In the Matter of: Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr., Respondent; Final Decision and Order

• Published date: 11 March 2021
• Record Number: 2021-05022
• Section: Notices
• Court: Industry And Security Bureau

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OMB Control Number: 0579–0332.

Summary of Collection: Section 901–

905 of the Federal Agriculture

Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (7

U.S.C. 1901) authorize the Secretary of

Agriculture to issue guidelines for

regulating the commercial

transportation of equine for slaughter,

by persons regularly engaged in that

activity within the United States.

Specifically, the Secretary is authorized

to regulate the food, water, and rest

provided to the equines equines while

they are in transit and to review related

issues be appropriate to ensuring that

these animals are treated humanely. To

implement the provisions of this Act,

the Veterinary Services program of the

U.S. Department of Agriculture’s

Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service (APHIS) has established

minimum standards to ensure the

humane movement of equines for

slaughter.

Need and Use of the Information:

APHIS will collect information in the

form of owner-shipper certificates of

fitness to travel to slaughter facility;

certificate of veterinary inspection;

application of backtags; collection of

business information on any person

found to be transporting horses to a

slaughtering facility; and recordkeeping.

The collected information is use to

ensure that equines being transported

for slaughter receive adequate food,

water, and rest and are treated

humanely. If the information was

collected less frequently or not

collected, APHIS’ ability to ensure that

equines destined for slaughter are

treated humanely would be significantly

hampered.

Description of Respondents: Business

or other for profit, Individuals or

Households, and Federal Government.

Number of Respondents: 332.

Frequency of Responses: Reporting:

On occasion ; Recordkeeping, and

Third-Party Disclosure:

Total Burden Hours: 8,608.

Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service

Title: National Veterinary Services

Laboratories Request Forms.

OMB Control Number: 0579–0430.

Summary of Collection: The Animal

Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 8301–

8317) provides the Secretary of

Agriculture broad authority to prohibit

or restrict, through orders and

regulations, the importation or entry of

any animal, article, or means of

conveyance if USDA determines that the

prohibition or restriction is necessary to

prevent the introduction or spread of

any pest or disease of livestock within

the United States. Disease prevention is

the most effective method for

maintaining a healthy animal

population.

In connection with this disease

prevention mission, the Animal and

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)

National Veterinary Services

Laboratories (NVSL) safeguard U.S.

animal health and contribute to public

health by ensuring that timely and

accurate laboratory support is provided

by their nationwide animal health

diagnostic system.

Need and Use of the Information:

APHIS will collect information using VS

Form 4–9, Request for Reagents or

Supplies; VS Form 4–10, NVSL

Customer Contact Update; and VS Form

4–11, NVSL Application for Laboratory

Training and; VS Form 12, NVSL

Laboratories Kit and Instrument Order

form. These forms are used to safeguard

the U.S. animal population from pests

and diseases. If the information was

collected less frequently or not

collected, APHIS would be unable to

process reagent orders or provide

requested training.

Description of Respondents: Foreign

Federal Government; Individuals or

households; Businesses; State, Local or

Tribal Government.

Number of Respondents: 1,115.

Frequency of Responses: Reporting:

On occasion.

Total Burden Hours: 1,223.

Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service

Title: Standardizing Phytosanitary

Treatment Regulations: Approval of

Cold Treatment and Irradiation

Facilities; Cold Treatment Schedules;

Establishment of Fumigation and Cold

Treatment Compliance Agree.

OMB Control Number: 0579–0450.

Summary of Collection: The United

States Department of Agriculture

(USDA) is responsible for preventing

plant diseases or insect pests from

entering the United States, preventing

the spread of pests and noxious weeds

not widely distributed into the United

States, and eradicating those imported

pests when eradication is feasible. The

Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 7701—et

seq.) authorizes the Department to carry

out this mission. Under the Plant

Protection Act, the Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is

authorized, among other things, to

regulate the importation of plants, plant

products, and other articles to prevent

the introduction of plant pests into the

United States. The phytosanitary

treatment regulations established

generic criteria that allows for the

approval of new cold treatment and

irradiation facilities; cold treatment

schedules; and the establishment of

fumigation and cold treatment

compliance agreements.

Need and Use of the Information:

APHIS will collect information using

PPQ form 519, Compliance Agreements,

PPQ form 530, Limited Permit and other

collection activities to provide generic

criteria for new cold treatment and

irradiation facilities, cold treatment

schedules, and the establishment of

fumigation and cold treatment

compliance agreements.

Description of Respondents: Business

or other for profit, State, Local, and

Tribal Government; Federal Government

(Foreign).

Number of Respondents: 92.

Frequency of Responses: Reporting;

Annually.

Total Burden Hours: 196.

Ruth Brown,

Departmental Information Collection

Clearance Officer.

[FR Doc. 2021–05055 Filed 3–10–21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

[Docket No. 19–BIS–0001]

In the Matter of: Alexander Brazhnikov,

Jr., Respondent; Final Decision and

Order

This matter is before me upon a

Recommended Decision and Order on

Sanction (‘‘Sanction RDO’’) of an

Administrative Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’). On

January 26, 2021, the ALJ referred the

Sanction RDO to me pursuant to 15 CFR

766.17(b)(2). In the Sanction RDO, the

ALJ found that Respondent Alexander

Brazhnikov, Jr. (‘‘Respondent’’) violated

15 CFR 764.2(d) by conspiring with

others to violate the Export

Administration Regulations (currently

codified at 15 CFR parts 730–774)

(‘‘EAR’’ or ‘‘Regulations’’) by exporting

regulated items to Russian End-Users on

the Entity List without the required

licenses. The ALJ recommended that a

denial of export privileges for 15 years

be assessed against Respondent. For the

reasons set forth below, I affirm the

Sanction RDO and issue the attached

Order imposing sanction.

As described in further detail below,

on April 21, 2020, in this same case, the

ALJ issued an Order Partially Granting

Motion for Summary Decision

(‘‘Summary Decision Order’’) in which

he found that Respondent had violated

the EAR. The ALJ attached the

Summary Decision Order to the

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1

Unless otherwise indicated, I have reproduced

the violation alleged in the Charging Letter exactly

as it is written. It includes all of the footnotes in

the charging section. The numbering of the

footnotes is different because the Charging Letter

had additional footnotes prior to the charging

section.

2

Brazhnikov pled guilty to all three counts of the

Criminal Information in Case No. 2:15–CR–300–01

(D. N.J.). [The remainder of the footnote references

an earlier footnote in the Charging Letter that was

not part of the charging section.]

3

A Schedule B number is a ten-digit number used

in the United States to classify physical goods for

export to another country.

4

These two transactions were among the overt

acts specifically alleged in Count Three (Conspiracy

to Violate IEEPA) of the Criminal Information to

which Brazhnikov pled guilty in the U.S. District

Court for the District of New Jersey ....

Brazhnikov admitted under oath that he was the

owner, chief executive officer, and principal

operator of the following four New Jersey-based

companies—ABN Universal, Inc., ZOND–R, Inc.,

Telecom Multipliers, and Electronic Consulting,

Inc.—and that these companies were used in

furtherance of the conspiracy.

5

The items were designated EAR99 under the

Regulations, which is a designation for items

subject to the Regulations but not listed on the

Commerce Control List. 15 CFR 772.1.

6

VNIITF has been on the Entity List since June

30, 1997. 62 FR 35,334 (Jun. 30, 1997). The VNIITF

Entity List listing has at all times relevant hereto

included VNIITF’s full name, the ‘‘VNIITF’’

acronym, and various VNIITF aliases (and related

acronyms), including the Federal State Unitary

Enterprise Russian Federal Nuclear Center—

Academician E.I. Zababkhin All-Russian Scientific

Research Institute of Technical Physics

(‘‘FGUPRFYaTs-VNIITF’’). FGUPRFYaTs-VNIITF

was added to the listing as an alias of VNIITF on

December 17, 2010. 75 FR 78,883 (Dec. 17, 2010).

7

See 15 CFR 744.11 and Supplement No. 4 to

part 744 of the Regulations (2008–2014).

8

In its Motion, BIS attached a copy of the

Criminal Information, Plea Agreement, Transcript

of Plea Hearing, and Judgment. Pursuant to 15 CFR

766.22(c), I have considered these documents in my

review.

Sanction RDO. I affirm the Summary

Decision Order as well.

I. Background

A. Respondent’s Criminal Conviction

On June 11, 2015, Respondent pled

guilty to a three-count Criminal

Information in the U.S. District Court for

the District of New Jersey. Count Three

charged Respondent with conspiracy to

willfully export from the United States

to Russia electronic components under

the jurisdiction of the Department of

Commerce without first having obtained

the required licenses from the

Department of Commerce, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. 371. The object of the

conspiracy was to evade the EAR by

supplying controlled electronics

components to Russian end-users,

including defense contractors licensed

to procure parts for the Russian military,

the Federal Security Service of the

Russian Federation (FSB), and Russian

entities involved in the design of

nuclear weapons and tactical platforms.

The overt acts alleged in furtherance of

the conspiracy included that on or about

November 20, 2013, and on or about

April 23, 2014, Respondent and his co-

conspirators caused the export of

electronic components obtained from

certain U.S. manufacturers to Russia on

behalf of ‘‘a banned entity for which no

export license could have lawfully been

obtained.’’ Respondent specifically

admitted to engaging in these overt acts

as part of his plea allocution.

B. BIS Charging Letter

In a Charging Letter filed on April 22,

2019, the Bureau of Industry and

Security (‘‘BIS’’) alleged that

Respondent committed one violation of

the EAR, stemming from his

involvement in a conspiracy to violate

the Regulations in connection with the

export to Russia of U.S.-origin electronic

components and other items subject to

the Regulations. The violation alleged in

the charging letter is as follows:

1

Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy

1. Beginning in at least January 2008, and

continuing through at least June 2014,

Brazhnikov conspired and acted in concert

with others, known and unknown, to bring

about acts that constitute violations of the

Regulations. The purpose of the conspiracy

was to evade the Regulations in connection

with the export to Russia of U.S.-origin

electronic components and other items

subject to the Regulations, including to

Russian entities on BIS’s Entity List,

Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the

Regulations.

2. Brazhnikov pled guilty in the U.S.

District Court for the District of New Jersey

on June 11, 2015, to having conspired to

violate the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (‘‘IEEPA’’) (in violation

of 18 U.S.C. 371), as well as to having

conspired to smuggle goods from the United

States (in violation of 18 U.S.C. 554) and to

commit money laundering (in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1956(h)).

2

3. Brazhnikov admitted under oath as part

of his plea allocution that he and his co-

conspirators acquired U.S.-origin electronic

components and other items while routinely

concealing from the U.S. manufacturers and

distributors of the items who the intended

end users were and where they were located.

4. Brazhnikov admitted under oath to

further concealing the actual intended end

users in an attempt to avoid detection by the

U.S. Government, including by re-packaging

and re-labeling the items and then having

them shipped to various falsely-identified

recipients and false addresses in Russia,

some of which were vacant apartments or

storefronts controlled by his Russian co-

conspirators. If Brazhnikov had exported the

items directly to a recipient or address on

BIS’s Entity List, it raised the possibility that

the shipment would have been flagged or

stopped by the U.S. Government. He also

admitted that he and his Russian co-

conspirators established a number of foreign

bank accounts in third countries in the

names of front companies, in order to conceal

from the U.S. Government, the source of the

funds and the identities of the end-users.

Brazhnikov would receive funds laundered

through these front accounts in third

countries, rather than directly from the end

users in Russia.

5. Brazhnikov also admitted under oath to

having systematically falsified shipping

documents to understate the value of the

U.S.-origin items he was exporting, in order

to evade the requirement to file Electronic

Export Information (‘‘EEI’’) with the U.S.

Government via the Automated Export

System (‘‘AES’’). An EEI filing was required

to be made in the AES for each export of

items subject to the Regulations when the

value of the items under a single Schedule

B or Harmonized Tariff Schedule number is

more than $2,500. 15 CFR 758.l (2008–2014);

see also 15 CFR 30.37 (2008–2014).

3

6. Brazhnikov’s overt acts in furtherance of

the conspiracy also included, inter alia,

exporting U.S.-origin electronic components

subject to the Regulations to the All-Russian

Scientific Research Institute of the Technical

Physics (‘‘VNIITF’’) in Russia, without the

required BIS licenses, on or about November

20, 2013, and on or about April 23, 2014,

respectively.

4

These items were designated

EAR99

5

under the Regulations and valued at

approximately $26,732 and $19,937,

respectively.

7. VNIITF was at all times relevant hereto

listed on the Entity List, Supplement No. 4

to Part 744 of the Regulations.

6

Pursuant to

Section 744.11 of the Regulations and

VNIITF’s Entity List entry, a BIS export

license was at all relevant times required to

export any item subject to the Regulations to

VNIITF, including the electronic components

described in Paragraph 6, supra.

7

8. Brazhnikov engaged in the unlicensed

exports described above knowing that that

[sic] no BIS export license had been sought

or obtained. He continued to do so,

moreover, even after though [sic] BIS Special

Agents conducted an outreach visit with him

on or about January 23, 2013, during which

the Special Agents discussed, inter alia, both

the licensing requirements for exports to

Russia and EEI filing requirements.

9. In so doing, as alleged in Paragraphs 1–

8, supra, Brazhnikov violated Section

764.2(d) of the Regulations.

C. Summary Decision Order

On December 16, 2019, BIS filed a

motion for summary decision pursuant

to 15 CFR 766.8. BIS argued that as a

result of Respondent’s criminal

conviction for Count Three, there was

no genuine issue of material fact as to

whether he had violated the EAR as

alleged in the Charging Letter, and that

BIS was entitled to a summary decision

as a matter of law.

8

On February 10,

2020, Respondent filed an opposition to

the motion.

On April 21, 2020, the ALJ issued the

Summary Decision Order. The ALJ

determined that BIS had met its burden

to show that there was no genuine issue

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of material fact as to the allegations

supporting the violation alleged in the

charging letter, and accordingly found

that Respondent violated 15 CFR

764.2(d). As BIS had not argued for a

particular sanction in its motion, the

ALJ ordered the parties to submit

written briefs stating their position as to

an appropriate sanction. The ALJ did

not certify his ruling in the Summary

Decision Order to the Under Secretary

for final decision.

D. Sanction RDO

On May 29, 2020, BIS submitted a

brief requesting that the ALJ recommend

that Respondent’s export privileges be

denied for at least 15 years. On that

same day, Respondent filed a brief

arguing that a six-month denial period

was appropriate.

On January 26, 2021, the ALJ issued

the Sanction RDO recommending a 15-

year denial period. In the Sanction RDO,

the ALJ again found that Respondent

had violated 15 CFR 764.2. As

previously stated, the Sanction RDO

incorporated the Summary Decision

Order as an attachment. The ALJ

referred the Sanction RDO to me for

review and final decision.

II. Review by Under Secretary

A. Introduction

Under Section 766.17(b)(2) of the

EAR, in proceedings such as this one,

the ALJ shall issue a recommended

decision that includes recommended

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

findings as to whether there has been a

violation of the EAR or any order,

license or authorization issued

thereunder. If the ALJ finds that one or

more violations have been committed,

the ALJ shall recommend an order

imposing administrative sanctions, or

such other action as the ALJ deems

appropriate. The ALJ must also

‘‘immediately certify’’ the record to the

Under Secretary for a final decision in

accordance with Section 766.22 of the

EAR.

The Under Secretary shall issue a

written order affirming, modifying or

vacating the recommended decision and

order of the ALJ based on the written

record for decision, including the

transcript of any hearing, and any

submissions by the parties concerning

the recommended decision. 15 CFR

766.22(c).

On February 5, 2021, I issued a notice

to the parties clarifying that my review

of this case would include both the

Sanction RDO and the incorporated

Summary Decision Order and, taking

note that Respondent had been

representing himself, gave the parties

additional time, until February 17, 2021,

to respond to both decisions.

B. Submissions of the Parties in

Response to the ALJ’s Decisions and

Orders

On February 17, 2021, BIS submitted

a response recommending that I find

that Respondent had violated the EAR

and affirm the recommended sanction.

Respondent did not submit a response

or a reply to the BIS response.

C. Review of Summary Decision Order

and Sanction RDO

In the Summary Decision Order and

again in the Sanction RDO, the ALJ

correctly found that ‘‘[b]etween January

2008 through June 2014, Respondent

violated 15 CFR 764.2(d) by conspiring

with others to violate the EAR by

exporting regulated items to Russian

end-users on BIS’ Entity List without

the required licenses.’’ Respondent, in

pleading guilty to Count Three of the

Information, admitted to all of the

material facts alleged in the Charging

Letter. The District Court, in accepting

the Defendant’s guilty plea, determined

that there was a factual basis to support

the plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)

(‘‘Before entering judgment on a guilty

plea, the court must determine that

there is a factual basis for the plea.’’).

As the ALJ concluded in the

Summary Decision Order, under the

doctrine of collateral estoppel,

Respondent cannot challenge the

underlying facts that he admitted to in

his criminal case. See SEC. v. Bilzerian,

29 F.3d 689, 694 (D.C. 1994)

(‘‘[C]ollateral estoppel prohibits

relitigation of an issue of fact or law that

has been decided in earlier litigation.’’).

In this case, the Charging Letter

included underlying facts from

Respondent’s criminal case that

establish as a matter of law that

Respondent violated Section 764.2(d).

The Sanction RDO recommended an

order imposing a denial of export

privileges for 15 years as a penalty

against Respondent. In recommending

this penalty, the ALJ noted the years-

long scheme, the sophisticated effort to

evade detection, the deliberateness of

the violation, and that the end-user for

the transactions described in the

Charging Letter was an organization on

BIS’s Entity List that poses a risk to U.S.

national security. The ALJ’s analysis in

support of the recommended sanction

was well-reasoned and persuasive. I

agree with his determination that a 15-

year denial of export privileges is

appropriate.

III. Conclusion and Final Order

Based on my review of the written

record and for the reasons described

above, I affirm the recommended

finding in the Summary Decision Order

and Sanction RDO that Respondent

violated the EAR as alleged in the

Charging Letter, and affirm the

recommended sanction of a 15-year

denial of export privileges in the

Sanction RDO.

Accordingly, it is therefore ordered:

FIRST, that for a period of Fifteen (15)

years from the date that this Order is

published in the Federal Register,

Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr., with a last

known address of 234 Central Avenue,

Mountainside, New Jersey 07092, and

when acting for or on his behalf, his

successors, assigns, representatives,

agents, or employees (hereinafter

collectively referred to as ‘‘Denied

Person’’), may not, directly or indirectly,

participate in any way in any

transaction involving any commodity,

software or technology (hereinafter

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’)

exported or to be exported from the

United States that is subject to the EAR,

or in any other activity subject to the

EAR, including, but not limited to:

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using

any license, license exception, or export

control document;

B. Carrying on negotiations

concerning, or ordering, buying,

receiving, using, selling, delivering,

storing, disposing of, forwarding,

transporting, financing, or otherwise

servicing in any way, any transaction

involving any item exported or to be

exported from the United States that is

subject to the EAR, or engaging in any

other activity subject to the EAR; or

C. Benefitting in any way from any

transaction involving any item exported

or to be exported from the United States

that is subject to the EAR, or from any

other activity subject to the EAR.

SECOND, that no person may, directly

or indirectly, do any of the following:

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf

of the Denied Person any item subject to

the EAR;

B. Take any action that facilitates the

acquisition or attempted acquisition by

the Denied Person of the ownership,

possession, or control of any item

subject to the EAR that has been or will

be exported from the United States,

including financing or other support

activities related to a transaction

whereby the Denied Person acquires or

attempts to acquire such ownership,

possession or control;

C. Take any action to acquire from or

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted

acquisition from the Denied Person of

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9

The Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR

parts 730–774, were promulgated under the Export

Administration Act of 1979 (‘‘EAA’’), formerly

codified at 50 U.S.C. 4601–4623. The offenses in

this case occurred between January 2008 and June

2014. Although the EAA had expired prior to 2008,

the President, through Executive Order 13,222 of

August 17, 2001, and through successive

Presidential Notices, continued the EAR in full

force and effect under the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (‘‘IEEPA’’), codified at 50

U.S.C. 1701, et seq. Accordingly, at the time the

offenses occurred, BIS had jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to the IEEPA and the EAR. The

EAA was repealed in 2018, with the enactment of

the Export Control Reform Act (‘‘ECRA’’). See 50

U.S.C. 4826. The ECRA provides BIS with

permanent statutory authority to administer the

EAR. The ECRA specifically states that all

administrative or judicial proceedings commenced

prior to its enactment are not disturbed by the new

legislation. See Id. Accordingly, BIS currently has

jurisdiction over this matter, as it did at the time

of the alleged offenses.

any item subject to the EAR that has

been exported from the United States;

D. Obtain from the Denied Person in

the United States any item subject to the

EAR with knowledge or reason to know

that the item will be, or is intended to

be, exported from the United States; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service

any item subject to the EAR that has

been or will be exported from the

United States and which is owned,

possessed or controlled by the Denied

Person, or service any item, of whatever

origin, that is owned, possessed or

controlled by the Denied Person if such

service involves the use of any item

subject to the EAR that has been or will

be exported from the United States. For

purposes of this paragraph, servicing

means installation, maintenance, repair,

modification or testing.

THIRD, after notice and opportunity

for comment as provided in Section

766.23 of the EAR, any person, firm,

corporation, or business organization

related to the Denied Person by

ownership, control, position of

responsibility, affiliation, or other

connection in the conduct of trade or

business may also be made subject to

the provisions of this Order.

FOURTH, that this Order shall be

served on Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr. and

on BIS, and shall be published in the

Federal Register. In addition, the ALJ’s

Summary Decision Order and the

Sanction RDO described above, shall

also be published in the Federal

Register, except for the section with the

Recommended Order in the Sanction

RDO.

This Order, which constitutes the

final agency action in this matter, is

effective upon publication in the

Federal Register.

Dated: March 5, 2021.

Jeremy Pelter,

Senior Advisor for Policy and Program

Integration, Performing the Nonexclusive

Functions and Duties of the Under Secretary

of Commerce for Industry and Security.

United States of America

Department of Commerce

Bureau of Industry and Security

In the Matter of: Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr.,

Respondent

Docket No. 19–BIS–0001

Recommended Decision and Order on

Sanction

Issued: January 26, 2021

Issued By: Hon. Michael J. Devine,

Presiding

Appearances

For the Bureau of Industry and Security

Gregory Michelsen, Esq., Opher

Shweiki, Esq., Deborah A. Curtis,

Esq., U.S. Department of Commerce,

Room H–3839, 14th Street &

Constitution Ave. NW, Washington,

DC 20230

For Respondent

Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr., pro se, 234

Central Ave., Mountainside, NJ 07092

I. Procedural History

This case arises from Alexander

Brazhnikov, Jr.’s (Respondent) violation

of the Export Administration

Regulations (EAR or Regulations). Prior

to the institution of this administrative

proceeding, Respondent pled guilty in

the U.S. District Court for the District of

New Jersey on June 11, 2015, to, inter

alia, having conspired to violate the

International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA), the statutory

scheme that gave effect to the EAR.

9

On April 22, 2019, the Bureau of

Industry and Security (BIS or Agency)

initiated this administrative proceeding

by issuing a Charging Letter against

Respondent alleging one violation,

conspiracy to violate the EAR, under 15

CFR 764.2(d). The charge read as

follows:

Charge 1 15 CFR 764.2(d)—Conspiracy

1. Beginning in at least January 2008, and

continuing through at least June 2014,

Brazhnikov conspired and acted in concert

with others, known and unknown, to bring

about acts that constitute violations of the

Regulations. The purpose of the conspiracy

was to evade the Regulations in connection

with the export to Russia of U.S.-origin

electronic components and other items

subject to the Regulations, including to

Russian entities on BIS’ Entity List,

Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the

Regulations.

2. Brazhnikov pled guilty in the U.S.

District Court for the District of New Jersey

on June 11, 2015, to having conspired to

violate the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (‘‘IEEPA’’) (in violation

of 18 U.S.C. 371), as well as to having

conspired to smuggle goods from the United

States (in violation of 18 U.S.C. 554) and to

commit money laundering (in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1956(h)).

3. Brazhnikov admitted under oath as part

of his plea allocution that he and his co-

conspirators acquired U.S.-origin electronic

components and other items while routinely

concealing from the U.S. manufacturers and

distributors of the items who the intended

end users were and where they were located.

4. Brazhnikov admitted under oath to

further concealing the actual intended end

users in an attempt to avoid detection by the

U.S. Government, including by re-packaging

and re-labeling the items and then having

them shipped to various falsely-identified

recipients and false addresses in Russia,

some of which were vacant apartments or

storefronts controlled by his Russian co-

conspirators. If Brazhnikov had exported the

items directly to a recipient or address on

BIS’ Entity List, it raised the possibility that

the shipment would have been flagged or

stopped by the U.S. Government. He also

admitted that he and his Russian co-

conspirators established a number of foreign

bank accounts in third countries in the

names of front companies, in order to conceal

from the U.S. Government, the source of the

funds and the identities of the end-users.

Brazhnikov would receive funds laundered

through these front accounts in third

countries, rather than directly from the end

users in Russia.

5. Brazhnikov also admitted under oath to

having systematically falsified shipping

documents to understate the value of the

U.S.-origin items he was exporting, in order

to evade the requirement to file Electronic

Export Information (‘‘EEI’’) with the U.S.

Government via the Automated Export

System (‘‘AES’’). An EEI filing was required

to be made in the AES for each export of

items subject to the Regulations when the

value of the items under a single Schedule

B or Harmonized Tariff Schedule number is

more than $2,500. 15 CFR 758.1 (2008–2014;

see also 15 CFR 30.37 (2008–2014).

6. Brazhnikov’s overt acts in furtherance of

the conspiracy also included, inter alia,

exporting U.S.-origin electronic components

subject to the Regulations to the All-Russian

Scientific Research Institute of the Technical

Physics (‘‘VNIITF’’) in Russia, without the

required BIS licenses, on or about November

20, 2013, and on or about April 23, 2014,

respectively. These items were designated

EAR99 under the Regulations and valued at

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While the Charging Letter stated the value of

the transactions as $26,732 and $19,937, the

invoices produced by BIS to support this allegation

showed that the amounts were listed in rubles, not

dollars. This discrepancy did not affect the ALJ’s

determination that Respondent violated the EAR.

11

15 CFR 766.17(b)(2) states, in pertinent part, ‘‘If

the administrative law judge finds that one or more

violations have been committed, the judge shall

recommend an order imposing administrative

sanctions, as provided in part 764 of the EAR, or

such other action as the judge deems appropriate.’’

approximately $26,732 and $19,937,

respectively.

10

7. VNIITF was at all times relevant hereto

listed on the Entity List, Supplement No. 4

to Part 744 of the Regulations. Pursuant to

Section 744.11 of the Regulations and

VNIITF’s Entity List entry, a BIS export

license was at all relevant times required to

export any item subject to the Regulations to

VNIITF, including the electronic components

described in Paragraph 6, supra.

8. Brazhnikov engaged in the unlicensed

exports described above knowing that no BIS

export license had been sought or obtained.

He continued to do so, moreover, even after

though [sic] BIS Special Agents conducted an

outreach visit with him on or about January

23, 2013, during which the Special Agents

discussed, inter alia, both the licensing

requirements for exports to Russia and EEI

filing requirements.

9. In so doing, as alleged in Paragraph 1–

8, supra, Brazhnikov violated Section

764.2(d) of the Regulations.

Neither party requested a hearing in

this case, and accordingly, the ALJ

issued an Order on October 18, 2019,

holding that the parties had waived

their right to a hearing and the case

would proceed on the record, and

further setting forth a schedule for

discovery, motions, and final briefs. See

15 CFR 766.6(c) and 766.15.

On December 16, 2019, BIS filed a

Motion for Summary Decision with

supporting documentation, contending

Respondent’s criminal conviction in

U.S. District Court demonstrates there is

no dispute Respondent committed a

violation of the EAR under 15 CFR

764.2(d). In response, Respondent filed

an opposition to the motion.

On April 21, 2020, the ALJ issued an

Order Partially Granting Motion for

Summary Decision (Summary Decision

Order), finding Respondent’s arguments

did not create a genuine issue of

material fact and that BIS was entitled

to a decision as a matter of law that

Respondent violated the EAR under 15

CFR 764.2(d). Respondent did not

dispute his conviction and did not

object to the documents BIS attached to

its Motion, which included his plea

allocution. Respondent was thus

collaterally estopped from denying the

facts set forth in the Charging Letter, as

they were the same facts to which

Respondent admitted through his guilty

plea in the federal criminal case.

Accordingly, the ALJ found Charge 1

proved, but reserved ruling on the

sanction. The Summary Decision Order

included Recommended Findings of

Fact and Recommended Ultimate

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. See Attachment A.

On May 29, 2020, BIS submitted a

final brief contending Respondent

should be denied export privileges for at

least 15 years. On the same date,

Respondent filed a brief, in the form of

a letter, arguing that deprivation of

export privileges for six months would

be a sufficient sanction.

The record is now ripe for decision on

sanction.

II. Recommended Findings of Fact

Regarding Sanction

After considering the whole record,

including the parties’ final briefs, and

the Summary Decision Order, I find the

following facts proved by preponderant

evidence:

1. As part of the conspiracy lasting

between January 2008 and June 2014,

Russian customers, including Russian

defense contractors, paid Respondent and his

co-conspirators to procure the U.S.-origin

electronics. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4 at p.

18 (Respondent’s Plea Allocution)).

2. To conceal the source of the funds and

thus the identities of the Russian customers,

Respondent and his co-conspirators

established bank accounts held by foreign

shell companies and moved the funds from

the Russian customers to those bank

accounts. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4 at pp.

17–21 (Respondent’s Plea Allocution)).

3. Respondent deliberately concealed the

identities of the true end-users (including the

VNIITF) of the electronics from the U.S.

vendors and U.S. authorities by utilizing

New Jersey corporations founded by

Respondent to repackage the items for export

to Russia, and by shipping the items to false

addresses in Russia, e.g., vacant apartments.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4 at pp. 21–22

(Respondent’s Plea Allocution)).

4. Respondent falsified the value of the

exported items to evade the requirements for

filing EEI forms, in an attempt to conceal the

extent of the activities from U.S. authorities.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4 at p. 22

(Respondent’s Plea Allocution)).

5. Respondent and his co-conspirators

were responsible for illegal export

transactions totaling over $65 million. (Mot.

for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4, p. 24 (Respondent’s

Plea Allocution)).

III. Discussion

A. Burden of Proof

The Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) governs proceedings for

administrative penalties for EAR

violations. 5 U.S.C. 554, et seq. See 50

U.S.C. 4819(c)(2) (‘‘Any civil penalty

under this subsection may be imposed

only after notice and opportunity for an

agency hearing on the record in

accordance with sections 554 through

557 of Title 5.’’) Pursuant to the APA,

the burden in this proceeding lies with

BIS to prove the charge against

Respondent by reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. 556(d).

The ‘‘reliable, probative, and

substantial’’ standard is synonymous

with the ‘‘preponderance of the

evidence’’ standard of proof. Steadman

v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981); In the

Matter of Abdulmir Madi, et al., 68 FR

57406 (October 3, 2003).

As noted in the Summary Decision

Order, BIS has already established there

is no genuine dispute of material fact

concerning the alleged violations.

Concrete Pipe & Products v.

Construction Laborers Pension Trust,

508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). Therefore, at

this stage of the proceedings, those facts

in the Summary Decision Order are

established. However, BIS still retains

the burden to prove any additional

aggravating facts offered in support of

its request for sanction with

preponderant evidence, meaning BIS

must show the fact’s existence is more

probable than not. 5 U.S.C. 556(d). After

determining which facts have been

proven by preponderant evidence, it is

then up to the ALJ to determine an

appropriate sanction.

11

B. Determining an Appropriate Sanction

Section 764.3 of the EAR describes

the permissible sanctions BIS may seek

for the violation charged in this

proceeding: (1) A civil penalty, (2) a

denial of export privileges under the

Regulations, and (3) an exclusion from

practice. See 15 CFR 764.3. Supplement

Number 1 to 15 CFR part 766, titled

Guidance on Charging and Penalty

Determinations in Settlement of

Administrative Enforcement Cases

(‘‘Penalty Guidance’’), provides non-

binding guidance on penalty

determinations in the context of

settlement discussions between BIS and

respondents in administrative

enforcement cases. The Penalty

Guidance was created to aid settlement

negotiations, and does not create any

right or obligation as to what penalty or

sanction BIS may seek after litigation;

however, it provides helpful guideposts

for considering an appropriate sanction

even in the context of a litigated

enforcement action.

1. Aggravation

The Penalty Guidance discusses

actions that may be considered

‘‘aggravating factors.’’ Such actions

include conduct that shows the

respondent knew he/she was violating

U.S. laws or regulations, i.e., a

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BIS demonstrated by preponderant evidence

that Respondent shipped items to VNIITF in

violation of the EAR, as set forth fully in the

Summary Decision Order.

13

BIS cites to the information provided by the

Nuclear Threat Initiative on its website, https://

www.nti.org/learn/facilities/926/.

deliberate intent to violate the EAR;

intentional concealment of conduct for

the purpose of misleading authorities or

other parties involved in the

transaction; and conduct that implicates

U.S. national security and/or U.S.

foreign policy, e.g., by exporting items

to individuals/organizations on BIS

‘‘Entity List.’’ See 15 CFR part 766,

Supp. No. 1, at § III ‘‘Aggravating

Factors.’’

As addressed in the Findings of Fact,

above, Respondent admitted to engaging

in deliberate acts with his co-

conspirators meant to conceal their

actions, including creating bank

accounts for shell companies to conceal

the true source of the funds, using his

New Jersey-based corporations to

repackage and ship the items to the

Russian end-users, shipping

components to false addresses to

conceal the true identity of the Russian

end-users, and falsifying the value of the

exports to evade EEI filing requirements.

Respondent admitted to these acts in his

plea allocution before the Federal

District Court, and accordingly BIS has

proven these facts by preponderant

evidence. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4

(Respondent’s Plea Allocution)). A

party’s deliberateness in violating the

EAR and concealment of the conduct

are aggravating factors that are given

substantial weight. See 15 CFR part 766,

Supp No. 1, at §§ III(A) and IV(B). There

is no dispute that Respondent willfully

and deliberately used sophisticated

tactics to evade detection by U.S.

authorities and to conceal the identities

of the true end-users from the U.S.

vendors.

In its final brief, BIS asserts that

pursuant to section 764.3 of the

regulations, BIS may seek

administrative sanctions including a

civil penalty of up to $307,922 per

violation or twice the value of the

transaction upon which the penalty is

imposed, whichever is greater. BIS also

states that in view of the $65 million

criminal forfeiture imposed in regard to

the criminal action, BIS is not

recommending an additional civil

penalty in this matter, but contends

Respondent’s conduct is of such a

serious nature that a 15-year denial of

export privileges is ‘‘not only necessary

but proportionate to other cases,

especially considering the activities of

the prohibited end-users at issue such as

VNIITF.’’ (BIS Final Brief, p. 9).

12

BIS

argues that VNIITF assists Russia in the

development of its nuclear weapons

program.

13

VNIITF is currently, and was

at the time of Respondent’s conduct, on

BIS’ Entity List. The Entity List was

established to identify organizations

that pose a significant national security

concern:

The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part

744) identifies persons reasonably believed to

be involved, or to pose a significant risk of

being or becoming involved, in activities

contrary to the national security or foreign

policy interests of the United States. The

entities are added to the Entity List pursuant

to sections of part 744 (Control Policy: End–

User and End–Use Based) and part 746

(Embargoes and Other Special Controls) of

the EAR.

15 CFR 744.16 (emphasis supplied).

The degree to which the conduct

implicates national security concerns

due to the sensitivity of the items

exported or the nature of the recipient

of the exports is another factor that is

given substantial weight. Here, the

recipient, VNIITF, is considered an

organization to which exports must be

carefully controlled because of potential

harm to the national security or foreign

policy. Respondent’s conduct in

providing VNIITF with electronic

components is highly troubling.

2. Mitigation

The Penalty Guidance likewise

discusses actions that may be

considered ‘‘mitigating factors.’’ Such

actions include immediate cessation of

the unlawful conduct once it was

discovered, quick and decisive efforts to

ascertain the cause and extent of the

violation, and exceptional cooperation

with the agency to investigate and

resolve violations. See 15 CFR part 766,

Supp. No. 1, at § III ‘‘Mitigating

Factors.’’

In his Final Brief, Respondent

presents the following in support of his

contention that a six-month denial of

export privileges is appropriate:

[C]onsidering that throughout the whole

time of COVID–19 I have been working at the

forefront and providing services to the

community, as well as a small amount of

offense, I believe that deprivation of export

privileges for 6 months will be sufficient

sanctions.

Resp. Final Brief, p. 1.

Respondent did not elaborate on his

efforts to aid those impacted by COVID–

19 or explain why that should be

considered a mitigating factor in these

administrative enforcement

proceedings.

In his opposition to BIS’ Motion for

Summary Decision, Respondent did not

acknowledge his responsibility for his

violations of the EAR, but instead

asserted that his father took

responsibility for the charges.

Respondent’s failure to acknowledge his

responsibility came after he pled guilty

in the criminal case and formally

admitted in a plea hearing before a U.S.

District Court judge that he had engaged

in the violations and acts of

concealment discussed above. In

addition to avoiding an admission of

responsibility, Respondent has not

presented any evidence that he will

implement an export compliance

program, or make any effort to ensure

his activities comport with export

regulations, if he is allowed to continue

in the export business. Likewise, he has

not demonstrated cooperation in any

significant manner with BIS in the

present case. A mere contention of some

form of community service relating to

the COVID–19 pandemic is not evidence

and does not present any valid basis for

mitigation of sanctions for the charged

violations.

3. Analysis of Respondent’s Conduct in

Comparison With Other Administrative

Penalty Cases

BIS points to the imposition of a 10-

year denial of export privileges in the

case In the Matters of: Trilogy

International Associates, Inc., William

Michael Johnson, Respondents, 83 FR

9259 (Mar. 5, 2018). In Trilogy, the

course of conduct lasted from January

2010 through May 2010, wherein the

respondents exported an explosives

detector and 115 analog to digital

converters to Russia. The Under

Secretary of Commerce for Industry and

Security found the respondents were

‘‘willfully ignoring, or, at best, blinding

themselves to their compliance

obligations.’’ 83 FR at 9262. Trilogy did

not involve export of items to an

organization on the Entity List, and the

time period of the illegal acts was much

briefer than Respondent’s four-year

course of conduct. Moreover, unlike the

instant case, the respondents in Trilogy

were found to have ‘‘willfully ignored’’

or ‘‘blinded themselves’’ to the

regulations, as opposed to having

engaged in extensive, deliberate

concealment efforts. As such, a harsher

penalty for Respondent seems

appropriate.

BIS also cites two cases in which

administrative enforcement actions

were brought against the respondents

after they had been convicted of

conspiracy to violate the IEEPA under

18 U.S.C. 371 and 50 U.S.C. 1705, as in

the instant case, by exporting items to

Russian end-users. In those cases, In the

Matter of: Alexey Krutilin, 82 FR 43218

(Sep. 14, 2017) and In the Matter of:

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The Entity List is found in Supplement No. 4

to 15 CFR Part 744. It designates foreign persons,

businesses, and organizations to which export is

prohibited without a license.

Dmitrii Karpenko, 82 FR 43217 (Sep. 14,

2017), the Office of Export Enforcement

proceeded under 15 CFR 766.25, which

allows the immediate imposition of an

administrative penalty without the need

for a charging letter and opportunity for

hearing, but restricts the penalty to a

maximum ten-year denial of export

privileges. The respondent in Krutilin

was given the maximum ten-year denial

penalty. The respondent in Karpenko

was given a five-year denial penalty.

Neither of those cases mentioned the

involvement of Russian organizations

on the Entity List.

Another case cited by BIS involving a

clearly deliberate violation of export

control regulations is In the Matter of:

Yavuz Cizmeci, 80 FR 18194 (Apr. 3,

2015), wherein the respondent aided

Iran Air in procuring a Boeing 747 in

direct violation of a Temporary Denial

Order (‘‘TDO’’). The TDO, issued on

June 6, 2008, prohibited a company

called Ankair from ‘‘directly or

indirectly, participating in any way in

any transaction involving the Boeing

747 . . . .’’ Yet, on June 26, 2008, the

respondent, CEO of Ankair, assisted in

transferring possession of the plane to

Iran Air. The transaction value was

estimated at approximately $5.3 million.

The respondent settled the

administrative enforcement action and

agreed to a $50,000 civil penalty and a

20-year denial of export privileges.

While this case is factually distinct,

both cases involve intentional violations

of the EAR and transactions in the

millions of dollars.

4. Sanction Determination

Respondent violated the EAR by

conspiring with others to, inter alia,

export electronic components to an

organization on the Entity List.

Respondent further admitted to

engaging in a years’ long, sophisticated

scheme to evade detection by U.S.

authorities. The deliberateness of

Respondent’s violations and

concealment efforts, the extent of the

activity, and the fact that Respondent

helped to export controlled items to an

organization that is considered to pose

a risk to U.S. national security, all

justify an extensive period of denial of

export privileges. Respondent failed to

provide any mitigating evidence.

Considering the 20-year denial imposed

in Cizmeci, the ten-year denials

imposed in Trilogy and Krutilin, and the

five-year denial imposed in Karpenko, a

15-year denial of export privileges for

Respondent’s conduct is comparable to

sanctions imposed in similar cases and

reasonable when considered in light of

the applicable Penalty Guidance factors.

Accordingly, I find that a 15-year denial

of export privileges is appropriate.

IV. Conclusions of Law

1. Respondent and the subject matter of

this proceeding are properly within the

jurisdiction of BIS pursuant to the Export

Control Reform Act of 2018 and the EAR. 50

U.S.C. 4826; 15 CFR parts 730–774.

2. Between January 2008 through June

2014, Respondent violated 15 CFR 764.2(d)

by conspiring with others to violate the EAR

by exporting regulated items to Russian end-

users on BIS’ Entity List without the required

licenses.

V. Recommended Order

[Redacted Section]

This Recommended Decision and

Order is being referred to the Under

Secretary for review and final action by

overnight carrier as provided under 15

CFR 766.17(b)(2). Due to the short

period of time for review by the Under

Secretary, all papers filed with the

Under Secretary in response to this

Recommended Decision and Order must

be sent by personal delivery, facsimile,

express mail, or other overnight carrier

as provided in 15 CFR 766.22(a).

Submissions by the parties must be

filed with the Under Secretary for

Export Administration, Bureau of

Industry and Security, U.S. Department

of Commerce, Room H–3898, 14th Street

and Constitution Avenue NW,

Washington, DC 20230, within twelve

(12) days from the date of issuance of

this Recommended Decision and Order.

Thereafter, the parties have eight (8)

days from receipt of any responses in

which to submit replies. See 15 CFR

766.22(b).

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of

this Recommended Decision and Order,

the Under Secretary shall issue a written

order, affirming, modifying, or vacating

the Recommended Decision and Order.

See 15 CFR 766.22(c). A copy of the

regulations regarding review by the

Under Secretary can be found in

Attachment B.

[Signature of Michael J. Devine]

Michael J. Devine

U.S. Coast Guard Administrative Law Judge

Done and dated January 26, 2021, at

Baltimore, Maryland

Attachment A: April 21, 2020 Order

Partially Granting Motion for

Summary Decision

Attachment B: Review by Under

Secretary, 15 CFR 766.22

Attachment A

United States Department of Commerce

Bureau of Industry and Security

Washington, DC

In the Matter of: Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr.

Respondent

Docket No. 19–BIS–0001

Order Partially Granting Motion for

Summary Decision

Issued: April 21, 2020

Issued By: Hon. Michael J. Devine,

Presiding

Appearances

For the Bureau of Industry and Security

Gregory Michelsen, Esq., Joseph V. Jest,

Esq., Deborah A. Curtis, Esq., U.S.

Department of Commerce, Room H–

3839, 14th Street & Constitution Ave.

NW, Washington, DC 20230

For Respondent

Alexander Brazhnikov, Jr., pro se, 234

Central Ave., Mountainside, NJ 07092

I. Preliminary Statement

The Bureau of Industry and Security

(BIS) initiated this administrative

enforcement action against Alexander

Brazhnikov, Jr. (Respondent) by serving

a Charging Letter against him on April

22, 2019. BIS brought one Charge

against Respondent, under 15 CFR

764.2(d), alleging he conspired with

others to do acts that constitute

violations of the Export Administration

Regulations (EAR).

As the basis for Charge 1, BIS alleged

Respondent conspired with others from

January 2008 through June 2014 to

export regulated electronic components

from the U.S. to Russian customers

listed on BIS’s ‘‘Entity List’’ without the

required licenses.

14

BIS supports Charge

1 with Respondent’s June 11, 2015

guilty plea and subsequent conviction

in the U.S. District Court for the District

of New Jersey of conspiracy to violate

the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA) by acting with

others to cause the export of electronic

components from United States

manufacturers to Russia on behalf of an

entity for which no export license could

have lawfully been obtained. According

to the Charging Letter, the facts

underlying the criminal case are the

same as the facts underlying this

administrative action.

On December 16, 2019, BIS filed a

Motion for Summary Decision, arguing

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Respondent’s conviction demonstrates

there is no dispute Respondent

committed a violation of the EAR under

15 CFR 764.2(d). Respondent filed a late

response on February 10, 2020, listing

his contentions in three numbered

paragraphs, arguing (1) his father took

responsibility for all of the actions

alleged in the Charging Letter, (2) BIS

did not prove that ‘‘these parts were

U.S.-Origin,’’ and (3) the total cost of the

exported items listed in two sample

invoices attached by BIS to its Motion

for Summary Decision was $734.58. For

the reasons set forth below, the

undersigned is PARTIALLY GRANTING

BIS’ Motion for Summary Decision.

II. Recommended Findings of Fact

1. Respondent pled guilty to a federal

criminal charge of conspiracy to violate the

International Emergency Economic Powers

Act (IEEPA) in the U.S. District Court for the

District of New Jersey on June 11, 2015, Case.

No. 2:15–CR–00300–WJM–1. (Mot. for

Summ. Dec., p. 4–5; Ex. 2; Ex. 3; Ex. 4; Ex.

5).

2. Between January 2008 and June 2014,

Respondent exported electronic components

from U.S. vendors to Russian end-users.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., pp. 5–6, 8; Ex. 4 at p.

17–18).

3. On or about November 20, 2013,

Respondent exported multiple shipments of

electronic components to the All-Russian

Scientific Research Institute of Technical

Physics (VNIITF) Academician E.I.

Zababakhina. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 2 at

p. 15; Ex. 4 at p. 24; Ex. 11).

4. Some of the items in the November 20,

2013 shipments were electronic components

on the Commerce Control List under ECCN

EAR99. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 9).

5. On or about April 23, 2014, Respondent

exported electronic components to VNIITF

Academician E.I. Zababakhina. (Mot. for

Summ. Dec., Ex. 2 at p. 15; Ex. 4 at 24; Ex.

12).

6. The components in the April 23, 2014

shipment were on the Commerce Control List

under ECCN EAR99. (Mot. for Summ. Dec.,

Ex. 10).

7. BIS placed the VNIITF on the Entity List

in 1997, and it remained there at all times

during 2008 through 2014. (Mot. for Summ.

Dec., pp. 8–9); see Entity List at Supplement

No. 4 to 15 CFR part 744.

8. BIS added the Academician E.I.

Zababakhina to the Entity List as an alias for

the VNIITF in 2010. (Mot. for Summ. Dec.,

pp. 8–9); see Entity List at Supplement No.

4 to 15 CFR part 744.

9. Respondent exported the afore-

mentioned items without obtaining a BIS

license.

III. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The alleged offenses occurred

between January 2008 and June 2014. At

that time, BIS had jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to the IEEPA and the

EAR promulgated under the Export

Administration Act of 1979 (EAA),

codified at 50 U.S.C. 4601–4623. See 15

CFR parts 730–774. Although the EAA

had lapsed at that time, the President,

through Executive Order 13,222 of

August 17, 2001, and through

successive Presidential Notices,

continued the regulations in full force

and effect under the IEEPA. 50 U.S.C.

1701, et seq.

In August 2018, Congress enacted the

John S. McCain National Defense

Authorization Act containing the Export

Control Reform Act of 2018, which

repealed much of the EAA but provided

BIS with permanent statutory authority

to administer the EAR. See 50 U.S.C.

4826. The 2018 Act specifically states

all administrative actions made or

administrative proceedings commenced

prior to its enactment are not disturbed

by the new legislation. See Id.

Accordingly, BIS currently has

jurisdiction over this matter, as it did at

the time of the alleged offenses.

B. Standard of Review for Summary

Decision

The regulations governing BIS civil

penalty enforcement proceedings allow

a party to move for summary decision

disposing of some or all of the issues in

the case if there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and the moving

party is entitled to summary decision as

a matter of law. 15 CFR 766.8. A dispute

over a material fact is ‘‘genuine’’ if the

evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could render a ruling in favor of

the non-moving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

The moving party bears the initial

burden of production to identify those

portions of the record that demonstrate

an absence of genuine issues of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 330–331 (1986). Once the moving

party meets that initial burden, the

burden of production then shifts to the

non-moving party to identify specific

evidentiary material that demonstrates a

genuine issue for trial. Id. Mere denials

of allegations are not sufficient to

demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact. Sanders v. Nunley, 634 F.Supp.

474, 476 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

When considering the ultimate

burden of persuasion, the ALJ must

apply the ‘‘substantive evidentiary

standard of proof that would apply at

the trial on the merits.’’ Liberty Lobby,

477 U.S. at 252. Here, the standard of

proof is the standard set forth in the

Administrative Procedure Act—a

preponderance of the evidence. 50

U.S.C. 4819(c)(2); Sea Island

Broadcasting Corp. of S.C. v. F.C.C., 627

F.2d 240, 243 (1980).

C. No Genuine Issue of Material Fact

Exists

1. Legal Basis for Charge 1 (15 CFR

764.2(d)—Conspiracy)

According to Charge 1, BIS alleges

Respondent conspired with others to

violate the EAR under 15 CFR 764.2(d),

from January 2008 through June 2014 to

procure electronic components from

U.S. vendors and export the

components to Russian end-users, while

evading U.S. licensing regulations

prohibiting such export transactions.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 1 [Charging

Letter], pp. 1–3). The electronic

components were listed on BIS’s

Commerce Control List. The Russian

end-users were listed on BIS’ Entity

List, and, as such, were entities deemed

by the U.S. ‘‘to pose a significant risk of

being or becoming involved, in

activities contrary to the national

security or foreign policy interests of the

United States.’’ 15 CFR 744.16.

a. Regulation of Items on the Commerce

Control List

BIS maintains authority over the

exportation of certain items. These

items are listed on the Commerce

Control List (CCL), and divided into

categories, such as ‘‘nuclear materials,’’

‘‘telecommunications and information

security,’’ and ‘‘aerospace and

propulsion.’’ 15 CFR 774.1(a); 15 CFR

738.2(a). Categories are divided into

groups, such as ‘‘materials,’’ ‘‘software,’’

and ‘‘technology.’’ 15 CFR 738.2(b).

Within each category and group, items

are identified by an Export Control

Classification Number (ECCN). 15 CFR

738.2(d).

An ECCN listing provides information

on the reasons that BIS regulates that

particular item; one must cross-

reference the information in the ECCN

listing with information provided in the

Commerce Country Chart to determine

if a license is required to export the item

to a particular country. 15 CFR 738.2,

738.4; Supplement No. 1 to Part 738

(Commerce Country Chart).

b. Regulation of Exports to Entities on

the Entity List

In addition to the Commerce Control

List, the EAR provides another layer of

regulation by way of the Entity List,

which specifies individuals, businesses,

and organizations to whom the export of

certain items is prohibited without a

license. With regard to the Entity List,

the EAR provides:

The Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to part

744) identifies persons reasonably believed to

be involved, or to pose a significant risk of

being or becoming involved, in activities

contrary to the national security or foreign

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Respondent was convicted of the crime

codified at 18 U.S.C. 371 (‘‘Conspiracy to commit

offense or to defraud United States’’). The IEEPA

specifies that violation of its terms can result in

criminal penalties pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1705

(‘‘Penalties’’).

policy interests of the United States. The

entities are added to the Entity List pursuant

to sections of part 744 (Control Policy: End-

User and End-Use Based) and part 746

(Embargoes and Other Special Controls) of

the EAR.

(a) License requirements. The public is

hereby informed that in addition to the

license requirements for items specified on

the Commerce Control List (CCL), you may

not export, reexport, or transfer (in-country)

items specified on the Entity List to listed

entities without a license from BIS. The

specific license requirement for each listed

entity is identified in the license requirement

column on the Entity List in Supplement No.

4 to this part.

15 CFR 744.16.

As stated in the regulation, above,

items subject to regulation by virtue of

being on the Commerce Control List

may also be subject to additional

regulation if the end-users are listed on

the Entity List.

c. Respondent Is Collaterally Estopped

From Denying the Facts Set Forth in the

Charging Letter Due to Guilty Plea in

Related Federal Criminal Case

BIS contends no genuine issue of

material fact exists as to Charge 1

because Respondent pled guilty to a

Federal criminal charge of conspiracy to

violate the IEEPA

15

in the U.S. District

Court for the District of New Jersey on

June 11, 2015, in Case. No. 2:15–CR–

00300–WJM–1. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., p.

4–5; Ex. 2 (Criminal Information); Ex. 3

(Plea Agreement); Ex. 4 (Transcript of

Plea Hearing); Ex. 5 (Judgment in a

Criminal Case). The facts underlying the

criminal case are the same facts

underlying this administrative action.

BIS attached the Criminal Information

for Case. No. 2:15–CR–00300–WJM–1 to

its Motion for Summary Decision,

which describes in detail the actions

taken by Respondent and his co-

conspirators to export regulated items to

Russian organizations on the Entity List

without obtaining the required licenses.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 2). BIS also

attached the plea agreement executed by

Respondent, the transcript of the plea

hearing, the judgment of conviction, and

Respondent’s response to BIS’s Requests

for Admission in this administrative

action. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Exs. 3–6,

respectively).

Through his responses to the Requests

for Admission, Respondent conceded

the authenticity of the documents

related to his criminal conviction

attached to BIS’ Motion for Summary

Decision. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 6 at

Requests for Admission Nos. 1–3).

Respondent also admitted to many of

the underlying facts in his response to

the Requests for Admission. (Mot. for

Summ. Dec., Ex. 6 at Requests for

Admission Nos. 5, 7, 14, 16, 19, 26–30).

The facts Respondent did not admit to

in the Requests for Admission are

contradicted by Respondent’s

statements made under oath during the

plea hearing. For example, Respondent

denied the following Request for

Admission:

15. Admit that Respondent Alexander

Brazhnikov, Jr., and his co-conspirators

exported electronic components from the

United States to Russia knowing that,

although licenses were required that licenses

had not been obtained.

Response: DENY. I had never sent any

electronic parts which required licensing. I

am not responsible for any ‘‘co-conspirators.’’

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 6).

Despite Respondent’s denial of that

Request for Admission, he answered as

follows in his plea hearing in the

criminal case:

U.S. Attorney: As part of the conspiracy to

evade the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act as alleged in Count 3 of the

Information, did you and your co-

conspirators purposefully export electronics

components from the United States to Russia

knowing that, although licenses were

required for such exports, licenses had not

been obtained?

Brazhnikov: Yes.

(Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 5, p. 23).

Collateral estoppel prevents

Respondent from denying or re-

litigating the facts set forth in the

Charging Letter, because they are the

same facts he admitted in his federal

criminal case. Smith v. SEC., 129 F.3d

356, 362 (6th Cir. 1997) (conviction for

insider trading creates situation where

‘‘[i]n order to prevail in the civil action,

the SEC now needs only to move for

summary judgment on the basis of the

collateral estoppel effect of that

conviction.’’); SEC. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d

689, 693–694 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (‘‘the

district court found that Bilzerian was

collaterally estopped from contesting

the facts set forth in support of the

SEC’s civil claims because the same

facts formed the basis of his criminal

conviction.’’). Accordingly, there is no

genuine dispute over whether

Respondent committed acts constituting

conspiracy to violate the EAR. The

specific facts are set forth in the

following section.

2. Material Facts as to Charge 1

Respondent was the owner, operator,

and CEO of several business

incorporated in New Jersey.

Respondent’s father was the owner,

operator, and CEO of several Russian

business entities. Respondent’s father

was one of Respondent’s co-conspirators

with respect to the following actions.

Between January 2008 and June 2014,

Respondent and his co-conspirators,

through the afore-mentioned businesses,

exported electronic components from

the U.S. to Russian end-users, knowing

the EAR required licenses for such

exports and not obtaining the required

licenses. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., pp. 5–

6, 8; Ex. 4 at pp. 17–18, 23).

One of the end-users to which

Respondent and his co-conspirators

exported items was the All-Russian

Scientific Research Institute of

Technical Physics (VNIITF)

Academician E.I. Zababakhina. BIS

placed the VNIITF on the Entity List in

1997, and it remained there at all times

from 2008 to 2014. BIS added the

Academician E.I. Zababakhina to the

Entity List as an alias for the VNIITF in

2010. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., pp. 8–9);

see Entity List at Supplement No. 4 to

15 CFR part 744.

On November 20, 2013, Respondent

and his co-conspirators sent multiple

shipments of electronic components,

evidenced by four invoices, to VNIITF

Academician E.I. Zababakhina. (Mot. for

Summ. Dec., Ex. 2 at p. 15; Ex. 4 at p.

24; Ex. 11). BIS, through certified

Licensing Determinations, determined

some of the items in the shipments were

electronic components found on the

Commerce Control List under ECCN

EAR99. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 9).

On April 23, 2014, Respondent and

his co-conspirators again shipped

electronic components to VNIITF

Academician E.I. Zababakhina. (Mot. for

Summ. Dec., Ex. 2 at p. 15; Ex. 4 at 24;

Ex. 12). BIS performed a certified

Licensing Determination, concluding

the components were found on the

Commerce Control List under ECCN

EAR99. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 10).

Pursuant to the Entity List, a license

was required to export ‘‘all items subject

to the EAR’’ to VNIITF Academician E.I.

Zababakhina. See Supplement No. 4 to

Part 744. As the November 20, 2013 and

April 23, 2014 shipments contained

items subject to the EAR, Respondent

was prohibited from exporting the items

without obtaining a license from BIS. 15

CFR 744.16(a). As evidenced by his

statement at the plea hearing,

Respondent and his co-conspirators

knew licenses were required for these

exports and failed to obtain them. (Mot.

for Summ. Dec., Ex. 4 at p. 23–24).

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15 CFR 740.3(b): ‘‘This License Exception is

available for all destinations in Country Group B

(see Supplement No. 1 to part 740), provided that

the net value of the commodities included in the

same order and controlled under the same ECCN

entry on the CCL does not exceed the amount

specified in the LVS paragraph for that entry.

17

Country Group B does not include Russia or

entities listed in the Entity List.

3. Respondent Failed To Identify Any

Genuine Issues of Material Fact

a. Respondent Claims His Father Took

All Responsibility

In his Response to the Motion for

Summary Decision, Respondent makes

three contentions. First, Respondent

contends his father ‘‘took all

responsibility for it.’’ (Resp. to Mot. for

Summ. Dec., p. 1). In support,

Respondent attached a document

drafted in Russia, along with a

translated copy, purportedly made by

Respondent’s father on October 10,

2019. The document states

Respondent’s father is the owner of two

companies (Zond-R, Inc.; Telecom

Multipliers, Inc.) involved in the

scheme to violate the IEEPA. (Resp. to

Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex. 1).

Respondent’s argument here is merely a

denial of the Charge and does not give

rise to a genuine issue of material fact.

Sanders, 634 F.Supp. at 476. Contrary to

Respondent’s bald assertion, the

document does not state Respondent’s

father takes all responsibility for the

scheme, it only affirms Respondent’s

father owns companies involved in the

scheme. Further, Respondent is

estopped from arguing now that his

father actually owned those companies,

because Respondent admitted in the

June 11, 2015 plea hearing in Criminal

Case No. 2:15–CR–00300–WJM–1 he

owned Zond-R, Inc. and Telecom

Multipliers, Inc. (Mot. for Summ. Dec.,

Ex. 4 at p. 17).

b. Respondent Argues BIS Did Not

Prove Items Were U.S.-Origin

Second, Respondent argues ‘‘BIS did

not provide ANY evidence that these

parts were U.S.-Origin.’’ (Resp. to Mot.

for Summ. Dec., p. 1). This argument

lacks merit because one element of the

crime to which Respondent pled guilty

was the fact that he, along with his co-

conspirators, illegally exported U.S.-

origin electronics to Russian

organizations. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex.

4 at pp. 20–24).

c. Respondent Contends BIS Misstated

the Monetary Value of the Exports

Finally, Respondent argues the cost of

the electronic components he conspired

to export was $734.58, not $46,669.71.

Respondent is referring to the November

20, 2013 and April 23, 2014 export

transactions mentioned by BIS in the

Charging Letter, which were among the

overt acts Respondent admitted to in the

criminal case. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Ex.

1 at pp. 2–3). The Charging Letter does

contain some errors in the amount of the

transactions; the invoices attached to

BIS’s Motion for Summary Decision

show the amounts were listed in rubles,

not dollars. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Exs.

11, 12).

However, the specific value of the

exports is not a material fact. A fact is

material if it ‘‘might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law.’’

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The

pertinent elements of the criminal

charge against Respondent in the U.S.

District Court and the administrative

charge against Respondent in this

proceeding are (1) Respondent

conspired with others (2) to export U.S.

electronic components (3) to Russian

organizations on BIS’s ‘‘Entity List’’ (4)

without the licenses required by the

EAR. See 18 U.S.C. 371; 50 U.S.C. 1705;

15 CFR 744.16. The cost of the items is

immaterial in regard to finding a

violation proven. While the EAR

provides a limited licensing exception

for certain exports under a certain

monetary value, this exception does not

apply to items exported to Russia or

items exported to entities on the Entity

List. See 15 CFR 740.3; Suppl. No. 1 to

Part 740.

16 17

D. Conclusion—BIS Is Entitled to a

Decision as a Matter of Law

BIS met its burden of production as to

Charge 1, conspiracy to violate the EAR

under 15 CFR 764.2(d), with evidence

that Respondent pled guilty a related

federal criminal charge. The facts

underlying the criminal charge being

identical to the facts underlying the

instant administrative charge,

Respondent is estopped from denying

them. Respondent filed a late response

to the Motion for Summary Decision but

failed to identify any triable issues of

fact. Considering BIS’ evidence as a

whole, BIS met its ultimate burden of

persuasion, showing by a

preponderance of the evidence that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and

BIS is entitled, as a matter of law, to a

decision in its favor as to Charge 1.

IV. Recommended Ultimate Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law

1. Respondent and the subject matter of

this proceeding are properly within the

jurisdiction of the BIS pursuant to the Export

Control Reform Act of 2018 and the Export

Administration Regulations (EAR). 50 U.S.C.

4826; 15 CFR parts 730–774.

2. The facts underlying the federal criminal

charge to which Respondent pled guilty are

identical to the facts set forth in the Charging

Letter. (Mot. for Summ. Dec., Exs. 1–5).

3. Respondent is estopped from denying or

re-litigating the facts set forth in the Charging

Letter. Smith v. S.E.C., 129 F.3d 356, 362 (6th

Cir. 1997); S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689,

693–694 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

4. Between January 2008 through June

2014, Respondent violated 15 CFR 764.2(d)

by conspiring with others to violate the EAR

by exporting regulated items to Russian end-

users on BIS’ Entity List without the required

licenses.

V. Sanction

Section 764.3 of the EAR establishes

the sanctions BIS may seek for the

violations charged in this proceeding.

The sanctions are: (1) A monetary

penalty, (2) denial of export privileges

under the regulations, and (3) exclusion

of practice before the Department of

Commerce. BIS has not moved for any

particular sanction to be imposed.

Accordingly, sanctions will be

addressed following an opportunity for

the parties to be heard on the issue. In

keeping with the October 18, 2019

Scheduling Order, this matter shall

proceed on the record. The parties shall

submit final written briefs stating their

positions as to an appropriate sanction

on or before May 29, 2020. There will

not be any reply briefs.

Wherefore,

Order

It is hereby ordered, BIS’s Motion for

Summary Decision is GRANTED IN

PART. Charge 1, brought pursuant to 15

CFR 764.2(d), is found PROVEN.

It is further ordered, the parties shall

submit written briefs stating their

positions as to an appropriate sanction

on or before May 29, 2020.

[Signature of Michael J. Devine]

Hon. Michael J. Devine

Administrative Law Judge

Done and dated April 21, 2020

Baltimore, Maryland

Attachment B

15 CFR 766.22—Review by Under

Secretary

(a) Recommended decision. For

proceedings not involving violations relating

to part 760 of the EAR, the administrative

law judge shall immediately refer the

recommended decision and order to the

Under Secretary. Because of the time limits

provided under the EAA for review by the

Under Secretary, service of the recommended

decision and order on the parties, all papers

filed by the parties in response, and the final

decision of the Under Secretary must be by

personal delivery, facsimile, express mail or

other overnight carrier. If the Under Secretary

cannot act on a recommended decision and

order for any reason, the Under Secretary

will designate another Department of

Commerce official to receive and act on the

recommendation.

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1

See Difluoromethane (R–32) From the People’s

Republic of China: Final Affirmative Determination

of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 86 FR 5136

(January 19, 2021).

2

See ITC’s Letter, Final Determination

Notification, dated March 2, 2021.

3

Id.

4

See Difluoromethane (R–32) from the People’s

Republic of China: Preliminary Affirmative

Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and

Postponement of Final Determination, 85 FR 52950

(August 27, 2020) (Preliminary Determination).

5

See section 736(a)(3) of the Act.

(b) Submissions by parties. Parties shall

have 12 days from the date of issuance of the

recommended decision and order in which to

submit simultaneous responses. Parties

thereafter shall have eight days from receipt

of any response(s) in which to submit replies.

Any response or reply must be received

within the time specified by the Under

Secretary.

(c) Final decision. Within 30 days after

receipt of the recommended decision and

order, the Under Secretary shall issue a

written order affirming, modifying or

vacating the recommended decision and

order of the administrative law judge. If he/

she vacates the recommended decision and

order, the Under Secretary may refer the case

back to the administrative law judge for

further proceedings. Because of the time

limits, the Under Secretary’s review will

ordinarily be limited to the written record for

decision, including the transcript of any

hearing, and any submissions by the parties

concerning the recommended decision.

(d) Delivery. The final decision and

implementing order shall be served on the

parties and will be publicly available in

accordance with § 766.20 of this part.

(e) [Reserved by 75 FR 33683].

[FR Doc. 2021–05022 Filed 3–10–21; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A–570–121]

Difluoromethane (R–32) From the

People’s Republic of China:

Antidumping Duty Order

AGENCY

: Enforcement and Compliance,

International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

SUMMARY

: Based on affirmative final

determinations by the Department of

Commerce (Commerce) and the

International Trade Commission (ITC),

Commerce is issuing the antidumping

duty (AD) order on difluoromethane (R–

32) from the People’s Republic of China

(China).

DATES

: Applicable March 11, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

:

William Miller or Joshua Tucker, AD/

CVD Operations, Office II, Enforcement

and Compliance, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of

Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue

NW, Washington, DC 20230; telephone:

(202) 482–3906 or (202) 482–2044,

respectively.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

:

Background

In accordance with section 735(d) of

the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the

Act), on January 19, 2021, Commerce

published its affirmative final

determination in the less-than-fair-value

(LTFV) investigation of R–32 from

China.

1

On March 2, 2021, the ITC notified

Commerce of its final affirmative

determination that an industry in the

United States is materially injured by

reason of imports of R–32 from China,

within the meaning of section

735(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act.

2

Scope of the Order

The product covered by this order is

R–32 from China. For a complete

description of the scope of the order, see

Appendix I to this notice.

Antidumping Duty Order

On March 2, 2021, in accordance with

sections 735(b)(i)(A)(i) and 735(d) of the

Act, the ITC notified Commerce of its

final determination that an industry in

the United States is materially injured

by reason of imports of R–32 from

China.

3

Therefore, in accordance with

section 735(c)(2) of the Act, we are

issuing this order. Because the ITC

determined that imports of R–32 from

China are materially injuring a U.S.

industry, unliquidated entries of such

merchandise from China which are

entered, or withdrawn from warehouse,

for consumption are subject to the

assessment of antidumping duties.

Therefore, in accordance with section

736(a)(1) of the Act, Commerce will

direct U.S. Customs and Border

Protection (CBP) to assess, upon further

instruction by Commerce, antidumping

duties equal to the amount by which the

normal value of the merchandise

exceeds the export price (or constructed

export price) of the subject

merchandise, for all relevant entries of

R–32 from China. Antidumping duties

will be assessed on unliquidated entries

of R–32 from China entered, or

withdrawn from warehouse, for

consumption on or after August 27,

2020, the date of publication of the

Preliminary Determination.

4

Continuation of Suspension of

Liquidation

In accordance with section 736 of the

Act, Commerce will instruct CBP to

continue to suspend liquidation on all

relevant entries of R–32 from China,

which are entered, or withdrawn from

warehouse, for consumption on or after

the date of publication of the ITC’s final

determination in the Federal Register.

These instructions suspending

liquidation will remain in effect until

further notice.

Commerce will also instruct CBP to

require cash deposits for estimated

antidumping duties equal to the cash

deposit rates for each producer and

exporter combination listed below.

Accordingly, effective on the date of

publication in the Federal Register of

the ITC’s final determination, CBP will

require, at the same time as importers

would normally deposit estimated

duties on the subject merchandise, a

cash deposit equal to the rates listed

below:

5

Producer Exporter

Estimated

weighted-

average

dumping

margin

(percent)

Taizhou Qingsong Refrigerant New Material Co., Ltd ............... Taizhou Qingsong Refrigerant New Material Co., Ltd ............... 161.49

Zibo Feiyuan Chemical Co., Ltd ................................................. Zibo Feiyuan Chemical Co., Ltd ................................................. 221.06

Zibo Feiyuan Chemical Co., Ltd ................................................. T.T. International Co., Ltd .......................................................... 221.06

Producers Supplying the Non-Individually- Examined Exporters

Receiving Separate Rates (see Appendix II). Non-Individually Examined Exporters Receiving Separate

Rates (see Appendix II). 196.19

China-Wide Entity ....................................................................... ..................................................................................................... 221.06

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