Motor vehicle safety standards; exemption petitions, etc.: General Motors North America, Inc.,

[Federal Register: October 3, 2001 (Volume 66, Number 192)]

[Notices]

[Page 50496-50499]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr03oc01-126]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

[Docket No. NHTSA 2000-7657, Notice 2]

General Motors North America; Denial of Application for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance

General Motors North America (GM) has determined that in some 1998- 1999 model year GM and Isuzu light trucks, use of the hazard flasher switch may activate the retained accessory power (RAP) feature with no key in the ignition. This occurs, according to GM, because of ``sneak'' circuits created in the flasher switch. When the RAP is activated, power windows and sunroofs in the affected vehicles are operable. This condition fails to meet the requirements of S4 of FMVSS 118, ``Power- operated window, partition, and roof panel systems.'' General Motors filedan appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573, ``Defect and Noncompliance Reports'' and subsequently petitioned for a determination that this noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h).

Notice of receipt of the petition was published in the Federal Register (65 FR 48280) on August 7, 2000, and opportunity was afforded for public comment until September 6, 2000.

As many as 975,462 GM light trucks including Chevrolet and GMC pickups and sport utility vehicles, Oldsmobile and Cadillac sport utility vehicles, and Isuzu pickups are involved. According to GM's petition, the problem is due to manufacturing tolerances in the hazard flasher switch of those vehicles and does not affect all of the vehicles

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equally. RAP activation is more difficult in some vehicles than in others. However, there is no way to identify which vehicles have problem flasher switches, so the entire vehicle population would be subject to recall.

For the reasons discussed in this notice, we believe that the noncompliance is not inconsequential to motor vehicle safety when evaluated by the criteria used by the agency in the past in making such decisions. Therefore, the agency denies the GM petition.

Note that NHTSA recently granted (66 FR 32871) a related but separate inconsequentiality petition from GM concerning noncomplying illumination of the center high-mounted stop lamp (CHMSL) caused by the same ``sneak'' circuit malfunction that caused the power window noncompliance that is the subject of this notice.

Background

The noncompliance involves the ``Retained Accessory Power'' (RAP) feature of the subject GM vehicles. RAP allows certain electrical accessories such as the radio and power windows to be used for a limited time interval after removal of a vehicle's ignition key. The presence of the RAP feature complies with the requirements of FMVSS No. 118 as long as RAP is active only during the time interval between turning off a vehicle's ignition with the ignition key and opening of either of the vehicle's front doors. This requirement, stated in S4(e) of FMVSS No. 118, permits manufacturers to equip vehicles with the RAP convenience feature while ensuring that a driver or other person will be present in the vehicle to supervise any children in the vehicle when the power windows are enabled by the RAP feature. Once RAP is activated, it remains active for no more than 20 minutes, and it is canceled immediately upon opening of one of the front doors of the vehicle.

On the noncomplying GM vehicles, the RAP can be activated without the ignition key by forcefully depressing the hazard flasher switch located on the steering column. The hazard flasher switch in the affected vehicles is a pushbutton that operates as a push-on/push-off switch. When the hazard flasher pushbutton is fully depressed, it reaches a stop approximately 6 mm below the fully extended ``on'' position. It is not necessary for the switch to reach the stop in order to go from the ``on'' position to the ``off'' position, or vice-versa. The pushbutton is spring-loaded and will not stay in the fully depressed position unless pressure is maintained on it.

Under certain conditions, unintended or so-called ``sneak'' circuits may be created in the switch if the pushbutton is depressed to its full extent of travel. The ``sneak'' circuits disappear when the switch is released. The presence of the ``sneak'' circuits causes activation of the RAP feature without the key in the ignition. The ``sneak'' circuits materialize more easily if the brake pedal is pressed in conjunction with use of the hazard flasher switch. Activation of the RAP feature in these modes fails to comply with S4(e) of FMVSS No. 118.

GM's Petition

GM's petition discussed in detail the nature of the circumstances under which RAP might be activated by use of the hazard flasher switch. An important GM rationale was that only some of the vehicles in the affected population had switches that were susceptible to RAP activation. The susceptibility depended on the force used to depress the switch pushbuttons. The necessary force for RAP activation varied from switch to switch because the root cause of the problem was manufacturing tolerances in the switches. The petition included data from a hands-on GM evaluation of 2,770 switches in which GM grouped the switches according to ease of RAP activation. In the evaluation, switches were operated repeatedly so as to intentionally activate RAP by forcefully pressing on the pushbutton, holding the pushbutton at the bottom limit of travel, and applying side force in all directions. Depending upon the amount of bottoming and side force applied before RAP was activated, GM categorized the switches as ``least difficult,'' ``moderately difficult,'' ``hard,'' and ``impossible.'' The data indicated only about 1 percent of the switches would cause RAP activation under normal use, i.e., with moderate bottoming force on the pushbutton. In almost 92 percent of switches, RAP activation was rated ``impossible.''

GM later revised this data significantly. In the revised data, the sample size dropped from 2,770 to 530 (apparently, many of the switches in the initial group were switches that had already been modified in production in an attempt to fix the problem.) In the revised data, the portion of sample switches that were ``least difficult'' was about 24 percent, and those categorized as ``impossible'' fell to about 57 percent.

According to GM, for RAP activation to occur unintentionally in the affected vehicles, two ``sneak'' circuits must be completed. Both circuits can be completed by depressing the hazard flasher button though, as discussed above, significant bottoming force on the button is often necessary and in some switches no amount of applied force caused RAP activation. However, one of the two ``sneak'' circuits is completed whenever the brake pedal is depressed enough to light the brake lamps. Thus, RAP activation is much easier when the brake pedal is depressed in conjunction with pressing on the hazard flasher switch. GM submitted data on ease of RAP activation with the brake pedal depressed for a sample of 234 hazard flasher switches from the affected vehicle population. This data indicated that RAP activation was ``least difficult'' in over half the switches in the sample, i.e., it could occur through normal use of the pushbutton with moderate bottoming force. Over 33 percent were ``moderately difficult'' and 14 percent were ``hard'' when the brake pedal was on. None of the switches in this sample were classified as ``impossible'' regarding RAP activation if the brake pedal was concurrently pressed.

GM's main rationale for inconsequentiality was that, for any harm to come to occupants of the affected vehicles as a result of the noncompliance, a chain of unlikely events would have to occur. GM stated that the following specific events, each of which it describes as having a low probability of occurring, all would have to occur before an opportunity would exist for a person to be injured by a power operated window or sunroof:

A young child or children within a certain age range (not infants, not older children) would have to be left unattended and unrestrained inside the vehicle. Restrained children would not have access to the hazard flasher switch located on the steering column. GM submitted the results of a survey that it commissioned to estimate the frequency with which children are left unattended in vehicles. In the survey, vehicles entering the parking areas of selected store and shopping complex locations in Virginia and California in June 2000 were monitored. Of a total of 730 vehicles observed, the survey found 25 percent had children of any age as occupants and 1.5 percent had children left in them unattended. Most of the unattended children were older (approx. 10 years and over) and the average time unattended was about 7\1/2\ minutes.

Unrestrained, unattended, young children would have to get access to and depress the hazard flasher switch to its limit of travel, and usually some force would be required for RAP activation to occur, or the child or children would have to press on the brake pedal while bottoming the switch. Even if these events occur, RAP probably would not

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be activated since some switches are not prone or are less prone to ``sneak'' circuits, as described previously. In this regard, GM conducted a human factors test to determine how likely children are to play with the hazard flasher switch, or the switch and brake pedal concurrently, when left alone in vehicles. GM describes the test as maximizing the possibility of switch usage by the children to determine not only the likelihood of RAP activation but also what would occur after any such activation. Four vehicles were used in the study and were all equipped with switches categorized as ``Least Difficult'' for RAP activation, and 138 young children were observed either individually or in pairs inside the vehicles for 20 minutes. At the conclusion of each 20 minute period, before removing the child or children from the vehicle, evaluators directed the children to activate the hazard flasher switch if they had not already. Pursuant to the GM test protocol, the children pressed on the switches a total of 554 times (mostly by direction) resulting in one occurrence of RAP activation in the case of a pair of children, a nine-year-old boy and four-year-old girl. The RAP was de-activated in that instance by the four-year-old opening a door prior to any use of the power windows. In total, 96 observations of either one or two children in vehicles for no more than 20 minutes resulted in 25 occasions of hazard switch activation. In seven of these 25 instances, window switches were contacted after hazard switch use but, as mentioned window switches were not touched in the one instance where hazard switch use caused RAP activation.

In the event unattended children activated the RAP feature, they would have to subsequently operate the power window or sunroof controls prior to RAP time-out or de-activation by a door being opened. Even then, power window use would be unlikely to actually lead to an injury. None of the affected vehicles has an ``express close'' feature so the windows only continue closing as long as the control is held.

GM believes that, because each of these events has a very low frequency or probability of occurrence, the likelihood of all of them occurring is negligible.

GM stated furthermore that it is not aware of any accidents, injuries, owner complaints, or field reports on the subject vehicles related to the noncompliance. GM commissioned an independent analysis of complaints in the NHTSA complaint database relating to power windows or sunroofs. That analysis found 30 complaints related in some way to entrapment out of 8,621 complaints involving power windows or sunroofs. Fourteen of those 30 involved an injury or near-injury to children. None of the 30 involved any of the subject GM vehicles.

Comments on the Petition

One comment was submitted regarding the subject GM inconsequentiality petition. The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) urged the agency to deny the GM petition. CAS stated, ``FMVSS 118 seeks to minimize child injury risks from the inadvertent operation of power accessory devices.'' However, CAS appears to have misunderstood the nature of the noncompliance and overstated the risk involved. It stated, ``If this petition is granted, a child could depress the hazard warning switch to its limit while another child remains in the path of a closing window or panel. Similarly, a driver could activate the hazard lights and exit the vehicle to check on a problem and leave the child inside free to operate the power windows.'' Neither of these scenarios accurately reflects the actual risk. In the first scenario described by CAS, the RAP may be activated by the child pressing the hazard flasher switch, but this would not cause the power windows to move. It would merely enable the power window buttons. In the second scenario, in which the driver activates the hazard flashers and then exits the vehicle, the RAP would be canceled when the driver opened the door to get out, and so the windows would not be operable by a child left behind in the vehicle, as CAS suggested.

CAS mentions the related problem of the potential for illumination of the CHMSL on the affected GM vehicles when the hazard flasher switch is used. CAS cites this as evidence that an effective remedy is required, not an exemption from remedy.

Petition Analysis

The subject GM petition is being denied because FMVSS No. 118 is very specific regarding the conditions under which power windows may be operable. A requirement in the Standard, stated in S4(e), seeks to prevent conditions like the one that exists in the noncomplying GM vehicles. GM contends that there is only a very small likelihood of an injury resulting from this noncompliance, considering all the unlikely events that must first take place. The GM human factors trial in which children were observed as occupants of affected GM vehicles was supposed to demonstrate that RAP activation is exceedingly unlikely. In our view, it showed that the behavior of children is unpredictable, and the possibility of RAP activation is not negligible. Therefore, existing safeguards in FMVSS No. 118 should be adhered to.

In determining inconsequentiality, the agency traditionally has considered whether a noncompliance is likely to increase the risk that occupants will experience the type of injury that the requirement is designed to protect against (Cosco, Inc., Denial of Application for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408 (June 1, 1999) (NHTSA-98-4033-2)). The main purpose of requiring power windows to be inoperative without the ignition key is to eliminate the possibility of unsupervised children operating them. The subject noncompliance makes RAP activation possible by means other than those allowed for in Standard No. 118, and it therefore increases the risk to occupants, particularly children, of an event that the standard is designed to protect against.

In addition, NHTSA denied a somewhat similar 1996 Ford Motor Company petition (62 FR 51500) in part because the involved vehicles were minivans which are considered family vehicles in which the presence of children is more likely than in other types of vehicles. The same argument applies to many of the subject GM vehicle models. According to GM, 569,163 of the affected vehicles, or more than 58 percent, are sport utility vehicles with passenger and cargo capacity that makes them suitable as family vehicles.

We also note that the NHTSA grant of the related petition involving CHMSL illumination by the same ``sneak'' circuit mechanism which can cause RAP activation does not influence our decision. In the case of the CHMSL problem, the lamp could be inadvertently illuminated by use of the hazard flasher switch, but the illumination was only momentary. That is, it only occurred while the switch was being held in the bottomed-out position. Release of the switch always turned the lamp off. In contrast, RAP activation caused by the ``sneak'' circuit condition results in a timed interval of 20 minutes in which the power windows can be used. This condition can result even if only momentary bottoming of the switch occurs. Once activated, the RAP is set to an ``on'' status and, unlike the CHMSL, releasing the hazard flasher pushbutton as occurs in normal use does not deactivate the RAP feature.

For the reasons expressed above, it is hereby decided that GM has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to

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motor vehicle safety, and its petition is denied.

(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 301118, 301120; delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8)

Issued on: September 27, 2001. Stephen R. Kratzke, Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.

[FR Doc. 01-24724Filed10-2-01; 8:45 am]

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