a case-by-case basis to ensure that they take appropriate actions for
regulatory compliance without creating unnecessary and potentially
hazardous modifications to the associated facility.
What are the requirements for a subsea BOP system? (Sec. 250.734)
This section of the existing regulations identifies the
requirements for a subsea BOP system used for drilling or conducting
operations. The section describes the requirements for subsea BOP
system capabilities, as well as the functionality, type, and quantity
of required equipment (e.g., BOPs, pod control systems, accumulator
capacity, ROVs, autoshear and deadman, acoustic control system, and
management and operating protocols).
Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (a)(4):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (a)(4) by adding that the
operator must have the ROV intervention capability to both open and
close each shear ram, ram locks, and one pipe ram. (Current regulations
require only closure capability.)
Summary of final rule revisions:
BSEE received comments in general support of the proposed revisions
to this section and is including the proposed language in the final
rule without change. However, based on comments, BSEE is also adding a
deferred compliance date--one year after publication of the final
rule--to allow operators to make the required equipment modifications.
Summary of Comments:
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for the
proposal to require the ROV intervention capability to both open and
close certain components. However, multiple commenters also requested a
one-year deferred compliance date to allow sufficient time to make the
required modifications to the existing equipment and ensure compliance
with the regulations.
Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' request to allow a one-
year deferred compliance date in order to allow sufficient time for
operators to
[[Page 57343]]
make the necessary equipment modifications to comply with this
provision. This is a reasonable amount of time for executing the
modifications to the impacted subsea BOP systems that currently lack
these functionalities, which must be removed from subsea service at a
safe operational time and undergo necessary equipment modifications
before being returned to subsea service. One year is a reasonable
period of time for responsibly accomplishing these steps, particularly
given that the critical function of ram closure will continue to be
required in the interim. BSEE does not want to inadvertently increase
the risk during any of the ongoing BOP operations and the one-year
deferred compliance date allows enough time for the operators to
conduct the necessary equipment modifications during routine
maintenance and other opportunities when the well is placed in a safe
condition.
What are the BOP system testing requirements? (Sec. 250.737)
This section of the existing regulations details the pressure test
frequency, procedures, and duration for BOP systems. This section also
contains additional testing requirements, including compliance with API
Standard 53, and specifies documentation required for certain BOP
testing.
Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and
(d)(3)(iii):
BSEE proposed to revise paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) by
adding the requirement that, if a BSEE representative is unable to
witness the testing, the operator must provide the initial test results
to the appropriate District Manager within 72 hours after completion of
the tests.
Summary of final rule revisions:
BSEE received comments in general support of the proposed revisions
to this section and is including the proposed language in the final
rule without change.
Summary of Comments:
Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for the
proposed return to the 2016 WCR requirement that, if BSEE is unable to
witness testing, the operator must provide initial test results within
72 hours.
Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' support for these
provisions and is including the proposed language in the final rule
without change.
V. Procedural Matters
Regulatory Planning and Review (Executive Orders (E.O.) 12866 and
13563)
E.O. 12866 provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review
all significant rules. To determine if this rulemaking is a significant
rule, a BSEE contractor prepared an economic analysis that assessed the
anticipated costs and potential benefits of the rulemaking. The
following discussion summarizes the economic analysis; a complete copy
of the economic analysis can be viewed at www.Regulations.gov (use the
keyword/ID ``BSEE-2022-0009'').
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several types of
economic analyses. First, E.O.s 12866, 14094, and 13563 direct agencies
to assess the costs and benefits of regulatory alternatives and, if
regulation is necessary, to select a regulatory approach that maximizes
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public
health, and safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a
statute requires another regulatory approach. Under E.O.s 12866 and
14094, an agency must determine whether a regulatory action is
significant and, therefore, subject to review by OMB. Section 3(f) of
E.O. 12866, as amended by E.O. 14094, defines a ``significant
regulatory action'' as any regulatory action that is likely to result
in a rule that:
--Has an annual effect on the economy of $200 million or more, or
adversely affects in a material way the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities
(also referred to as ``economically significant'');
--Creates serious inconsistency or otherwise interferes with an action
taken or planned by another agency;
--Materially alters the budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, user
fees, loan programs, or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof; or
--Raises novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates,
the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in E.O. 12866.
OIRA has determined that this final rule is not significant within
the definition of E.O. 12866 because the estimated annual costs or
benefits would not exceed $200 million in any year of the 10-year
analysis period and the rule will not meet any of the other
significance triggers. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed this final
rule.
(1) Need for Regulatory Action
BSEE has identified a need to amend the existing well control
regulations to ensure that oil and gas operations on the OCS are
conducted in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. In
particular, BSEE considers the rule necessary to reduce the likelihood
of an oil or gas blowout, which can lead to the loss of life, serious
injuries, and harm to the environment. As the Deepwater Horizon
incident demonstrated, blowouts can result in catastrophic
consequences.
After the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010, BSEE adopted several
recommendations from multiple investigation teams to improve the safety
of offshore operations. Subsequently, on April 29, 2016, BSEE published
the 2016 Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Final Rule (81 FR
25888) (2016 WCR). The 2016 WCR consolidated the equipment and
operational requirements for well control into one part of BSEE's
regulations; enhanced BOP and well design requirements; modified well-
control requirements; and incorporated certain industry technical
standards. Most of the 2016 WCR provisions became effective on July 28,
2016.
Although the 2016 WCR addressed a significant number of issues that
were identified during the analyses of the Deepwater Horizon incident,
BSEE recognized that BOP equipment and systems continue to improve and
that well control processes also evolve. Therefore, after the 2016 WCR
took effect, BSEE continued to engage with the offshore oil and gas
industry, Standards Development Organizations (SDOs), and other
stakeholders. During these engagements, BSEE identified issues, and
stakeholders expressed a variety of concerns regarding the
implementation of the 2016 WCR. BSEE completed a review of the 2016 WCR
and, on May 15, 2019, published the 2019 WCR in the Federal Register
(84 FR 21908). The 2019 WCR left most of the 2016 WCR unchanged.
Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet:
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to
promote and
[[Page 57344]]
protect public health and the environment, among other policy goals
identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019 WCR contains
many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted safely and
in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this final rule
addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and as
authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), will
further promote the objectives of E.O. 13990. At this time, BSEE is
finalizing narrowly focused revisions to improve operations that use a
BOP, certain BOP capabilities and functionalities, and BSEE oversight
of such operations. The final rule will:
(A) Clarify the general BOP system expectations,
(B) Require failure notifications to be sent to BSEE and modify the
timeframes for commencing a failure analysis,
(C) Require submission of the independent third party
qualifications with the associated permit application,
(D) Establish dual shear ram requirements for surface BOPs on
existing floating production facilities when an operator replaces an
entire surface BOP stack,
(E) Require ROV open functions for subsea BOPs, and
(F) Require submittal of certain BOP test results if BSEE is unable
to witness the testing.
(2) Alternatives
BSEE has considered two regulatory alternatives:
(A) Promulgate the requirements contained within the final rule.
(B) Take no regulatory action and continue to rely on existing well
control regulations in combination with permit conditions, deepwater
operations plans (DWOPs), operator prudence, and industry standards.
Alternative 1--the final rule--would incorporate recommendations
provided by government, industry, academia, and other stakeholders. In
addition to addressing concerns and aligning with industry standards,
this final rule would prudently improve efficiency and consistency of
the regulations.
(3) Economic Analysis
BSEE's economic analysis evaluated the expected impacts of the
final rule compared with the baseline. The baseline refers to current
industry practice in accordance with existing regulations, industry
permits, DWOPs, and industry standards with which operators already
comply. Impacts that exist as part of the baseline were not considered
costs or benefits of the final rule. Thus, the cost analysis evaluates
only activities, expenditures, and capital investments representing a
change from the baseline that would result when the rule is finalized.
BSEE quantified and monetized the costs, in year 2022 dollars, of all
the provisions in the final rule determined to result in a change
compared to the baseline. These estimated compliance costs are
discussed more specifically in the associated final regulatory impact
analysis, which can be viewed at www.regulations.gov (use the keyword/
ID ``BSEE-2022-0009'').
BSEE qualitatively assessed the benefits of the final rule. The
rulemaking will allow BSEE to address stakeholder concerns related to
the BOP and well control provisions in 30 CFR part 250 and provide
clarification about regulations in this section. The amendments will
have a positive net impact on worker safety and the environment. The
benefits include clarification, more timely review of data to
facilitate faster response to systemic risks, increased accountability
of verification entities to ensure that risks are accurately assessed
and verified, improved protection from a blowout, improved ability to
manage a blowout, and the assurance that BSEE receives and is able to
review BOP testing data to help identify risks.
BSEE's economic analysis covers 10 years (2023 through 2032) to
ensure it encompasses any significant costs and benefits likely to
result from this final rule. A 10-year period was used for this
analysis because of the uncertainty associated with predicting
industry's activities and the advancement of technical capabilities
beyond 10 years. It is very difficult to predict, plan, or project
costs associated with technological innovation due to unknown
technological or business constraints that could drive a product into
mainstream adoption or into obsolescence. The regulated community
itself has difficulty conducting business modeling beyond a 10-year
time frame. Over time, the costs associated with a particular new
technology may drop because of various supply and demand factors,
causing the technology to be more broadly adopted. In other cases, an
existing technology may be replaced by a lower-cost alternative as
business needs may drive technological innovation. Extrapolating costs
and benefits beyond this 10-year time frame would produce more
speculative results and therefore be disadvantageous in determining
actual costs and benefits likely to result from this final rule. BSEE
concluded that this 10-year analysis period provides the best overall
ability to forecast reliable costs and benefits likely to result from
this final rule. When summarizing the costs and benefits, we present
the estimated annual effects, as well as the 10-year discounted totals
using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, per OMB Circular A-4,
``Regulatory Analysis.''
Table 1 presents the total costs per year of the final rule. As
seen in the table, the estimated costs over the ten-year period are
$2.8 million undiscounted, $2.6 million discounted at 3%, and $2.4
million discounted at 7%.
Table 1--Total Costs Associated With Final Amendments to BOP and Well
Control Regulations
[2022$]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discounted Discounted
Year Undiscounted at 3% at 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023............................ $38,046 $38,046 $38,046
2024............................ 1,898,190 1,842,903 1,774,009
2025............................ 38,046 35,862 33,231
2026............................ 38,046 34,817 31,057
2027............................ 595,852 529,407 454,573
2028............................ 38,046 32,819 27,126
2029............................ 38,046 31,863 25,352
2030............................ 38,046 30,935 23,693
2031............................ 38,046 30,034 22,143
2032............................ 38,046 29,159 20,694
---------------------------------------
[[Page 57345]]
Total....................... 2,798,410 2,635,845 2,449,924
---------------------------------------
Annualized.................. 279,841 309,001 348,814
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Annualized costs are calculated by the annuity method.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Regulatory
Flexibility Act, and the Congressional Review Act
The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals
Management, certifies that this final rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities as defined
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA).
The RFA, at 5 U.S.C. 603, requires agencies to prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis to determine whether a regulation would have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Further, under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., an
agency is required to produce compliance guidance for small entities if
the rule would have a significant economic impact. For the reasons
explained in this section, BSEE believes that this final rule likely
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. BSEE provides this Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
to demonstrate the relatively minor impact of this final rule on small
entities and to support DOI's certification.
(1) Description of the Reasons That Action by the Agency Is Being
Considered
Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet:
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other
policy goals identified in the E.O.
(2) Description and Estimated Number of Small Entities Regulated
Small entities, as defined by the RFA, consist of small businesses,
small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. 5 U.S.C.
601(6). We have not identified any small organizations or small
government jurisdictions that the rule would impact, so this analysis
focuses on impacts to small businesses. A small business is one that is
independently owned and operated and that is not dominant in its field
of operation. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 601(3); 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(1). The
definition of small business varies from industry to industry to
properly reflect differing industry characteristics. 15 U.S.C.
632(a)(3).
The final rule will affect all well drilling operators and Federal
oil and gas lease holders on the OCS, primarily those working in the
Gulf of Mexico. BSEE's analysis shows that this will include 48
companies that drilled at least one offshore well during the period
2015 to 2021. Of these drilling operators, approximately 20 are likely
to be active in each given year. Entities that will operate under the
final rule are classified primarily under North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) codes 211120 (Crude Petroleum
Extraction), 211130 (Natural Gas Extraction), and 213111 (Drilling Oil
and Gas Wells). For NAICS classifications 211120 and 211130, the Small
Business Administration defines a small business as one with fewer than
1,251 employees; the rest are considered large businesses (the
threshold for 213111 is lower, and thus less inclusive). BSEE estimates
that approximately 83 percent of offshore operators drilling on the OCS
are small under this standard.
(3) Description and Estimate of Compliance Requirements
BSEE has estimated the incremental costs for small operators and
lease holders in the offshore oil and natural gas production industry.
BSEE did not consider costs already incurred as a result of current
industry practice in accordance with existing regulations, industry
permits, DWOPs, and API industry standards with which operators already
comply because they are part of the baseline.
Three provisions of the final rule will have cost impacts on a
substantial number of small businesses. For the amendments to Sec.
250.730(c), BSEE estimates that the annual cost of adding an additional
recipient to failure notification submissions is $101 per company. For
the amendments to Sec. 250.732(b), BSEE estimates that the annual cost
of adding independent third-party qualifications to associated permit
application (e.g., APDs and APMs) is $682 per company. For the new
requirements under Sec. 250.737(d)(2)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) to submit
BOP testing data to BSEE when it does not witness the testing, BSEE
estimates that the annual cost per company to comply with these
requirements will be $58.03. The combined cost of these provisions
constitutes less than 1 percent of revenues for the smallest operators
and therefore is not a significant economic impact.
(4) Identification of All Relevant Federal Rules That May Duplicate,
Overlap, or Conflict With the Final Rule
The final rule will not conflict with any relevant Federal rules or
duplicate or overlap with any Federal rules in any way that will
unnecessarily add cumulative regulatory burdens on small entities
without any gain in regulatory benefits.
(5) Description of Significant Alternatives to the Final Rule
BSEE has considered two regulatory alternatives:
(A) Promulgate the requirements contained within the final rule.
(B) Take no regulatory action and continue to rely on existing well
control regulations in combination with permit conditions, DWOPs,
operator prudence, and industry standards.
Alternative 1--the final rule--would incorporate recommendations
provided by government, industry, academia, and
[[Page 57346]]
other stakeholders. In addition to addressing concerns and aligning
with industry standards, this final rule will prudently improve
efficiency and consistency of the regulations.
The potential costs to small entities are believed to be small;
however, the risk of safety or environmental accidents for small
companies is not necessarily lower than it is for larger companies.
Offshore operations are highly technical and can be hazardous. Adverse
consequences in the event of incidents are similar regardless of the
operator's size. The final rule will reduce risk for entities of all
sizes.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
This final rule will not impose an unfunded mandate on State,
local, or Tribal governments or the private sector of more than $189
million per year. The final rule will not have a significant or unique
effect on State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector. A
statement containing the information required by Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) is not required.
Takings Implication Assessment (E.O. 12630)
Under the criteria in E.O. 12630, this final rule does not have
significant takings implications. The rule is not a governmental action
capable of interference with constitutionally protected property
rights. A Takings Implication Assessment is not required.
Federalism (E.O. 13132)
Under the criteria in E.O. 13132, this final rule does not have
federalism implications. This final rule does not substantially and
directly affect the relationship between the Federal and State
governments. To the extent that State and local governments have a role
in OCS activities, this final rule does not affect that role. A
federalism assessment is not required.
Civil Justice Reform (E.O. 12988)
This final rule complies with the requirements of E.O. 12988.
Specifically, this rule:
(1) Meets the criteria of section 3(a) requiring that all
regulations be reviewed to eliminate errors and ambiguity and be
written to minimize litigation; and
(2) Meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2) requiring that all
regulations be written in clear language and contain clear legal
standards.
Consultation With Indian Tribes (E.O. 13175)
BSEE strives to strengthen its government-to-government
relationships with Tribal Nations and Alaska Natives through a
commitment to consultation with the Tribes and recognition of their
right to self-governance and Tribal sovereignty. We are also respectful
of our responsibilities for consultation with Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) Corporations. BSEE evaluated the subject matter
of this rulemaking under the criteria in E.O. 13175, Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (dated November 6, 2000),
DOI's Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes and Policy on
Consultation with Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Corporations (512
Departmental Manual 4, dated November 30, 2022 and 512 Departmental
Manual 6, dated November 30, 2022, respectively), and DOI's Procedures
for Consultation with Indian Tribes and Procedures for Consultation
with Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Corporations (512 Departmental
Manual 5, dated November 30, 2022, and 512 Departmental Manual 7, dated
November 30, 2022, respectively) and determined that it has no
substantial direct effects on Tribal Nations or Alaska Natives.
Therefore, consultation under E.O. 13175 and DOI's Procedures for
Consultation with Tribal Nations and ANCSA Corporations is not
required.
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995
This final rule does not contain any new collection of information
that requires approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). OMB
has previously approved the information collection requirements
associated with 30 CFR part 250, subpart G, Well Operations and
Equipment, and assigned OMB Control Number 1014-0028. That approval is
currently with OMB under the renewal process, and in accordance with 5
CFR 1320.10, an agency may continue to conduct or sponsor this
collection of information while the submission is pending at OMB. The
currently approved annual burden associated with this information
collection is 160,842 hours. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and
a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
During the proposed rule stage, BSEE suggested changing the
requirements in subpart G, Well Operations and Equipment, by revising
regulatory provisions published in the 2019 WCR for drilling, workover,
completion, and decommissioning operations. These changes provide
clarity to BOP system requirements and revise a few specific BOP
equipment capabilities. These proposed changes were estimated to add 10
burden hours to the 1014-0028 collection.
The following provides a breakdown of the paperwork hour burdens
and non-hour cost burdens for this final rule.
Section 250.730--This section will add text requiring that BSEE and
the designated third party receive failure reports. This will result in
no burden changes in the currently approved failure reporting burden
because adding BSEE to already-required transmissions to third parties
would impose minimal to no additional burden.
Section 250.732(b)--This section will add to the current paragraph
that the independent third party qualifications must be sent to BSEE
with the associated permit application (hour burden and any associated
fees are covered under 1014-0025 or 1014-0026); furthermore, there are
no changes in hour burden. Any anticipated burdens are miniscule and
won't add any additional burdens to the permitting process.
Section 250.737(d)(2) and (3)--This section will add the
requirement that if BSEE is unable to witness BOP testing, the operator
must provide the initial test results to the appropriate District
Manager within 72 hours after completion of the tests. The 2019 WCR
provisions removed this requirement from the regulations. Yet, BSEE
inadvertently never removed the IC burden associated with this
requirement; therefore, no burden changes are needed.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
BSEE analyzed the provisions of the rule in compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et
seq.) to determine whether they could have a significant impact on the
quality of the human environment. The DOI implementing regulations for
NEPA encourage the use of existing NEPA analyses when a bureau
determines those analyses ``adequately assess[ ] the environmental
effects of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives,'' and the
supporting record for that determination evaluates ``whether new
circumstances, new information[,] or
[[Page 57347]]
changes in the action or its impacts not previously analyzed may result
in significantly different environmental effects.'' (43 CFR 46.120)
BSEE prepared Environmental Assessments (EAs) for both the 2016 WCR
and the 2019 WCR. Those EAs analyzed the environmental effects of
regulatory revisions the same as or similar to those contained in this
final rule, because the majority of this rule reverts to the regulatory
standards established in the 2016 WCR (and revised through the 2019
WCR). Both EAs resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact. BSEE
evaluated this rulemaking through a Determination of NEPA Adequacy
(DNA) and found that the previous EAs adequately assessed the
environmental effects of the potentially impact-producing portions of
this rulemaking and that no new circumstances, new information, or
changes in the action or its impacts exist that could result in
significantly different environmental effects than those analyzed in
the previous EAs. The balance of the changes in the final rule are
purely administrative in nature with no potential for environmental
impacts. Consequently, no additional NEPA analysis is required.
Data Quality Act
In developing this rule, we did not conduct or use a study,
experiment, or survey requiring peer review under the Data Quality Act
(Pub. L. 106-554, app. C, sec. 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-154).
Effects on the Nation's Energy Supply (E.O. 13211)
This rule is not a significant energy action under the definition
in E.O. 13211. The rule is not a significant regulatory action under
E.O. 12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094, and it is not likely
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or
use of energy. A Statement of Energy Effects is not required.
List of Subjects in 30 CFR Part 250
Administrative practice and procedure, Continental shelf,
Environmental impact statements, Environmental protection, Government
contracts, Incorporation by reference, Investigations, Oil and gas
exploration, Outer Continental Shelf--mineral resources, Outer
Continental Shelf--rights-of-way, Penalties, Pipelines, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Sulfur.
Laura Daniel-Davis,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of the
Interior amends 30 CFR part 250 as follows:
PART 250--OIL AND GAS AND SULFUR OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF
0
1. The authority citation for part 250 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 30 U.S.C. 1751, 31 U.S.C. 9701, 33 U.S.C.
1321(j)(1)(C), 43 U.S.C. 1334.
0
2. Amend Sec. 250.730 by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text and
(c) to read as follows:
Sec. 250.730 What are the general requirements for BOP systems and
system components?
(a) You must ensure that the BOP system and system components are
designed, installed, maintained, inspected, tested, and used properly
to ensure well control. The working-pressure rating of each BOP
component (excluding annular(s)) must exceed MASP as defined for the
operation. For a subsea BOP, the MASP must be determined at the
mudline. The BOP system includes the BOP stack, control system, and any
other associated system(s) and equipment. The BOP system and individual
components must be able to perform their expected functions and be
compatible with each other. Your BOP system must be capable of closing
and sealing the wellbore to the well's MASP at all times, except as
otherwise specified in the BOP system requirements of this subpart. The
BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing without losing ram
closure time and sealing integrity due to the corrosiveness, volume,
and abrasiveness of any fluids in the wellbore that the BOP system may
encounter. Your BOP system must meet the following requirements:
* * * * *
(c) You must follow the failure reporting procedures contained in
API Standard 53 (incorporated by reference in Sec. 250.198) and:
(1) You must provide a written notice of equipment failure to the
Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs (OORP) Chief, any third party
designated by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this section, and
the manufacturer of such equipment within 30 days after the discovery
and identification of the failure. A failure is any condition that
prevents the equipment from meeting the functional specification.
(2) You must start an investigation and a failure analysis within
90 days of the failure to determine the cause of the failure and
complete the investigation and the failure analysis within 120 days
after initiation. You also must document the results and any corrective
action. You must submit the analysis report to the OORP Chief, any
third party designated by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this
section, and the manufacturer. If you cannot complete the investigation
and analysis within the specified time, you must submit an extension
request detailing when and how you will complete the investigation and
analysis to BSEE for approval. You must submit the extension request to
the OORP Chief.
(3) If the equipment manufacturer notifies you that it has changed
the design of the equipment that failed or if you have changed
operating or repair procedures as a result of a failure, then you must,
within 30 days of such changes, report the design change or modified
procedures in writing to the OORP Chief, and any third party designated
by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this section.
(4) Submit notices and reports to the Chief, Office of Offshore
Regulatory Programs; Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement;
45600 Woodland Road, Sterling, Virginia 20166. BSEE may designate a
third party to also receive the data and reports. If BSEE designates a
third party, you must submit the data and reports to the designated
third party as well.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 250.732 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 250.732 What are the independent third party requirements for
BOP systems and system components?
* * * * *
(b) The independent third party must be a technical classification
society, a licensed professional engineering firm, or a registered
professional engineer capable of providing the required certifications
and verifications. You must submit the independent third party
qualifications to BSEE with the associated permit application (e.g.,
APD and APM). BSEE will evaluate the submitted qualifications to ensure
they meet the regulatory requirements for permit approval.
* * * * *
0
4. Amend Sec. 250.733 by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:
[[Page 57348]]
Sec. 250.733 What are the requirements for a surface BOP stack?
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) On new floating production facilities installed after April 29,
2021, that include a surface BOP, or when you replace an entire surface
BOP stack on an existing floating production facility, follow the BOP
requirements in Sec. 250.734(a)(1).
* * * * *
0
5. Amend Sec. 250.734 by revising paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 250.734 What are the requirements for a subsea BOP system?
(a) * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
When operating with a subsea BOP
system, you must: Additional requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
(4) Have a subsea BOP stack You must have the ROV intervention
equipped with remotely operated capability to open and close each
vehicle (ROV) intervention shear ram, ram locks, one pipe ram,
capability. and disconnect the lower marine
riser package (LMRP) under MASP
conditions as defined for the
operation. You must be capable of
performing these functions in the
response times outlined in API
Standard 53 (as incorporated by
reference in Sec. 250.198). The
ROV panels on the BOP and LMRP must
be compliant with API RP 17H (as
incorporated by reference in Sec.
250.198).
* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
6. Amend Sec. 250.737 by revising paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and
(d)(3)(iii) to read as follows:
Sec. 250.737 What are the BOP system testing requirements?
* * * * *
(d) * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
You must . . . Additional requirements . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
(2) * * *......................... (ii) Contact the District Manager at
least 72 hours prior to beginning
the initial test to allow BSEE
representative(s) to witness the
testing. If BSEE representative(s)
are unable to witness the testing,
you must provide the initial test
results to the appropriate District
Manager within 72 hours after
completion of the tests.
* * * * * * *
(3) * * *......................... (iii) Contact the District Manager
at least 72 hours prior to
beginning the stump test to allow
BSEE representative(s) to witness
the testing. If BSEE
representative(s) are unable to
witness the testing, you must
provide the test results to the
appropriate District Manager within
72 hours after completion of the
tests.
* * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2023-17847 Filed 8-22-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-VH-P
