Airworthiness directives: Bell,
[Federal Register: August 29, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 168)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 45584-45594]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr29au01-10]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. 2001-SW-13-AD; Amendment 39-12408; AD 2001-17-17]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 47B, 47B-3, 47D, 47D-1, 47G, 47G-2, 47G2A, 47G-2A-1, 47G-3, 47G-3B, 47G-3B-1, 47G-3B-2, 47G-3B-2A, 47G-4, 47G-4A, 47G-5, 47G-5A, 47H-1, 47J, 47J-2, 47J-2A, and 47K Helicopters
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHTI) Model 47B, 47B-3, 47D, 47D-1, 47G, 47G-2, 47G2A, 47G-2A-1, 47G-3, 47G-3B, 47G-3B- 1, 47G-3B-2, 47G-3B-2A, 47G-4, 47G-4A, 47G-5, 47G-5A, 47H-1, 47J, 47J- 2, 47J-2A, and 47K helicopters. That AD currently requires either recurring liquid penetrant or eddy current inspections of the main rotor blade grip (grip) threads for a crack. If a crack is detected, that AD requires, before further flight, replacing the cracked grip with an airworthy grip. That AD also establishes a retirement life of 1200 hours time-in-service (TIS) for each grip. This AD contains the same requirements as the existing AD but adds two part numbers (P/N) to the applicability and requires only recurring eddy current inspections of the grip threads. This AD also requires reporting any results of the grip inspections to the FAA Rotorcraft Certification Office. This AD is prompted by the results of an accident investigation, an operator survey conducted by a trade association, various comments concerning the current AD, and a further analysis of field service data. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a grip, loss of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 3, 2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marc Belhumeur, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 222-5177, fax (817) 222- 5783.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background Information
On May 12, 1987, the FAA issued AD 86-06-08R1 (52 FR 24135, June 29, 1987) that amended AD 86-06-08 (51 FR 11300, April 2, 1986). Those AD's required an initial and repetitive fluorescent dye penetrant inspection of each grip. On August 31, 2000, the FAA issued Emergency AD 2000-18-51 that superseded AD's 86-06-08 and 86-06-08R1. AD 2000-18- 51 requires initial and recurring liquid penetrant or eddy current inspections of the grip threads for a crack and, before further flight, replacing any cracked grip with an airworthy grip. That Emergency AD also establishes a retirement life of 1200 hours TIS for each grip. That Emergency AD was published in the Federal Register on November 15, 2000 (65 FR 68884) as a final rule, request for comments.
Airworthiness Directive 2000-18-51 was prompted by the results of an investigation of an August 1998 Canadian accident in which a grip failed on a BHTI Model 47G-2 helicopter due to a fatigue crack. An analysis of field service data revealed fatigue cracks in the majority of the grips inspected. The requirements of that AD are intended to prevent failure of a grip, loss of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
Since issuing AD 2000-18-51, other cracked grips with less than 1200 hours TIS have been discovered including one grip with a 2-inch crack through the grip. Since then, the FAA has also determined that the liquid penetrant inspection is inadequate for finding smaller cracks in the grip threads. Additionally, two parts produced under a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), P/Ns R74-120-252-11 and R74-120-135- 5, were inadvertently omitted from the applicability of AD 2000-18-51. Based on these findings, the earlier accident investigation, a further analysis of field service data, the results of an operator survey conducted by a trade association, and several comments received as a result of the issuance of AD 2000-18-51 as a final rule, request for comments, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on March 23, 2001 (66 FR 17105, March 29, 2001) proposing to supersede AD 2000-18-51.
Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the numerous comments received from the 17 commenters. The comments and the FAA's responses are listed in the following table:
Comment
FAA response
1. A couple of commenters state that The FAA concurs and will place the FAA should make available to the in the public docket public all of the history related to anyinformation that is not the failed grips, to include the
proprietary. Anyone wishing damage history, manufacture date, and this information can obtain it hours.
by submitting a request under the Freedom of Information Act to the office provided under the caption FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. 2. Several commenters state that the The FAA does not concur. The grips should be eddy current inspected FAA has determined that the before initial installation to ensure 300-hour TIS inspection that they are airworthy.
interval is sufficient to ensure safety. 3. Several commenters question the The FAA does not concur. The accuracy of the information gathered grip in question was within from the Canadian accident. Many
specifications, and records commenters state that the 1998
indicate that the helicopter accident seems to be a result of poor on which the grip was quality control. Several other
installed was certified, commenters state that the grip had a equipped, and maintained in questionable history or incomplete accordance with acceptable records.
procedures. 4. A few commenters state that the FAA The FAA does not concur. The has not shown that the affected grips FAA believes that a crack will are unsafe after 1200 hours TIS. The not propagate to failure commenters state that if the FAA
within 300 hours TIS only if believes a crack will not propagate to the part life is limited to failure within 300 hours TIS for
1200 hours TIS. After 1200 either the smaller or larger grip, the hours TIS, the probability of grip retirement life should remain at cracking is too high and the original 2500 hours for wood-blade recurring inspections may not grips and 5000 hours for metal-blade provide an adequate level of grips.
safety. Also, recurring inspections by themselves are not a terminating action.
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5. A couple of commenters state that it The FAA does not concur. The is not clear who is responsible for owners/operators are reporting results of the grip eddy responsible for complying with current inspection to the FAA. The the AD, including reporting commenters state that the
the results of the grip eddy nondestructive inspection (NDI)
current inspections to the facility should be responsible for FAA. Furthermore, the NDI reporting the results.
facility typically only receives minimal aircraft information when parts are sent to them for inspection; therefore, if they were required to report to the FAA they would need to do an inquiry to obtain all the FAA- requested information. 6. Two commenters state that the public The FAA partially concurs. should be kept abreast of the on-going Detailed test results are BHTI blade grip propagation tests. The generally proprietary to the commenters also state that if the
manufacturer; however, if the tests show that a crack will not
BHTI blade grip propagation propagate to failure within 300, 400, tests justify a change to the 500, or 600 hours TIS, the FAA should eddy current inspection change the eddy current inspections to intervals, the FAA will adjust match the BHTI test results.
the intervals as appropriate. 7. Several commenters state that
The FAA does not concur. Even previous grip failures may have been though these types of abuses initiated by sudden stoppage, trailer could damage the grips, there transporting, rotor over-speed, bad has been no clear connection installation procedures, poor
between these types of abuses maintenance, or other misuse.
and all the cracked grips. 8. One commenter states that all new The FAA does not concur; it has blade grips with redesigned root radii no data to support may still have cracking problems, and recommending a voluntary eddy the FAA should issue a Special
current inspection of the Airworthiness Information Bulletin redesigned grips. (SAIB) to that effect and recommend a voluntary eddy current inspection at 300-hour TIS intervals. 9. Two commenters state that the FAA The FAA does not concur. Only should send notification of proposed emergency ADs are sent to each AD action to each registered owner and registered owner followed by not just post a notice in the Federal the publication of the final Register.
rule in the Federal Register. In compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act, notification of proposed action is given by Federal Register notice. However, these published notices may be accessed via the Internet. 10. One commenter states that the
The FAA does not concur. Both reinstallation of the steel adapter the adapter and the grip nuts to the aluminum grip during
should be cleaned and recurring inspections can create an inspected for any burrs, unsafe condition. Another commenter damage, or out-of tolerance states that frequent dismantling of threads before any these components is harmful.
reinstallation. These grips have had recurring inspections since 1985, and the service history suggests that reinstalling the adapter to the grip threads causes no damage if done properly. 11. A few commenters state that an x- The FAA does not concur. There ray would be better than an eddy
is no data that suggests that current inspection for finding cracks x-rays would increase the in the grip threads.
likelihood of finding cracks in the grip threads. Compared to eddy current inspections, x- ray inspections are more expensive and do not offer any advantage other than finding internal flaws. Internal flaws are not a concern in grip- thread cracking. The grips cylindrical design also makes the x-ray inspection difficult to perform. 12. Many commenters state that the FAA The FAA does not concur. The does not know what caused the problems FAA has extensively researched with the grips, does not have
this safety concern and is sufficient or reliable data, and has continuously monitoring in- based ADs on faulty equipment and
service problems of the fleet questionable airworthiness records. worldwide, taking into account accident data and service difficulty information. The most common reason for cracking has been high stress concentrations in the affected parts. All of the cracked grips had a high stress concentration due to the sharp radii in the thread root. 13. One commenter states that there The FAA does not concur. have been no instances in the U.S. Neither AD 86-06-08 nor AD 86- fleet where the old 300-hour zyglo 06-08 R1 addressed the inspection has not maintained an
cracking found in grips with adequate level of safety; therefore, less than 1200 hours TIS. AD 86-06-08 adequately prevents an Also, the FAA has received unsafe condition.
reports outlining situations where zyglo inspections have not found known cracks. 14. Two commenters state that a 300- The FAA concurs and has made hour TIS inspection interval should be that change in this final allowed if the last inspection
rule. performed on the grips was an eddy current inspection. 15. Many commenters state that the FAA The FAA concurs and has made should change the requirement of the that change in this final rule initial inspection from ``the initial AD. inspection is within 10 hours TIS for grips that have 300 hours or more hours TIS'' to ``an initial inspection that is within 10 hours TIS for grips that have not had any previous inspection and have 300 hours or more TIS''. 16. A commenter states that 8 days and The FAA does not concur. revenue of $5,000 a day should be
Although the FAA understands added to the economic impact of the AD. that some operators could have their helicopters grounded for several days, which will result in a loss of revenue, any cost estimate based on assumed ground time and lost revenue would be speculative. The FAA bases its economic impact costs only on known parameters such as labor and parts costs. 17. A commenter states that until
The FAA does not concur. Data everyone agrees on correct procedures, has shown that cracks can only a one-time inspection should be develop any time during a required.
grip's service life, and inspecting the grips on a regular basis is needed to prevent a failure. 18. A couple of commenters point out The FAA partially concurs. that the Canadian and Australian
Transport Canada and the airworthiness authorities have
Civilian Aviation Safety retained the original retirement lives Authority of Australia have of the grips and have not amended
changed the initial eddy their current ADs, and according to a current inspection from 1200 recent survey, the majority of the hours TIS to 600 hours TIS. grips in Canada reach their retirement Neither authority has changed life with no defects.
the grip's retirement life; however, they have their own rules and procedures and must make their own safety determinations.
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19. One commenter states that the
The FAA does not concur. The proposed AD should not be issued. The accident report states that commenter explains his belief that the water was dislodged during grip installed on the 1998 Canadian disassembly of the grip from accident fractured because water was the hub. This does not mean lodged in the grip's thread and
that water was in the threads, because pitting was in the thread
nor does the report suggest roots.
water in the threads. The report states that there was extensive pitting in the threads. The pits are 0.0008 inch or less and cannot be seen by the naked eye. 20. One commenter states that the 1971 The FAA does not concur. The and 1972 accidents that occurred in grips involved in those the U.S. were a result of installing accidents were P/N 47-120-135- the wrong grips.
1 and -2. Those grips were approved for the BHTI Model 47 G-2 helicopters. The newer approved grips are P/N 47-120- 135-3. There are no differences between either of these part-numbered grips at the threads. 21. Several commenters state that the The FAA does not concur. The problem with the failed/fractured
FAA has not found any grips is a manufacturing defect or a manufacturing defect or quality control problem. Many
quality control problem. commenters believe that the manufacturer should inspect each grip before it is sold and that the same requirement should be placed on grips manufactured under PMA. 22. One commenter states that an eddy The FAA does not concur. current inspection of the grip, before Although this type of abuse further flight, should be added to the could damage grips, there has AD in the event of a sudden stoppage been no documented connection occurrence. Also, as part of the
between sudden stoppage and reporting the requirements, add the the cracked grips. Also, all question ``Has this grip had any prior sudden stoppages require history involving a sudden stoppage removal and disassembly of the incident or aircraft accident (sudden main rotor. If blade impact is stoppage as defined in the Bell 47 violent, or if the drag brace Maintenance and Overhaul
belt is sheared and the aft Instructions)?''.
side of the blade butt contacts the aft outboard side of the grip, the complete hub assembly must be replaced. 23. One commenter states that the
The FAA does not concur. The assumption that dye penetrant
FAA has received reports of inspections are not reliable cannot be confirmed cracks missed by a accepted. The commenter also states dye penetrant inspection and that two labs, one of which is listed found by an eddy current in Appendix 2 of the proposal as a inspection. Although dye recommended facility, state that, for penetrant inspections remain a the purpose of the proposed
reliable inspection method, inspection, ``the high sensitivity the FAA has determined that level of the dye penetrant method
the eddy current inspection is would be just as accurate as the eddy more appropriate when current method.'' Additionally, the inspecting for cracks in the commenter states that United States blade grip threads. has been using a dye penetrant inspection method, probably testing more aircraft with more hours than other countries, inspection. and we have had no accidents''. 24. One commenter states that few of The FAA does not concur. the facilities identified in Appendix Paragraph (e) of the NPRM and 2 of the proposal can perform the
paragraph (g) of this AD proposed tests because they do not address the procedure for have the probe required to do so. This obtaining an alternative situation can cause a hardship on
method of compliance (AMOC). operators who are on tight schedules Appendix 2 contains only a or live in remote areas. The commenter partial list of known eddy states that there is no mention in the current inspection facilities. proposal of any alternate means of If any of these facilities do compliance when rapid inspection
not have the equipment or services or parts are not available. expertise to inspect the threads, then another facility will need to be found or an AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety must be requested and approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. 25. Several commenters state that the The FAA does not concur. inspection should be performed during Inspection intervals of 600 the normally scheduled 600 and 1200- and 1200 hours TIS do not hour inspections.
provide an adequate level of safety based on the service history of these grips. 26. One commenter states that the
The FAA does not concur. The manufacturer changed thread standards FAA has determined that there in the late 1970's. The commenter
was no physical change to the believes that is when the problem
thread standards or design in supposedly started and AD 86-06-08 was that timeframe. issued. 27. One commenter asks why we don't The FAA does not concur. There state the fact that all 4 grip
is no data showing that sudden failures occurred on rotor systems stoppage is connected to grip that had suffered sudden stoppage. failures and the commenter did not provide any information showing that all 4 grip failures suffered sudden stoppage or that sudden stoppage contributed to the failures.
After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes described previously in the disposition of comments 14 and 15. Additionally, the FAA discovered an error in two of the P/Ns given in paragraph (d) of the NPRM; those P/Ns are corrected in this final rule. For better clarity, the FAA has also reorganized the compliance times for performing the eddy current inspections and has added an NDI testing facility to Appendix 2. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.
The FAA estimates that 1130 helicopters of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 10 work hours per helicopter to accomplish the disassembly, inspection, and re-assembly of the grips from the helicopter, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Required parts, if a grip needs to be replaced, will cost approximately $4,000 per grip (there are two grips on each helicopter). Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $9,718,000, assuming one inspection per helicopter and replacement of both grips on each helicopter.
The regulations adopted herein will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is determined that this final rule does not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
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FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-11983 (65 FR 68884, November 15, 2000), and by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD), Amendment 39-12408, to read as follows:
2001-17-17 Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.: Amendment 39-12408. Docket No. 2001-SW-13-AD. Supersedes AD 2000-18-51, Amendment 39- 11983, Docket No. 2000-SW-35-AD.
Applicability: Model 47B, 47B-3, 47D, 47D-1, 47G, 47G-2, 47G2A, 47G-2A-1, 47G-3, 47G-3B, 47G-3B-1, 47G-3B-2, 47G-3B-2A, 47G-4, 47G- 4A, 47G-5, 47G-5A, 47H-1, 47J, 47J-2, 47J-2A, and 47K helicopters, with main rotor blade grips, part number (P/N) 47-120-135-2, 47-120- 135-3, 47-120-135-5, 47-120-252-1, 47-120-252-7, 47-120-252-11, 74- 120-252-11, 74-120-135-5, R47-120-252-11, and R47-120-135-5, installed, certificated in any category.
Note 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (g) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a main rotor blade grip (grip), separation of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:
(a) Conduct an eddy current inspection of the threads of both grips for a crack in accordance with Appendix 1 of this AD or an equivalent FAA-approved procedure containing the requirements of the procedure in Appendix 1:
(1) Within 300 hours time-in-service (TIS) since initial installation on any helicopter for a grip with less than 300 total hours TIS;
(2) Within 10 hours TIS for a grip with 300 or more total hours TIS that has not had any previous dye penetrant or eddy current inspection;
(3) Within 200 hours TIS since the last dye penetrant inspection; OR
(4) Within 300 hours TIS since the last eddy current inspection, whichever occurs first.
(b) Thereafter, conduct the eddy current inspection in accordance with Appendix 1 of this AD or an equivalent FAA-approved procedure containing the requirements of the procedure in Appendix 1 at intervals not to exceed 300 hours TIS.
(c) Report the results of each inspection to the FAA Rotorcraft Certification Office within 7 calendar days. Reporting requirements have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget and assigned OMB control number 2120-0056.
Note 2: See Appendix 2 of this AD for a list of known eddy current inspection facilities.
(d) If a crack is detected, before further flight, replace any cracked grip with an airworthy grip.
(e) On or before 1200 hours TIS, replace each grip with an airworthy grip.
(f) This AD establishes a retirement life of 1200 hours TIS for the grips, P/N 47-120-135-2, 47-120-135-3, 47-120-135-5, 47-120-252- 1, 47-120-252-7, 47-120-252-11, 74-120-252-11, 74-120-135-5, R47- 120-252-11, and R47-120-135-5.
(g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.
Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.
(h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(i) This amendment becomes effective on October 3, 2001.
Appendix 1
Nondestructive Inspection Procedure
Task: Eddy Current (ET) Inspection of Mast Threads for Cracks
1.0 Area of Inspection
1.1 The inboard inside diameter machined threads (reference figure 1).
2.0 Equipment
2.1 Zetec Miz-20/22, Phasec 2200 or equivalent piece of equipment.
2.2 Match molded ET probe SPC-193 (100kHz) or equivalent. (See Figure 3.)
2.3 Reference standard EC-010-021, or equivalent. (See Figures 4 and 5.)
2.4 Light oil.
3.0 Personnel Requirements
3.1 Personnel performing the ET inspection must be minimally qualified to a Level II in ET inspection, certified in accordance with an industry accepted standard (such as ATA-105, NAS-410, or MIL-STD-410) or an FAA accepted company procedure.
4.0 Standardization
4.1 Connect probe to flaw detector and turn power on.
4.2 Adjust the Phasec 2000 as shown in table 1. Adjust all other equipment as necessary.
4.3 Adjust the V:H gain ratio to 1.5:1-2:1.
4.4 Monitor the crack response when moving the probe in one direction only across each EDM notch of the standard. Adjust the coarse gain for a crack response of 2-3 units from the smallest (0.04") notch. Record the number units of displacement and noise level for each of the EDM notches.
5.0 Pre Inspection
5.1 The part shall be clean and free of loose debris.
5.2 A thin coating of clean oil may be applied to the teeth to help the ET probe slide easily.
6.0 Inspection
6.1 Place the probe into the threaded area and slide it in the same direction as was done on the standard while monitoring the screen for root cracks. Moving the probe in the same direction produces a repeatable display that allows for more accurate flaw size determination. Scan the probe along each individual thread until all the threads are inspected. (See Figures 2 and 3.)
7.0 Evaluation
7.1 Repeat standardization and rescan any areas where there is a vertical crack-like deflection.
7.2 If indication persists, mark the location on the part. Record the number units of displacement, phase orientation, and noise level.
8.0 Accept/Reject Criteria
8.1 All repeatable crack-like indications above the noise level detected shall be cause for rejection.
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Appendix 2
Partial List of Nondestructive Inspection Testing Facilities Identified by Operators and FAA
Met Chem Testing Laboratories Inc. 369 W. Gregson Ave. (3085 S.) Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3440 Phone: (801) 487-0801 FAX: (801) 466-8790 www.metchemtesting.com
Galactic NDT Services 10728 D. South Pipeline RD Hurst, Texas 76053 Phone: (800) 458-6387
Global Testing Technologies 1173 North Service Rd. Unit D3 Oakville Toronto Canada Phone: (905) 847-9300 FAX: (905) 847-9330
Paragon Services, Inc. 1015 S. West St. Wichita, KS 67213 Phone: (316) 945-5285 FAX: (316) 945-0629
NOE Services 8775 E. Orchard Rd. #809 Englewood, CO Phone: (303) 741-0518 FAX: (303) 741-0519
Applied Technical Services, Inc. 1190 Atlanta Industrial Drive Marietta, GA 30066 Phone: (770) 423-1400 FAX: (770) 514-3299
Rotorcraft Support Van Nuys CA 91406 Phone: (818) 997-7667 FAX: (818) 997-1513
Palm Beach Aircraft Propeller, Inc Palm Beach County Park Airport 2633 Lantana Road Suite 23, Bldg 1501 Lantana, FL 33462 Phone: (800) 965-7767 FAX: (561) 965-7933 Email: info@pbapi.com Website: www.pbapi.com Contact: Will Burbage
Other FAA approved repair facilities may be used.
Appendix 3
AD Compliance Inspection Report (Sample Format)
Bell Model 47 Main Rotor Blade Grip
Provide the following information and mail or fax it to:
Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas, 76193-0170, USA, Fax: 817-222- 5783.
Aircraft Registration No: Helicopter Model: Helicopter Serial Number: Owner and Operator of the Helicopter:
Grip #1 Grip #2
Part Number: Serial Number:
Hours TIS on the Part at Inspection:
Crack Found (Y/N) If yes, describe below.
Description of Findings
Who performed the inspections?
If a crack was found, describe the crack size, location, and orientation (provide a sketch or pictures with the grip part and serial number).
Provide any other comments.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas on August 15, 2001. David A. Downey, Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 01-21749Filed8-28-01; 8:45 am]
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