Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
| Published date | 04 June 2020 |
| Citation | 85 FR 34405 |
| Record Number | 2020-12016 |
| Section | Notices |
| Court | Industry And Security Bureau |
Federal Register, Volume 85 Issue 108 (Thursday, June 4, 2020)
[Federal Register Volume 85, Number 108 (Thursday, June 4, 2020)]
[Notices]
[Pages 34405-34413]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2020-12016]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Industry and Security
Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges
Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp.
Way, Tehran, Iran;
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 42 Avenue Montaigne
75008, Paris, France;
Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik
Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates;
Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways--Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil
Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey;
Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al Naser Wings
Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21) Beside Al Jadirya
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309,
St. 3/H.20) Al Mansour) Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan;
Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay,
Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al
Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif,
Saudi Arabia 61177;
Bahar Safwa General Trading, PO Box 113212) Citadel Tower, Floor-5,
Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and PO Box
8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;
Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue
Bird Ltd, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah
Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates;
Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad) Anwar Nur Shammout, a/
k/a
[[Page 34406]]
Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street,
Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17-18
Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and
Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey.
Pursuant to Sec. 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations,
15 CFR parts 730-774 (2020) (``EAR'' or ``the Regulations''), I hereby
grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (``OEE'') to
renew the temporary denial order issued in this matter on December 2,
2019. I find that renewal of this order, as modified, is necessary in
the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the
Regulations.\1\
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\1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774
(2020), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While Section 1766 of
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections
which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA,
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall
continue in effect according to their terms until modified,
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5)
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
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I. Procedural History
On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Export Enforcement (``Assistant Secretary''), signed an
order denying Mahan Airways' export privileges for a period of 180 days
on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order
also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (``Blue
Airways of Armenia''), as well as the ``Balli Group Respondents,''
namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, Vahid
Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue
Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky
Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued ex parte
pursuant to Sec. 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect on
March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the Federal Register.
This temporary denial order (``TDO'') was renewed in accordance
with Sec. 766.24(d) of the Regulations.\2\ Subsequent renewals also
have issued pursuant to Sec. 766.24(d), including most recently on
December 2, 2019.\3\ Some of the renewal orders and the modification
orders that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as
respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain
parties.\4\
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\2\ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a
temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it
believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent
an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no
later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a
temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of
any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate
modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as
respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously
added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek
renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected
if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any
party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent
may oppose a renewal request as set forth in Sec. 766.24(d).
Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal
their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the
underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or
subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also
note 4, infra.
\3\ The December 2, 2019 renewal order was effective upon
issuance and published in the Federal Register on December 6, 2019
(84 FR 66873). Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008,
March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3,
2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August
9, 2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, July 22,
2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7,
2016, December 30, 2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14,
2018, December 11, 2018, and June 5, 2019, respectively. The August
24, 2011 renewal followed the issuance of a modification order that
issued on July 1, 2011, to add Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The
July 13, 2015 renewal followed a modification order that issued May
21, 2015, and added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar
Safwa General Trading as respondents. Each of the renewal orders and
each of the modification orders referenced in this footnote or
elsewhere in this order has been published in the Federal Register.
\4\ Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the
Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization
related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or
position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related
services may be added as a ``related person'' to a temporary denial
order to prevent evasion of the order.
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The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as
to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue
Airways of Armenia.\5\ As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and
Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick
Aviation Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of
the TDO.\6\ A modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand
Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.\7\
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\5\ Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS
administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was
approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The
sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included,
inter alia, a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct
five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli
Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department
of Justice and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control.
\6\ See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of related
persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini
remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick
resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge
for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR
764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the
settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years
of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years
suspended conditioned upon Gatewick's full and timely payment of the
civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the
seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect,
superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of
the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was
published in the Federal Register on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR
49283 (Aug. 20, 2014).
\7\ Zarand Aviation's export privileges remained denied until
July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order
issued on that date.
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As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air
General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added
as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012.
Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4,
2013 renewal order.
On May 21, 2015, a modification order issued adding Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as
respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further infra,
these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they
were acting together to, inter alia, obtain aircraft subject to the
Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO. Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive
officer, Issam Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the
July 13, 2015 renewal order.\8\ On November 16, 2017, a modification
order issued to remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK)
Ltd. as related persons
[[Page 34407]]
following a request by OEE for their removal.\9\
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\8\ The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (``OFAC'') designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam
Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (``SDGTs'') on
May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ``providing
support to Iran's Mahan Air.'' See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
\9\ The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the
Federal Register on December 4, 2017. See 82 FR 57203 (Dec. 4,
2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an
administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial
order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian's violation of
the TDO after his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco
(UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by
Eslamian, also were parties to the settlement agreement and were
added to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to
other sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and
Skyco shall be subject to a conditionally-suspended denial order for
a period of four years from the date of the settlement order.
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The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the
export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard,
Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General
Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay,
Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout.
On May 6, 2020, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for
renewal of the TDO that issued on December 2, 2019. The written request
was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration.
Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in
accordance with Sec. Sec. 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. Furthermore, no
appeal of the related person determinations made as part of the
September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012,
February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or modification orders has
been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.\10\
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\10\ A party named or added as a related person may not oppose
the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order,
but may file an appeal of the related person determination in
accordance with Sec. 766.23(c). See also note 2, supra.
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II. Renewal of the TDO
A. Legal Standard
Pursuant to Sec. 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order
temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing
that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an
``imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and (d).
``A violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of
likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a
violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the
matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative
charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' Id. A
``lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a
violation.'' Id.
B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal
OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the
issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders
subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015
modification order and the renewal order issued on December 2, 2019,
and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which
indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The
initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan
Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by
knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically
Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 1-3''), items subject to the EAR and classified
under Export Control Classification Number (``ECCN'') 9A991.b, without
the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted
by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-
export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (``Aircraft 4-6'')
to Iran.
As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence
presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1-3 continued to be flown on
Mahan Airways' routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the
Regulations and the TDO itself.\11\ It also showed that Aircraft 1-3
had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on
the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as
discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010
renewal orders, Mahan Airways registered Aircraft 1-3 in Iran, obtained
Iranian tail numbers for them (EP-MNA, EP-MNB, and EP-MNE,
respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in
violation of the Regulations and the TDO,\12\ while also committing an
additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and
acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired
aircraft was an MD-82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan
Airways' livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airways' routes under tail
number TC-TUA.
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\11\ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates
the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).
\12\ The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant
service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of
the March 9, 2010 renewal order.
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The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the
United Kingdom (``U.K.'') had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court
on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court's December
21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove
the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan
Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the
U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1-3. In a
letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways'
Chairman indicated, inter alia, that Mahan Airways opposes U.S.
Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the
aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 ``forward
bookings'' for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so
and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the
aircraft.
The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan
Airways' violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin
aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In
February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in
the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations
and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United
Arab Emirates (``UAE''), in violation of both the TDO and the
Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer
motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways' violations were
facilitated by Gatewick LLC, which not only participated in the
transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways'
sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the
UAE.
Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan
Airways asserted that Aircraft 1-3 were not being used, but stated in
pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran
especially ``in an airworthy
[[Page 34408]]
condition'' and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K. court
appeal, the aircraft ``could immediately go back into service . . . on
international routes into and out of Iran.'' Mahan Airways' January 24,
2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ]] 108, 110. This
clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction with Mahan
Airways' prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the need to
renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations. Two of
these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no longer
in Mahan Airways' possession. The third of these 747s remained in Iran
under Mahan's control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, it was
designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (``SDGT'') by the
U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
(``OFAC'') on September 19, 2012.\13\ Furthermore, as discussed in the
February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that this
747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways, had been flown
between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons and/or
other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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\13\ See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx.
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In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24,
2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter,
Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by
operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways' livery and
logo, on flights into and out of Iran.\14\ At the time of the July 1,
2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in
France, with tail numbers F-OJHH and F-OJHI, respectively.\15\ The
August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired
another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499
and Iranian tail number EP-VIP, in violation of the Regulations.\16\ On
September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail numbers F-
OJHH, F-OJHI, and EP-VIP) were designated as SDGTs.\17\
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\14\ The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The
engines are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export
Control Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain
controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the
total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the
Regulations. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or
reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government
authorization pursuant to Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of the
Regulations.
\15\ OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August
24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation
and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and
to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail
numbers EP-MHH and EP-MHI). It was determined subsequent to the
February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for
these A310s was cancelled and that Mahan Airways then continued to
fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F-OJHH and
F-OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan
Airways' possession.
\16\ See note 14, supra.
\17\ See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously
designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64427
(October 18, 2011).
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The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of
continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons
acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another
Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines--two GE CF6-50C2
engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively--and other aircraft
parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\18\ The February 4,
2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance
with Sec. 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President
and the head of Mahan's Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan's
acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1-3) that
resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with
Mahan dating back to 1997.
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\18\ Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013
renewal order as ``Turkish Company No. 1.'' Kral Aviation purchased
a GE CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in
July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this
engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the
freight forwarder in accordance with Sec. 758.8 of the Regulations.
OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for the second CF6-
50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the second
engine subsequently cancelled the item's sale to Kral Aviation. In
September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that another
Turkish company (``Turkish Company No. 2'') was attempting to
purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish
Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order.
On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS's Entity
List, Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Regulations. See 78 FR
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the
Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United States. See 15
CFR 744.11.
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The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence
obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE
CF6-50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via
Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were
involved in or aware of matters related to the engine's arrival in
Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine,
and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.
Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through
Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (``Pioneer
Logistics''), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its
director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously
had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali
Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a
sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha,
Managing Director of Mahan's General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated
that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner
were ``actually the property of and owned by Mahan.'' He further stated
that he held ``legal title to the shares until otherwise required by
Mahan'' but would ``exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and
only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/or decisions [would]
only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan[.]'' \19\
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\19\ Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda
also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR
75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE's continued
investigation of Mahan Airways' activities and detailed an attempt by
Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF-502R-5 aircraft engines (MSNs
LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S.
company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts
supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of
the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a
Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin
aircraft parts subject to the Regulations--including, among other
items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power
control unit--being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in
violation of the TDO.
The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from
the March-June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items
subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of
Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP-MOI and EP-
MOK, respectively.\20\ In addition, aviation
[[Page 34409]]
industry resources indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan
Airways in late November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS's
Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Regulations) on August
15, 2011, for acting contrary to the national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States.\21\ Open source information
indicated that at least EP-MOI remained active in Mahan's fleet, and
that the aircraft was being operated on multiple flights in July 2014.
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\20\ The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.-origin engines.
The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN
9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires
U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7
of the Regulations.
\21\ See 76 FR 50407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal
order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery
and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers
EP-MMK and EP-MML, respectively. OEE's investigation also showed
that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air
Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian
Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS's Entity List on August 15,
2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft
may have been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian
airline in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP-APE and
EP-APF, respectively.
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The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional
attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject the Regulations in
further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE became
aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231 (``the
IRU'') that had been sent to the United States for repair. The IRU is a
U.S.-origin item, subject to the Regulations, classified under ECCN
7A103, and controlled for missile technology reasons. Upon closer
inspection, it was determined that IRU came from or had been installed
on an Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation
revealed that as of approximately February 2014, this aircraft was
registered under Iranian tail number EP-MMB and had been painted in the
livery and logo of Mahan Airways.
The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts
by the Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan's
illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland filed a
civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b)
that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December
2, 2014. EP-MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways' fleet and
has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December
19, 2017.
Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and
interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan
Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224.
In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways' use of Asian Aviation
Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf of Mahan for
the purchase of engines and other equipment.\22\
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\22\ See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55073 (Sep. 15, 2014).
OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer
Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways' use of
Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations
was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, supra, at 14.
BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the
Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).
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The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two
aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus
A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late
2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or
ownership of Mahan Airways.\23\ The sales agreements for these two
aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.\24\
Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers
(``EFT'') were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General
Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550. The May 21, 2015
modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents'
attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft
physically located in the United States in similarly-patterned
transactions during the same recent time period. Transactional
documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99,
respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements
for Al Naser Airlines.\25\ A review of the payment information for
these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and
Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs
164 and 550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by OEE Special Agents
prior to their planned export from the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.-origin engines
that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN
9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued
at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The
aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export
of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\24\ The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a
25% owner of Al Naser Airlines.
\25\ Both aircraft were physically located in the United States
and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Sec.
734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.-origin
engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under
Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s
contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent
of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to
the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified
under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to
Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sec. Sec.
742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
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The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al
Naser Airlines' attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways
extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to include a total of nine
aircraft.\26\ Four of the aircraft, all of which are subject to the
Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been
issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-MMG
(MSN 383), EP-MMH (MSN 391) and EP-MMR (MSN 416), respectively.\27\
Publicly available flight tracking information provided evidence that
at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP-MMH and EP-MMR were
being actively flown on routes into and out of Iran in violation of the
Regulations.\28\ The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed evidence
that Mahan Airways had begun actively flying EP-MMD on international
routes into and out of Iran. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order
described publicly available aviation database and flight tracking
information indicating that
[[Page 34410]]
Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail numbers and
press into active service under Mahan's livery and logo at least two
more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or through Al
Naser Airlines: EP-MME (MSN 371) and EP-MMF (MSN 376), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015,
that appeared on Mahan Airways' website and stated that Mahan
``added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]'' and that the newly
acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321.
See http://www.mahan.aero/en/mahan-air/press-room/44. The press
release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways' website.
Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan
had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May
2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13,
2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was
actively involved in Al Naser Airlines' acquisition of MSNs 164 and
550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were
detained by OEE).
\27\ The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft
are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these
aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
\28\ There is some publicly available information indicating
that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number
EP-MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus
A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in
violation of the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were
designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive
Order 13224. See 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).
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The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways' acquisition
of a BAE Avro RJ-85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the Regulations
and its subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP-MOR.\29\
This information was corroborated by publicly available information on
the website of Iran's civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order
also outlined Mahan's continued operation of EP-MMF in violation of the
Regulations on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai,
China, respectively.
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\29\ The BAE Avro RJ-85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that
are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d.
The BAE Avro RJ-85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at
more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a
result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-
export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to
Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued
operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP-MMD (MSN 164), EP-
MMF (MSN 376), and EP-MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or
through Al Naser Airlines, as previously detailed in pertinent part in
the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly
available flight tracking information showed that the aircraft were
operated on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing,
China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew
from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December
22, 2016, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to
Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December
26 and December 28, 2016, EP-MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from
Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding
Mahan Airways' operation of multiple Airbus aircraft subject to the
Regulations, including, but not limited to, aircraft procured from or
through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including
from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, Afghanistan. The
June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a suspected
planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to
the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE's December 13,
2016 renewal request.
The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan
employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the
purchase of an aircraft subject to the Regulations and classified under
ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines'
acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a
Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR-SEB, and an Airbus A320
(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR-SEA, from a Romanian company in
violation of the TDO and the Regulations.\31\ Open source information
indicates that after the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly
exposed Al Naser's acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and
357), the leases were subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned
to their owner.
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\31\ The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which
are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control
Classification (``ECCN'') 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which
consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under
ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S.
Government authorization pursuant to Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of
the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence
indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of
aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally
procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of
Iran, including from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara,
Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq.
The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began
actively operating EP-MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired
in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP-
A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.\32\ It also
discussed evidence that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft
subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP-MME, EP-
MMF, and EP-MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran,
including from/to Beijing, China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are
subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The
Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more
than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result
is subject to the Regulations regardless of its location. The
aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export
of this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization
pursuant to Sec. Sec. 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June
4, 2018, EP-MMT (MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran,
Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC's May 24, 2018
designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret
Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order
13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC's
designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan
has an interest.\33\ The June 14, 2018 order also cited the April 2018
arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen on a three-count criminal
information filed in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey involving the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft
parts valued at over $2 million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See 83 FR 27828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC's related press
release stated in part that ``[o]ver the last several years, Otik
Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-
related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are
procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently
as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with
replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as
aircraft brakes.'' The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that
were designated are: EP-MMA (MSN 20), EP-MMB (MSN 56), EP-MMC (MSN
282), EP-MMJ (MSN 526), EP-MMV (MSN 2079), EP-MNF (MSN 547), EP-MOD
(MSN 3162), EP-MOM (MSN 3165), EP-MOP (MSN 2257), EP-MOQ (MSN 2261),
EP-MOR (MSN 2392), and EP-MOS (MSN 2347). See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180524.aspx.
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The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available
information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP-MMB,
EP-MME, EP-MMF, and EP-MMQ, on international flights into and out of
Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and
Dubai, UAE.\34\ It also discussed that OEE's continued investigation of
Mahan Airways and its affiliates and agents had resulted in an October
2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, stemming from her
involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin aircraft engine,
valued at approximately $810,000, to Mahan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Flight tracking information showed that on December 10,
2018, EP-MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran,
and EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran.
Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from
Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP-MMQ
(MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and
Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC's September 14, 2018
designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive
Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and
Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel
& Tourism
[[Page 34411]]
SDN BHD, of Malaysia.\35\ As general sales agents for Mahan Airways,
these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways' flights,
including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to or for
benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.\36\
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\35\ See 83 FR 34301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan
Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53359 (Oct.
22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating
of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14,
2018).
\36\ OFAC's press release concerning its designation of My
Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that
[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S.
warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai
government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.'' My Aviation provides
cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and
works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on
regularly-scheduled Mahan Airways' flights to Tehran, Iran. My
Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking
services. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm484.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 5, 2019 renewal order highlighted Mahan's continued
violation of the TDO and the Regulations. An end-use check conducted by
BIS in Malaysia in March 2019 uncovered evidence that, on approximately
ten occasions, Mahan had caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed
export of U.S.-origin items subject to the Regulations from the United
States to Iran via Malaysia. The items included helicopter shafts,
transmitters, and other aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the
Commerce Control List and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. The
June 5, 2019 order also detailed publicly available flight tracking
information showing that Mahan continues to unlawfully operate a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran,
including on routes to and from Damascus Syria.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP-MMJ (MSN 526) flew from
Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 24, 2019, EP-
MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, and
on May 23, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The June 5, 2019 order also described actions taken by both BIS and
OFAC to thwart efforts by entities connected to or acting on behalf of
Mahan Airways to violate U.S. export controls and sanctions related to
Iran. On May 14, 2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha Asmath Shaikh, and
two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General
Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, to the Entity List
pursuant to Sec. 744.11 of the Regulations, including for engaging in
activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan's behalf.\38\ On
January 24, 2019, OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight Travel LLC, which is
Mahan's general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air,
an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 747s \39\ and
is owned or controlled by Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See 84 FR 21233 (May 14, 2019).
\39\ These 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP-FAA
and EP-FAB, respectively.
\40\ OFAC's press release concerning these designations states
that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ``being owned or
controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or
providing financial, material or technological support for, or
financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF,'' and
that Flight Travel LLC was being designated for ``acting for or on
behalf of Mahan Air.'' It further states, inter alia, that ``Mahan
Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan
Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air,
facilitating the airline's illicit operations.'' See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20190124.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 2, 2019 renewal order noted that OEE's on-going
investigation revealed that U.S.-origin passenger flight and database
management software subject to the Regulations was provided to a
company in Turkey and subsequently used to facilitate and service
Mahan's operations into and out of Turkey in further violation of the
Regulations.
Additionally, open source information, including flight tracking
data and news articles published in October 2019, showed that Mahan
Airways was now operating a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 on routes between
Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, and Mashhad. This aircraft,
bearing Iranian tail number EP-MNB, appears to be one of the three
aircraft that Mahan illegally acquired via Blue Airways of Armenia and
U.K.-based Balli Group that resulted in the issuance of the original
TDO.\41\ See supra at 10-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ The same open sources indicate this aircraft continues to
operate on flights within Iran to include a May 11, 2020 flight from
Tehran, Iran to Kerman, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence was also described in the December 2, 2019 renewal order
showing that on or about November 11, 2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or
abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.-origin atomic absorption
spectrometer, an item subject to the Regulations, from the United
States to Iran via the UAE. Finally, publicly-available flight tracking
information showed that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number
of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran,
including on routes to and from Guangzhou, China, Istanbul, Turkey, and
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Publicly-available flight tracking information shows that
on November 23, 2019, EP-MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to
Tehran, Iran, and on November 21, 2019, EP-MMF (MSN 376) flew on
routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on
November 20, 2019, EP-MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OEE's May 6, 2020 renewal request and on-going investigation
further demonstrate the nature of Mahan Airway's prior actions and its
continued actions in violation of the TDO and the Regulations, both
directly and through its widespread network of procurement agents,
front companies, and intermediaries.
Subsequent to the December 2, 2019 renewal, Ali Abdullah Alhay and
Issam Shammout, parties added to the TDO in May and July 2015,
respectively, were each indicted on 17 counts in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Alhay and Shammout were
charged with, among other violations, conspiring to export aircraft and
parts to Mahan in violation of export control laws and the embargo on
Iran beginning around August 2012 through May 2015. Mahan Airways also
continues to violate the TDO by operating a number of aircraft subject
to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP-MMD, EP-MMF, and
EP-MMI, aircraft originally acquired from Al Naser Airlines, on
international flights into and out of Iran from/to Bangkok, Thailand,
Dubai, UAE, and Shanghai, China. These flights have continued since the
renewal request was submitted, including May 8-10, 2020.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that
on May 8, 2020, EP-MMD (MSN 164) flew on routes between Bangkok,
Thailand and Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP-MMF (MSN 376)
flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and Tehran. In addition, on May 9,
2020, EP-MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and
Tehran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, OEE is continuing its efforts to disrupt Mahan's
acquisition of aircraft and parts subject to the Regulations as well as
its role in transporting or forwarding items subject to the Regulations
from destinations including, but not limited to, Malaysia to Iran.
C. Findings
Under the applicable standard set forth in Sec. 766.24 of the
Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the
evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied
persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that
such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that
given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation,
there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Therefore, renewal of the
TDO is necessary in the
[[Page 34412]]
public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to
give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and
abroad that they should continue to avoid dealing with Mahan Airways
and Al Naser Airlines and the other denied persons, in connection with
export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the
Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the
Regulations.
IV. Order
It is therefore ordered: First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower,
No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD
KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates; MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754,
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab
Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al
Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN
AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING
LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL
TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai
40594, United Arab Emirates; MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways- Istanbul
Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli
Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL
NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home
46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al Jadirya
Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St.
3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH
ALHAY A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-
Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St. 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private
Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177;
BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5,
Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box
8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY
BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/
K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone,
United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD
ANWAR NUR SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al
Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515,
and 17-18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom,
and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A
Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or on their behalf, any
successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a ``Denied Person''
and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may not, directly or
indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any
commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to
as ``item'') exported or to be exported from the United States that is
subject to the Export Administration Regulations (``EAR''), or in any
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license
exception, or export control document;
B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying,
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of,
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way,
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the
United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other
activity subject to the EAR; or
C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to
the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the
following:
A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item
subject to the EAR;
B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from
the United States, including financing or other support activities
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item,
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair,
modification or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided
in Sec. 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or
business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control,
position of responsibility, affiliation in the conduct of trade or
business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or
other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that
are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-
origin technology.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 766.24(e) of the EAR,
Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar
Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a
full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the
Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40
South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-4022. In accordance with
the provisions of Sec. Sec. 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR,
Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco
Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue
Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their
inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in
support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge,
U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore,
Maryland 21202-4022.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 766.24(d) of the EAR,
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not
later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be
opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or
Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in Sec. 766.24(d), by filing a
written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before
the expiration date of the Order.
A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser
Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa
[[Page 34413]]
General Trading and each related person, and shall be published in the
Federal Register.
This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for
180 days.
Dated: May 29, 2020.
P. Lee Smith,
Performing the Non-Exclusive Functions and Duties of the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2020-12016 Filed 6-3-20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P
