Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
| Published date | 25 August 2020 |
| Record Number | 2020-13184 |
| Section | Proposed rules |
| Court | Federal Communications Commission |
Federal Register, Volume 85 Issue 165 (Tuesday, August 25, 2020)
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 165 (Tuesday, August 25, 2020)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 52455-52470]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-13184]
Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 165 / Tuesday, August 25, 2020 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 52455]]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97
[IB Docket No. 18-313; FCC 20-54; FRS 16848]
Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission seeks comment through a
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking adopted on April 23, 2020, on
additional amendments to its rules related to satellite orbital debris
mitigation. A related Final rule document, the Report and Order, which
adopts amendments to the Commission's satellite orbital debris
mitigation rules is published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register.
DATES: Comments are due October 9, 2020. Reply comments are due
November 9, 2020.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by IB Docket No. 18-313,
by any of the following methods:
Federal Communications Commission's Website: http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merissa Velez, 202-418-0751.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), IB Docket No. 18-313,
FCC 20-54, adopted on April 23, 2020, and released on April 24, 2020.
The full text of this document is available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-54A1.pdf. To request materials in accessible
formats for people with disabilities, send an email to [email protected]
or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530
(voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).
Comment Filing Requirements
Interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or
before the dates indicated in the DATES section above. Comments may be
filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).
Electronic Filers. Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS, http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs.
Paper Filers. Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing. If more than one docket
or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, filers
must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or
rulemaking number.
Filings can be sent by commercial overnight courier, or by first-
class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express,
and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW, Washington,
DC 20554.
Effective March 19, 2020, and until further notice, the
Commission no longer accepts any hand or messenger delivered filings.
This is a temporary measure taken to help protect the health and safety
of individuals, and to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19. See FCC
Announces Closure of FCC Headquarters Open Window and Change in Hand-
Delivery Policy, Public Notice, DA 20-304 (March 19, 2020). https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-closes-headquarters-open-window-and-changes-hand-delivery-policy.
Persons with Disabilities. To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice)
or 202-418-0432 (TTY).
Ex Parte Presentations
The Commission will treat this proceeding as a ``permit-but-
disclose'' proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte
rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any
written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation
within two business days after the presentation (unless a different
deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making
oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the
presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise
participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was
made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during
the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of
the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the
presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the
proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or
arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings
(specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data
or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This document contains proposed new and modified information
collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing
effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the
Office of Management and Budget to comment on the information
collection requirements contained in this document, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. In addition, pursuant to the Small
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, we specifically seek comment on
how we might further reduce the information collection burden for small
business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Synopsis
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
This Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) seeks comment on
additional amendments to the Commission's rules related to satellite
orbital debris mitigation. The Commission seeks comment on rule
revisions related to probability of accidental explosions, collision
risk for multi-satellite systems, maneuverability
[[Page 52456]]
requirements, casualty risk, indemnification, and performance bonds
tied to successful spacecraft disposal.
A. Probability of Accidental Explosions
Our existing orbital debris rules require that applicants provide a
statement that the space station operator has assessed and limited the
probability of accidental explosions during and after the completion of
mission operations. We had not proposed to change this rule as part of
the Notice, but observe that the ODMSP now includes a metric for
assessing this objective. The ODMSP states in relevant part that ``[i]n
developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, each program
should demonstrate, via commonly accepted engineering and probability
assessment methods, that the integrated probability of debris-
generating explosions for all credible failure modes of each spacecraft
. . . (excluding small particle impacts) is less than 0.001 (1 in
1,000) during deployment and mission operations.'' We seek comment on
inclusion of this metric in our rules. Specifically, we propose to
modify our rule such that applicants must include in the orbital debris
statement a demonstration concerning limiting risk from accidental
explosions and associated orbital debris during mission operations,
including the 0.001 threshold. We seek comment on how the Commission
should assess such demonstrations, noting that the ODMSP states that
the demonstration should be ``via commonly accepted engineering and
probability assessment methods.'' We also seek comments on the costs
and benefits of incorporating a specific metric on this topic into our
application disclosure rules.
B. Total Probability of Collisions With Large Objects
In response to the Notice, we received a number of differing views
regarding whether the Commission should consider collision risk with
large objects on a system-wide, i.e., aggregate, basis, and if so, how.
We believe these issues merit further discussion and expansion of the
record on how the Commission should analyze multi-satellite NGSO
systems, and in particular, large constellations in this context. The
NASA Standard, also incorporated into the revised ODMSP, provides that
the probability of collision with large objects (10 cm or larger) not
exceed 0.001 (1 in 1,000) during the orbital lifetime of a single
satellite. With improved access to space, it is increasingly possible
to launch constellations of satellites that number in the hundreds or
thousands. For deployments of satellites in such numbers, analysis of
whether individual satellites in the system satisfy the 0.001 (1 in
1,000) metric on a per-satellite basis, absent any additional analysis,
might not adequately address the ultimate probability of collision.
While we believe these concerns can in many cases be addressed through
sufficiently reliable mitigation measures such as maneuverability and
orbit selection, these types of concerns form the basis for seeking
comment here on how the Commission should review the collision risks
associated with multi-satellite systems from the perspective of
sustaining the space environment while at the same time encouraging
deployment of new and innovative satellite systems designed to provide
beneficial services to the U.S. public.
The revised ODMSP includes a new objective titled ``clarification
and additional standard practices for certain classes of space
operations.'' This objective includes a discussion of ``large
constellations'' and lists a number of factors to be considered when
looking at various aspects of these large constellations. In the
context of a threshold for post-mission disposal reliability, the ODMSP
guidance states that ``factors such as mass, collision probability,
orbital location, and other relevant parameters should be considered.''
As we consider the ODMSP to use as a reference in the commercial and
otherwise non-governmental context,\1\ we seek comment on the role that
this guidance should play in our rules, including how to analyze
collision risk specifically when it comes to multi-satellite
constellations.
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\1\ As noted, by its terms, the ODMSP applies to U.S. government
activities, but provides a reference generally to promote efficient
and effective space safety practices. ODMSP, Preamble.
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First, we ask how the Commission should consider the collision
risks associated with a system in its entirety as part of the licensing
process. Is assessing the total probability of collision on a system-
wide basis consistent with the public interest? Assuming that the
Commission should consider collision risks on a system-wide basis as
part of its licensing process, we seek comment on the process through
which such collision risks should be considered. We seek comment on the
factors that could be considered in performing an analysis, and if
there are metrics or thresholds that can provide additional certainty
to applicants regarding the Commission's review process.\2\ For
example, one possible approach could be to identify a system-wide
collision probability metric or other metric that, if exceeded, would
trigger further review. Such an approach could provide applicants with
a clear safe harbor when designing their systems. For applicants
exceeding the threshold, additional specific factors could be
identified that the Commission would take into consideration as part of
its further review. We seek comment on this approach, or whether there
are other suitable indicators that might help to categorize some
systems as lower-risk and some as requiring further analysis. Would
this approach provide adequate regulatory certainty or is a bright-line
rule that applies in all cases preferable? How should we balance the
certainty provided by a bright-line rule with the flexibility provided
by a safe harbor approach?
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\2\ To the extent possible, we ask that commenters supporting or
disagreeing with particular metrics provide analysis that includes
sample constellation sizes, satellite area-to-mass ratio, deployment
altitudes, and other potentially relevant considerations.
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We seek comment on the factors that could be relevant both in
establishing a threshold or bright-line rule, and in assessing a system
on a more detailed basis, for example, if the system risk exceeds a
particular safe harbor. We seek comment on consideration of factors
including per-satellite collision risk, maneuverability, number of
satellites (potentially including constellation replenishment rate and
replacement satellites), orbital lifetime, and/or size for NGSO
satellites. Are there any other factors that could or should be
considered? We note that as adopted in the Order, the calculation of
the per-satellite collision risk using the NASA Debris Assessment
Software, or higher fidelity model would already take into account the
initial orbit and area-to-mass ratio of an individual satellite. When
assessing total collision risk, should we attempt to make a bright-line
distinction between large constellations and small systems, with
different applicable metrics, or should we attempt to specify a metric
that is scalable to both small and large multi-satellite systems? We
also seek comment on whether we should establish a separate process for
evaluation of system-wide collision risk for satellites that operate in
the MEO region.\3\
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\3\ We note that the ODMSP does not provide a separate metric
for spacecraft operating in MEO for assessment of per-satellite
probability of collision with large objects. See ODMSP, 3-1. The
ODMSP does provide for a 100-year maximum orbital lifetime for use
in the assessment, however, and as the Order specifies above,
applicants planning to operate spacecraft in the MEO region can
refer to this 100-year value in calculating probability of collision
on a per-satellite basis. See also Aerospace Comments at 8 (limiting
the period of assessing collision probability to a finite time such
as 100 years will make assessment feasible for satellites that have
an orbital lifetime greater than 100 years).
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To the extent that we consider a particular threshold or safe
harbor that would be applicable to multi-satellite NGSO systems, we
seek comment on using total collision risk, i.e., in the aggregate, as
calculated as the sum of the probability of collision associated with
each individual satellite in the system. Should we ask that applicants
take into consideration replacement/replenishment satellites as part of
this calculation, and if so, over what period of time? Is the 15 years
that correlates with the typical licensing period for part 25 NGSO
systems a reasonable period of time? \4\ We observe that depending on
the replenishment cycle of a constellation, the total number of
satellites launched into orbit over the course of a license term could
be significantly higher than the number of satellites authorized for
operation at any given time. Are rapidly replenished satellites more
likely to be deployed into lower orbits, however, where an individual
satellite's collision risk would generally be lower? We seek comment on
how the number of satellites could be calculated for purposes of
analysis. In the Notice, we proposed to refer to the 0.001 probability
of collision metric in assessing total collision probability as a
whole. Some commenters agreed that total collision risk should be
assessed, but disagreed about whether the 0.001 metric should apply. We
seek comment on using a total collision probability metric as a
threshold or safe harbor, and ask whether commenters may have different
views on the application of a 0.001 probability of collision metric to
the satellite constellation as a whole, if that metric was used only to
identify those systems that would require additional review. In
addition, is there a metric other than 0.001 that should be used as a
threshold or safe harbor? We recognize that using a total collision
risk metric would require that larger systems meet a lower per-
satellite risk than smaller systems. Should the Commission consider
another factor or factors entirely, such as number of satellites and
mass?
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\4\ We note that any provisions regarding replacement satellites
would only apply to systems authorized under part 25, excluding
satellites licensed under the streamlined process, since replacement
satellites are not contemplated as part of either a part 5
experimental or part 97 amateur space station authorization, or as
part of the streamlined small satellite processes. Under the Part 25
rule, technically identical replacement satellites can be deployed
without any limitation during a license term in order to maintain
the authorized number of operational satellites. 47 CFR 25.113(i).
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We also seek comment on whether, and to what extent, reliability or
failure rate of any maneuvering capabilities should be part of the
Commission's review of collision risk. The Order specifies that for
individual satellites, the probability of collision with large objects
may be deemed zero, absent evidence to the contrary, during any period
where the satellite is capable of maneuvering to avoid collisions. With
respect to multi-satellite systems, we expect that most systems will
have some maneuvering capabilities. We ask how we should evaluate or
otherwise consider the likelihood that any individual satellites in a
multi-satellite system will experience a failure of those maneuvering
capabilities. Should we accept applicant's targeted reliability at face
value, absent any evidence emerging to the contrary? Alternatively, are
there methods for assessing proposed reliability rates or determining
whether certain failure rates may raise concerns with collision risk?
For purposes of developing a threshold or safe harbor, should the
Commission ask applicants to assume a certain maneuverability failure
rate when calculating total collision risk? An example of this would be
if in processing applications, systems having a total collision
probability of less than 0.001, calculated assuming a 10% failure of
maneuvering capability, are considered low risk for total collision
probability and thus deemed not to need any further analysis with
respect to collision risk. We seek comment on this type of approach,
whereby we consider an assumed failure rate value for purposes of a
safe harbor, rather than the applicant's expected failure rate, since
additional information may be required to support an expected
maneuvering failure rate. We also seek comment on what might be a
reasonable maneuverability failure rate for establishing a safe harbor,
whether based upon an assumed reliability or expected reliability.
Additionally, we ask how the collision risk associated with any failed
satellites should be assessed. For example, should it be assumed that
the maneuvering capability fails in the deployment orbit, in the orbit
that presents the worst-case in terms of collision risk, some
combination of both, or perhaps a range of orbits representing the
expected range and duration of satellite operations? Are there methods
by which we can apply historical data concerning the typical point in a
satellite mission where failures occur in order to refine any analysis.
In the event that we were to adopt some type of safe harbor
approach, we seek comment on the review process for those systems that
may not meet the safe harbor. One aspect of a more detailed assessment
might be taking a closer look at the possible failure rate of
maneuverability. As an example, if an applicant did not satisfy the
safe harbor, the applicant could provide a more detailed demonstration
that its actual failure rate for its maneuvering capabilities is
expected to be significantly lower than the assumed rate of the safe
harbor. We seek comment. If the system is a larger one that will have
multiple deployments, one approach could be to include a license
condition that would require the applicant to provide additional
demonstrations if the actual failure rate for the initial deployments
is substantially higher than the expected failure rate expressed in its
application. We seek comment on this approach and on other alternatives
for assessing an expected failure rate on a more detailed basis.
We also seek comment on other aspects of a potentially more
detailed review process for NGSO systems that cannot meet a particular
safe harbor. Are there higher fidelity analyses that could provide the
Commission with greater assurance that the risks are acceptable? Should
applicants in these cases provide additional detail on the types of
alternatives considered when designing their system, or measures that
will be taken to reduce the total risk of collision? What measures
might correlate with lower risk? Are there specific measures that can
be specified in a rule, with a goal of minimizing the need for a case-
by-case approach?
Some commenters suggest that operators may attempt to disguise the
true size of their systems in order to accept risk in excess of any
total or aggregate collision risk benchmark. Should we consider
establishing additional rules, such as attribution rules, to address
this concern, or could it can be adequately addressed on a case-by-case
basis? In our experience, the operational characteristics of an
application are often enough to indicate whether specific space
stations are part of the same system or not, and we seek comment on
addressing this issue through rule provisions at this time.
C. Maneuverability Above a Certain Altitude in LEO
In the Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether to adopt a
requirement that all NGSO satellites
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planning to operate above a particular altitude have propulsion
capabilities reserved for station-keeping and to enable collision
avoidance maneuvers, regardless of whether propulsion is necessary to
de-orbit within 25 years. We received a number of comments suggesting
that all NGSO satellites or systems deployed above 400 km in the LEO
region should have the capability to maneuver sufficient to conduct
collision avoidance during the time when the spacecraft are located
above 400 km. We seek comment on adopting such a requirement, including
the costs and benefits of such a requirement. Would requiring
maneuverability above a particular altitude help to ensure that the
burden for conducting collision avoidance maneuvers is more evenly
distributed among operators, since all Commission-authorized satellites
would have some collision avoidance capability when operating in the
upper part of the LEO region? To what extent would such a requirement
enhance space safety in the LEO region?
We recognize that the costs and benefits of this type of approach
are likely to be contingent to some extent on the altitude selected as
the cut-off for maneuvering capabilities. While the majority of
commenters who agreed that a requirement was necessary suggested 400 km
as an appropriate cut-off, some parties suggested alternative
altitudes, such as 600 or 650 kilometers. We seek comment on these
various options. We observe that in the Small Satellite Order, the
Commission decided to adopt a 600 km cut-off for a propulsion
requirement, but also that the Commission explicitly left open the
topic for further discussion as part of this proceeding, stating that
broader concerns about a safe operating environment in the LEO region,
as well as issues related to satellites transiting through the ISS
orbit would be addressed in this proceeding.\5\ Some parties supporting
a higher cut-off altitude note that academic and other research
satellites, as well as commercial systems of small satellites,
including CubeSats, are often deployed to altitudes between 400 km and
600 km. These commenters are generally concerned with the impact of a
rule on the utility of CubeSats and on low-cost missions such as
academic missions, since such small satellites may not have the volume
or electrical capacity to support a propulsion system. Other commenters
point out that a 400 km cutoff correlates with the approximate altitude
where the ISS operates, and we seek comment on the extent to which a
maneuverability requirement could help operators readily avoid the ISS,
and thereby minimize the number of collision avoidance maneuvers that
would need to be undertaken by the ISS. If we were to adopt a
requirement tied to the operations of the ISS, we seek comment on
requiring maneuverability during any period when satellites are
``located in the LEO region in an orbit with an apogee above 400 km,''
\6\ for example, or whether there would be an alternative way to
specify a cut-off orbital altitude. We observe that objects deployed
below 400 km will typically re-enter Earth's atmosphere in a very short
time, within a few years at most, and in some cases CubeSats are
deployed from the ISS, spending their mission below that altitude. We
seek comment on balancing the potential benefits associated with
requiring maneuverability for spacecraft located above 400 km with the
potential impact to certain categories of satellite missions.
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\5\ Small Satellite Order, 34 FCC Rcd at 10392, 10394, 10395-96,
paras. 42, 46, 48 Accordingly, we do not believe further
consideration of the topic as part of this proceeding, including
consideration of an altitude cut-off below 600 km, conflicts with
the Commission's determination in the Small Satellite Order.
\6\ For objects orbiting the Earth, the point in orbit that the
object is farthest from the Earth is known as its ``apogee.'' The
point in orbit that the object is closest to the Earth is known as
the object's ``perigee.'' These terms are used in several places in
part 25 of our rules. See, e.g., 47 CFR 25.114(6).
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We also seek comment on whether the impact of a maneuverability
requirement on certain small satellite missions could be minimized,
such as through a gradual phase-in of a maneuverability requirement,
with a grandfathering period of several years to accommodate those
satellites already in advanced design and construction stages. As
technology continues to develop, is it increasingly feasible that even
very small satellites could eventually accommodate propulsion systems
or other generally reliable maneuvering capabilities? Alternatively,
should we only apply such a requirement to larger systems of
satellites, 100 or more for example, so that the number of non-
maneuverable satellites overall above the ISS would be decreased
without impacting academic and research missions or small commercial
systems? Or should we provide a blanket exception for certain
categories of satellites?
Additionally, we seek comment on what types of maneuverability
could be deemed sufficient to reliably conduct collision avoidance
maneuvers for purposes of this type of rule. For example, comments from
NASA suggest that space stations using differential drag may not in
some instances be able to reliably perform collision avoidance, but
other commenters suggest that differential drag should be deemed
sufficient. Some parties suggest that the Commission adopt a particular
performance-based threshold for maneuverability to ensure that
satellites are capable of changing their trajectory to avoid
collisions. For example, Amazon suggests that satellites should be
capable of maneuvering at least 5 km within 48 hours of receiving a
conjunction warning. We seek comment on whether there is a performance-
based objective or other bright-line rule with respect to collision
avoidance capabilities that the Commission could adopt that would
provide certainty to applicants regarding their ability to satisfy any
requirements in this area. Is the Amazon proposal in line with the type
of maneuverability sufficient to conduct effective collision avoidance,
or is a different demonstration of maneuverability appropriate? Should
we consider how far in advance an operator would need to act if they
deem a particular conjunction warning actionable? Do those operators
with differential drag capabilities in fact use those capabilities to
perform collision avoidance? Are there other indicia, such as ability
of an operator to obtain accurate positional information for its
satellites, that should be considered in assessing an applicant's
ability to maneuver their satellites to avoid a collision? Is a bright
line rule possible related to ``effective'' maneuverability, or a safe
harbor provision? If case-by-case analysis is necessary, what type of
analysis and/or supporting information should applicants provide to the
Commission in order to facilitate review?
It is our understanding that on occasion a spacecraft will visit
the ISS on a resupply mission, for example, then undock with the ISS
and raise the spacecraft orbit to above the ISS before deploying
satellites. If the Commission were to adopt a maneuverability
requirement for space stations above 400 km, we seek comment on
adopting a special exception for these types of missions, or addressing
them on an ad hoc basis through the waiver process. We could consider
factors such as whether these operations are already closely
coordinated with NASA vis-[agrave]-vis the ISS, and are sufficiently
unique that they are unlikely to result in a large numbers of non-
maneuverable objects at altitudes above the ISS. We seek comment on
these and any other relevant factors in evaluating
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exemptions or waiver requests for these special circumstances.
D. Post-Mission Orbital Lifetime
In the Notice, the Commission inquired whether the 25-year
benchmark for completion of NGSO post-mission disposal by atmospheric
re-entry remains a relevant benchmark, as applied to commercial or
other non-Federal systems. The 25-year benchmark has been applied in
Commission licensing decisions for NGSO systems. The NASA Standard and
ODMSP specify a maximum 25-year post-mission orbital lifetime, with the
revised ODMSP stating that for spacecraft disposed of by atmospheric
reentry, the spacecraft shall be ``left in an orbit in which, using
conservative projections for solar activity, atmospheric drag will
limit the lifetime to as short as practicable but no more than 25
years.'' Most commenters support a reduction in the 25-year benchmark
as applicable to non-Federal systems, but others suggest that a 25-year
benchmark is sufficient. We seek comment on how to apply the ODMSP
guidance that the post-mission lifetime be ``as short as practicable
but no more than 25 years.'' Incorporating the 25-year metric into our
rules may not incentivize commercial and other non-Federal operators to
limit the post-mission orbital lifetime to ``as short as practicable.''
We ask whether a maximum 25-year limit on post-mission orbital lifetime
would provide operators with any incentive to shorten post-mission time
in orbit, or whether another approach might be preferable to encourage
shorter post-mission orbital lifetimes to the extent possible.
As an initial matter, in the Order we observed that specifying
post-mission orbital lifetime may be unnecessary for those satellites
that would have maneuverability during the period when they are located
above 400 km or for those satellites deploying and operating below 400
km, so any rule we adopt could apply just to those satellites in the
Low Earth Orbit region not meeting those descriptions. Accordingly, if
the Commission were to adopt the maneuverability requirements specified
above that would apply to all satellites, we believe that it may be
unnecessary to adopt a rule setting an upper limit for post-mission
orbital lifetime for space stations in the LEO region. We believe that
if maneuverability were required for space stations located above 400
km, or 600 km, for example, space stations will re-enter Earth's
atmosphere ``as soon as practicable,'' and well within 25 years, either
because the space station already planned to operate below the
specified altitude from which it would re-enter in a few years, or
because the space station would be maneuvered down to an altitude below
400 km or 600 km, from which it would reenter within a few years. We
seek comment. This approach has the benefit of being consistent with a
shorter than 25-year post-mission disposal lifetime for spacecraft
being disposed of by atmospheric re-entry, and is therefore consistent
with the view of many commenters that acceptable post-mission disposal
lifetimes should be reduced below 25 years for LEO spacecraft.
If there were some limited scenarios in which spacecraft with
maneuverability will remain in orbit for significant amounts of time
following the conclusion of the mission, more than five years, for
example, we seek comment on whether the Commission should seek more
information from the operator regarding the planned post-mission
disposal lifetime, such as the reliability of collision avoidance
during that extended period. Is there another approach that the
Commission should take in such circumstances? Would these scenarios be
sufficiently unlikely that a case-by-case approach would be reasonable,
or is there a bright-line rule that should apply in what we believe
would be these limited circumstances?
If the Commission does not adopt a maneuverability requirement of
the type described above, we seek comment on what should be
incorporated into the Commission's rules regarding post-mission
lifetime for space stations disposed of by atmospheric reentry that
would not otherwise re-enter within a short period of time either
because of maneuverability or very low deployment/operational altitude.
We note that some commenters to the Notice suggest that post-mission
orbital lifetimes on the order of five years may be appropriate in many
cases. Some commenters also argue that the Commission should avoid
adopting a ``one-size-fits all'' rule for post-mission orbital
lifetime. Taking into consideration these views, should we encourage
operators to dispose of their spacecraft ``as soon as practicable'' by
adopting a presumptively acceptable post-mission orbital lifetime of
five years, for example, but allow applicants to provide additional
demonstrations in support of a longer post-mission lifetime in
circumstances when they are unable to achieve a five-year disposal? Is
five years the right length of time for this type of a safe-harbor
provision? Demonstrations in support of a longer post-mission lifetime
could include information demonstrating that the applicant considered
reasonable alternatives, as well as information regarding planned
deployment orbit, and the ratio of the mission lifetime to the post-
mission lifetime. Would this type of safe harbor approach provide
sufficient certainty to applicants will enabling flexibility? Using the
ODMSP guideline, what factors should the Commission consider in
determining whether a particular post-mission orbital lifetime is ``as
short as practicable?'' Or, should we simply adopt a requirement that
satellites in the LEO region be removed from orbit as soon as
practicable, but no more than five years following the end of the
mission?
E. Casualty Risk Assessment
Casualty Risk and Design for Demise or Targeted Re-entry. The
revised ODMSP states that for those spacecraft disposed of by re-entry
into Earth's atmosphere (either by disposal maneuver or using
atmospheric drag alone) the risk of human casualty from surviving
components with impact kinetic energies greater than 15 joules should
be less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). The ODMSP also states that
``[d]esign-for-demise and other measures, including reusability and
targeted reentry away from landmasses, to further reduce reentry human
casualty risk should be considered.'' The Commission has long
encouraged satellite designers to consider ``design for demise'' when
choosing materials for satellite construction--and we observe that in
some instances it may be relatively easy for a satellite design to
select materials that will fully burn up in the atmosphere or have
impact kinetic energies of less than 15 joules.
Given the guidance in the ODMSP, we seek comment on whether we
should adopt additional rule revisions concerning strategies to lower
casualty risk. For example, we could adopt a presumptively acceptable
(i.e., safe harbor) human casualty risk threshold of zero--achievable
through either design for demise or planned targeted reentry, and only
require additional information from applicants regarding casualty risk
such as a description of whether the applicants had considered such
strategies to lower casualty risk, where the calculated casualty risk
is greater than zero. Under this approach, the Commission could approve
satellites with casualty risk up to the maximum of 1 in 10,000, but
asking applicants to provide additional information when the calculated
casualty risk is greater than zero could help to ensure that applicants
are considering strategies such as design for demise and targeted
[[Page 52460]]
re-entry, consistent with the ODMSP. We seek comment on the pros and
cons of such an approach for ensuring that operators are not
unnecessarily running casualty risk. As an alternative, are there other
safe harbor approaches or bright-line rules with respect to design for
demise and targeted re-entry that could be adopted by the Commission?
Cumulative Casualty Risk. We also seek to develop the record
further on consideration of casualty risk on a system-wide basis. In
response to the Notice, some commenters raised concerns with
consideration of casualty risk on an aggregate basis. As noted, the
revised ODMSP states, with respect to ``large constellations,'' that
cumulative re-entry human casualty risk should be limited. Consistent
with this guidance, we observe that large constellations could raise
additional concerns about human casualty risk when calculated
cumulatively for all the satellites in the constellation, even if each
individual satellite has a casualty risk that is less than 1 in 10,000.
While these concerns can in many cases be addressed through designing
satellites for demise and direct re-entry strategies, we seek comment
on reviewing the cumulative risk associated with larger systems to
determine if such systems have in fact limited cumulative risk. We seek
comment on whether there is a particular metric we should apply to
multi-satellite systems? Should a cumulative metric apply based on the
number of satellites in the system, similar to the ODMSP, which defines
a ``large constellation'' as more than 100 satellites? Should the
number of satellites include consideration of replacement/replenishment
satellites over a 15-year license term? One approach could be a safe
harbor similar to some of the concepts described above, wherein a
system satisfying a 1 in 10,000, or other risk metric system-wide would
satisfy the safe harbor threshold, such that no further analysis of
risk would be required We seek comment on this safe harbor approach and
a reasonable risk metric for a safe harbor. For systems not satisfying
the safe harbor, applicants could provide the Commission with
additional demonstrations that the applicants have limited the
cumulative casualty risk associated with the system. In assessing these
demonstrations, the Commission could consider factors such as the total
number of satellites, the per-satellite casualty risk, and whether the
applicant has considered factors such as targeted disposal--and, if
so--the expected reliability of targeted disposal. We seek comment on
this approach, and how the Commission should consider these or other
factors in assessing cumulative casualty risk. Alternatively, should
the Commission try to adopt a bright-line rule applicable in these
cases, or is there a maximum cumulative risk above which the Commission
should not authorize a system? Several commenters suggest that we
consider a per-year or annualized casualty risk rate approach, and we
alternatively seek comment on this approach and how it might be
implemented as part of the licensing process. Similar to the discussion
above regarding total collision risk, we additionally seek comment on
whether we need to adopt attribution rules or other rules to address a
situation where operators may attempt to disguise the true size of
their systems in order to accept risk in excess of any cumulative risk
benchmark.
F. Indemnification
In the Notice, we sought comment on the adoption of an
indemnification requirement as part of a broader discussion of
liability issues and economic incentives. In response to concerns and
questions expressed by various commenters, we seek additional comments
on this issue in order to obtain a fuller record. We also seek comment
on whether any indemnification requirement should be addressed as a
license condition and affirmed as part of the application process
rather than as a separate agreement following licensing in order to
address concerns raised by some commenters concerning the details of
implementation.
As the Commission specified in the Notice and previously explained
in detail in the 2004 Orbital Debris Order, under international law,
the United States government could potentially be presented with a
claim for damage resulting from private satellite operations.
Specifically, the United States is party to two international treaties
addressing liability arising from activities in outer space--the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(Outer Space Treaty) and the Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by a Space Object (Liability Convention). The Outer Space
Treaty and Liability Convention, were signed by the United States and
ratified by Congress, and thus have the force and effect of federal
law. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty states in part that, ``State
Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities,''
and that, ``[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer
space . . . shall require authorization and continuing supervision by
the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.'' Under Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty, a State Party to the Treaty that ``launches or
procures the launching of an object into outer space . . . and each
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty
or its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component
parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space[.]'' \7\ The Liability
Convention specifies that liability rests with a ``launching state,''
which is defined as either (1) a State which launches or procures the
launching of a space object, or (2) a State from whose territory or
facility a space object is launched. The Liability Convention contains
both strict liability (Article II) and fault-based liability (Article
III) provisions. The launching state is strictly liable for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to an
aircraft in flight. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than
on the surface of the earth to a space object of one launching state or
to persons or property on board such a space object by a space object
of another launching state, the launching state ``shall be liable only
if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it
is responsible.'' The treaty also provides for joint and several
liability in certain circumstances, including where more than one State
can be considered a ``launching state.''
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\7\ Outer Space Treaty, Article VII. As the Commission noted in
the 2004 Orbital Debris Order, the definition of ``space object''
includes ``component parts of a space object,'' which would arguably
incorporate orbital debris resulting from satellite operations.
Orbital Debris Order, 19 FCC Rcd at 11612-13, para. 109.
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Regardless of whether a particular claim results in a payment of
compensation, the United States would incur costs in addressing such
claims, and those costs would be borne by U.S. taxpayers. Thus, there
is a connection between the Commission's issuance of a license for
satellite communications and exposure of the U.S. government to claims
under international law, particularly because the Commission is often
the only agency reviewing an operator's plans for on-orbit operations
and orbital debris mitigation, including post-mission disposal
activities. Under these circumstances, conditioning Commission
authorization on indemnification of the U.S. government
[[Page 52461]]
may be a reasonable step, given the absence of protections under
international law of the protection from liability under U.S. law
related to a licensing authority's exercise of its discretionary
functions. We seek comment on these considerations.
Some commenters question whether an indemnification requirement is
necessary because the U.S. government could initiate a civil action to
secure recovery from the relevant operator. Boeing states that the U.S.
could recover under a claim of contribution, claim of equitable tort
indemnification, or claim of equitable apportionment. It does not
appear that the theories Boeing presents have been tested in the
context of the treaty-based liability involved here. We seek comment
and any supporting legal analysis concerning whether these alternative
avenues are in fact an available means for recovery with respect to the
full range of claims that might arise under international law related
to space activities. If so, and as observed by some commenters, an FCC
indemnification requirement may be an unnecessary formal step to
acknowledge an existing legal obligation of licensees engaged in space
activities. We seek comment on this view. We also seek comment and
supporting legal analysis on whether there are any applicable
limitations on liability inherent in these alternative approaches to
recovery. For example, are there any provisions in the governing laws
that express a legislative intent to limit or exempt from liability
activities that may trigger a claim under international law or that are
extra-territorial in scope?
Several commenters request that the Commission provide additional
legal analysis regarding Commission authority for adopting an
indemnification requirement, or otherwise question the Commission's
jurisdiction in this area.\8\ As discussed in the Order, our conclusion
is that the Commission has authority, pursuant to the Communications
Act, to review and assess orbital debris mitigation plans as part of
its public interest analysis in issuing licenses for space station
communications. As noted, Title III of the Act provides for the
licensing of radio communications, including satellite communications,
only upon a finding that the ``public convenience, interest, or
necessity will be served thereby.'' We consider an applicant's plan to
mitigate orbital debris risks to be a relevant public interest factor
in approving an applicant's space station operations, and the analysis
undertaken by the Commission is designed to ensure that space systems
reviewed by the Commission have sufficient plans to mitigate orbital
debris, consistent with the public interest. We seek additional comment
on whether the same sources of authority provide a sufficient basis for
an indemnification requirement. As a policy matter, a clear
indemnification requirement may strengthen the incentives of applicants
to mitigate risk, by ensuring that licensee's consider in their
planning and decision making the costs that could be associated with
any claim brought under the relevant Outer Space Treaties. In this way,
ensuring that the licensee has agreed to indemnify the U.S. government
in those circumstances could be viewed as an economic aspect of
ensuring that the more technical aspects of orbital debris mitigation
are fully considered by licensees. Additionally, incorporating
indemnification as part of a sufficient orbital debris mitigation plan
may further the public interest by ensuring that U.S. taxpayers are not
ultimately responsible for defraying costs resulting from the
activities of non-government entities in the event of a claim under
international law. We seek comment on these questions.
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\8\ See Intelsat Comments at 12; Space Logistics Comments at 13;
Intelsat Comments at 12; Boeing Comments at 37-38; SIA Comments at
9; Telesat Comments at 11. See also SIA Apr. 15, 2020 Ex Parte
Letter at 2 (stating that the Commission ``cites no statutory
authority'' for this requirement); Space Logistics Comments at 13
(stating that the Commission cannot promulgate insurance or
indemnification requirements under ancillary authority). Since we
focus on the authority for the Commission to adopt an
indemnification requirement as deriving from the same authority of
the Commission to review debris mitigation plans, we do not address
the issue of ancillary authority, but to the extent that commenters
believe this issue may be relevant, we invite comment.
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Several commenters to the Notice argue that in other regulatory
contexts, Congress has directly addressed the role of regulatory
agencies with respect to liability and indemnification issues, but
argue that here, Congress has not provided the Commission with specific
authority concerning indemnification. We seek comment and supporting
legal analysis on whether these expressions of legislative intent
preclude the adoption of an indemnification requirement for FCC. We
observe that in several examples cited by commenters, Congress provided
for indemnification related to specific types of activities and did not
address FCC-licensed activities. We also note that in some instances,
Congress has sanctioned acceptance of liability by the U.S. government
within certain ranges. An example of this is the liability risk-sharing
regime for commercial space transportation, addressed by statute and
implemented by the FAA. Under the statute, launch or re-entry licensees
obtain insurance to cover claims of third parties against launch or
reentry participants, including the licensee, its customer, and the
U.S. government and agencies and any contractors or subcontractors. The
FAA sets insurance requirements based upon the FAA's determination of
the maximum probable loss that would result from the licensed launch or
reentry activities, within statutory ceilings. Subject to
appropriations, the U.S. government may pay successful third-party
liability claims in excess of the required maximum probable loss-based
insurance, up to $1.5 billion (as adjusted for post-1989 inflation)
above the amount of the maximum probable loss-based insurance. For
claims in excess of the maximum probable loss-based insurance plus
government indemnification, the licensee or legally liable party is
responsible. We seek comment and any supporting legal analysis on
whether the fact that Congress addressed third-party liability as it
relates to, for example, launches authorized by the FAA, implies that
Congress explicitly or implicitly precluded the Commission from
addressing liability issues related its regulation under Title III,
including review of on-orbit and disposal activities. We observe that
the liability regime for launch activities specified by statute and in
FAA rules does not appear to address post-launch issues arising from
damages caused by a ``launch payload'' after a nominal launch is
concluded.
In response to the Notice, Intelsat requests that the Commission
conduct an analysis of whether other governmental agencies would be
better suited to decide whether to impose indemnification requirements
on space station licensees in the first instance. Specifically,
Intelsat requests that we conduct an analysis with respect to the
Department of State. We do not believe it is the Commission's role to
opine on the suitability of agencies for particular activities.
However, we seek comment on whether there are any authorities granted
by statute or developed through regulation, in addition to those
already identified in the record, that may have relevance to a possible
FCC indemnification requirement. SIA also raises the question of
whether there should be a distinction in an indemnification provision
between liability based on fault and liability that results from the
strict liability provision of the Outer Space Treaties. The Liability
Convention includes some fault-based provisions, and some strict
liability provisions (for damage caused
[[Page 52462]]
by its space object on the surface of the earth or to an aircraft in
flight). For a claim brought under the Outer Space Treaties, a State
party to the treaty could be found liable based upon the particular
provision at issue, whether that provision was fault-based, or strict
liability--in accordance with the terms of the treaty. SIA asks, in
effect, whether, for strict liability, there should also be a
determination of fault on the part of the non-governmental operator as
a pre-condition to requiring indemnification, and if so, how such a
determination might be made. We seek comment on the questions raised by
SIA.
Costs. Most of the commenters addressing this issue in response to
the Notice argue that the costs of the indemnification requirement to
operators would outweigh any potential benefits. Some commenters argue
that such a requirement would be contrary to U.S. national interests in
promoting innovation and competitiveness and ensuring that the Unites
States is the jurisdiction of choice for space activities. Along these
lines, some parties suggest that an indemnification requirement could
lead to forum shopping, wherein entities apply for licenses from
foreign administrations rather than the United States. Some parties
also ask the Commission consider including a cap on a U.S. licensee's
potential liability, both in terms of timing and duration. We make
several observations and seek additional comment on these issues,
noting that we also seek to foster innovation and to encourage the
development of new services and technology, and through the
indemnification requirement would seek to achieve the goal of limiting
taxpayer liability at a relatively minimal cost for responsible
operators.
We seek comment on the actual costs that operators believe they
will incur as a result of this requirement as proposed in the draft
rule (i.e., without adopting a ``cap'' on liability), including the
costs to those entities that are publicly traded. We observe that
operators would have the choice whether or not to purchase insurance to
cover certain liabilities, depending on individualized needs. Although
the Order does not adopt an insurance requirement at this time, we seek
comment on the availability and costs of insurance, noting that some
other countries require insurance for the types of activities that
would be covered by the proposed indemnification requirement. Some
parties characterize the uncertainty associated with liability as an
issue from the perspective of filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Additionally, we seek comment on potential costs of
indemnification for non-commercial entities, such as those that may be
applying under the Commission's experimental or amateur rules, while
observing that the operation of a space station, may present the same
risks in terms of potential U.S. government liability regardless of
whether the operator is an amateur, non-profit, commercial entity, etc.
We observe that several other countries require indemnification and
insurance as part of their licensing processes. We seek comment and
legal analysis on the extent to which indemnification and insurance
requirements are used in the regulatory structures of other countries,
and the extent to which these requirements are a substantial or
dominant consideration as operators select the country in which they
base their ``regulatory home.''
We seek comment on a concern raised by a number of commenters
related to capping potential liability for a U.S. licensee under any
indemnification requirement. We seek comment on whether a cap on the
amount of any indemnification requirement, as included in a number of
indemnification requirements adopted by other countries, would serve
the public interest. We also seek comment on whether, to the extent any
such cap implies that the Commission is making a determination
concerning the scope of risk accepted on behalf of the United States,
such a determination is within the scope of the Commission's authority.
Additionally, if an upper limit on the indemnification were to be
adopted, we seek comment on a value for that upper limit. We observe
that the United Kingdom, for example, has adopted a cap of 60 million
euros (per-satellite, since satellites are licensed individually) that
applies to those missions not considered higher-risk. We seek comment
on whether a comparable amount, converted to U.S. dollars, would be a
reasonable cap on indemnification of the U.S. government by licensees
in these circumstances.
Implementation. In the Notice, the Commission sought comment on the
means to execute documents related to indemnification, and proposed
rule text implementing the requirement. After further consideration and
in response to comments that noted some potential issues with the
procedures proposed, we are seeking comment on whether an
indemnification requirement should be implemented through license
condition, or through a document provided by the licensee prior to
license grant. For example, should any indemnification requirement be
implemented by having applicants include a signed statement regarding
indemnification, which will be standardized, along with the other
information provided in their application. We seek comment on this
proposal and on any specific terms or conditions of indemnification
that might be appropriate. In describing the obligation of licensees in
our application rules, we propose language that is similar to what we
proposed in the Notice, but in response to comments make clear that any
indemnification obligation would be associated with claims brought
under the Outer Space Treaties.
We also seek comment on any implementation issues related to any
adoption of an indemnification requirements. As a possible approach,
applicants whose applications for U.S. licenses are pending at the time
the rule becomes effective could be required to file an amendment with
the indemnification statement. We seek comment. We also seek comment on
the treatment that should be afforded to existing licensees, including
in the event of license modification filed after any requirement is
adopted. Additionally, we seek comment on the appropriate approach for
assignments and transfers of licenses.
Additionally, we seek comment on alternative implementation
arrangements. SIA suggests that it may be appropriate for satellites in
orbit or under construction as of November 15, 2018, the date the
Notice was adopted, to be grandfathered. We seek comment on whether any
indemnification requirement should be associated with the timing of
licensing or construction of particular satellites, rather than with
the timing of when the license is granted, or whether there are other
benchmarks that should define applicability of any requirement adopted.
Market Access. We seek comment on the issue of indemnification by
market access grantees, in other words, non-U.S.-licensed space
stations granted access to the United States market.\9\ In the majority
of instances we would not require an indemnification agreement for a
non-U.S.-licensed operator authorized for U.S. market access, as the
relevant countries will have taken actions that associate the satellite
operations with their national regulatory structure and will have
identified the relevant State parties to the Outer Space Treaty.
However, there are some cases
[[Page 52463]]
in which the goals of any indemnification requirement might be served
by requiring indemnification from operators of satellites granted
market access. For example, some countries submit filings to the ITU on
behalf of a satellite operator, but decline to take any responsibility
with respect to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaties. In a
situation where there is no other country taking such responsibility,
and the applicant has substantial connections to the United States, to
the point that those predominate perception of the country that may be
responsible for supervision, indemnification may be appropriate. We
seek comment on whether in these cases, involving so-called ``flag of
convenience,'' requiring indemnification may be appropriate for
licensing purposes. We also seek comment on any specific factual and
regulatory indicators that should be used to identify such cases.
Should factors such as registration of the satellite with the United
Nations, ownership and operation of the space station by a U.S. company
from a U.S. network control center, or other factors be considered?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ We note that this could also include an application filed by
an earth station operator requesting communications with a non-U.S.-
licensed satellite, either under parts 5 or 25.
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Other Unique Implementations. We observe that in some instances the
United States, through a government contract promulgated by an agency
or other entity (e.g., NASA), may have agreed to indemnify an operator
against certain claims. In these instances where an operator believes
that the United States has indemnified the operator, we propose that
the applicant could provide a demonstration of these circumstances,
which would provide a basis for exempting the applicant from the
indemnification requirement. We seek comment on this and any other
unique situations in which an indemnification requirement might run
contrary to allocations of responsibility between governmental and non-
governmental actors, established in law or regulation. As an example,
University Small-Satellite Researchers suggest that in some cases state
institutions, such as universities, may not be able to accept liability
and risk for third parties due to sovereign immunity provisions. We
seek comment on any possible limitations in this area that should be
considered. To the extent that the bar on indemnification of third
parties is associated with concerns about waiving governmental
immunity, we observe that the third party in this instance would be the
federal government, and we believe this may present a different factual
scenario for universities when it comes to waiving governmental
immunity. However, we seek comment and supporting legal analysis on
this point.
Additionally, AMSAT and ARRL suggest that we add the word
``owners'' to an indemnification provision in the amateur rules, so
that the owners of an amateur satellite could be the indemnifying
parties rather than the individual amateur licensees. We seek comment
on this approach, and also on how to define ``owner'' for purposes of
the amateur rules. We further seek comment on how we would ensure that
the indemnification requirement remains valid in the event that the
ownership changes for an amateur space station.
G. Performance Bond for Successful Disposal
In the Notice, the Commission had mentioned bonds as an example of
an economic incentive, but had not made a specific proposal. In this
Further Notice, we seek comment on whether a performance bond tied to
successful post-mission disposal may be in the public interest, as
applicable to space station licensees. Essentially, we seek comment on
adopting a requirement that space station licensees post a surety bond,
similar to what they already do for spectrum use, that would be
returned once the space stations authorized have successfully completed
post-mission disposal. What are the costs and benefits of a performance
bond approach?
In response to the mention of a post-mission disposal bond in the
Notice, some commenters expressed disagreement with the idea. According
to Eutelsat, a performance bond requirement related to satellite end-
of-life would cover what are typically unanticipated events that occur
despite a proponent's best effort, and collection under a performance
bond would not mitigate the result of such unanticipated events. We
believe this topic is worth further discussion, however, and observe
that there may be benefits to a performance bond, despite the fact that
even where the bond is forfeited the unsuccessful satellites would
remain in orbit. Several commenters to the Notice suggest that there is
difficulty in ensuring that entities follow through with their planned
orbital debris mitigation plan. SpaceX, for example, states that once
the government adopts verifiable requirements, the government should
tie its rules to a rigorous enforcement framework that penalizes the
generation of debris and reflects the seriousness of the harm such
debris inflicts. We observe, first, that while anomalous events are
unanticipated, there are steps that an operator can take to reduce the
probability of anomalous events, including testing, and design
redundancies, and second, that with a bond in place tied to successful
disposal, an operator may decide to begin end-of-life disposal
procedures at an earlier stage if the satellite begins experiencing
technical issues. We seek comment, however, on how to address
situations where there may be a satellite anomaly or the disposal plan
changes for reasons outside of an operator's control. We also observe
that further developing the record could contribute to further
conversations about how to fund future efforts toward active debris
removal.\10\ We seek comment on these potential benefits and on
generally whether a post-mission disposal bond could help to ensure
that operators comply with orbital debris mitigation best practices.
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\10\ The viability of forfeited performance bonds as a source of
funding for active cleanup of debris in orbit is outside the scope
of this proceeding. See, e.g., ORBCOMM Comments at 20 (stating that
it is not clear if the Commission could ever establish a program to
use forfeited de-orbit bonds to pay for the retrieval of spacecraft
that were not successfully de-orbited); Sirius XM Comments at 10
(stating that fees obtained from penalizing rogue operators could be
used to fund debris removal efforts); Satellite DFR Comments at 4
(the Commission or other regulatory entity should develop and fund a
comprehensive program to begin removing debris from Earth orbit);
Secure World Foundation Comments at 9 (stating that the removal of
debris will need to be funded by governments--and stating that a
government-supported technology development program, coupled with
government purchase of service contracts, is the best way to develop
this capability).
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Additionally, we seek comment on the impact of a disposal bond on
U.S. licensing of satellite systems and U.S. satellite industry
innovation, including innovation by smaller providers, entrepreneurs,
and new entrants to the satellite industry. We recognize that there may
be complexities in structuring a bond that would cover satellite end-
of-life, and that maintaining a bond over a longer period of time than
is required our current bond regime could potentially result in
increased costs to licensees. We seek comment. A disposal bond may need
to be maintained for 15 years or longer, depending on the specific
disposal plans for the satellite or system, and we seek comment on
whether there are ways of structuring a bond requirement to reduce
costs to licensees. Are there different issues that need to be
considered with a longer time period? What happens if the ownership of
the satellite/license changes over time? Although a performance bond
tailored to this scenario may not currently exist, we also seek comment
on whether a Commission rule could help to drive the market toward the
creation of an
[[Page 52464]]
appropriate bond instrument that would allow operators to satisfy this
rule. Additionally, we seek comment on what other countries doing to
ensure post-mission disposal. Would adoption of a bond requirement
encourage entities to seek licenses outside the United States?
In addition to the orbital debris mitigation plan submitted by
operators at the application-stage, there are a number of decisions by
operators during and after the spacecraft mission which should be made
in alignment with orbital debris mitigation best practices and
culminate in successful disposal of the spacecraft. Are application-
stage requirements sufficient in all cases to incentivize operators to
make decisions consistent with orbital debris mitigation best practices
throughout the mission and post-mission lifetime of the spacecraft? We
seek comment on whether a performance bond can help to ensure post-
mission disposal satellite reliability in instances where it may be
difficult to assess, for example, where the operator's application-
stage demonstration includes ensuring reliability through extensive
testing of its satellites. Would a performance bond be another way to
ensure the accuracy of the licensee's reliability estimate for post-
mission disposal and to further discourage deployments that would
potentially result in negative long-term impacts to the orbital
environment? Should a potential bond requirement apply to both NGSO and
GSO satellite licensees?
We also seek comment on some basic implementation issues that would
be associated with a disposal bond requirement, such as the question of
what constitutes a successful disposal. For NGSO systems, what factors
would be considered in determining an appropriate upfront amount for
the bond? To what extent would factors such as satellite mass, number
of satellites, expected orbital lifetime of a failed satellite, or
collision probability of a failed satellite over time be considered,
and how would those factors be weighted? \11\ Taking into consideration
both the costs to licensees of a full or partially forfeited bond and
the costs to future space operations associated with having failed
satellites remain on orbit, what is a reasonable amount for a surety
bond for an NGSO system? As one example, we seek comment on the
following formula, where the forfeited amount would be based upon any
undisposed objects remaining in orbit and undisposed at the conclusion
of the license term, beyond those accounted for in the licensee's
calculation of the probability of successful disposal. The amount of
the bond would also take into consideration the mass of the objects and
the number of years that an individual undisposed satellite would
remain in orbit longer than 25 years, up to a maximum of 200 years per
object. We seek comment on this approach generally, and welcome comment
on any alternatives to the specifics of this proposal. For the actual
forfeited bond calculation for NGSO licensees, the amount could be
calculated as follows:
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\11\ As one example, a surety bond could be calculated through a
formula that takes into account the mean number of years on orbit
for a potential failed satellite, the mean satellite mass, and the
total number of satellites in the system. Such a formula could also
take into account the collision probability of failed satellites
over time.
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FA = ((M-EM) * ((Y-25) * (O-E.O.))
Where FA is the forfeited amount to be paid in dollars, M is the total
undisposed mass in orbit in kilograms, EM is the expected undisposed
mass in orbit in kilograms, and Y is the mean of the remaining years in
orbit for any individual undisposed object, up to a maximum of 200
years per object, O is the total number of undisposed objects in orbit,
and E.O. is the expected number of undisposed objects in orbit. The
result would be rounded to the nearest $10,000. We observe that this
formulation would result in a forfeited bond of zero for any space
station or system deploying into an orbit in which, using conservative
projections for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the
spacecraft's time in orbit to 25 years or less. In this example,
therefore, licensees of space stations fitting this description would
not be required to post a surety bond. We seek comment. In addition, we
seek comment on whether we should provide an exemption from the
requirement to post a bond where the maximum forfeited bond under this
formula or a different formulation would be less than a certain amount,
for example, $10,000. We observe that the bond in this example would be
most significant for those NGSO systems consisting of a large mass and
which would have satellites remaining in orbit for a significant number
of years beyond 25 years in the event of a failure. We also seek
comment on whether we should incorporate the collision probability of
the failed satellites over time, with a higher collision probability
resulting in a higher forfeited bond.
Continuing with the example above, the initial surety bond for NGSO
licensees could be calculated as follows:
BA = (TM)*((Y-25)(TO))
Where BA is the amount of the bond in dollars, TM = the total mass of
the satellite system, Y = number of years that an individual satellite
will remain in orbit if it fails in the deployment orbit, and TO =
total number of objects in orbit. The bond amount (BA) could also be
capped, for example, at a maximum of $100,000,000 for any system. We
seek comment on this formula, including, whether certain variables
should be modified to incorporate different factors such as individual
satellite mass, as well as on the potential monetary amounts and
whether those amounts are sufficient to provide an economic incentive
for operators.
As a simpler alternative for NGSO systems, default could be based
upon the failure to dispose according to the expected disposal
reliability, or failure to dispose according to the expected disposal
reliability taking into consideration satellite mass. Under this
alternative, a licensee would post a bond of $10,000,000, for example,
and forfeit the bond if the disposal did not satisfy the disposal
reliability metric stated in the application. The amount of the initial
bond could vary depending on factors such as mass, number of
spacecraft, and number of years in orbit. What costs on both sides
should be taken into account when determining a reasonable amount? Is,
for example, $20,000 per satellite reasonable if the satellite is
deployed to an orbit where it will remain for thousands of years?
Should a bond be most significant for those NGSO systems consisting of
a large mass and which would have satellites remaining in orbit for a
significant number of years beyond 25 years in the event of a failure?
We seek comment on these various alternatives, and on whether there is
another approach that would incentivize NGSO operators to achieve high
disposal reliability.
If a bond were applied to GSO licensees, a successful disposal
could be based on disposal in accordance with Sec. 25.283(a) of the
Commission's rules within a certain period of time following the
conclusion of operations, such as six months following the conclusion
of operations. We seek comment on defining successful disposal for
purposes of a GSO disposal bond. As one example, the bond could be
forfeited based upon the length of time the space station was in orbit
before it was determined that disposal could not be successfully
completed. Under this approach, the longer the space station is
maintained on-orbit before the attempted disposal or anomaly causing
inability to dispose of the spacecraft, the higher the amount of the
bond forfeited. We observe that the
[[Page 52465]]
longer that a GSO space station operates, generally the more
susceptible that space station is to malfunction that could put
successful disposal at risk. This example would take into consideration
this observation, and the amount to be forfeited in the event of a
failed disposal would be determined according to the following formula:
FA = $5,000,000*(Y)
Where FA is the amount to be paid in dollars, and Y is calculated as
follows: If the satellite operates for less than 15 years then Y = 1;
if the satellite operates between 15 and 20 years, then Y = 2; and if
the satellite operates for more than 20 years, then Y = two plus the
total number of operational years, minus 20. We seek comment.
As part of the above example, a GSO licensee could be required to
post an initial surety bond, in the amount of, for example, $5,000,000.
For each license extension thereafter, the GSO licensee would then
increase the bond in an amount that would cover the additional five-
year term, up to the maximum that would be forfeited if the satellite
operates for that full five-year term.\12\ In other words, if the
operator seeks a five-year extension of the license, from 15 to 20
years, then the operator would increase the bond amount by an
additional $5,000,000. We seek comment on this specific example, and on
the concept of an increasing bond with successive license extensions.
We also seek comment on the monetary amounts involved and whether those
amounts, or alternative amounts would be sufficient to provide an
economic incentive for operators. What are the factors that we should
consider in setting a bond amount and structuring the bond for GSO
licensees? Is there evidence to justify, for example, doubling the bond
for extending a GSO satellite's license beyond 15 years or similarly,
to support significant increases for each year beyond 20 years? As a
simpler alternative, default could be based on whether or not the GSO
licensee successfully disposed of the space station, with a single bond
amount, $10,000,000 dollars, for example, due if the space station is
not disposed of in accordance with the Commission's rules. We seek
comments on these various alternatives, on the appropriate bond amount,
and whether there is another approach that would incentivize GSO
operators to achieve high disposal reliability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Different increases in the bond amount for license
extensions shorter than five years could also be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also seek comment on whether we should consider any other
factors with respect to a failed disposal, such as failure to fully
vent pressurized vessels, or failure to perform a targeted, controlled
reentry into Earth's atmosphere. Additionally, we seek comment on the
timing of a bond requirement, if one were to be adopted. For example,
would it be reasonable to require licensees to post a surety bond
related to post-mission disposal within 30 days following grant of
their license? Or, would we require the operators to post a surety bond
closer to the date of launch, for example, 90 days prior to launch? We
further seek comment on how and when the Commission could make a
determination that either the disposal was successful and the bond may
be released or that the licensee would need to forfeit a certain
amount. For example, should operators file a statement with the
Commission specifying the details of the disposal, including those
details relevant to determining whether the disposal was successful and
to what extent?
Additionally, we seek comment on whether a bond should apply to
grantees of U.S. market access. We observe that the post-mission
disposal may be addressed in some instances by a different
administration, and thus the post-mission disposal bond may overlap
with existing requirements in this instance. If such a requirement did
not apply to market access grantees, how would this impact U.S.
operators? If such a requirement were to apply to both market access
grantees and U.S.-licensed systems, how would this impact the
availability of satellites services in the United States?
Under the NGSO example above referencing a specific formula, small-
scale systems, including but not limited to those authorized under the
experimental, amateur, or part 25 streamlined small satellite process
are unlikely to need to post a bond, both because we would expect a
typically small number of satellites in a particular system and because
the deployment orbit for those types of missions often results in the
spacecraft re-entering within 25 years as a result of atmospheric drag.
We seek comment on whether we would still apply the bond to NGSO
systems authorized under either an experimental or amateur
authorization, and on whether a categorical exemption would be
necessary for small systems licensed under part 25, such as under the
NGSO streamlined small satellite process, since under certain
formulations, those types of licensees would typically not be required
to post a disposal bond as practical matter. Alternatively, if we adopt
a simplified type of approach for NGSO systems that relies on the
licensee meeting the disposal reliability metric indicated in the
application, for example, we seek comment on the applicability of that
alternative approach to experimental, amateur, or small-scale systems
such as those that would be authorized through the part 25 streamlined
small satellite process.
Finally, we seek comment on whether there are alternative
approaches to a bond that should be considered, such as a corporate
guarantee, and on the pros and cons of such alternative approaches.
Ordering Clauses
It is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 301, 303, 307, 308,
309, and 310 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
151, 154(i), 301, 303, 307, 308, 309, and 310, that this Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted.
It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a
copy of this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), the Commission has prepared this present Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities by the policies and rules
proposed in this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Written public
comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as
responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines specified in
the Notice for comments. The Commission will send a copy of this FNPRM,
including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the FNPRM and IRFA (or
summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
The FNPRM proposes several changes to 47 CFR parts 5, 25, and 97.
Principally, it seeks comment on and proposes to:
(1) Include a metric in the Commission's rules regarding the
probability of accidental explosions during and after the completion of
satellite mission operations;
(2) Specify how the Commission will assess probability of collision
with large
[[Page 52466]]
objects and casualty risk on a system-wide basis;
(3) Adopt an applicant certification that NGSO space stations will
have capability to perform collision avoidance maneuvers during any
period when the space stations are located above 400 km in altitude;
(4) Adopt a requirement that space station licensees indemnify the
United States against any costs associated with a claim brought under a
provision of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, or the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects related to the facilities
that are the subject of the license; and
(5) Adopt a bond requirement for space station licensees under part
25 of the Commission rules, tied to successful disposal of the
spacecraft following the end of the mission.
B. Legal Basis
The proposed action is authorized under sections 1, 4(i), 301, 303,
307, 308, and 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 301, 303, 307, 308, and 309.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules May Apply
The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where
feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be
affected by adoption of proposed rules. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A small business concern is one which: (1) Is independently owned
and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3)
satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA). Below, we describe and estimate the number of
small entity licensees that may be affected by adoption of the proposed
rules.
Satellite Telecommunications and All Other Telecommunications
Satellite Telecommunications. This category comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The category has a small business size standard of
$35 million or less in average annual receipts, under SBA rules. For
this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that there were a
total of 333 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this total,
299 firms had annual receipts of less than $25 million. Consequently,
we estimate that the majority of satellite telecommunications providers
are small entities.
All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other Telecommunications''
category is comprised of establishments primarily engaged in providing
specialized telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking,
communications telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry
also includes establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite
terminal stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems.
Establishments providing internet services or voice over internet
protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied telecommunications
connections are also included in this industry. The SBA has developed a
small business size standard for ``All Other Telecommunications'',
which consists of all such firms with annual receipts of $35 million or
less. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 show that
there were 1,442 firms that operated for the entire year. Of those
firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts less than $25 million and
15 firms had annual receipts of $25 million to $49, 999,999. Thus, the
Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other
Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by our action can be
considered small. We estimate, however, that some space station
applicants applying under part 25 of the Commission's rules would
qualify as small entities affected by these rule changes. If the
Commission were to apply the bond requirement to amateur and
experimental space station licensees, then additional small entities
would be affected by the rule changes.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
The proposed rules would contain a few additional application
disclosures relevant to small entities, including certification of
maneuverability and demonstration regarding probability of accidental
explosions. With respect to the maneuverability certification, some
applicants may need to consider modifications to their satellite design
and operational plans to achieve the maneuverability certification.
We observe that most small entities do not launch and operate large
satellite constellations and so we believe that proposals for operators
to perform certain calculations in the aggregate are not likely to be
burdensome. The rules proposed require a system-level assessment to be
conducted in several areas for any systems consisting of more than one
space station. Some small entities may apply for and operate multiple
space stations, and thus this requirement would apply to some small
entities as well. However, we believe conducting these assessments is
not more significant than the type of technical analysis that an
applicant will already be performing in preparing its application for
Commission.
The bond requirement proposed in the FNPRM would require part 25
space station licensees to submit a demonstration to the Commission
that they have posted a bond that meets the requirements specified in
the Commission's rules. The space station licensee would then need to
maintain the bond over the course of the license term, until the
disposal of the spacecraft. The FNPRM seeks comment on methods to
structure the bond requirement that may reduce costs, and on whether to
exempt experimental, amateur, and other categories likely to be
relevant to small entities.
E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant,
specifically small business, alternatives that it has considered in
reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following four
alternatives (among others): ``(1) The establishment of differing
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and
reporting requirements under the rules for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.''
The proposals in the FNPRM would further clarify the authorization
process by specifying additional disclosures in the rules, thereby
providing applicants, including small entities, with a more
[[Page 52467]]
complete view of the information that the Commission needs during a
typical license or authorization process in order to adequately assess
the applicant's orbital debris mitigation plan. The FNPRM also
specifically seeks comment on the use of performance, rather than
prescriptive, or design, standards in the context of the
maneuverability certification.
We also seek comment on whether the impact of a maneuverability
requirement on certain small satellite missions could be minimized,
such as through a gradual phase-in of the requirement.
In addition to seeking comment regarding the structure of the bond,
the FNPRM seeks comment on the appropriate monetary amount for the
bond, which could affect the extent of the impact on small entities.
Additionally, for NGSO licensees, the FNPRM seeks comment on whether
default should be tied to a certain number of undisposed space stations
or undisposed mass in orbit. The resolution of this question could
affect the extent of the impact of default on small entities, which may
in some instances have fewer NGSO space stations in orbit than large
entities. The FNPRM seeks comment on some approaches that could
eliminate a bond requirement altogether for most small entities.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
None.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Parts 5, 25, and 97
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Satellites.Federal
Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 5, 25, and 97
as follows:
PART 5--EXPERIMENTAL RADIO SERVICE
0
1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 336.
0
2. Amend Sec. 5.64 by revising paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4)(i)
introductory text, (b)(4)(i)(A) and (D), (b)(7)(iv)(B)(2), and adding
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 5.64 Special provisions for satellite systems.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration
that the integrated probability of debris-generating explosions for all
credible failure modes of the space station (excluding small particle
impacts) is less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000) during deployment and mission
operations. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system,
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
(4) * * *
(i) Where the application is for an NGSO space station or system,
the following information must also be included:
(A) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a
space station during any period in which the space station will be
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects. For
systems consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also
include an assessment of the total probability of collision, calculated
as the sum of the probability of collision associated with each
individual space station. Where the total probability of collision
exceeds 0.001 (1 in 1,000) assuming a 10% failure rate of any
maneuvering capability at an orbit that presents the worst case for
collision risk, the statement must include an additional demonstration
of the expected failure rate of maneuverability, and the orbit where
the operator would expect most failures to occur, and calculate the
total probability of failure based on those assumptions.
* * * * *
(D) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee,
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the
event that a system will not maintain orbital tolerances, e.g., its
propulsion system will not be used for orbital maintenance, that fact
should be included in the debris mitigation disclosure. Such systems
must also indicate the anticipated evolution over time of the orbit of
the proposed satellite or satellites. All systems should describe the
extent of satellite maneuverability, whether or not the space station
design includes a propulsion system. For space stations deployed into
the portion of the low-Earth orbit region above 400 km, the operator
must certify that the space stations will be designed with the
maneuvering capabilities sufficient to perform effective collision
avoidance throughout the period when the space stations are above 400
km.
* * * * *
(7) * * *
(iv) * * *
(B) * * *
(2) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). For systems
consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also include
an assessment of the total casualty risk associated with the system,
calculated as the sum of the casualty risk associated with each
individual space station. If this total casualty risk exceeds 0.0001 (1
in 10,000), the statement must also include a description of strategies
considered to reduce collision risk, such as designing the satellites
with materials more likely to demise upon reentry and/or targeted re-
entry, and the extent to which those strategies were incorporated into
the mission profile.
(c) Applicants must submit a signed statement stating that upon
issuance of a license by the Commission, the licensee will be
responsible for indemnifying the United States against any costs
associated with a claim brought under a provision of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of
[[Page 52468]]
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies or
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects related to the facilities that are the subject of the license.
PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319,
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.
0
4. Amend Sec. 25.114 by revising paragraphs (d)(14)(iii),
(d)(14)(iv)(A)(1) and (4), (d)(14)(vii)(D)(2)(ii),and (d)(14)(viii),
and adding (d)(14)(ix) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.114 Applications for space station authorizations.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(14) * * *
(iii) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration
that the integrated probability of debris-generating explosions for all
credible failure modes of the space station (excluding small particle
impacts) is less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000) during deployment and mission
operations. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system,
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
(iv) * * *
(A) Where the application is for an NGSO space station or system,
the following information must also be included:
(1) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a
space station during any period in which the space station will be
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects. For
systems consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also
include an assessment of the total probability of collision, calculated
as the sum of the probability of collision associated with each
individual space station. The total estimated number of space stations
deployed over a 15-year period, including any replacement space
stations, must be used for this calculation. Where the total
probability of collision exceeds 0.001 (1 in 1,000) assuming a 10%
failure rate of any maneuvering capability at an orbit that presents
the worst case for collision risk, the statement must include an
additional demonstration of the expected failure rate of
maneuverability, and the orbit where the operator would expect most
failures to occur, and calculate the total probability of failure based
on those assumptions.
* * * * *
(4) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee,
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the
event that a system will not maintain orbital tolerances, e.g., its
propulsion system will not be used for orbital maintenance, that fact
should be included in the debris mitigation disclosure. Such systems
must also indicate the anticipated evolution over time of the orbit of
the proposed satellite or satellites. All systems should describe the
extent of satellite maneuverability, whether or not the space station
design includes a propulsion system. For space stations deployed into
the portion of the low-Earth orbit region above 400 km, the operator
must certify that the space stations will be designed with the
maneuvering capabilities sufficient to perform effective collision
avoidance throughout the period when the space stations are above 400
km.
* * * * *
(vii) * * *
(D) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). For systems
consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also include
an assessment of the total casualty risk associated with the system,
calculated as the sum of the casualty risk associated with each
individual space station. The total estimated number of space stations
deployed over a 15-year period, including any replacement space
stations, must be used for this calculation. For applications for
either a single space station or multiple space stations, where
portions of any individual spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry
and impact the surface of the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of
15 joules, the statement must also include a description of strategies
considered to reduce casualty risk, such as use of materials designed
to demise upon reentry and/or targeted re-entry, and the extent to
which those strategies were incorporated into the mission profile.
(viii) Applicants must submit a signed statement stating that the
licensee will be responsible for indemnifying the United States against
any costs associated with a claim brought under a provision of the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies or Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects related to the facilities that are the subject
of the license.
(ix) For non-U.S.-licensed space stations, the requirement to
describe the design and operational strategies to minimize orbital
debris risk can be satisfied either by submitting the information
required of U.S.-licensed space stations, or by demonstrating that
debris mitigation plans for the space station(s) for which U.S. market
access is requested are subject to direct and effective regulatory
oversight by the national licensing authority.
* * * * *
0
5. Add Sec. 25.166 under the center heading ``Forfeiture, Termination,
and Reinstatement of Station Authorization'' to read as follows:
Sec. 25.166 Surety bonds for successful post-mission disposal.
(a) For all space stations licenses issued after [DATE], the
licensee must post a surety bond specific to successful post-mission
disposal within 30 days of the grant of its license. Failure to post a
bond will render the license null and void automatically.
(1) An NGSO licensee:
(i) Must have on file a surety bond requiring payment in the event
of default as defined in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section,
determined according to
[[Page 52469]]
the following formula: BA = (TM)*((Y-25)(TO)). BA is the amount of the
bond in dollars, TM is the total mass of the satellite system, Y is the
number of years that an individual satellite will remain in orbit if it
fails in the deployment orbit, and TO is the total number of objects in
orbit. The bond amount (BA) would be capped at a maximum of
$100,000,000 for any system.
(ii) Will be considered in default if any undisposed objects remain
in orbit and undisposed at the conclusion of the license term, beyond
those accounted for in the licensee's calculation of the probability of
successful disposal. In the case of default, the NGSO licensee will be
responsible for the amount determined according to the following
formula, and rounded to the nearest $10,000. FA = (M-EM) * ((Y-25)*(O-
EO)). FA is the amount to be paid in dollars, M is the total undisposed
mass in orbit in kilograms, EM is the expected undisposed mass in orbit
in kilograms, Y is the mean of the remaining years in orbit for any
individual undisposed object, up to a maximum of 200 years per object,
and O is the total number of undisposed objects in orbit, and EO is the
expected number of undisposed objects in orbit.
(2) A GSO licensee:
(i) Must have on file a surety bond requiring payment in the event
of default as defined in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section in the
amount of $5,000,000. If the licensee is granted a modification to
extend the length of its license by up to five years, the surety bond
on file must be increased by $5,000,000, and by an additional
$5,000,000 for a subsequent extension of up to five years. For any
additional years of license extension authorized by the Commission, the
surety bond on file must be increased to an amount that would satisfy
the formula in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section.
(ii) Will be considered in default if the licensed space station is
not disposed of in accordance with the statement specified in
Sec. Sec. 25.114(d)(14)(iv) and 25.283 within 6 months following
conclusion of operations. In the case of default, the NGSO licensee
will be responsible for the amount determined according to the
following formula: FA = $5,000,000*(Y), where FA is the amount to be
paid in dollars, and Y is calculated as follows: If the satellite
operates for less than 15 years then Y = 1; if the satellite operates
between 15 and 20 years, then Y = 2; and if the satellite operates for
more than 20 years, then Y = two plus the total number of operational
years, minus 20.
(b) The licensee must use a surety company deemed acceptable within
the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 9304 et seq. (See, e.g., Department of
Treasury Fiscal Service, Companies Holding Certificates of Authority as
Acceptable Sureties on Federal Bonds and As Acceptable Reinsurance
Companies, 57 FR 29356, July 1, 1992.) The bond must name the U.S.
Treasury as beneficiary in the event of the licensee's default. The
licensee must provide the Commission with a copy of the performance
bond, including all details and conditions.
PART 97--AMATEUR RADIO SERVICE
0
6. The authority citation for part 97 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151-155, 301-609, unless otherwise noted.
0
7. Amend Sec. 97.207 by revising paragraphs (g)(1)(iii) introductory
text, (g)(1)(iv)(A)(1) and (4), (g)(1)(vii)(D)(2)(ii) and adding
paragraph (h), to read as follows:
Sec. 97.207 Space station.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(1) * * *
(iii) A statement that the space station operator has assessed and
limited the probability, during and after completion of mission
operations, of accidental explosions or of release of liquids that will
persist in droplet form. This statement must include a demonstration
that the integrated probability of debris-generating explosions for all
credible failure modes of the space station (excluding small particle
impacts) is less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000) during deployment and mission
operations. Energy sources include chemical, pressure, and kinetic
energy. This demonstration should address whether stored energy will be
removed at the spacecraft's end of life, by depleting residual fuel and
leaving all fuel line valves open, venting any pressurized system,
leaving all batteries in a permanent discharge state, and removing any
remaining source of stored energy, or through other equivalent
procedures specifically disclosed in the application;
(iv) * * *
(A) * * *
(1) A demonstration that the space station operator has assessed
and limited the probability of collision between any space station of
the system and other large objects (10 cm or larger in diameter) during
the total orbital lifetime of the space station, including any de-orbit
phases, to less than 0.001 (1 in 1,000). The probability shall be
calculated using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool. The collision risk may be assumed zero for a
space station during any period in which the space station will be
maneuvered effectively to avoid colliding with large objects. For
systems consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also
include an assessment of the total probability of collision, calculated
as the sum of the probability of collision associated with each
individual space station. Where the total probability of collision
exceeds 0.001 (1 in 1,000) assuming a 10% failure rate of any
maneuvering capability at an orbit that presents the worst case for
collision risk, the statement must include an additional demonstration
of the expected failure rate of maneuverability, and the orbit where
the operator would expect most failures to occur, and calculate the
total probability of failure based on those assumptions.
* * * * *
(4) The statement must disclose the accuracy, if any, with which
orbital parameters will be maintained, including apogee, perigee,
inclination, and the right ascension of the ascending node(s). In the
event that a system is not be maintained to specific orbital
tolerances, e.g., its propulsion system will not be used for orbital
maintenance, that fact should be included in the debris mitigation
disclosure. Such systems must also indicate the anticipated evolution
over time of the orbit of the proposed satellite or satellites. All
systems should describe the extent of satellite maneuverability,
whether or not the space station design includes a propulsion system.
For space stations deployed into the portion of the low-Earth orbit
region above 400 km, the operator must certify that the space stations
will be designed with the maneuvering capabilities sufficient to
perform effective collision avoidance throughout the period when the
space stations are above 400 km.
* * * * *
(vii) * * *
(D) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) An assessment as to whether portions of any individual
spacecraft will survive atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of
the Earth with a kinetic energy in excess of 15 joules, and
demonstration that the calculated casualty risk for an individual
spacecraft using the NASA Debris Assessment Software or a higher
fidelity assessment tool is less than 0.0001 (1 in 10,000). For systems
consisting of multiple space stations, the statement must also include
an assessment of the
[[Page 52470]]
total casualty risk associated with the system, calculated as the sum
of the casualty risk associated with each individual space station. For
applications for either a single space station or multiple space
stations, where portions of any individual spacecraft will survive
atmospheric re-entry and impact the surface of the Earth with a kinetic
energy in excess of 15 joules, the statement must also include a
description of strategies considered to reduce casualty risk, such as
use of materials designed to demise upon reentry and/or targeted re-
entry, and the extent to which those strategies were incorporated into
the mission profile.
(h) At least 90 days prior to the planned launch of the space
station, the licensee grantee or owner of each space station must
submit a signed statement stating that upon issuance of a license by
the Commission, the license grantee or owner will be responsible for
indemnifying the United States against any costs associated with a
claim brought under a provision of the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies or Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects related to
the facilities that are the subject of the license.
[FR Doc. 2020-13184 Filed 8-24-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
