Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants

Published date25 January 2021
Citation86 FR 6850
Record Number2020-27508
SectionRules and Regulations
CourtCommodity Futures Trading Commission
6850
Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 14 / Monday, January 25, 2021 / Rules and Regulations
1
See generally Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 81 FR 636 (Jan. 6, 2016). The CFTC
Margin Rule, which became effective April 1, 2016,
is codified in part 23 of the Commission’s
regulations. 17 CFR 23.150—23.159, 23.161. In May
2016, the Commission amended the CFTC Margin
Rule to add Regulation 23.160, 17 CFR 23.160,
providing rules on its cross-border application. See
generally Margin Requirements for Uncleared
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants—Cross-Border Application of the
Margin Requirements, 81 FR 34818 (May 31, 2016).
Commission regulations are found at 17 CFR part
1 et seq. (2017), and may be accessed through the
Commission’s website, https://www.cftc.gov.
2
7 U.S.C. 6s(e) (capital and margin requirements).
3
CEA section 1a(39), 7 U.S.C. 1a(39) (defining the
term ‘‘prudential regulator’’ to include the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency; the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Farm Credit
Administration; and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency). The definition of prudential regulator
specifies the entities for which these agencies act
as prudential regulators.
4
VM (or variation margin), as defined in
Regulation 23.151, is the collateral provided by a
party to its counterparty to meet the performance
of its obligation under one or more uncleared swaps
between the parties as a result of a change in the
value of such obligations since the trade was
executed or the last time such collateral was
provided. 17 CFR 23.151.
5
See definition of ‘‘financial end user’’ in
Regulation 23.151. In general, the definition covers
entities involved in regulated financial activity,
including banks, brokers, intermediaries, advisers,
asset managers, collective investment vehicles, and
insurers. 17 CFR 23.151.
6
IM (or initial margin) is the collateral (calculated
as provided by §23.154 of the Commission’s
regulations) that is collected or posted in
connection with one or more uncleared swaps
pursuant to §23.152. IM is intended to secure
potential future exposure following default of a
counterparty (i.e., adverse changes in the value of
an uncleared swap that may arise during the period
of time when it is being closed out). See CFTC
Margin Rule, 81 FR at 683.
7
17 CFR 23.152; 17 CFR 23.153.
8
See 17 CFR 23.157(a).
9
Regulation 23.157 does not require VM to be
maintained in a custodial account. 17 CFR 23.157.
10
17 CFR 23.152(b)(3); 17 CFR 23.153(c); 81 FR
at 653.
11
17 CFR 23.151 (defining the term ‘‘minimum
transfer amount’’).
ANM WY D Gillette, WY [Remove]
Gillette-Campbell County Airport, WY
(Lat. 44°2056N, long. 105°3222W)
Paragraph 6002 Class E Airspace
Designated as Surface Areas.
* * * * *
ANM WY E2 Gillette, WY [New]
Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport, WY
(Lat. 44°2056N, long. 105°3222W)
That airspace extending upward from the
surface to and including 6,900 feet MSL
within a 5-mile radius of the Northeast
Wyoming Regional Airport. This Class E
airspace is effective during the specific dates
and times established in advance by a Notice
to Airmen. The effective date and time will
thereafter be continuously published in the
Chart Supplement.
Paragraph 6004 Class E Airspace Areas
Designated as an Extension to a Class D or
Class E Surface Area.
* * * * *
ANM WY E4 Gillette, WY [Amended]
Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport, WY
(Lat. 44°2056N, long. 105°3222W)
That airspace extending upward from the
surface within 3.4 miles each side of the
Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport 170°
bearing extending from the 5-mile radius to
12 miles south of the airport.
Paragraph 6005 Class E Airspace Areas
Extending Upward From 700 Feet or More
Above the Surface of the Earth.
* * * * *
ANM WY E5 Gillette, WY [Amended]
Northeast Wyoming Regional Airport, WY
(Lat. 44°2056N, long. 105°3222W)
That airspace extending upward from 700
feet above the surface of the earth within 4
miles each side of the Northeast Wyoming
Regional Airport 170° bearing extending from
the 5-mile radius to 14 miles south of the
airport, and that airspace 4 miles each side
of the 350° bearing extending from the 5-mile
radius to 11 miles north of the airport.
Issued in Seattle, Washington, on January
14, 2021.
Byron Chew,
Acting Group Manager, Operations Support
Group, Western Service Center.
[FR Doc. 2021–01306 Filed 1–22–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 23
RIN 3038–AF06
Margin Requirements for Uncleared
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major
Swap Participants
AGENCY
: Commodity Futures Trading
Commission.
ACTION
: Final rule.
SUMMARY
: The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or
‘‘CFTC’’) is amending the margin
requirements for uncleared swaps
(‘‘Final Rule’’) for swap dealers (‘‘SD’’)
and major swap participants (‘‘MSP’’)
for which there is not a prudential
regulator (‘‘CFTC Margin Rule’’). The
Final Rule amends the CFTC Margin
Rule to permit the application of a
minimum transfer amount (‘‘MTA’’) of
up to $50,000 for each separately
managed account (‘‘SMA’’) of a legal
entity that is a counterparty to an SD or
MSP in an uncleared swap transaction
and to permit the application of separate
MTAs for initial margin (‘‘IM’’) and
variation margin (‘‘VM’’).
DATES
: This Final Rule is effective
February 24, 2021.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
:
Joshua B. Sterling, Director, 202–418–
6056, jsterling@cftc.gov; Thomas J.
Smith, Deputy Director, 202–418–5495,
tsmith@cftc.gov; Warren Gorlick,
Associate Director, 202–418–5195,
wgorlick@cftc.gov; Liliya Bozhanova,
Special Counsel, 202–418–6232,
lbozhanova@cftc.gov; or Carmen
Moncada-Terry, Special Counsel, 202–
418–5795, cmoncada-terry@cftc.gov,
Market Participants Division,
Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Three Lafayette Centre,
1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC
20581.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
:
I. Background
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
In January 2016, the Commission
adopted Regulations 23.150 through
23.161, namely the CFTC Margin Rule,
1
to implement section 4s(e) of the
Commodity Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’),
2
which requires SDs and MSPs for which
there is not a prudential regulator
3
(‘‘covered swap entity’’ or ‘‘CSE’’) to
meet minimum IM and VM
requirements adopted by the
Commission by rule or regulation.
Regulations 23.152 and 23.153 require
CSEs to collect or post, each business
day, VM
4
for uncleared swap
transactions with each counterparty that
is an SD, MSP, or financial end user,
5
and IM
6
for uncleared swap
transactions for each counterparty that
is an SD, MSP, or a financial end user
that has material swaps exposure.
7
IM
posted or collected by a CSE must be
held by one or more custodians that are
not affiliated with the CSE or the
counterparty.
8
VM posted or collected
by a CSE is not required to be
maintained with a custodian.
9
To alleviate the operational burdens
associated with making de minimis
margin transfers without resulting in an
unacceptable level of uncollateralized
credit risk, Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and
23.153(c) provide that a CSE is not
required to collect or post IM or VM
with a counterparty until the combined
amount of such IM and VM, as
computed under Regulations 23.154 and
23.155 respectively, exceeds an MTA of
$500,000.
10
The term MTA (or
minimum transfer amount) is further
defined in Regulation 23.151 as a
combined amount of IM and VM, not
exceeding $500,000, under which no
exchange of IM or VM is required.
11
Once the MTA is exceeded, the SD or
MSP must collect or post the full
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12
See 17 CFR 23.152(b)(3); 17 CFR 23.153(c).
13
Pursuant to a Commission plan of
reorganization, DSIO was renamed Market
Participants Division (‘‘MPD’’) effective November
8, 2020.
14
CFTC Letter No. 17–12, Regulations
23.152(b)(3) and 23.153(c): No-Action Position
for Minimum Transfer Amount with respect to
Separately Managed Accounts (Feb. 13, 2017)
(‘‘Letter 17–12’’), https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/
public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/17-12.pdf.
15
Id.
16
The ISDA master agreement is a standard
contract published by ISDA commonly used in
over-the-counter derivatives transactions that
governs the rights and obligations of parties to a
derivatives transaction. A CSA sets forth the terms
of the collateral arrangement for the derivatives
transaction.
17
CFTC Letter No. 19–25, Regulations 23.151,
23.152, and 23.153—Staff Time-Limited No-Action
Position Regarding Application of Minimum
Transfer Amount under the Uncleared Margin Rules
(Dec. 6, 2019) (‘‘Letter 19–25’’), https://
www.cftc.gov/csl/19-25/download.
18
See Recommendations to Improve Scoping and
Implementation of Initial Margin Requirements for
Non-Cleared Swaps, Report to the CFTC’s Global
Markets Advisory Committee by the Subcommittee
on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps
(May 2020), https://www.cftc.gov/media/3886/
GMAC_051920MarginSubcommitteeReport/
download (‘‘GMAC Subcommittee Report’’ or
‘‘Report’’). The Global Markets Advisory Committee
(‘‘GMAC’’) established the GMAC Subcommittee to
consider issues raised by the implementation of
margin requirements for non-cleared swaps, to
identify challenges associated with forthcoming
implementation phases, and to make
recommendations through a report. The GMAC
Subcommittee issued the GMAC Subcommittee
Report recommending various actions, including
the codification of Letters 17–12 and 19–25. The
GMAC adopted the Report and recommended to the
Commission that it consider adopting the Report’s
recommendations.
19
See Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 85
FR 59470 (Sept. 22, 2020).
20
Comments were submitted by the following
entities: American Council of Life Insurers
(‘‘ACLI’’); Futures Industry Association (‘‘FIA’’);
Investment Company Institute (‘‘ICI’’); ISDA, Global
Foreign Exchange Division (‘‘GFXD’’) of the Global
Financial Markets Association (‘‘GFMA’’), and
Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (‘‘SIFMA’’) in a joint letter (‘‘ISDA/
GFMA/SIFMA’’); Managed Funds Association
(‘‘MFA’’); and SIFMA AMG. The comment letters
are available at https://comments.cftc.gov/
PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=4155.
amount of both IM and VM required to
be exchanged with the counterparty.
12
During the implementation of the
CFTC Margin Rule, market participants
identified certain operational and
compliance burdens associated with the
application of the MTA. To mitigate
these burdens, the Division of Swap
Dealer and Intermediary Oversight
(‘‘DSIO’’) staff issued two no-action
letters.
13
B. DSIO No-Action Letter No. 17–12
Addressing the Application of MTA to
SMAs
In February 2017, DSIO staff issued a
no-action letter in response to a request
for relief from the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association’s
Asset Management Group (‘‘SIFMA
AMG’’).
14
Staff stated that based on
SIFMA AMG’s representations, it would
not recommend enforcement action
against an SD that does not comply with
the MTA requirements of Regulations
23.152(b)(3) or 23.153(c) with respect to
the swaps of a legal entity that is the
owner of multiple SMAs, provided that,
among other conditions, the SD applies
an MTA no greater than $50,000 to each
SMA.
SIFMA AMG sought no-action relief
on behalf of members—asset
management firms whose clients
include large institutional investors,
such as pension plans and endowments,
that hire asset managers to exercise
investment discretion over portions of
the clients’ assets for management in
SMAs—that enter into uncleared swaps
with SDs that are registered with the
Commission and are subject to the CFTC
Margin Rule.
15
SIFMA AMG requested
relief that would permit SDs entering
into swaps with SMAs to treat each
SMA separately for the purposes of
applying the MTA.
SIFMA AMG argued that the
application of the MTA at the SMA
owner or legal entity level presented
significant practical challenges for
SMAs that trade uncleared swaps with
a single SD. SIFMA AMG stated that
each SMA is governed by an investment
management agreement that grants asset
managers authority over a portion of
their client’s assets. An SD may face the
same legal entity as a counterparty
through multiple SMAs administered by
different asset managers. Each SMA that
trades derivatives typically has its own
payment netting set corresponding to
each International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (‘‘ISDA’’) master
agreement and credit support annex
(‘‘CSA’’) used by an asset manager.
16
Because the SMAs exist independently
from each other, with their assets held,
transferred, and returned separately at
the account level, SIFMA AMG asserted
that it is impractical for asset managers
to collectively calculate the MTA across
the SMAs of a single owner and to move
collateral, in the aggregate, across the
accounts.
C. DSIO No-Action Letter No. 19–25
Concerning the Application of Separate
MTAs for IM and VM
In December 2019, DSIO staff issued
an additional no-action letter
concerning the application of the MTA
in response to a request for relief from
ISDA on behalf of its member SDs.
17
DSIO stated that based on ISDA’s
representations, it would not
recommend enforcement action against
an SD or MSP that does not combine IM
and VM amounts for the purposes of
Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and 23.153(c).
More specifically, the no-action position
covers SDs or MSPs that apply separate
MTAs for IM and VM obligations on
uncleared swap transactions with each
swap counterparty, provided that the
combined MTA for IM and VM with
respect to that counterparty does not
exceed $500,000.
In its request for no-action relief,
ISDA stated that separate MTAs for IM
and VM better reflect the operational
requirements and the legal structure of
the Commission’s regulations, noting
that the CFTC Margin Rule requires IM
to be segregated with an unaffiliated
third party, while not imposing similar
segregation requirements with respect to
VM. ISDA asserted that, as a result,
distinct workflows have been
established for the settlement of IM
through custodians and tri-party agents
that are completely separate from the
settlement process for VM.
D. Market Participant Feedback and
Proposal
Swap market participants, including a
subcommittee established by the CFTC’s
Global Markets Advisory Committee
(‘‘GMAC Subcommittee’’), expressed
support for the adoption of regulations
consistent with the no-action letters,
noting that Letter 19–25, in particular, is
time-limited and, more generally, the
codification of no-action positions can
be beneficial in that it can provide
certainty to market participants with
respect to the application of the
Commission’s regulations.
18
Consistent with this feedback, the
Commission has expressed the view that
adopting regulations in accordance with
the terms of no-action letters, where
feasible, can facilitate efforts by market
participants to take the operation of the
Commission’s regulations into account
in planning their uncleared swap
activities. Accordingly, based on its
experience implementing the CFTC
Margin Rule and the administration of
Letters 17–12 and 19–25, the
Commission decided to issue a notice of
proposed rulemaking (‘‘Proposal’’) to
amend the CFTC Margin Rule consistent
with the staff positions set forth in those
no-action letters, and to request
comments on the Proposal.
19
II. Final Rule
The Commission received six
comment letters, all of which expressed
support for the Proposal.
20
Commenters
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21
See ACLI at 1; FIA at 4.
22
See ISDA/GFMA/SIFMA at 2; SIFMA AMG at
4.
23
See 81 FR at 653 (rejecting commenters’ request
to extend to each separate account of a fund or plan
its own initial margin threshold, while
acknowledging that separate managers acting for the
same fund or plan may not take steps to inform the
fund or plan of their uncleared swap exposures on
behalf of their principal on a frequent basis).
24
GMAC Subcommittee Report at 16.
25
See ICI at 6; ISDA/GFMA/SIFMA at 2; SIFMA
AMG at 3. See also MFA at 3 (noting that the
amendment to the MTA definition would eliminate
the significant burden of requiring multiple asset
managers running SMAs for the same SMA owner
to coordinate the calculation of the MTA among
them).
26
See, e.g., ICI at 6.
27
The Commission notes that Regulation
23.410(c)(1)(i) prohibits disclosure by an SD or
MSP, including a CSE, of confidential information
provided by or on behalf of a counterparty to the
SD or MSP. Nevertheless, Regulation 23.410(c)(2)
provides that the SD or MSP may disclose the
counterparty’s confidential information if the
disclosure is authorized in writing by the
counterparty.
28
As further discussed below, the application of
the MTA, as provided in this Final Rule, is only
available for separate accounts of an owner that,
consistent with the definition of SMA, as adopted
by the Final Rule, are not subject to collateral
agreements that provide for netting across separate
accounts.
generally noted that the proposed
amendments represent practical
solutions that ease the operational
burden of compliance with the CFTC
Margin Rule without materially
increasing systemic risk. Two
commenters also noted that while
consistent approaches to derivatives
regulation are desirable, the
Commission should adopt the proposed
amendments even if the prudential
regulators do not adopt similar
changes.
21
Several commenters
highlighted the importance of the
regulatory certainty that the adoption of
regulations consistent with existing no-
action relief would bring.
22
The comments confirm the rationale
articulated for the Proposal. As such,
the Commission is adopting the
amendments to Regulations 23.151,
23.152(b)(3), 23.153(c) and 23.158(a), as
proposed.
A. Application of MTA to SMAs
The Commission is adopting the
proposed amendment to the definition
of MTA in Regulation 23.151 to allow a
CSE to apply an MTA of up to $50,000
to each SMA owned by a counterparty
with whom the CSE enters into
uncleared swaps. The amendment is
consistent with the terms of Letter 17–
12, which provides that DSIO would not
recommend enforcement action if an SD
applies an MTA no greater than $50,000
to each SMA of a legal entity, subject to
certain conditions.
As discussed in the Proposal, when
the Commission adopted the CFTC
Margin Rule, it rejected the notion that
SMAs of a legal entity should be treated
separately from each other in applying
certain aspects of the margin
requirements for uncleared swaps.
23
However, after implementing the margin
requirements for several years, and in
particular, administering the application
of the MTA, including the staff’s
issuance of Letter 17–12, the
Commission believes that separately
treating SMAs, at least with respect to
the application of the MTA, is
appropriate from an operational
perspective.
The Commission notes, as discussed
in the Proposal, that certain owners of
SMAs, such as pension funds, in
administering investments for
beneficiaries, may engage in collateral
management exercises and may have the
capability to aggregate collateral across
their SMAs. As such, a beneficial owner
may be able to aggregate the MTA across
its SMAs that trade with a particular
CSE and centralize the management of
collateral for the SMAs, which may
result in increased netting among the
SMAs and the CSE, and more efficient
collateral management. However, the
Commission points out that other SMA
owners may not have such capability
because, as noted in the GMAC
Subcommittee Report, the SMA owners
may not be able to coordinate trading
activity across their SMAs, given that
they typically grant full investment
discretion to their asset managers and
do not employ a centralized collateral
manager in-house.
24
In theory, while asset managers could
coordinate with each other the
calculation of the MTA across SMAs
under their management, the
Commission believes that accepted
market practice may preclude the
sharing of information among asset
managers. In this regard, the
Commission notes that the GMAC
Subcommittee Report stated that owners
of SMAs typically prohibit information
sharing among their SMAs and require
asset managers to keep trading
information confidential, with the result
that asset managers lack transparency
and control over the assets of the SMA
owner other than the specific assets
under their management.
The Commission requested comment
on the feasibility of coordination among
asset managers. Several commenters,
consistent with the GMAC
Subcommittee Report’s findings,
indicated that confidentiality
requirements and logistical
impediments prevent asset managers
from aggregating IM and VM obligations
across SMAs for purposes of
determining whether the MTA
threshold has been exceeded, rendering
the application of a single MTA across
SMAs impractical.
25
Commenters
further asserted that the ability to apply
a separate MTA to each SMA is critical
for asset managers that provide services
to clients through an SMA structure.
26
Likewise, the Commission believes
that confidentiality requirements may
also preclude communications between
a CSE and individual asset managers of
SMAs of an owner concerning the
owner’s overall trading activity. As
discussed in the GMAC Subcommittee
Report, a duty of confidentiality to the
legal entity may prevent a CSE from
sharing information across the asset
managers of SMAs of a legal entity.
27
As
a result, even though each SMA of an
owner may contribute to reaching the
MTA limit, asset managers for the SMAs
may only know the amounts of IM and
VM being contributed by SMAs under
their management.
In light of the practical challenges that
the calculation of the MTA across SMAs
poses, as described above, the
Commission is amending Regulation
23.151 to allow CSEs to apply an MTA
of up to $50,000 for each SMA of a
counterparty. The Commission notes,
however, that under this application of
the MTA to SMAs, as adopted, an MTA
of up to $50,000 could be applied to an
indefinite number of SMAs. This
application of the MTA would
effectively replace the aggregate limit of
$500,000 for a particular counterparty’s
uncollateralized risk for uncleared
swaps with an individual limit of
$50,000 for each SMA of such
counterparty. In turn, the counterparty
could have an aggregate amount of
uncollateralized risk in excess of
$500,000.
This application of the MTA to SMAs
could incentivize owners of SMAs to
create separate accounts by formulating
trading strategies to reduce or avoid
margin transfers. However, the
Commission believes that the inability
to net collateral across separate accounts
would stem the indiscriminate creation
of SMAs
28
because the MTA for SMAs,
as adopted in this Final Rule, is set at
a low level (i.e., $50,000), and any
potential benefits resulting from the
avoidance of margin transfers would
become less meaningful, as the
fragmentation of an owner’s investments
among SMAs would reduce the ability
to aggregate swaps positions and net
collateral.
Several commenters agreed with the
Commission’s view that the potential
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29
See ICI at 7; MFA at 3; SIFMA AMG at 4.
30
See ICI at 7, MFA at 3.
31
See ICI at 7.
32
As further discussed below, the Final Rule
defines the term SMA as an account managed by
an asset manager pursuant to a specific grant of
authority to such asset manager under an
investment management agreement between the
counterparty and the asset manager with respect to
a specified portion of the counterparty’s assets.
33
See SIFMA AMG at 4.
34
See 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
35
17 CFR 23.600.
36
The definition of the term SMA, as adopted,
refers to the aggregate account of a counterparty
managed by an asset manager under the investment
management agreement, and not to fund or pool
sleeves overseen by sub-advisers.
37
See 17 CFR 23.157 (requiring IM to be
segregated with an independent custodian. The
CFTC Margin Rule does not impose similar
segregation requirements with respect to VM).
38
Letter 19–25 describes the application of
separate MTAs for IM and VM with the following
illustration: An SD and a counterparty agree to a
$300,000 IM MTA and a $200,000 VM MTA. If the
margin calculations set forth in Commission
regulations 23.154 (for IM) and 23.155 (for VM)
require the SD to post $400,000 of IM with the
counterparty and $150,000 of VM with the
counterparty, the SD will be required to post
$400,000 of IM with the counterparty (assuming
that the $50 million IM threshold amount, defined
in Commission regulation 23.151, for the
counterparty has been exceeded). The SD, however,
will not be obligated to post any VM with the
counterparty as the $150,000 requirement is less
than the $200,000 MTA. By contrast, in the absence
of relief, the SD would have been required to post
$550,000 (the full amount of both IM and VM),
given that the combined amount of IM and VM
exceeds the MTA of $500,000.
risk of an increase in the amount of
uncollateralized margin is mitigated by,
among other safeguards, the low MTA
thresholds and the limitations on
netting across separate accounts.
29
The
commenters further noted that the costs
and practical challenges associated with
establishing and maintaining SMAs are
significant and would likely override
the benefit of a marginal MTA
increase.
30
One commenter also argued
that it is extremely unlikely that an asset
manager could coordinate its activities
with other SMA managers to minimize
the SMA owner’s margin requirements,
given that asset managers typically
exercise discretion over a portion of the
SMA’s assets and maintain
confidentiality with respect to the
SMA’s trading activity.
31
Another
commenter pointed out that the
requirement that the SMAs’ asset
managers must be granted authority
over assets under their management
under the investment management
agreement
32
creates practical as well as
cost challenges that would further
disincentivize the creation of
unnecessary SMAs.
33
The Commission further notes that
there are other provisions in the CEA
and the Commission’s regulations that
would mitigate the increase in
uncollateralized credit risk resulting
from the absence of an aggregate limit in
the MTA. Specifically, section 4s(j)(2) of
the CEA requires CSEs to adopt a robust
and professional risk management
system adequate for the management of
their swap activities,
34
and Regulation
23.600
35
mandates that CSEs establish a
risk management program to monitor
and manage risks associated with their
swap activities that includes, among
other things, a description of risk
tolerance limits.
The Commission is also amending
Regulation 23.151 to add a definition for
the term SMA. The new definition of
SMA uses the definition of the term set
forth in Letter 17–12. As adopted, the
term SMA is defined as an account of
a counterparty to a CSE that is managed
by an asset manager pursuant to a
specific grant of authority to such asset
manager under an investment
management agreement between the
counterparty and the asset manager,
with respect to a specified portion of the
counterparty’s assets.
36
The definition
requires that the swaps of the SMA (i)
be entered into between the
counterparty and the CSE by the asset
manager pursuant to authority granted
by the counterparty to the asset manager
through an investment management
agreement; and (ii) be subject to a
master netting agreement that does not
provide for the netting of IM or VM
obligations across all SMAs of the
counterparty that have swaps
outstanding with the CSE.
The definition of SMA is designed to
limit the application of the MTA, as
prescribed by the Final Rule, to SMAs
that have dedicated netting sets under
the SMAs’ ISDA master agreements and
CSAs, or are otherwise precluded from
netting collateral across SMAs, and that
are administered by asset managers with
authority that is limited to assets
specifically under their management.
The Commission notes that the limited
authority of asset managers over the
assets of a legal entity and the practical
inability to net collateral payments
across SMAs pose obstacles in the
calculation and aggregation of the MTA
across SMAs that this Final Rule is
designed to address.
B. Application of Separate MTAs for IM
and VM
The Commission is revising the
margin documentation requirements
outlined in Regulation 23.158(a),
consistent with Letter 19–25, to
recognize that a CSE can apply separate
MTAs for IM and VM with each
counterparty in determining whether IM
or VM or both must be posted or
collected with a counterparty under
Regulation 23.152 (requiring CSEs to
exchange IM with a counterparty) or
Regulation 23.153 (requiring CSEs to
exchange VM with a counterparty).
Regulation 23.158(a), as amended, states
that if a CSE and its counterparty agree
to have separate MTAs for IM and VM,
the MTAs corresponding to IM and VM
must be specified in the margin
documentation required by Regulation
23.158, and the MTAs, on a combined
basis, must not exceed the MTA
specified in Regulation 23.151.
The Commission believes that the
amendment to Regulation 23.158(a)
accommodates a widespread market
practice that facilitates the
implementation of the CFTC margin
requirements. In administering the
application of the MTA, including the
issuance of Letter 19–25, the
Commission has recognized that, as a
practical matter, CSEs and their
counterparties maintain separate
settlement workflows for IM and VM
and agree to separate MTAs in each of
their IM and VM CSAs, which,
combined, do not exceed $500,000.
These separate settlement workflows for
IM and VM reflect, from an operational
perspective, the different segregation
requirements applicable to IM and VM
under the CFTC Margin Rule.
37
The Commission acknowledges that
the amendment to Regulation 23.158(a)
may result in the exchange of less
margin than the amount that would be
exchanged if the MTA were computed
on an aggregate basis.
38
However, the
Commission notes that because the total
amount of combined IM and VM that
would not be exchanged would
generally not exceed $500,000, the
differences in the total margin
exchanged would not be material and
would not result in an unacceptable
level of credit risk. While the MTA as
applied to SMAs, pursuant to the
amendments to Regulation 23.151, may
result in an aggregate MTA that exceeds
$500,000, the Commission nonetheless
believes that the increased level of
uncollateralized risk that might result
from the application of the MTA to
SMAs will be mitigated because the
MTA levels applicable to SMAs are set
at a very low level (i.e., $50,000), which
would reduce the incentive for SMA
owners to create additional SMAs to
avoid the transfer of margin given the
inability to net collateral across SMAs,
as provided by the Final Rule.
The Commission believes, consistent
with the views expressed by DSIO staff
in issuing Letter 19–25, that the
application of separate MTAs for IM and
VM, subject to certain conditions, will
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39
See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2016/2251 Supplementing Regulation (EU) No. 648/
2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of July 4, 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central
Counterparties and Trade Repositories with Regard
to Regulatory Technical Standards for Risk-
Mitigation Techniques for OTC Derivative Contracts
Not Cleared by a Central Counterparty (Oct. 4,
2016), Article 25(4), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:32016R2251&from=EN.
40
See section 752 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), calling on the CFTC
to consult and coordinate on the establishment of
consistent international standards with respect to
the regulation of swaps.
41
See ACLI at 2; MFA at 4; SIFMA AMG at 4.
42
See e.g., ACLI at 2.
43
See ICI at 8.
44
See ICI at 9; MFA at 4.
45
See SIFMA AMG at 4.
46
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
47
Pursuant to section 2(e) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C.
2(e), each counterparty to an uncleared swap must
be an ECP, as defined in section 1a(18) of the CEA,
7 U.S.C. 1a(18).
48
See Further Definition of ‘‘Swap Dealer,’’
‘‘Security-Based Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘‘Major Swap
Participant,’’ ‘‘Major Security-Based Swap
Participant’’ and ‘‘Eligible Contract Participant,’’ 77
FR 30596, 30701 (May 23, 2012).
49
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
50
7 U.S.C. 19(a).
reduce the cost and burdens associated
with the transfer of small margin
balances, without undermining the
Commission’s objective of requiring
swap counterparties to protect
themselves by mitigating their credit
and market risks. The Commission
further notes that similar applications of
the MTA are permitted in certain
foreign jurisdictions, including the
European Union.
39
The amendment to
Regulation 23.158(a) therefore promotes
consistent regulatory standards across
jurisdictions, in line with the statutory
mandate set forth in the Dodd-Frank
Act
40
and reduces the need for market
participants to create and implement IM
and VM settlement flows tailored to
different jurisdictions.
A number of commenters confirmed
the Commission’s understanding that
the application of separate MTAs for IM
and VM facilitates compliance with the
CFTC Margin Rule.
41
Commenters noted
that if swap counterparties were
required to apply a single combined
MTA, they would need to implement
significant changes to the
documentation and operational
processes.
42
In particular, ICI noted that
in the absence of Letter 19–25 and this
Final Rule, counterparties would have
to reconcile two operational processes:
Margin calculation protocols that
account for a combined MTA and
separate workflows that exist for IM and
VM settlement in light of the
Commission’s segregation requirements,
which differentiate treatment for IM and
VM.
43
Several commenters expressed
support for extending the application of
separate MTAs for IM and VM to SMAs
for which an MTA of up to $50,000
would be applicable, noting that the
stated rationale for proposing the
revisions to Regulation 23.158(a) applies
equally to SMAs and that allowing such
application would establish a consistent
regulatory approach to applying MTA
thresholds.
44
In addition, noting some
ambiguity, SIFMA AMG urged the
Commission to confirm that the ability
to apply separate MTAs for IM and VM
would extend to SMAs.
45
In response,
the Commission confirms that the
amendments to Regulations 23.151 and
23.158(a), as adopted, permit a CSE to
apply separate MTAs for IM and VM
with each counterparty, or an SMA of a
counterparty, provided the MTAs, on a
combined basis, do not exceed the
respective limits set by Regulation
23.151. The Commission notes that the
text of the amendment to Regulation
23.158(a) refers to Regulation 23.151,
which, as amended, defines MTA and
provides for the application of an MTA
of up to $50,000 for each SMA of a
counterparty, thus allowing for the
application of separate amounts of IM
and VM to the MTA of an SMA, as
provided in amended Regulation
23.151.
C. Conforming Changes
Consistent with the amendment to the
definition of MTA in Regulation 23.151,
the Commission is adopting conforming
changes to Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and
23.153(c) by replacing ‘‘$500,000’’ with
‘‘the minimum transfer amount, as the
term is defined in 23.151.’’ The changes
replace the reference to $500,000 in
current Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and
23.153(c), which effectively limits the
MTA to $500,000, with a reference to
the revised definition of MTA, which
allows for the application of an MTA of
up to $50,000 for each SMA.
III. Administrative Compliance
The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(‘‘RFA’’) requires Federal agencies to
consider whether the rules they propose
will have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small
entities.
46
As discussed in the Proposal,
the amendments being adopted herein
only affect certain SDs and MSPs and
their counterparties, which must be
eligible contract participants
(‘‘ECPs’’).
47
The Commission has
previously established that SDs, MSPs
and ECPs are not small entities for
purposes of the RFA.
48
Therefore, the
Commission believes that the Final Rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities, as defined in the RFA.
Accordingly, the Chairman, on behalf
of the Commission, hereby certifies
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the
Final Rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(‘‘PRA’’)
49
imposes certain
requirements on Federal agencies,
including the Commission, in
connection with their conducting or
sponsoring any collection of
information, as defined by the PRA. The
Commission may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid
Office of Management and Budget
control number. The Final Rule, as
adopted, contains no requirements
subject to the PRA.
B. Cost-Benefit Considerations
Section 15(a) of the CEA
50
requires
the Commission to consider the costs
and benefits of its actions before
promulgating a regulation under the
CEA. Section 15(a) further specifies that
the costs and benefits shall be evaluated
in light of the following five broad areas
of market and public concern: (1)
Protection of market participants and
the public; (2) efficiency,
competitiveness, and financial integrity
of futures markets; (3) price discovery;
(4) sound risk management practices;
and (5) other public interest
considerations. The Commission
considers the costs and benefits
resulting from its discretionary
determinations with respect to the
section 15(a) considerations.
The Commission is amending
Regulation 23.151 consistent with Letter
17–12. The Commission is revising the
definition of MTA in Regulation 23.151
to permit CSEs to apply an MTA of up
to $50,000 for each SMA of a
counterparty that enters into uncleared
swaps with a CSE. The Commission also
is amending Regulation 23.151 to add a
definition for the term SMA (or
separately managed account). The
Commission is also revising Regulation
23.158(a) consistent with Letter 19–25
to state that if a CSE and its
counterparty agree to have separate
MTAs for IM and VM, the respective
amounts of MTA must be reflected in
the margin documentation required by
Regulation 23.158(a). Finally, the
Commission is adopting conforming
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7 U.S.C. 2(i).
52
See e.g., ICI at 7 and MFA at 3 (addressing the
concern that permitting the application of a
reduced, individualized MTA, as proposed, to an
indefinite number of SMAs may incentivize SMA
owners to create additional separate accounts).
changes to Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and
23.153(c) to incorporate the change to
the definition of MTA in Regulation
23.151.
The baseline for the Commission’s
consideration of the costs and benefits
of this Final Rule is the CFTC Margin
Rule. The Commission recognizes that
to the extent market participants have
relied on Letters 17–12 and 19–25, the
actual costs and benefits of the
amendments, as realized in the market,
may not be as significant.
The Commission notes that the
consideration of costs and benefits
below is based on the understanding
that the markets function
internationally, with many transactions
involving U.S. firms taking place across
international boundaries; with some
Commission registrants being organized
outside of the United States; with
leading industry members typically
conducting operations both within and
outside the United States; and with
industry members commonly following
substantially similar business practices
wherever located. Where the
Commission does not specifically refer
to matters of location, the following
discussion of costs and benefits refers to
the effects of the Final Rule on all
activity subject to the amended
regulations, whether by virtue of the
activity’s physical location in the
United States or by virtue of the
activity’s connection with activities in,
or effect on, U.S. commerce under
section 2(i) of the CEA.
51
As previously discussed, the
Commission received six comment
letters expressing support for the
Proposal. Commenters generally noted
that the proposed amendments are
beneficial for market participants and
characterized them as helpful and
practical accommodations that reflect
the realities of the marketplace and
facilitate compliance with the CFTC
Margin Rule. Several commenters
elaborated on specific benefits of the
amendments, noting for instance that
the amendments would eliminate
burdens associated with the application
of a single MTA across SMAs of a
counterparty, provide regulatory
certainty and contribute to global
consistency in regulatory standards.
Some commenters also addressed
concerns that the Commission had
raised in the Proposal, pointing out
mitigating factors.
52
1. Benefits
The amendments to Regulation 23.151
allow CSEs to apply an MTA of up to
$50,000 to SMAs of a counterparty.
Under the current requirements, a CSE
must apply the MTA with respect to
each counterparty to an uncleared
transaction. As a result, in the context
of a counterparty that has multiple
SMAs through which uncleared swaps
are traded, with each SMA potentially
giving rise to IM and VM obligations,
the amounts of IM and VM attributable
to the SMAs of the counterparty must be
aggregated to determine whether the
MTA has been exceeded, which would
require the exchange of IM or VM.
As previously discussed, because the
assets of SMAs are separately held,
transferred, and returned at the account
level, and CSEs and SMA asset
managers do not share trading
information across SMAs, aggregation of
IM and VM obligations across SMAs for
the purpose of determining whether the
MTA has been exceeded may be
impractical, hindering efforts to comply
with the CFTC Margin Rule. The
Commission acknowledges, however,
the possibility that, in certain contexts,
an owner of SMAs, such as a pension
fund that administers investments for
beneficiaries, may be set up to perform
collateral management exercises and
may have the capability to aggregate
collateral across SMAs. Nevertheless,
according to industry feedback, the only
practical alternative to fully ensure
compliance with the margin
requirements is to set the MTA for each
SMA at zero, so that trading by a given
SMA does not result in an inadvertent
breach of the aggregate MTA threshold
without the exchange of the required
margin.
The amendments to Regulation
23.151, by allowing the application of
an MTA of up to $50,000 for each SMA
of a counterparty, will ease the
operational burdens and transactional
costs associated with managing frequent
transfers of small amounts of collateral
that counterparties would incur if the
MTA for SMAs were to be set at zero.
In addition, the amendments give
flexibility to CSEs, owners of SMAs, and
asset managers to negotiate MTA levels
within the regulatory limits that match
the risks of the SMAs and their
investment strategies, and the uncleared
swaps being traded.
Furthermore, because the
amendments to Regulation 23.151
simplify the application of the MTA in
the SMA context, thereby reducing the
operational burden, market participants
may be encouraged to participate in the
uncleared swap markets through
managed accounts, and account
managers may also make their services
more readily available to clients. As a
result, trading in the uncleared swap
markets may increase, promoting
competition and liquidity.
The amendment of Regulation
23.158(a) could likewise lead to
efficiencies in the application of the
MTA. The amendment, as adopted,
states that if a CSE and its counterparty
agree to have separate MTAs for IM and
VM, the respective amounts of MTA
must be reflected in the margin
documentation required by Regulation
23.158(a). CSEs will thus be able to
maintain separate margin settlement
workflows for IM and VM to address the
differing segregation treatments for IM
and VM under the CFTC Margin Rule.
The Commission notes that the
application of separate MTAs for IM and
VM has been adopted in other
jurisdictions, including the European
Union, and the practice is widespread.
The amendments, by aligning the CFTC
with other jurisdictions with respect to
the application of the MTA, advance the
CFTC’s goal of promoting consistent
international standards, in line with the
statutory mandate set forth in the Dodd-
Frank Act.
Finally, the amendments, as adopted,
provide certainty to market participants
who may have relied on Letters 17–12
and 19–25, and could thereby facilitate
their efforts to take the operation of the
Commission’s regulations into account
in the planning of their uncleared swap
activities.
2. Costs
The amendments to Regulation 23.151
could result in a CSE applying an MTA
that exceeds, in the aggregate, the
current MTA limit of $500,000. That is
because the amendments, as adopted,
permit the application of an MTA of up
to $50,000 for each SMA of a
counterparty, without limiting the
number of SMAs to which the $50,000
threshold may be applied. The
amendments thus could incentivize
SMA owners to increase the number of
separate accounts in order to benefit
from the higher MTA limit. As a result,
the collection and posting of margin for
some SMAs may be delayed, since
margin will not need to be exchanged
until the MTA threshold is exceeded,
which could result in the exchange of
less collateral to mitigate the risk of
uncleared swaps.
The amendment to Regulation
23.158(a), as adopted, states that if a
CSE and its counterparty agree to have
separate MTAs for IM and VM, the
respective amounts of MTA must be
reflected in the margin documentation
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Supra note 38 (explaining how the application
of separate MTAs for IM and VM could result in
the exchange of lower amounts of margin than if IM
and VM MTA were computed on an aggregate
basis).
54
The following illustration explains how the
application of separate MTAs for IM and VM could
result in the exchange of higher amounts of margin
than if IM and VM MTA were computed on an
aggregate basis: An SD and a counterparty agree to
$300,000 IM MTA, and $200,000 VM MTA. If the
margin calculations set forth in Commission
regulations 23.154 (for IM), and 23.155 (for VM)
require the SD to post $200,000 of IM with the
counterparty and $250,000 of VM with the
counterparty, the SD would not be required to post
IM with the counterparty as the $200,000
requirement is less than the $300,000 MTA.
However, the SD would be required to post
$250,000 in VM as the VM required exceeds the
$200,000 VM MTA, even though the total amount
of margin owed is below the $500,000 MTA set
forth in Commission regulations 23.152(b)(3) and
23.153(c). Letter 19–25 at 4.
55
See ICI at 7; MFA at 3; SIFMA AMG at 3.
56
7 U.S.C. 6s(j)(2).
57
17 CFR 23.600.
required by Regulation 23.158(a). The
amendment recognizes that CSEs can
apply separate MTAs for IM and VM for
determining whether Regulations
23.152(b)(3) and 23.153(c) require the
exchange of IM or VM. The Commission
acknowledges that the application of
separate IM and VM MTAs may result
in the exchange of a lower amount of
total margin between a CSE and its
counterparty to mitigate the risk of their
uncleared swaps than the amount that
would be exchanged if the IM and VM
MTA were computed on an aggregate
basis.
53
The Commission notes that this
cost may be mitigated because the
application of separate IM and VM
MTAs could also result in the exchange
of higher rather than lower amounts of
margin.
54
While the Commission recognizes that
the uncollateralized exposure that may
result from amending Regulations
23.151 and 23.158(a), in line with
Letters 17–12 and 19–25, could increase
credit risk associated with uncleared
swaps, the Commission believes that a
number of safeguards exist to mitigate
this risk. The Commission notes that the
amendments, as adopted, set the MTA
at low levels. When the MTA is applied
to a counterparty, the sum of the IM and
VM MTAs must not exceed $500,000.
When the MTA is applied to an SMA of
a counterparty, the sum of the IM and
VM MTAs must not exceed $50,000. In
particular with respect to the
application of the MTA to SMAs, the
low level of the MTA may dampen the
incentive to create additional SMAs to
benefit from the potentially higher MTA
threshold given the inability to net
collateral across SMAs under the Final
Rule. Several commenters confirmed the
Commission’s assessment and some
added that the burdens and costs of
creating and maintaining separate
accounts would likely override the
benefits of any marginal increase in
MTA.
55
Also, the Commission notes that
other regulatory safeguards exist that
would limit the potential increase in the
credit exposure, including section
4s(j)(2) of the CEA,
56
which mandates
that CSEs adopt a robust and
professional risk management system
adequate for the management of day-to-
day swap activities, and Regulation
23.600,
57
which requires CSEs, in
establishing a risk management program
for the monitoring and management of
risk related to their swap activities, to
account for credit risk and to set risk
tolerance limits.
3. Section 15(a) Considerations
In light of the foregoing, the CFTC has
evaluated the costs and benefits of the
Final Rule pursuant to the five
considerations identified in section
15(a) of the CEA as follows:
a. Protection of Market Participants and
Public
As discussed above, the amendments
to Regulations 23.151 and 23.158(a),
which address the application of the
MTA to SMAs and the application of
separate MTAs for IM and VM, remove
practical burdens in the application of
the MTA, facilitating the
implementation of the CFTC Margin
Rule, with minimal impact on the
protection of market participants and
the public in general. Although the
amendments, as adopted, could result in
larger amounts of MTA being applied to
uncleared swaps, potentially resulting
in the exchange of reduced margin to
offset the risk of uncleared swaps, the
impact is likely to be negligible relative
to the size of the uncleared swap
positions. The Commission notes that
the MTA thresholds are set at low
levels. In addition, CSEs are required to
monitor and manage risk associated
with their swaps, in particular credit
risk, and to set tolerance levels as part
of the risk management program
mandated by Regulation 23.600. To
meet the risk tolerance levels, a CSE
may contractually limit the MTA or the
number of SMAs for a particular
counterparty with whom the CSE enters
into uncleared swap transactions.
b. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and
Financial Integrity of Markets
By amending Regulation 23.151 to
allow CSEs to apply an MTA of up to
$50,000 for each SMA of a counterparty,
the Commission eliminates burdens and
practical challenges associated with the
computation and aggregation of the
MTA across multiple SMAs. In
addition, the new MTA threshold for
SMAs could have the effect of delaying
how soon margin would be exchanged,
as the aggregate MTA for SMAs is no
longer limited to $500,000.
The simplification of the process for
applying the MTA to SMAs and the
reduced cost that may be realized from
the deferral of margin obligations may
encourage market participants to enter
into uncleared swaps through accounts
managed by asset managers and also
encourage asset managers to accept
more clients. The amendments to
Regulation 23.151 could therefore foster
competitiveness by encouraging
increased participation in the uncleared
swap markets.
The amendment to Regulation
23.158(a) states that if a CSE and its
counterparty agree to have separate
MTAs for IM and VM, the respective
amounts of MTA must be reflected in
the margin documentation required by
Regulation 23.158(a). The amendment
recognizes that CSEs can apply separate
MTAs for IM and VM, enabling CSEs to
accommodate the different segregation
treatments for IM and VM under the
CFTC’s margin requirements and to
more efficiently comply with the CFTC
Margin Rule.
The amendments to Regulations
23.151 and 23.158(a) could have the
overall effect of permitting larger
amounts of MTA being applied to
uncleared swaps, resulting in the
collection and posting of less collateral
to offset the risk of uncleared swaps,
which could undermine the integrity of
the markets. The Commission, however,
believes that the uncollateralized swap
exposure will be limited given that the
MTA thresholds are set at low levels,
and there are other built-in regulatory
safeguards, such as the requirement that
CSEs establish a risk management
program under Regulation 23.600 that
provides for the implementation of
internal risk parameters for the
monitoring and management of swap
risk.
The Commission also notes that the
amendments provide certainty to market
participants who may have relied on
Letters 17–12 and 19–25, and thereby
facilitate their efforts to take the
operation of the Commission’s
regulations into account in planning
their uncleared swap activities.
c. Price Discovery
The amendments to Regulations
23.151 and 23.158(a) simplify the
process for applying the MTA, reducing
the burden and cost of implementation.
Given these cost savings, CSEs and
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7 U.S.C. 19(b).
other market participants may be
encouraged to increase their
participation in the uncleared swap
markets. As a result, trading in
uncleared swaps may increase, leading
to increased liquidity and enhanced
price discovery.
d. Sound Risk Management
Because the amendments to
Regulations 23.151 and 23.158(a) permit
the application of larger amounts of
MTA, less margin may be collected and
posted to offset the risk of uncleared
swaps. Nevertheless, the Commission
believes that the risk is mitigated
because the regulatory MTA thresholds
are set at low levels, and CSEs are
required to have a risk management
program that provides for the
implementation of internal risk
management parameters for the
monitoring and management of swap
risk.
The Commission also notes that the
amendments simplify the application of
the MTA, reducing the burden and cost
of implementation, without leading to
an unacceptable level of
uncollateralized credit risk. Such
reduced burden and cost could
encourage market participants to
increase their participation in the
uncleared swap markets, potentially
facilitating improved risk management
for counterparties using uncleared
swaps to hedge risks. Moreover, by
facilitating compliance with certain
aspects of the Commission’s regulations,
the Commission allows market
participants to focus their efforts on
monitoring and ensuring compliance
with other substantive aspects of the
CFTC Margin Rule, thus promoting
balanced and sound risk management.
e. Other Public Interest Considerations
The amendment to Regulation
23.158(a) addresses the application of
separate MTAs for IM and VM,
contributing to the CFTC’s alignment
with other jurisdictions, such as the
European Union, which advances the
CFTC’s efforts to achieve consistent
international standards. The CFTC’s
alignment with other jurisdictions with
respect to the application of the MTA
will benefit CSEs that are global market
participants by eliminating the need to
establish different settlement workflows
tailored to each jurisdiction in which
they operate.
C. Antitrust Considerations
Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the
Commission to take into consideration
the public interest to be protected by the
antitrust laws and endeavor to take the
least anticompetitive means of
achieving the objectives of the CEA, as
well as the policies and purposes of the
CEA, in issuing any order or adopting
any Commission rule or regulation
(including any exemption under section
4(c) or 4c(b)), or in requiring or
approving any bylaw, rule, or regulation
of a contract market or registered futures
association established pursuant to
section 17 of the CEA.
58
The Commission believes that the
public interest to be protected by the
antitrust laws is generally to protect
competition. The Commission requested
comment on whether the Proposal
implicated any other specific public
interest to be protected by the antitrust
laws and received no comments.
The Commission has considered the
Final Rule to determine whether it is
anticompetitive and has identified no
anticompetitive effects. The
Commission requested comment on
whether the Proposal was
anticompetitive and, if it was, what the
anticompetitive effects were, and
received no comments.
Because the Commission has
determined that the Final Rule is not
anticompetitive and has no
anticompetitive effects, the Commission
has not identified any less
anticompetitive means of achieving the
purposes of the CEA.
List of Subjects 17 CFR Part 23
Swaps, Swap dealers, Major swap
participants, Capital and margin
requirements.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR
part 23 as set forth below:
PART 23—SWAP DEALERS AND
MAJOR SWAP PARTICIPANTS
1. The authority citation for part 23
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6b, 6b–
1,6c, 6p, 6r, 6s, 6t, 9, 9a, 12, 12a, 13b, 13c,
16a, 18, 19, 21.
2. Amend § 23.151 by:
a. Revising the definition of
‘‘minimum transfer amount’’; and
b. Adding in alphabetical order a
definition for ‘‘separately managed
account’’.
The revision and addition read as
follows:
§ 23.151 Definitions applicable to margin
requirements.
* * * * *
Minimum transfer amount means a
combined initial and variation margin
amount under which no actual transfer
of funds is required. The minimum
transfer amount shall be $500,000.
Where a counterparty to a covered swap
entity owns two or more separately
managed accounts, a minimum transfer
amount of up to $50,000 may be applied
for each separately managed account.
* * * * *
Separately managed account means
an account of a counterparty to a
covered swap entity that meets the
following requirements:
(1) The account is managed by an
asset manager and governed by an
investment management agreement,
pursuant to which the counterparty
grants the asset manager authority with
respect to a specified amount of the
counterparty’s assets;
(2) Swaps are entered into between
the counterparty and the covered swap
entity by the asset manager on behalf of
the account pursuant to authority
granted by the counterparty through an
investment management agreement; and
(3) The swaps of such account are
subject to a master netting agreement
that does not provide for the netting of
initial or variation margin obligations
across all such accounts of the
counterparty that have swaps
outstanding with the covered swap
entity.
* * * * *
3. Amend § 23.152 by revising
paragraph (b)(3) to read as follows:
§ 23.152 Collection and posting of initial
margin.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) Minimum transfer amount. A
covered swap entity is not required to
collect or to post initial margin pursuant
to §§ 23.150 through 23.161 with respect
to a particular counterparty unless and
until the combined amount of initial
margin and variation margin that is
required pursuant to §§ 23.150 through
23.161 to be collected or posted and that
has not been collected or posted with
respect to the counterparty is greater
than the minimum transfer amount, as
the term is defined in § 23.151.
* * * * *
4. Amend § 23.153 by revising
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 23.153 Collection and posting of
variation margin.
* * * * *
(c) Minimum transfer amount. A
covered swap entity is not required to
collect or to post variation margin
pursuant to §§ 23.150 through 23.161
with respect to a particular counterparty
unless and until the combined amount
of initial margin and variation margin
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Recommendations to Improve Scoping and
Implementation of Initial Margin Requirements for
Non-Cleared Swaps, Report to the CFTC’s Global
Markets Advisory Committee by the Subcommittee
on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps
(April 2020), available at https://www.cftc.gov/
media/3886/GMAC_
051920MarginSubcommitteeReport/download.
60
See generally BCBS/IOSCO, Margin
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives
(July 2019), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/d475.pdf.
61
Specifically, CEA Section 4s(j)(2), 7 U.S.C.
6s(j)(2), requires swap dealers to adopt a robust risk
management system adequate for the management
of their swap activities, and CFTC Rule 23.600, 17
CFR 23.600, requires swap dealers to establish a
risk management program to monitor and manage
risks associated with their swap activities.
62
Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump
Regarding Final Rule: Cross-Border Application of
the Registration Thresholds and Certain
Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and
Major Swap Participants (July 23, 2020), available
at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/stumpstatement072320.
63
CFTC Letter No. 17–12, Commission
Regulations 23.152(b)(3) and 23.153(c): No-Action
Position for Minimum Transfer Amount with
respect to Separately Managed Accounts (February
13, 2017), available at https://www.cftc.gov/idc/
groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/
17-12.pdf.
that is required pursuant to §§ 23.150
through 23.161 to be collected or posted
and that has not been collected or
posted with respect to the counterparty
is greater than the minimum transfer
amount, as the term is defined in
§ 23.151.
* * * * *
5. Amend § 23.158 by revising
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 23.158 Margin documentation.
(a) General requirement. Each covered
swap entity shall execute
documentation with each counterparty
that complies with the requirements of
§ 23.504 and that complies with this
section, as applicable. For uncleared
swaps between a covered swap entity
and a counterparty that is a swap entity
or a financial end user, the
documentation shall provide the
covered swap entity with the
contractual right and obligation to
exchange initial margin and variation
margin in such amounts, in such form,
and under such circumstances as are
required by §§ 23.150 through 23.161.
With respect to the minimum transfer
amount, if a covered swap entity and a
counterparty that is a swap entity or a
financial end user agree to have separate
minimum transfer amounts for initial
and variation margin, the
documentation shall specify the
amounts to be allocated for initial
margin and variation margin. Such
amounts, on a combined basis, must not
exceed the minimum transfer amount,
as the term is defined in § 23.151.
* * * * *
Issued in Washington, DC, on December 9,
2020, by the Commission.
Robert Sidman,
Deputy Secretary of the Commission.
Note: The following appendices will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendices to Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and
Major Swap Participants—Voting
Summary and Chairman’s and
Commissioners’ Statements
Appendix 1—Voting Summary
On this matter, Chairman Tarbert and
Commissioners Quintenz, Behnam, Stump,
and Berkovitz voted in the affirmative. No
Commissioner voted in the negative.
Appendix 2—Supporting Statement of
Commissioner Dawn D. Stump
Overview
I am pleased to support the final
rulemaking that the Commission is adopting
with respect to the ‘‘minimum transfer
amount’’ provisions of its margin
requirements for uncleared swaps.
This rulemaking addresses
recommendations that the Commission has
received from its Global Markets Advisory
Committee (‘‘GMAC’’), which I am proud to
sponsor, and is based on a comprehensive
report prepared by GMAC’s Subcommittee on
Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps
(‘‘GMAC Margin Subcommittee’’).
59
It
demonstrates the value added to the
Commission’s policymaking by its Advisory
Committees, in which market participants
and other interested parties come together to
provide us with their perspectives and
potential solutions to practical problems.
The rulemaking we are adopting makes
two changes to the Commission’s uncleared
margin rules, which have much to commend
them—indeed, we did not receive any
comment letters opposing them. These rule
changes further objectives that I have
commented on before:
The need to tailor our rules to assure that
they are workable for those required to
comply with them; and
the benefits of codifying relief that has
been issued by our Staff and re-visiting our
rules, where appropriate.
A Different Universe Is Coming Into Scope
of the Uncleared Margin Rules
The Commission’s uncleared margin rules
for swap dealers, like the Framework of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
and the Board of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions
(‘‘BCBS/IOSCO’’)
60
on which they are based,
were designed primarily to ensure the
exchange of margin between the largest, most
systemic, and interconnected financial
institutions for their uncleared swap
transactions with one another. Today, these
institutions and transactions are subject to
uncleared margin requirements that have
taken effect since the rules were adopted.
Pursuant to the phased implementation
schedule of the Commission’s rules and the
BCBS/IOSCO Framework, though, a different
universe of market participants—presenting
unique considerations—will soon be coming
into scope of the margin rules. It is only now,
as we enter the final phases of the
implementation schedule, that the
Commission’s uncleared margin rules will
apply to a significant number of financial
end-users, and we have a responsibility to
make sure they are fit for that purpose.
Accordingly, now is the time we must
thoughtfully consider whether the regulatory
parameters that we have designed for the
largest financial institutions in the earlier
phases of margin implementation need to be
tailored to account for the practical and
operational challenges posed by the exchange
of margin when one of the counterparties is
a pension plan, endowment, insurance
provider, mortgage service provider, or other
financial end-user.
This rulemaking regarding the minimum
transfer amount (‘‘MTA’’) does exactly that.
The Commission’s uncleared margin rules
provide that a swap dealer is not required to
collect or post initial margin (‘‘IM’’) or
variation margin (‘‘VM’’) with a counterparty
until the combined amount of such IM and
VM exceeds the MTA of $500,000. Yet, the
application of the MTA presents a significant
operational challenge for institutional
investors that typically hire asset managers to
exercise investment discretion over portions
of their assets in separately managed
accounts (‘‘SMAs’’) for purposes of
diversification. As a practical matter, neither
the owner of the SMA, the manager of the
assets in the SMA, nor the swap dealer that
is a counterparty to the SMA is in a position
to readily determine when the MTA has been
exceeded on an aggregate basis (or to assure
that it is not).
To address this challenge, the Commission
is amending the definition of MTA in its
margin rules to allow a swap dealer to apply
an MTA of up to $50,000 to each SMA
owned by a counterparty with which the
swap dealer enters into uncleared swaps. As
noted in the release, any potential increase in
uncollateralized credit risk as a result would
be mitigated both by the conditions set out
in the rules we are adopting, as well as
existing safeguards in the Commodity
Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’) and the Commission’s
regulations.
61
This is a sensible approach and an
appropriate refinement to make the
Commission’s uncleared margin rules
workable for SMAs given the realities of the
modern investment management
environment. As I have stated before, no
matter how well-intentioned a rule may be,
if it is not workable, it cannot deliver on its
intended purpose.
62
The Benefits of Codifying Staff Relief and
Re-Visiting Our Rules
Application of MTA to SMAs: The rule
change that I have discussed above regarding
the application of the MTA to SMAs would
codify no-action relief in Letter No. 17–12
that our Staff issued in 2017.
63
The
Commission’s Staff often has occasion to
issue relief or take other action in the form
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See comments of Commissioner Dawn D.
Stump during Open Commission Meeting on
January 30, 2020, at 183 (noting that after several
years of no-action relief regarding trading on swap
execution facilities (‘‘SEFs’’), ‘‘we have the benefit
of time and experience and it is time to think about
codifying some of that relief.... [T]he SEFs, the
market participants, and the Commission have
benefited from this time and we have an obligation
to provide more legal certainty through codifying
these provisions into rules.’’), available at https://
www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020/08/
1597339661/openmeeting_013020_Transcript.pdf.
65
Statement of Commissioner Dawn D. Stump for
CFTC Open Meeting on: (1) Final Rule on Position
Limits and Position Accountability for Security
Futures Products; and (2) Proposed Rule on Public
Rulemaking Procedures (Part 13 Amendments)
(September 16, 2019), available at https://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
stumpstatement091619.
66
CFTC Letter No. 19–25, Commission
Regulations 23.151, 23.152, and 23.153—Staff
Time-Limited No-Action Position Regarding
Application of Minimum Transfer Amount under
the Uncleared Margin Rules (December 6, 2019),
available at https://www.cftc.gov/csl/19-25/
download.
67
Under the Commission’s uncleared margin
rules, IM posted or collected by a swap dealer must
be held by one or more custodians that are not
affiliated with the swap dealer or the counterparty,
whereas VM posted or collected by a swap dealer
is not required to be segregated with an
independent custodian. See 17 CFR 23.157.
1
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 FR
636 (Jan. 6, 2016) (‘‘Margin Rule’’).
2
Although addressed in the final rules, there are
currently no registered MSPs.
3
Section 4s(e) of the Commodity Exchange Act
(‘‘CEA’’), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act,
requires the Commission to adopt rules for
minimum initial and variation margin for uncleared
swaps entered into by SDs and MSPs for which
there is no prudential regulator.
4
BCBS/IOSCO, Margin requirements for non-
centrally cleared derivatives (July 2019), available
at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d475.pdf. The
BCBS/IOSCO framework was originally
promulgated in 2013 and later revised in 2015.
5
Recommendations to Improve Scoping and
Implementation of Initial Margin Requirements for
Non-Cleared Swaps, Report to the CFTC’s Global
Markets Advisory Committee by the Subcommittee
on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps
(Apr. 2020), available at https://www.cftc.gov/
media/3886/GMAC_
051920MarginSubcommitteeReport/download.
6
See Margin Rule, 81 FR at 645.
of no-action letters, interpretative letters, or
advisories on various issues and in various
circumstances. This affords the Commission
a chance to observe how the Staff action
operates in real-time, and to evaluate lessons
learned. With the benefit of this time and
experience, the Commission should then
consider whether codifying such Staff action
into rules is appropriate.
64
As I have said before, ‘‘[i]t is simply good
government to re-visit our rules and assess
whether certain rules need to be updated,
evaluate whether rules are achieving their
objectives, and identify rules that are falling
short and should be withdrawn or
improved.’’
65
Experience with the Staff no-
action relief in Letter No. 17–12 supports our
rule change to tailor the application of the
MTA under the Commission’s uncleared
margin rules in the SMA context.
Separate MTAs for IM and VM: The second
rule change regarding the MTA that we are
adopting similarly would codify existing
Staff no-action relief in recognition of market
realities. Consistent with Staff no-action
Letter No. 19–25,
66
it would recognize that a
swap dealer may apply separate MTAs for IM
and VM with each counterparty, provided
that the MTAs corresponding to IM and VM
are specified in the margin documentation
required under the Commission’s regulations,
and that the MTAs, on a combined basis, do
not exceed the prescribed MTA.
Staff’s no-action relief, and the
Commission’s rule amendments to codify
that relief, take into account the separate
settlement workflows that swap
counterparties maintain to reflect, from an
operational perspective, the different
regulatory treatment of IM and VM.
67
And
given that the total amount of combined IM
and VM exchanged would not exceed the
prescribed MTA, separate MTAs for IM and
VM would not materially increase the
amount of credit risk at a given time. Under
Letter No. 19–25 and this codification, swap
dealers and their counterparties can manage
MTA in an operationally practicable way that
aligns with the market standard.
There Remains Unfinished Business
While I am pleased with the steps the
Commission is taking, there remains
unfinished business in the implementation of
uncleared margin requirements. The report of
the GMAC Margin Subcommittee
recommended several actions, beyond those
that we are adopting, to address the hurdles
associated with the application of uncleared
margin requirements to end-users. Having
been present for the development of the
Dodd-Frank Act, I recall that the concerns
expressed by many lawmakers at the time
focused on the application of the new
requirements to end-users. The unique
challenges with respect to uncleared margin
that caused uneasiness back in 2009–2010
are now much more immediate as the margin
requirements are being phased in to apply to
these end-users. As the calendar turns into
the new year, I look forward to continuing to
work together to address the other
recommendations included in the GMAC
Margin Subcommittee’s report regarding
applying the uncleared margin rules to
financial end-users. The need to do so will
only become more urgent as time marches
on.
Conclusion
To be clear, these changes to the uncleared
margin rules are not a ‘‘roll-back’’ of the
margin requirements that apply today to the
largest financial institutions in their swap
transactions with one another. Rather, they
reflect a thoughtful refinement of our rules to
take account of specific circumstances in
which the rules impose substantial practical
and operational challenges (i.e., they are not
workable) when applied to financial end-
users that are now coming within the scope
of their mandates.
I am very appreciative of the many people
whose efforts have contributed to bringing
this rulemaking to fruition. First, the
members of the GMAC, and especially the
GMAC Margin Subcommittee, who devoted a
tremendous amount of time to provide us
with a high-quality report on complex margin
issues during the turmoil at the start of the
pandemic. Second, Chairman Tarbert and my
fellow Commissioners for working with me
on these important issues. And finally, the
Staff of the Market Participants Division,
whose tireless efforts have enabled us to
advance these initiatives to assure that our
uncleared margin rules are workable for all,
thereby enhancing compliance consistent
with our oversight responsibilities under the
CEA.
Appendix 3—Statement of Commissioner
Dan M. Berkovitz
I. Introduction
I support today’s two final rules that make
tailored amendments to the CFTC’s Margin
Rule.
1
The Margin Rule requires swap
dealers (‘‘SDs’’) and major swap participants
(‘‘MSPs’’) for which there is no prudential
regulator to post and collect, each business
day, initial and variation margin for
uncleared swap transactions with each
counterparty that is an SD, MSP, or a
financial end user with material swaps
exposure (‘‘MSE’’).
2
The Margin Rule is a
lynchpin of the Dodd-Frank reforms for
swaps markets, and critical to mitigating
risks in the financial system that might
otherwise arise from uncleared swaps.
3
I
support the final rules because they provide
targeted, operational improvements to the
Margin Rule; include backstops to deter any
potential abuse; and are unlikely to increase
risk to the U.S. financial system.
The two final rules address: (1) The
definition of MSE and an alternative method
for calculating initial margin (‘‘MSE and
Initial Margin Final Rule’’); and (2) the
application of the minimum transfer amount
(‘‘MTA’’) for initial and variation margin
(‘‘MTA Final Rule’’). The final rules align
Commission requirements with international
frameworks developed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (‘‘BCBS/IOSCO’’),
4
and
incorporate recommendations made to the
CFTC’s Global Markets Advisory
Committee.
5
The final rules also build off
existing CFTC staff no-action letters that in
some cases have been in place since 2017,
and that have operated with no apparent
detrimental effects.
II. MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule
The MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule
amends the definition of MSE to align it with
the BCBS/IOSCO framework, including the
method for calculating the average daily
aggregate notional amount (‘‘AANA’’) of
swaps. The final rule provides for
calculations based on the average of the last
business day in each month of a three-month
period. The Commission previously raised
concerns that this method of AANA
calculation could potentially become less
representative of an entity’s true AANA and
swaps exposure, potentially through the use
of ‘‘window dressing’’ to artificially reduce
AANA during the measurement period.
6
The MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule
includes an important new provision to
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MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule at new
§23.151 (defining ‘‘Material Swaps Exposure’’).
8
The preamble to the MSE and Initial Margin
Final Rule also notes an analysis by the CFTC’s
Office of the Chief Economist indicating that the
new month-end AANA calculation method captures
substantially the same entities and total number of
entities as the Commission’s previous daily AANA
calculation method. As with any rulemaking, the
Commission is free in the future to periodically
review its data and confirm that the new AANA
calculation method is performing as expected.
9
7 U.S.C. 6a(c)(2).
10
MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule at section
II(B).
11
17 CFR 23.151.
12
Both aspects of the MTA Final Rule were the
subject of CFTC staff no-action letters issued in
2017 and 2019, respectively.
address this issue. The final rule explicitly
prohibits any ‘‘[a]ctivities not carried out in
the regular course of business and willfully
designed to circumvent calculation at month-
end to evade meeting the definition of
material swaps exposure ....
7
The
addition of this language to the final rule’s
regulatory text will help ensure that CFTC
efforts at international harmonization will
not come at the expense of the safety and
soundness of the U.S. financial system.
8
I
thank the Chairman and the CFTC staff for
working with my office to include this
provision.
The MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule will
also allow SDs and MSPs for which there is
no prudential regulator (‘‘Covered Swap
Entities’’ or ‘‘CSEs’’) to rely on the initial
margin calculations of the more sophisticated
counterparties with whom they transact
swaps to manage their risks. This flexibility
is limited to circumstances where a CSE
enters into uncleared swaps with an SD,
MSP, or swap entity to hedge its customer-
facing swaps. This amendment to the
Commission’s existing rules could help
promote liquidity and competition in swaps
markets by increasing choice for end-users
that are CSE customers.
The MSE and Initial Margin Final Rule
provides helpful direction regarding the
scope of hedging swaps for purposes of
relying on a CSE counterparty’s initial
margin calculations. As set forth in the
preamble to the final rule, a hedging swap
must be consistent (although not identical)
with the statutory definition of ‘‘bona fide
hedging transaction or position’’ in CEA
section 4a(c)(2)(B).
9
The final rule also makes
clear that existing Commission regulations
require a CSE that relies on its counterparty’s
initial margin calculations to also take steps
to ‘‘monitor, identify, and address potential
shortfalls in the amounts of [initial margin]
generated by the counterparty on whose
[initial margin] model the CSE is relying.’’
10
III. MTA Final Rule
To reduce operational burdens associated
with de minimis margin transfers, the Margin
Rule provides that a CSE is not required to
collect or post margin until the combined
amount of initial margin and variation
margin that is required to be collected or
posted and that has not been collected or
posted with respect to the counterparty
exceeds $500,000—the MTA.
11
This MTA
level, in part, helps limit the amount of a
counterparty’s uncollateralized, uncleared
swaps exposure and mitigate any systemic
risk arising from such swaps.
The MTA Final Rule addresses the
application of the $500,000 MTA level to a
counterparty’s ‘‘separately managed
accounts,’’ as well as the use of separate
MTAs for initial and variation margin.
12
The
MTA Final Rule codifies separate treatment
for separately managed accounts and permits
an MTA of $50,000 for each such account of
a counterparty. This approach responds to
practical limits on the ability of asset
managers, for example, to aggregate initial
and variation margin obligations across
multiple separately managed accounts owned
by the same counterparty. The MTA Final
Rule also provides that if certain entities
agree to separate MTAs for initial margin and
variation margin, the respective amounts of
MTA must be reflected in their required
margin documentation.
These new provisions balance concerns
over operational inefficiencies and practical
challenges in the Commission’s MTA rules
against concerns that they may result in the
exchange of less total margin than would be
the case under the Commission’s current
requirements. Comments in response to the
proposed rule noted the difficulties that
would be associated with creating numerous
separately managed accounts solely to evade
the comparatively low $50,000 MTA for
separately managed accounts. The MTA
Final Rule also defines separately managed
account so that the swaps of such account are
not subject to a netting of initial or variation
margin obligations. This potentially provides
further disincentive to create separately
managed accounts solely for the purpose of
evading the $50,000 MTA level for such
accounts.
IV. Conclusion
Mitigating systemic risk to the U.S.
financial system was a primary objective of
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, and of
subsequent Commission rulemakings to
implement Dodd-Frank, including the
Margin Rule adopted in 2016. The
Commission must remain committed to the
Margin Rule and vigilant for any large pool
of uncollateralized, uncleared swaps
exposure. Today’s targeted final rules, which
codify existing practices, include embedded
backstops, and provide tailored operational
enhancements to the Margin Rule, are
unlikely to present systemic risks.
I thank staff of the Market Participants
Division for their work on these final rules.
[FR Doc. 2020–27508 Filed 1–22–21; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
50 CFR Part 679
[Docket No. 200221–0062; RTID 0648–
XA805]
Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic
Zone Off Alaska; Pacific Cod by
Catcher Vessels Using Trawl Gear in
the Western Regulatory Area of the
Gulf of Alaska
AGENCY
: National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
ACTION
: Temporary rule; modification of
closure.
SUMMARY
: NMFS is opening directed
fishing for Pacific cod by catcher vessels
using trawl gear in the Western
Regulatory Area of the Gulf of Alaska
(GOA). This action is necessary to fully
use the A season allowance of the 2021
total allowable catch (TAC) of Pacific
cod by catcher vessels using trawl gear
in the Western Regulatory Area of the
GOA.
DATES
: Effective 1200 hrs, Alaska local
time (A.l.t.), January 20, 2021, through
1200 hrs, A.l.t., June 10, 2021.
Comments must be received at the
following address no later than 4:30
p.m., A.l.t., February 3, 2021.
ADDRESSES
: Submit your comments,
identified by NOAA–NMFS–2019–0102
by any of the following methods:
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: Go to
www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=NOAA-NMFS-2019-
0102, click the ‘‘Comment Now!’’ icon,
complete the required fields, and enter
or attach your comments.
Mail: Submit written comments to
Glenn Merrill, Assistant Regional
Administrator, Sustainable Fisheries
Division, Alaska Region NMFS, Attn:
Records. Mail comments to P.O. Box
21668, Juneau, AK 99802–1668.
Instructions: NMFS may not consider
comments if they are sent by any other
method, to any other address or
individual, or received after the
comment period ends. All comments
received are a part of the public record,
and NMFS will post the comments for
public viewing on www.regulations.gov
without change. All personal identifying
information (e.g., name, address),
confidential business information, or
otherwise sensitive information
submitted voluntarily by the sender will
be publicly accessible. NMFS will
accept anonymous comments (enter
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