Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1
| Published date | 26 March 2021 |
| Citation | 86 FR 16241 |
| Record Number | 2021-06328 |
| Section | Notices |
| Court | Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
16241
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 57 / Friday, March 26, 2021 / Notices
USEI. As documented in the Safety
Evaluation Report, the NRC staff
concludes that, consistent with 10 CFR
20.2002, WEC provided an adequate
description of the materials and the
proposed manner and conditions of
waste disposal. The NRC staff also
concluded that the use of the site-
specific dose assessment methodology
to evaluate the projected doses
associated with the transportation and
disposal of the waste streams at USEI
are acceptable. The NRC staff reviewed
the input parameters included in this
modeling and found that they are
appropriate for the scenarios
considered. The NRC staff also
evaluated the potential doses associated
with transportation, waste handling,
and disposal and found that the
projected doses have been appropriately
estimated and are demonstrated to meet
the NRC’s alternate disposal standard of
contributing a dose of not more than ‘‘a
few millirem per year’’ to any member
of the public and are as low as is
reasonably achievable. The NRC staff
also concluded that the projected doses
from the post-closure and intruder
scenarios at USEI are also within ‘‘a few
millirem per year’’ over a period of
1,000 years. Lastly, because of the
presence of SNM, the NRC evaluated
potential criticality in its SER, and
found no concerns. This subsequent
disposal request remains bounded by
the parameters of the previous request
and approval. Therefore, the NRC
concludes that issuance of the
exemption is will not endanger life,
property, and is consistent with the
common defense and security.
The Exemption Is in the Public Interest
Issuance of the exemption to WEC
and USEI is in the public interest
because it would provide for the
efficient and safe disposal for the
subject waste material, would facilitate
the decommissioning of the East Lagoon
at the CFFF site, and would conserve
low-level radioactive waste disposal
capacity at licensed low-level
radioactive disposal sites, while
ensuring that the material being
considered is disposed of safely in a
regulated facility. Therefore, based upon
the evaluation above, an exemption is
appropriate pursuant to 10 CFR 30.11
and 10 CFR 70.17.
IV. Environmental Considerations
As required by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC
performed an environmental assessment
(EA) that analyzes the environmental
impacts of the proposed exemption in
accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and
NRC implementing regulations in 10
CFR part 51. Based on that EA, the NRC
staff has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed exemption and has issued a
finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). The EA and FONSI were
published in the Federal Register on
March 11, 2021 (86 FR 13915).
V. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
70.17 and 10 CFR 30.11, the exemptions
for WEC and USEI and associated WEC
license amendment are authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, is
consistent with the common defense
and security, and is in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission
hereby grants WEC and USEI
exemptions from 10 CFR 70.3 and 10
CFR 30.3 to allow WEC to transfer the
specifically identified byproduct
material and SNM waste described
above from the WEC CFFF for disposal
at the USEI disposal facility located near
Grand View, Idaho, and issues WEC a
conforming license amendment.
Dated: March 23, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jacob I. Zimmerman,
Chief, Fuel Facility Licensing Branch,
Division of Fuel Management, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021–06301 Filed 3–25–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–289; NRC–2021–0079]
Exelon Generation Company, LLC;
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
1
AGENCY
: Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION
: Exemption; issuance.
SUMMARY
: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from
the licensee that would permit Exelon
Generation Company, LLC to reduce the
minimum coverage limit for onsite
property damage insurance from $1.06
billion to $50 million for Three Mile
Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.
DATES
: The exemption was issued on
March 22, 2021.
ADDRESSES
: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2021–0079 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
•Federal Rulemaking website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2021–0079. Address
questions about Docket IDs in
Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301–415–0624; email:
Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed
in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT
section of this document.
•NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For
problems with ADAMS, please contact
the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR)
reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–
415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@
nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced (if it is
available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
•Attention: The PDR, where you may
examine and order copies of public
documents, is currently closed. You
may submit your request to the PDR via
email at pdr.resource@nrc.gov or call 1–
800–397–4209 or 301–415–4737,
between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST),
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
:
Theodore Smith, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–6721, email: Theodore.Smith@
nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated: March 23, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Bruce A. Watson,
Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch,
Division of Decommissioning, Uranium
Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment—Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Docket No. 50–289
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
1
Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated June 20, 2017
(Agencywide Documents Access and
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Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML17171A151), Exelon
Generation Company, LLC (Exelon, the
licensee) certified to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC, the
Commission) that it planned to
permanently cease power operations at
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit
1 (TMI–1) on or about September 30,
2019. On September 20, 2019, Exelon
permanently ceased power operations at
TMI–1. By letter dated September 26,
2019 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19269E480), Exelon certified to the
NRC that the fuel was permanenetly
removed from the TMI–1 reactor vessel
and placed in the spent fuel pool (SFP)
as of September 26, 2019. Accordingly,
pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section
50.82(a)(2), the TMI–1 renewed facility
operating license no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement
or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
The facility is still authorized to possess
and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear
fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored
onsite at the TMI–1 facility in the SFP.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated November 25, 2019
(ADAMS Accession No. ML19330D862),
Exelon requested an exemption from 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning onsite
liability insurance. The exemption from
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit the
licensee to reduce the required level of
onsite property damage insurance from
$1.06 billion to $50 million for TMI–1.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
requires each licensee to have and
maintain onsite property damage
insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor
site in the event of an accident. The
onsite insurance coverage must be either
$1.06 billion or whatever amount of
insurance is generally available from
private sources (whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an
incident at a permanently shutdown
and defueled reactor is much less than
the risk from an operating power
reactor. In addition, since reactor
operation is no longer authorized at
TMI–1, there are no events that would
require the stabilization of reactor
conditions after an accident. Similarly,
the risk of an accident that would result
in significant onsite contamination at
TMI–1 is also much lower than the risk
of such an event at operating reactors.
Therefore, the licensee requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to
reduce its onsite property damage
insurance from $1.06 billion to $50
million, commensurate with the
reduced risk of an incident at the
permanently shutdown and defueled
TMI–1 site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions
are authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to public health or safety,
and are consistent with the common
defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after
the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
Unit 2 accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially
cover onsite cleanup costs in the event
of a major nuclear accident. The
specified $1.06 billion coverage amount
requirement was developed based on an
analysis of an accident at a nuclear
reactor operating at power resulting in
a large fission product release and
requiring significant resource
expenditures to stabilize the reactor and
ultimately decontaminate and cleanup
the site.
These cost estimates were developed
based on the spectrum of postulated
accidents for an operating nuclear
reactor. Those costs were derived from
the consequences of a release of
radioactive material from the reactor.
Although the risk of an accident at an
operating reactor is very low, the
consequences onsite and offsite can be
significant. In an operating plant, the
high temperature and pressure of the
reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as
the inventory of relatively short-lived
radionuclides, contribute to both the
risk and consequences of an accident.
With the permanent cessation of reactor
operations at TMI–1 and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor
vessel, such accidents are no longer
possible. As a result, the reactor vessel,
RCS, and supporting systems no longer
operate and have no function related to
the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are
no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
largest radiological risks are associated
with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In
the exemption request dated November
25, 2019, the licensee discussed both
design-basis and beyond design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored
in the SFP. The licensee determined
that there are no possible design-basis
events at TMI–1 that could result in an
offsite radiological release exceeding the
limits established by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) early phase Protective Action
Guides (PAGs) of 1 roentgen equivalent
man at the exclusion area boundary 365
days after permanent shutdown, as a
way to demonstrate that any possible
radiological releases would be minimal
and would not require precautionary
protective actions (e.g., sheltering in
place or evacuation). The NRC staff
evaluated the radiological consequences
associated with various
decommissioning activities and the
design-basis accidents at TMI–1, in
consideration of a permanently
shutdown and defueled condition. The
possible design-basis accident scenarios
at TMI–1 have greatly reduced
radiological consequences. Based on its
review, the NRC staff concluded that no
reasonably conceivable design-basis
accident exists that could cause an
offsite release greater than the EPA
PAGs.
The only incident that might lead to
a significant radiological release at a
decommissioning reactor is a zirconium
fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond
design-basis accident scenario that
involves loss of water inventory from
the SFP resulting in a significant heatup
of the spent fuel, and culminating in
substantial zirconium cladding
oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario
is related to the decay heat of the
irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time since TMI–1 has
been permanently shut down.
The Commission has previously
authorized a lesser amount of onsite
financial protection, based on this
analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In
SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to Financial
Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR
140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483),
the NRC staff recommended changes to
the power reactor financial protection
regulations that would allow licensees
to lower onsite insurance levels to $50
million upon demonstration that the
fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled.
In its Staff Requirements Memorandum
to SECY–96–256, dated January 28,
1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15062A454), the Commission
supported the NRC staff’s
recommendation that, among other
things, would allow permanently
shutdown power reactor licensees to
reduce commercial onsite property
damage insurance coverage to $50
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million when the licensee was able to
demonstrate the technical criterion that
the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the
SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical
criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g.,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion
Nuclear Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 1999
(64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power
Station, published in the Federal
Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR
15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear
Generation Plant, published in the
Federal Register on May 6, 2015 (80 FR
26100); Oyster Creek Nuclear
Generating Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 2018
(83 FR 67365) and Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on January 13, 2020 (85 FR
1827)). These prior exemptions were
based on these licensees demonstrating
that the SFP could be air-cooled,
consistent with the technical criterion
discussed above.
Exelon’s November 25, 2019,
exemption request addressed air-cooling
of fuel in a drained SFP. In the
attachment to this request, the licensee
compared TMI–1 fuel storage
parameters with those used in NRC
generic evaluations of fuel cooling
included in NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety
and Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized-Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Plants,’’ dated August 1997 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML082260098). The
analysis described in NUREG/CR–6451
determined that natural air circulation
would adequately cool fuel that has
decayed for 17 months after operation in
a typical PWR, which is slightly longer
than the zirconium fire period of 488
days that Exelon used for its reqest for
TMI–1. Exelon evaluated the decay heat
at TMI–1 and determined that the
average decay heat for the most recently
offloaded TMI–1 spent fuel assembly
488 days after shutdown will be slightly
less than the decay heat for the average
fuel assembly at 519 days for the
representative PWR plant in NUREG/
CR–6451. This is in part because the
power per fuel assembly at TMI–1 is 16
percent less than that modeled in
NUREG/CR–6451.
The licensee compared the post-
shutdown fuel storage conditions with
those assumed for the analysis
presented in NUREG/CR–6451. The
licensee found that the TMI–1 fuel
storage configuration is conservative in
comparison to the representative
configuration used in the NUREG/CR–
6451 analysis with respect to the fuel
assembly size (15 x 15 for TMI–1 vs. 17
x 17 for NUREG/CR–6451), the fuel
storage pitch (TMI–1’s is smaller, due to
a larger gap around fuel assemblies
inside the cells), and the rack orifice
size being the same size or larger than
those modeled in NUREG/CR–6451.
Thus, the cooling air flow should be
comparable. Differences in the rack
material were determined to have
minimal impact, based on Table 3.1 of
NUREG/CR–6441, which states that heat
conduction in structures is of low
relative importance when computing
cladding temperatures, although racks
for both TMI–1 and the NUREG/CR–
6451 model are stainless steel.
Therefore, at 488 days after
permanent shutdown (i.e., the effective
date of the requested exemption), the
NRC staff has reasonable assurance that
fuel stored in the TMI–1 SFP would be
adequately air-cooled in the highly
unlikely event the SFP completely
drained.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
the Spent Fuel Pool,’’ dated June 4, 2001
(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML003721626
and ML011450420, respectively), the
NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium
fire risks at decommissioning reactors
and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Providing
an analysis of when the spent fuel
stored in the SFP is capable of air-
cooling is one measure that can be used
to demonstrate that the probability of a
zirconium fire is exceedingly low.
However, the NRC staff has more
recently used an additional analysis that
bounds an incomplete drain down of
the SFP water, or some other
catastrophic event (such as a complete
drainage of the SFP with rearrangement
of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The
analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via
conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is
often referred to as an adiabatic heatup.
The licensee’s adiabatic heatup
analyses demonstrate that there would
be at least 10 hours after the loss of all
means of cooling (both air and/or
water), before the spent fuel cladding
would reach a temperature where the
potential for a significant offsite
radiological release could occur. The
licensee states that for this loss of all
cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient
time for personnel to respond with
additional resources, equipment, and
capability to restore cooling to the SFPs,
even after a non-credible, catastrophic
event.
In the analysis provided in the
attachment to its November 25, 2019,
exemption request, the licensee
compared the conditions for the hottest
fuel assembly stored in the SFP to a
criterion proposed in SECY–99–168,
‘‘Improving Decommissioning
Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants,’’
dated June 30, 1999 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML12265A598), applicable to offsite
emergency response for the unit in the
decommissioning process. This criterion
considers the time for the hottest
assembly to heat up from 30 degrees
Celsius (°C) to 900 °C adiabatically. If
the heatup time is greater than 10 hours,
then offsite emergency preplanning
involving the plant is not necessary.
Based on the limiting fuel assembly for
decay heat and adiabatic heatup
analysis presented in the attachment, at
488 days after permanent cessation of
power operations (i.e., 488 days of
decay time), the time for the hottest fuel
assembly to reach 900 °C is greater than
10 hours after the assemblies have been
uncovered. As stated in NUREG–1738,
‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool
Accident Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February
2001 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), 900 °C is an acceptable
temperature to use for assessing onset of
fission product release under transient
conditions to establish the critical decay
time for determining the availability of
10 hours for deployment of mitigation
equipment and, if necessary, for offsite
agencies to take appropriate action to
protect the health and safety of the
public if fuel and cladding oxidation
occurs in air.
The NRC staff reviewed the
calculation to verify that important
physical properties of materials were
within acceptable ranges and the results
were accurate. The NRC staff
determined that physical properties
were appropriate. Therefore, the NRC
staff found that 488 days after
permanent cessation of power
operations, more than 10 hours would
be available before a significant offsite
release could begin. The NRC staff
concluded that the adiabatic heatup
calculation provided an acceptable
method for determining the minimum
time available for deployment of
mitigation equipment and, if necessary,
implementing measures under a
comprehensive general emergency plan.
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The NRC staff performed an
evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for TMI–1 being permanently defueled
as part of SECY–20–0041, ‘‘Request by
Exelon Generation Company, LLC for
Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements for the Three
Mile Island Nuclear Station,’’ dated May
5, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML19311C762).
Based on the evaluation in SECY–20–
0041 and SECY–96–256, the NRC staff
determined $50 million to be an
adequate level of onsite property
damage insurance for a
decommissioning reactor once the spent
fuel in the SFP is no longer susceptible
to a zirconium fire. The NRC staff has
postulated that there is still a potential
for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could
result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire.
In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the
rupture of a large contaminated liquid
storage tank (∼450,000 gallon) causing
soil contamination and potential
groundwater contamination as the most
costly postulated event to
decontaminate and remediate (other
than an SFP zirconium fire). The
postulated large liquid radiological
waste storage tank rupture event was
determined to have a bounding onsite
cleanup cost of approximately $50
million. Therefore, the NRC staff
determined that the licensee’s proposal
to reduce onsite insurance to a level of
$50 million would be consistent with
the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost, as discussed in
SECY–96–256, to account for the
postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the TMI–1
site, should such an event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the
licensee’s proposed reduction in onsite
property damage insurance coverage to
a level of $50 million is consistent with
SECY–96–256 and subsequent
insurance considerations resulting from
additional zirconium fire risks as
discussed in SECY–00–0145 and SECY–
01–0100. In addition, the NRC staff
notes that similar exemptions have been
granted to other permanently shutdown
and defueled power reactors, upon
demonstration that the criterion of the
zirconium fire risks from the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible
concern. As previously stated, the NRC
staff concluded that 488 days after the
permanent cessation of power
operations on September 20, 2019,
sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will
have elapsed at TMI–1 to decrease the
probability of an onsite radiological
release from a postulated zirconium fire
accident to negligible levels. In
addition, the licensee’s proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50
million is consistent with the maximum
estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid
radwaste storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in
accordance with the TMI–1 Post-
Shutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report dated April 2019 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML19095A041), all spent
fuel will be removed from the SFP and
moved into dry storage at an onsite
independent spent fuel storage
installation by the end of 2022, and the
probability of an initiating event that
would threaten SFP integrity occurring
before that time is extremely low, which
further supports the conclusion that the
zirconium fire risk is negligible.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow Exelon to
reduce the minimum coverage limit for
onsite property damage insurance. As
stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the
NRC to grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when
the exemptions are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has
determined that the licensee’s proposed
reduction in onsite property damage
insurance coverage to a level of $50
million is consistent with SECY–96–
256. Moreover, the NRC staff concluded
that 488 days after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at TMI–1 to decrease the
probability of an onsite and offsite
radiological release from a postulated
zirconium fire accident to negligible
levels. In addition, the licensee’s
proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a
level of $50 million is consistent with
the maximum estimated cleanup costs
for the recovery from the rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste storage
tank.
The NRC staff has determined that
granting the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or the Commission’s
regulations. Therefore, based on its
review of the licensee’s exemption
request as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY–96–256, the NRC
staff concludes that the exemption is
authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue
Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
were established to provide financial
assurance that following a significant
nuclear incident, onsite conditions
could be stabilized and the site
decontaminated. The requirements of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level
of onsite insurance coverage for TMI–1
are predicated on the assumption that
the reactor is operating. However, TMI–
1 permanently shut down on September
20, 2019, and permanently defueled as
of September 26, 2019. The permanently
shutdown and defueled status of the
facility results in a significant reduction
in the number and severity of potential
accidents and, correspondingly, a
significant reduction in the potential for
and severity of onsite property damage.
The proposed reduction in the amount
of onsite insurance coverage does not
impact the probability or consequences
of potential accidents. The proposed
level of insurance coverage is
commensurate with the reduced
consequences of potential nuclear
accidents at TMI–1. Therefore, the NRC
staff concludes that granting the
requested exemption will not present an
undue risk to the health and safety of
the public.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the
Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not
eliminate any requirements associated
with physical protection of the site and
would not adversely affect the licensee’s
ability to physically secure the site or
protect special nuclear material.
Physical security measures at TMI–1 are
not affected by the requested exemption.
Therefore, the proposed exemption is
consistent with the common defense
and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present
whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be
available to stabilize reactor conditions
and cover onsite cleanup costs
associated with site decontamination
following an accident that results in the
release of a significant amount of
radiological material. Since TMI–1
permanently shut down on September
20, 2019, and permanently defueled as
of September 26, 2019, it is no longer
possible for the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents
or other credible events at TMI–1 to
exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. The licensee
has evaluated the consequences of
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis
conditions involving a loss of coolant
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Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 57 / Friday, March 26, 2021 / Notices
from the SFP. The analyses show that
488 days after the permanent cessation
of power operations on September 20,
2019, the likelihood of such an event
leading to a large radiological release is
negligible. The NRC staff’s evaluation of
the licensee’s analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the
licensee’s proposed $50 million level of
onsite insurance is consistent with the
bounding cleanup and decontamination
cost as discussed in SECY–96–256, to
account for the hypothetical rupture of
a large liquid radiological waste tank at
the TMI–1 site, should such an event
occur. Therefore, the NRC staff
concludes that the application of the
current requirements in 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in
onsite insurance coverage is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule for the permanently
shutdown and defueled TMI–1 reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special
circumstances are present whenever
compliance would result in undue
hardship or other costs that are
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the
licensee was required to continue to
maintain an onsite insurance level of
$1.06 billion, the associated insurance
premiums would be in excess of those
necessary and commensurate with the
radiological contamination risks posed
by the site. In addition, such insurance
levels would be significantly in excess
of other decommissioning reactor
facilities that have been granted similar
exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance
with the existing rule would result in an
undue hardship or other costs that are
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted and are significantly in excess
of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC’s approval of an exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding
that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from the requirement to prepare an
environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in
accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
of an exemption from the requirements
of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR
is a categorical exclusion provided that:
(i) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (iii) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no
significant construction impact; (v)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
As the Director, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery
and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, I have
determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because
reducing the licensee’s onsite property
damage insurance for TMI–1 does not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the
probability or consequences of an
accident previously evaluated; (2) create
the possibility of a new or different kind
of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of
safety. The exempted financial
protection regulation is unrelated to the
operation of TMI–1 or site activities.
Accordingly, there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure. The exempted
regulation is not associated with
construction so there is no significant
construction impact. The exempted
regulation does not concern the source
term (i.e., potential amount of radiation
in an accident) or any activities
conducted at the site. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential
for, or consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region resulting from issuance of
the requested exemption. The
requirement for onsite property damage
insurance involves surety, insurance,
and indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special
circumstances are present as set forth in
10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants Exelon an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for
TMI–1. TMI–1 permanently ceased
power operations on September 20,
2019. The exemption permits TMI–1 to
lower the minimum required onsite
insurance to $50 million 488 days after
permanent cessation of power
operations, which occurred on January
20, 2021.
The exemption is effective
immediately.
Dated: March 22, 2021.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Patricia K. Holahan,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2021–06328 Filed 3–25–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[SEC File No. 270–141, OMB Control No.
3235–0249]
Proposed Collection; Comment
Request
Upon Written Request, Copies Available
From: U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of FOIA Services,
100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549–2736
Extension:
Rule 12f–3
Notice is hereby given that pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(‘‘PRA’’) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) is soliciting comments
on the existing collection of information
provided for in Rule 12f–3 (17 CFR
240.12f–3), under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) (15 U.S.C.
78a et seq.). The Commission plans to
submit this existing collection of
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