Texas Central Railroad High-Speed Rail Safety Standards

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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 213 / Tuesday, November 3, 2020 / Rules and Regulations

1

TCRR supplemented its petition in August 2016,

and submitted an updated petition in September

2017.

2

Subsequent references to ‘‘N700’’ or ‘‘N700

series trainset’’ are meant to refer to the N700 series

trainset currently in, or future variants approved

for, use.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 299

[Docket No. FRA–2019–0068, Notice 5]

RIN 2130–AC84

Texas Central Railroad High-Speed

Rail Safety Standards

AGENCY

: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION

: Final rule; rule of particular

applicability and record of decision.

SUMMARY

: This final rule of particular

applicability (RPA) establishes safety

standards for the Texas Central Railroad

(TCRR or the railroad) high-speed rail

(HSR) system. These standards are not

intended for general application in the

railroad industry, but apply only to the

TCRR system planned for development

in the State of Texas. This rule takes a

systems approach to safety, and so

includes standards that address the

aspects of the TCRR HSR system

consistent with the regulatory

framework for the general system, but in

a manner appropriate to TCRR’s

technology and application, including

signal and trainset control, track, rolling

stock, operating practices, system

qualifications, and maintenance. The

TCRR HSR system is planned to operate

from Houston to Dallas, on dedicated

track, with no grade crossings, at speeds

not to exceed 330 km/h (205 mph). The

TCRR rolling stock, track, and core

systems will replicate the Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system operated by the

Central Japan Railway Company (JRC),

and will be used exclusively for revenue

passenger service.

DATES

: Effective date. This final rule is

effective December 3, 2020.

Incorporation by reference. The

incorporation by reference of the

standards listed in the rule is approved

by the Director of the Federal Register

as of December 3, 2020.

ADDRESSES

: Docket: For access to the

docket to read background documents

or comments received, go to http://

www.regulations.gov at any time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT

: For

issues related to the technical safety

requirements: Frederick Mottley,

Systems Engineer, at (617) 494–3160;

Devin Rouse, Mechanical Engineer, at

(202) 493–6185; or Michael Hunter,

Attorney Adviser, at (202) 493–0368.

For issues related to the Record of

Decision: Kevin Wright, Environmental

Protection Specialist at (202) 493–0845;

or Kathryn Johnson, Attorney Adviser,

at (202) 493–0407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary

II. Statutory Authority

III. Proceedings to Date

IV. Discussion of Comments Received on the

NPRM

A. Context and Overview

B. Regulatory Approach

C. General Safety Oversight

D. Interference With the Union Pacific

Railroad

E. Track Safety

F. Crashworthiness and Occupant

Protection

G. Reissuance of NPRM

H. Electrical Arcing From the Overhead

Catenary System

I. Right-of-Way Barrier Protection

J. Emergency Response

K. Noise Emission and Vibration

L. Eminent Domain

M. Regulatory Evaluation

N. Enforcement

V. Discussion of Final Rule and Regulatory

Changes

A. Non-Substantive Corrections

B. Evaluation of Substantive Changes

1. § 299.5 Definitions

2. Subpart B—Signal and Trainset Control

System

3. § 299.345 Visual Inspections; Right-of-

Way

4. § 299.347 Special Inspections

5. § 299.713 Program Approval

Procedures

C. Trainset Image Recording System

D. Decision Under 49 U.S.C. 20306,

Exemption for Technological

Improvements

E. Incorporation by Reference

VI. FRA’s Record of Decision

A. Summary of Alternatives Considered

1. No Build Alternative

2. Build Alternatives

B. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

1. Environmentally Preferable Build

Alternative

2. Environmentally Preferable Houston

Station Option

C. Mitigation Commitments

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771, and

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive

Order 13272; Regulatory Flexibility

Assessment

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

D. Federalism Implications

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

F. National Environmental Policy Act

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental

Justice)

H. Clean Air Act/Air Quality General

Conformity

I. Section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act

J. Department of Transportation Act

Section 4(f) Determination

K. Endangered Species Act/Section 7 U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service Biological

Opinion

L. Executive Order 11990 Preservation of

the Nation’s Wetlands (Executive Order

11990 & DOT Order 5660.1a)

M. Floodplain Management (Executive

Order 11988 & DOT Order 5650.2)

N. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal

Consultation)

O. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

P. Energy Impact

I. Executive Summary

On August 30, 2019, FRA granted

TCRR’s rulemaking petition (petition),

which was submitted April 16, 2016.

1

The petition proposed comprehensive

safety requirements for the application

of JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen

technology, and its associated design

and engineering principals. TCRR’s

petition represented that the regulatory

requirements offered by TCRR translate

the technological and operational

aspects of the JRC Tokaido Shinkansen

system in a manner that can be

regulated under a framework similar to

other US passenger rail operations while

maintaining the integrity of the safety

case developed by JRC over 50 years of

experience operating high-speed trains.

The Tokaido Shinkansen system first

went into service on October 1, 1964,

under the operation of the Japanese

National Railways (JNR). On April 1,

1987, JNR was privatized and split into

six passenger railroads and a freight

railroad. JRC took over operations of the

Tokaido Shinkansen system in Central

Japan, and is still operating the system

today. In over 50 years of Tokaido

Shinkansen system operations, JNR, and

now JRC, have optimized operations to

a very high level of safety and

performance. The Tokaido Shinkansen

system has moved over 6 billion

passengers without a passenger fatality

or injury due to trainset accidents such

as a derailment or collision.

TCRR intends to implement a high-

speed passenger rail system by using the

Tokaido Shinkansen system’s service-

proven technology and by replicating

JRC’s operational and maintenance

practices and procedures. TCRR plans to

implement the latest, service-proven

derivative of the N700 trainset and other

core systems currently in use on the

Tokaido Shinkansen line,

2

which have

been refined for high-speed operations

over the last 50+ years. TCRR plans to

adapt the N700 series trainset and

supporting systems in a manner suitable

for the Texas environment and operate

under a regulatory framework that

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85 FR 14036.

4

85 FR 14449.

5

See https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-

ncov/community/large-events/mass-

gatheringsready-for-covid-19.html.

6

85 FR 17527.

7

85 FR 21159.

8

See Docket FRA–2019–0068, Final

Environmental Impact Statement at ES–5.

9

Comments submitted regarding the Final EIS are

addressed below, under section VII. F. National

Environmental Policy Act.

enables FRA to provide effective safety

oversight.

FRA has evaluated the economic

burden that the final rule would have on

TCRR. Discussion of this can be found

under section VII. A. Executive Orders

12866 and 13771, and DOT Regulatory

Policies and Procedures. FRA

concluded that because this final rule

generally includes only voluntary

actions, or alternative action that would

be voluntary, the final rule does not

impart additional burdens on TCRR.

Further, this document also contains

FRA’s Record of Decision with respect

to the environmental review conducted

pursuant to the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), as discussed in

section VI. FRA’s Record of Decision.

Except for the changes discussed

under sections V. A. Non-substantive

Corrections and V. B. Evaluation of

Substantive Changes, FRA is adopting

the rule text of the NPRM otherwise

unchanged in this final rule.

II. Statutory Authority

Under the Federal railroad safety

laws, FRA has jurisdiction over all

railroads, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 20102,

except urban rapid transit operations

that are not connected to the general

railroad system of transportation

(general system). Moreover, FRA

considers a standalone intercity railroad

line to be part of the general system,

even if it is not physically connected to

other railroads (as FRA has previously

stated with respect to the Alaska

Railroad; 49 CFR part 209, appendix A).

FRA considers the contemplated TCRR

system as intercity passenger rail, not

urban rapid transit. Accordingly, the

TCRR system will be subject to FRA

jurisdiction, whether it connects to the

general system or not. Please see FRA’s

policy statement, contained at 49 CFR

part 209, appendix A, discussing in

greater detail FRA’s jurisdiction over

passenger railroads, which includes

discussion on how FRA characterizes

passenger operations.

FRA has a regulatory program in

place, pursuant to its statutory

authority, to address equipment, track,

operating practices, and human factors

in the existing, conventional railroad

environment. However, significant

operational and equipment differences

exist between TCRR’s system and

existing passenger operations in the

United States. In many of the railroad

safety disciplines, FRA’s existing

regulations do not address the safety

concerns and operational peculiarities

of the TCRR system. Therefore, to allow

TCRR to operate as envisioned, an

alternative regulatory approach is

required to provide safety oversight.

III. Proceedings to Date

On March 10, 2020, FRA published a

notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

3

The NPRM proposed safety

standards to enable safe operations and

an alternate method for Federal safety

oversight. The NPRM also opened the

public comment period, which was

initially scheduled to close on May 11,

2020.

On March 12, 2020, FRA announced

that it was holding three public hearings

on the NPRM, and was conducting

proceedings under 49 U.S.C. 20306.

4

Those hearings were to be held in

Dallas, Navasota, and Houston, Texas,

between March 31 and April 2, 2020.

However, in light of the President’s

March 13, 2020, national emergency

declaration, Proclamation on Declaring

a National Emergency Concerning the

Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19)

public health emergency, and the

Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention (CDC) guidance to cancel

mass gatherings of people,

5

FRA

postponed the three public hearings on

March 30, 2020.

6

On April 16, 2020, FRA announced,

consistent with CDC guidance advising

against in-person gatherings, that it

decided to convene the three public

hearings, and to conduct proceedings

under 49 U.S.C. 20306, telephonically

between May 4th through 6th, 2020.

7

The choice to conduct these hearings

telephonically represented merely a

change in the manner of public

engagement. Also, in the same

announcement, FRA extended the

comment period to May 26, 2020, so

that members of the public would have

adequate time to review and provide

written comments on the transcripts of

the three public hearings conducted.

Further, FRA addressed the numerous

requests it received to not hold ‘‘virtual

hearings,’’ due to concerns over the lack

of reliable high-speed internet access,

and/or to postpone hearings until they

can be safely held in-person.

In response to public comments, FRA

explained that it decided to hold

telephonic hearings, capable of

accommodating the same number of

participants as previously scheduled in-

person hearings, as it was consistent

with ensuring public health and that no

technology beyond a telephone was

necessary for participation. Moreover,

FRA explained that there was no need

to further postpone the public hearings

or further extend the comment period

given the extensive public outreach

already conducted related to this

proposed rule, and the supplementary

nature of the public hearings as related

to the opportunity to provide detailed

written comments on the proposed rule.

FRA conducted the three telephonic

public hearings, and proceedings under

49 U.S.C. 20306, as scheduled and the

comment period closed on May 26,

2020. FRA is aware of concerns that the

publication of the final environmental

impact statement (EIS) effectively cut off

the comment period for the NPRM on

May 15, 2020. Those concerns are

unfounded. The Final EIS stated that—

As of the execution of this Final EIS on

May 15, 2020, oral comments made during

the public hearings and written comments

submitted to the Docket have raised no new

substantive issues relevant to environmental

concerns from those received during the

public comment period of the Draft EIS

(discussed in Section 9.6.2, Public and

Agency Involvement, Draft EIS Comment

Period, and Appendix H, Response to Draft

EIS Comments) or on topics not already

covered within this Final EIS. FRA will

continue to evaluate comments received

during the comment period for the Proposed

Rulemaking. FRA will address comments on

technical safety requirements proposed in the

NPRM in the Final Rule, which will be

published in the Federal Register.

8

It is clear from the text of the Final

EIS that FRA did not close the

rulemaking comment period on May 15,

2020. Rather, FRA informed the public

that FRA was not able to consider in the

Final EIS comments submitted on the

NPRM that were received by FRA after

May 15, 2020. This was necessary to

allow for printing and distribution of

the Final EIS. However, the text of the

Final EIS clarified that FRA continued

to consider comments submitted during

the rulemaking comment period.

IV. Discussion of Comments Received

on the NPRM

9

During the 77-day comment period,

FRA received 287 written submissions

providing comments on the NPRM and

had fifty-two individuals provide

testimony during the three days of

public hearings. As discussed below,

not all comments necessitated a

response in this final rule, but all

comments were carefully and

thoroughly considered.

Although FRA’s responses to

comments, discussed below, generally

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FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement.

11

85 FR 14036, 14038.

12

79 FR 36123.

13

82 FR 60723 and FRA. Dallas to Houston High-

Speed Rail—Passenger Service from Houston to

Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-

reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Draft

Environmental Impact Statement.

14

While this statement was accurate at the time

of publication of the Draft EIS in December 2017,

it was incomplete. The Final EIS clarified that it

was not just the proposed speed of the TCRR’s

passenger operations that require FRA regulatory

action. As described in the Final EIS, FRA’s existing

regulations do not adequately address the safety

concerns and operational characteristics of TCRR’s

proposed HSR system. FRA. Dallas to Houston

High-Speed Rail—Passenger Service from Houston

to Dallas https://railroads.dot.gov/environmental-

reviews/dallas-houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail-passenger, Final

Environmental Impact Statement, Chapter 1.0,

Introduction. Subsequent to the publication of the

Draft EIS, in November 2018, FRA published a final

rule establishing safety standards for passenger

operations up to 220 miles per hour.

15

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement, Abstract.

16

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Mitigation Commitments.

17

Surface Transportation Board Decision, Texas

Central Railroad and Infrastructure, Inc. & Texas

Central Railroad, LLC-Petition for Exemption-

Passenger Rail Line Between Dallas and Houston,

Tex., July 16, 2020, Docket No. FD 36025. STB also

found that TCRR must file an application under 49

U.S.C. 10901 and 49 CFR part 1150 to seek STB

authority to construct and operate its proposed

system.

address issues raised in comments

critical of the rulemaking or TCRR, or

both, FRA also received comments

supportive of the rulemaking or TCRR,

or both. Commenters providing support

ranged from members of the public, to

various railroad or railroad-related

associations, to State and Federal

elected officials. As these supportive

commenters did not raise any

substantive issues regarding the

technical safety requirements proposed

in the NPRM, FRA has not provided a

response to those comments in this final

rule.

FRA also received comments

requesting that FRA either extend the

comment period or otherwise postpone

the issuance of this final rule, or

objecting to the telephonic hearing

format or the notice provided for the

public hearings. These comments are

addressed above, in section III.

Proceedings to Date.

FRA did not provide responses in this

final rule to comments that were

considered either outside the scope of

the rulemaking, or that raised issues that

were previously raised to FRA as part of

the environmental review process,

which FRA addressed and responded to

in the Final EIS released on May 29,

2020, available for review on FRA’s

website for the environmental review of

the proposed Dallas to Houston High-

Speed Rail.

10

FRA’s responses below address the

remaining comments received. These

comments were either critical of the

rulemaking or raised issues

necessitating further explanation or

clarification. As multiple commenters

raised similar issues, FRA organized its

responses so that like-issues are grouped

together.

A. Context and Overview

FRA received comments regarding the

timing of the rulemaking in relation to

the timing of the EIS. Commenters

expressed confusion over how the

rulemaking and NEPA processes, and

the final rule and the EIS relate to each

other. Commenters were concerned

about FRA granting a ‘‘safety permit’’

without conducting surveys of the entire

right-of-way (ROW), or other types of

analyses (such as a hazard analysis). In

addition, commenters raised concerns

about the timing of coordination with

other Federal agencies that may need to

occur before or during construction.

As discussed in the NPRM, TCRR

approached FRA in March of 2014,

seeking assistance in understanding

how FRA would or could apply its

regulations to a high-speed passenger

railroad system that replicated the

Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system, as

operated by JRC.

11

On June 25, 2014,

FRA published a Notice of Intent to

prepare an Environmental Impact

Statement in the Federal Register.

12

On

December 22, 2017, FRA published its

Draft EIS and opened its comment

period.

13

FRA stated in the Draft EIS

that FRA’s regulations at the time did

not address safety requirements

comprehensively for passenger train

operations above 150 mph, such as

TCRR’s contemplated operation. As

such, FRA would need to take some

form of regulatory action to ensure the

contemplated system would be operated

safely, such as issuing an RPA,

imposing requirements or conditions by

order(s) or waiver(s), or taking some

other form of regulatory action.

14

This

regulatory action constitutes a Major

Federal Action requiring review under

NEPA.

15

The purpose of the NEPA process is

to inform the decisionmaker and the

public of the potential environmental

impacts that may result from the

proposed action. As such, the EIS must

be finalized before the agency takes the

action that is the subject of the

environmental review. The Final EIS

itself, while a meaningful milestone in

the NEPA process, does not permit

construction or operations. Rather, the

EIS enables FRA to reach a decision that

is informed by an understanding of the

potential environmental impacts of this

rulemaking.

The analysis of potential

environmental impacts in the EIS is

based on TCRR’s conceptual

engineering design, which is contained

in conceptual engineering reports

prepared by TCRR and appended to the

Draft and Final EIS. While the

conceptual engineering design has been

appropriately used to inform the NEPA

process, TCRR must complete more

thorough engineering and design work

to facilitate construction. TCRR will

need to consider the agreed upon

mitigation and compliance measures

16

and the requirements of this rule as it

advances the engineering design. In

addition, TCRR must follow all

applicable Federal, State, and local

requirements, which are separate from

FRA’s jurisdiction. This includes the

Surface Transportation Board (STB),

which issued a decision on July 16,

2020, finding that the operation

proposed by TCRR is subject to STB

jurisdiction.

17

FRA does not grant any kind of

construction approval or permit. Neither

does this final rule, by itself, grant any

permission or authority for TCRR to

operate. Furthermore, this rulemaking

does not relieve TCRR of its

responsibilities to design, construct and

operate a safe railroad. It merely

provides alternatives to certain

requirements and safety standards,

which are more appropriate for the

technology and system proposed by

TCRR. TCRR must design, operate and

maintain its system in compliance with

this regulation.

What this final rule does is establish

the minimum Federal safety

requirements with which TCRR must

comply. The publication of this final

rule is the beginning for TCRR, not the

end, of its continuous obligation to

demonstrate compliance with the

regulation. FRA will continue to

provide safety oversight throughout

TCRR’s development and testing phases,

in addition to during revenue

operations. In this manner, the

expectations for compliance are no

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See the discussion of System Qualification in

the NPRM at 85 FR 14036, 14044.

19

See the discussion of crashworthiness and

occupant protection under Trainset Structure of the

NPRM at 85 FR 14036, 14039, and under section

IV. F. Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection of

this final rule.

20

Please also see the discussion of Automatic

Train Control System in the NPRM. 85 FR 14036,

14041.

21

Please also see section IV. C. 8. Personnel

Qualification in the NPRM at 85 FR 14036, 14045,

and section IV. G. Reissuance of NPRM of this final

rule.

22

83 FR 59182, 59186.

23

85 FR 14036, 14037; 83 FR 59182.

24

83 FR 59182, 59186.

25

Note, FRA typically tries to craft regulations so

that they are technology-neutral and performance-

based. Because TCRR’s safety case is derived from

the use of JRC’s technology, and operational and

maintenance practices, this regulation was written

specifically for that technology to maintain the

integrity of the baseline safety case.

different for TCRR than any other

railroad under FRA jurisdiction.

Prior to commencing actual revenue

operations, TCRR will need to

demonstrate that all the safety critical

components system work together as a

single, integrated system, pursuant to

subpart F of this rule.

18

This involves a

number of points of compliance that

TCRR will work through over the

coming years.

To underscore this point, there are

several significant requirements that

TCRR must meet. For example, TCRR

must demonstrate that the trainset meets

the requisite crashworthiness and

occupant protection requirements as

established under subpart D.

19

Also,

TCRR must have its positive train

control (PTC) system certified in

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20157 and

subpart B of this final rule.

20

Further,

TCRR must train and qualify its

employees performing safety sensitive

functions before those employees

engage in their respective work (i.e.,

drivers will need to be certified under

49 CFR part 240, maintenance

employees will need to be qualified in

accordance with TCRR’s training

program established under 49 CFR part

243, etc.).

21

Moreover, not only initially,

but continuously thereafter, TCRR must

demonstrate that its track meets the

track safety standards outlined in

subpart C. In addition, not only must

TCRR comply with the technical safety

requirements established in this final

rule, it also must comply with the other

regulations identified under § 299.3(c),

such as part 214, Railroad Workplace

Safety; part 219, Control of Alcohol and

Drug Use; part 228, Hours of Service of

Railroad Employees; and part 270,

System Safety Program.

FRA notes that there were questions

and concerns raised with respect to the

lack of interoperability of the system.

However, lack of interoperability is not,

per se, a bar to operation in the U.S. It

is true that FRA stated in 2016 that it

did not envision a network of

standalone, non-interoperable HSR

systems comprising the nationwide

network, but this perspective was built

largely on historical precedence and

should not be interpreted as a

prohibition in any way. And in 2018,

FRA stated that standalone systems

should continue to be regulated

comprehensively (such as through a rule

of particular applicability or other

specific regulatory action(s)), and on a

case-by-case basis, as it is prudent due

to the small number of potential

operations and the potential for

significant differences in their design.

22

Since then, FRA has not seen a

proliferation of non-interoperable

systems in the U.S. In fact, FRA has

seen more potential conventional (steel-

wheel-on-steel-rail) operations avail

themselves of the Tier III requirements

rather than pursuing the more arduous

and costly route of being a standalone

system. For example, Amtrak’s next-

generation Acela is in the process of

demonstrating that its new trainsets

comply with the Tier III requirements.

XpressWest, is attempting to conduct

Tier III operations between Victorville,

CA and Las Vegas, NV (the XpressWest

bullet train). And while FRA generally

considers matters in the context of the

established interoperable general

railroad system, FRA’s mission is to

enable safe, reliable, and efficient

movement of people and goods by rail,

regardless of the technology used.

B. Regulatory Approach

Several commenters asked why FRA

elected to pursue a rule of particular

applicability for TCRR. Initially, FRA

notes that taking action to provide a

regulatory framework to govern the

operation of the system proposed by

TCRR is consistent with FRA’s mission

is to enable safe, reliable, and efficient

movement of people and goods by rail.

Further, as FRA stated when granting

the petition to undertake the

rulemaking, TCRR’s petition

demonstrated that TCRR’s system would

replicate the system and operations of

the Tokaido Shinkansen, as operated by

JRC, allowing TCRR to take advantage of

that system’s exemplary 50-year safety

record. (Docket FRA–2019–0068, FRA

Letter Granting Petition).

As discussed under section III.

Regulatory Approach of the NPRM, FRA

explained that it was taking this

approach as it was consistent with its

statement in the Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards final rule, published

November 21, 2018.

23

FRA considers

TCRR a standalone system, as its tracks

are not physically connected to the rest

of the general system, and would be

prohibited from doing so by this

regulation. FRA stated in 2018 that a

standalone system’s regulation would

have to bring together all aspects of

railroad safety (such as operating

practices, signal and trainset control,

and track) that must be applied to the

individual system.

24

Such an approach

covers more than passenger equipment,

and would likely necessitate particular

ROW intrusion protection and other

safety requirements not typically

addressed in FRA’s more general

regulations. With this regulation, FRA

continues to believe that addressing

proposals for standalone HSR systems

in this manner is prudent. Entities

considering standalone operations

voluntarily assume the higher costs of

building new and dedicated

infrastructure, knowing they cannot take

advantage of the cost savings from

sharing existing infrastructure.

Alternatively, FRA could have issued

a comprehensive set of waivers from

FRA’s existing regulations, to the extent

permitted by law, under 49 U.S.C.

20103(b), in order to provide regulatory

approval to the operation. However, in

this case, electing to develop and

publish a comprehensive regulation is

more efficient. Such a regulation, in

addition to providing regulatory

approval, institutes a comprehensive

regulatory framework, that provides

TCRR clarity on the minimum Federal

safety standards that it must comply

with through technology-specific,

25

performance-based requirements. In

addition, it provides the railroad a

higher degree of regulatory certainty

than waivers, as waivers are revocable,

subject to changing conditions, and

necessitate renewal, generally every five

years. Further, by issuing an RPA, FRA

is able to protect the integrity of the

system, by establishing regulatory

requirements codifying the service-

proven technological, operational, and

maintenance aspects of the Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system operated by

JRC.

C. General Safety Oversight

FRA received a number of comments,

both written oral, concerning a lack of

adequate safety oversight for TCRR. The

commenters expressed general concerns

regarding the safe construction of the

system, and more specific concerns with

construction of the system where it

intersects various pipelines. In addition,

commenters expressed concerns that no

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49 CFR part 209, Appendix A.

27

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement.

one agency would be responsible for the

overall safety of the system and for the

perceived lack of coordination between

three specific Federal agencies: FRA, the

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety

Administration (PHMSA), and the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

(FERC). As these comments are closely

related, FRA will address them together.

DOT does not have plenary authority

to regulate every aspect of

transportation and is limited to the

authority granted to it by Congress.

Accordingly, the same is true for each

of DOT’s operating administrations—the

regulatory authority for each one is

limited at the Federal level by the scope

of authority granted by Congress.

As discussed above in section II.

Statutory Authority, FRA’s authority to

regulate the railroad industry is

established in 49 U.S.C. ch. 201. FRA

has jurisdiction over all railroads, as

defined in 49 U.S.C. 20102, except

urban rapid transit operations that are

not connected to the general railroad

system of transportation. Notably, FRA

has broad authority to regulate every

area of railroad safety. 49 U.S.C. 20103.

But, there must be a nexus to railroad

safety for FRA to regulate. However,

FRA does not exercise jurisdiction

under all of its regulations to the full

extent permitted by statute. Based on its

knowledge of where the safety problems

were occurring at the time of its

regulatory action, and its assessment of

the practical limitations on its role, FRA

decided to regulate something less than

the total universe of railroads.

26

While FRA’s jurisdiction is broad, it

is not unlimited, and there are some

areas where FRA defers to another

entity. In practice, FRA exercises its

authority through regulations on matters

where safety is most effectively

addressed at the Federal level, and is

necessary to ensure unimpeded

interstate commerce, or explicitly

required by statute. Some elements of

safety are more effectively addressed by

other levels of government (i.e., State or

local), or by industry itself through the

development and maintenance of

industry standards and recommended

practices. For example, the civil

construction of a railroad and its

structures are more effectively

addressed by State and local

requirements that take into account the

geotechnical, seismic, and hydrological

conditions associated with a local

environment. While FRA could assert

its safety authority over the design and

construction of a railroad bridge, for

example, these specific requirements are

more effectively addressed and

monitored at the State and local level.

Similarly, in railroad repair shop

environments, where railroads perform

maintenance on their equipment, the

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration provides Federal safety

oversight of the work conditions within

the shop environment, even though it is

a railroad facility and railroad

employees are involved.

With that said, FRA clarifies that

there is no one agency that is

responsible for every aspect of safety as

it relates to TCRR. To ensure proper

safety of the system, each Federal, State,

and local authority must perform its

part. FRA will certainly oversee railroad

safety where conditions might impact

the safe operation of the system, but

other agencies will also play a role.

Where there are intersections among

agencies, appropriate coordination must

occur to ensure that the proper agency

or entity is enforcing the correct

requirements (whether Federal, State, or

local), at the appropriate time. In the

same spirit, where non-governmental

organizations have a potential nexus of

safety considerations (e.g., TCRR

operations adjacent to Union Pacific

Railroad (UPRR) operations), it is

expected that those organizations

coordinate appropriately with each

other in good faith.

In turning to the specific issues raised

about safety oversight of the

construction of the system, and the

safety of the TCRR system in relation to

pipelines in the vicinity, FRA clarifies

that where a condition impacts the safe

operation of the railroad, FRA could

intervene to ensure the condition is

properly remediated. Although FRA has

not exercised its jurisdiction in this area

(civil construction), FRA would not be

precluded from doing so, should the

need arise, to ensure railroad safety. The

particular facts of a situation would

dictate the appropriate authority to

handle the issue.

Generally, TCRR is obligated to

comply with PHMSA’s safety

requirements, including those related to

pipeline damage, electrical emissions,

and cathodic protection, where there are

pipeline crossings. FERC has no

jurisdiction or decision-making

authority over the construction or

operation of TCRR’s system. FERC-

regulated pipelines occur in the vicinity

of the alignment, and relocation and/or

maintenance activities of these utilities

during the construction of the system

may require FERC involvement by the

applicable utility providers. PHMSA

and FERC requirements are discussed in

more detail in Section 3.9.2, Utilities

and Energy, Regulatory Context of the

Final EIS.

27

All natural gas utility providers,

including Atmos Energy, are required to

operate in accordance with operational

safety regulations, including regulations

promulgated by PHMSA, and would

have to consider how external factors

might impact their operational safety as

the parties communicate and coordinate

during planning and development. Id.

It is not necessary for FRA to

coordinate with PHMSA or FERC in

order to develop the minimum Federal

railroad safety requirements contained

in this final rule. As discussed above,

FERC has no involvement during the

development of minimum Federal safety

standards for the operation of the TCRR

system. As TCRR advances from the

conceptual engineering that was the

basis for the environmental analysis in

the Final EIS to design engineering,

more detailed information will become

available about pipelines that may need

to be relocated, which would be subject

to FERC jurisdiction. In addition, TCRR

is already required to comply with

PHMSA requirements regarding

pipeline safety applicable to utility

crossings, relocations, and/or

maintenance activities involving natural

gas or hazardous liquid transportation

pipelines impacted by TCRR’s system.

FRA is unaware of any need to amend

PHMSA’s requirements in light of the

contemplated TCRR system.

Although no coordination was

necessary, FRA has nonetheless

coordinated with both FERC and

PHMSA after receiving the public

comments regarding pipeline safety and

in response to the expressed lack of

coordination. Both the EIS and the

development of the safety standards in

this final rule represent only the

beginning of coordination on these

issues common to any linear

construction project, and FRA would

expect TCRR to continue and, as

necessary expand, this coordination and

engagement as TCRR moves forward.

D. Interference With the Union Pacific

Railroad

A number of comments received were

focused on the potential impacts to

conventional track circuits and

signaling technology caused by TCRR’s

electrified railroad. UPRR submitted

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See Section 3.15, Electromagnetic Fields of the

Final EIS for a discussion of the potential impacts

associated with the generation of electromagnetic

fields.

29

A tractive power system is a system that

provides a means to produce tractive effort to a

trainset or motive power unit, i.e., the propulsion

system. Most traction power systems utilize the

transmission of direct current (DC) or alternating

current (AC) electricity by means of an overhead

wire or powered third rail to convert electrical

energy to tractive effort (the force that accelerates

a vehicle along a track).

comments expressing these concerns to

both the Draft EIS and the NPRM.

28

FRA notes that the matter of potential

interference to conventional track

circuits and signaling technology,

whether from traction power systems,

29

or other known sources, is a matter that

is not unique to the contemplated TCRR

operation. The effects and potential

interference that can be caused by rail

vehicle traction power systems are well-

established, and require design-specific

and local environmental information to

assess. To date, FRA has not

promulgated specific regulations

addressing the use of traction power

systems on railroads holistically, as the

matter has been effectively handled by

industry standards, local or utility

requirements (if applicable), and

contractual responsibilities. In this final

rule FRA does not deviate from this

practice and therefore is not regulating

TCRR’s traction power system.

Electrified railroads and transit

systems operate over and adjacent to rail

lines using conventional track circuitry

and signaling technology throughout the

U.S., including FRA-regulated

operations on the Northeast Corridor,

and in Pennsylvania, Chicago, northern

Indiana, Denver, and San Francisco

(specifically the electrification of

Caltrain’s commuter rail service,

currently in progress). Furthermore,

numerous light-rail and transit

operations utilize traction power

systems that operate adjacent to, or in

some cases directly on, FRA-regulated

properties utilizing conventional

signaling technology (e.g., Utah Transit

Authority’s mid-Jordan extension). FRA

points to numerous examples that UPRR

itself, operates over or adjacent to

25kVA electrified track, including most

notably Denver’s A-line, which operates

on electrified track directly adjacent to

UPRR utilizing the same PTC

technology.

Several commenters, including UPRR,

provided broad language concerning the

need to address potential

electromagnetic interference (EMI), but

provided no specific justification as to

why current industry practice, or the

requirements proposed within the

NPRM were insufficient. FRA believes

the high-level language used by the

commenters to describe the hazard,

unaccompanied by any supporting

technical data, underscores a lack of

understanding of the subject matter.

Although commenters did not specify

the mechanism by which traction power

systems may introduce risk, they may be

concerned with the potential for

voltages to be induced into parallel

conductors (i.e., UPRR’s track) which, in

turn, could interfere with rudimentary

circuit designs and technology being

employed by UPRR for track circuit

occupancy and grade crossing activation

circuits. Commenter references to

interference with UPRR’s PTC system

may likewise relate to the potential for

induced voltage that could lead to a

track circuit appearing to be unoccupied

even though a train may actually be

shunting the circuit. This typically

occurs with more primitive DC and AC

technologies, if not designed to account

for such conditions, as those types of

primitive technologies cannot decipher

the induced voltage from the circuit’s

own power source. FRA notes that

while this is certainly a hazard that

must be addressed, such site-specific

issues can only be addressed as TCRR

proceeds from conceptual to detailed

design phases. It is FRA’s expectation

that TCRR and any affected stakeholders

will collaboratively address any

potential impacts in the same manner as

all other projects have, to date.

Although FRA believes the matter is

sufficiently addressed under its current

regulatory framework, this final rule

addresses traction power system EMI

and electromagnetic compatibility

(EMC) as it relates to safety critical

equipment and systems employed by

TCRR. See § 299.435(e). This

requirement is an adaptation of the

electrical systems requirements for Tier

II trainsets in 49 CFR 238.425. TCRR

proposed applying these requirements

to be consistent with deliberations by

the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

on a recommended expansion of FRA’s

Tier III requirements in a future

rulemaking. UPRR commented on this

requirement contained in the NPRM,

but did not understand the requirement,

its context, or origins. The requirement

under § 299.435(e) is not intended to

provide a means for UPRR to negate its

responsibilities to ensure that its own

systems are designed to protect against

undesired inputs and potential

interference, as UPRR’s suggested

modifications and commentary

recommend, but rather to illustrate the

due diligence performed through the

development of the rulemaking. Both

FRA and TCRR recognized the

importance of EMI/EMC for electrified

high-speed railroads, and the inclusion

of this requirement will ensure TCRR is

responsive to the issue.

UPRR also raised concern over

sightlines being reduced at a particular

highway-rail grade crossing on UPRR’s

system due to the possible future

placement of a TCRR viaduct support

column. UPRR’s concern is based on the

conceptual engineering provided as part

of the environmental review process.

Similar to the above discussion on

possible EMI with UPRR’s signal

system, FRA would expect that the two

railroads work together, and with the

owner of the roadway, to identify and

mitigate any hazards associated with

reduced sightlines at any impacted

highway-rail grade crossing, once final

designs are developed. In addition, FRA

expects that any localized risk presented

regarding these issues would be

identified in TCRR’s risk-based hazard

analysis program under part 270 and

mitigated appropriately.

E. Track Safety

Several commenters raised concerns

with the potential for buckling of the

track structure due to high ambient

temperatures in Texas during the

summer. These general concerns were

supplemented by comments that soil

conditions and curvature in the

alignment could exacerbate this

potential. Many cited challenges UPRR

has faced in this regard to support their

concerns. A certain set of commenters

further argued that an expert report had

identified ‘‘sharp curves’’ in the

alignment as a potential risk when

compared to tangent track; while it is

factually correct that the probability of

rail buckling is higher for a curve

compared to tangent track, the

commenters seem to have

mischaracterized this relationship in

this particular instance to support their

point. In either case, this regulation

addresses this risk in a manner that is

consistent with how this risk is

managed for all railroads under FRA’s

jurisdiction, and when combined with

JRC’s adopted practice, provides a level

of engineering and internal rail stress

management that is superior to most, if

not all, North American practice.

The continuous welded rail (CWR)

program, as proposed in the NPRM, is

a translation and an adaptation of JRC’s

designs, standards, and procedures. Like

the track and CWR requirements

applicable to railroads on the general

system under 49 CFR part 213, the track

and CWR requirements in this rule are

independent of the specific

environmental conditions over which

they are applied. The governing site-

specific geotechnical, drainage, and

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See http://www.rlbadc.com.

31

85 FR 14036, 14039.

weather conditions will drive the

detailed design of the track and its

support structure in order to achieve

and maintain compliance with the

regulatory requirements. (Please see the

discussion under section IV. A. Context

and Overview of this final rule.) These

safety requirements set the standards

that must be maintained by the track

and track structure design. In addition,

these safety requirements set the

operational limitations associated with

various track conditions. In effect, these

represent variables that the railroad

must consider when determining its

final designs. If it is not possible to

attain the required alignment geometry

or maintain a specific track class due to

site specific conditions, then the design

operating speed must reflect what is

safely achievable. Concurrently, safe

operational limits will also be validated

by comprehensive dynamic tests of the

actual revenue trainsets over the entire

line, as required under Subpart F. While

the variables at play in this rule are

specific to TCRR (based on JRC’s

designs), the fundamental railroad

engineering principles and design

process is not. To be clear, the

conceptual engineering report included

as part of the Final EIS does not

represent the final design of TCRR’s

alignment and track structure. This

regulation will help TCRR establish a

safe, detailed design.

The track safety standards under

Subpart C of the final rule translate the

track safety standards as implemented

on JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen HSR

system for TCRR’s HSR system. As

discussed in the NPRM, the Tokaido

Shinkansen’s technical safety

requirements were developed over

many years, and have been highly

optimized in conjunction with the rest

of the system (i.e., signal and train

control, and rolling stock), since service

began over 50 years ago. The primary

reason for adopting the Tokaido

Shinkansen’s technical safety

requirements for TCRR is to ensure the

safety of the TCRR operation by

protecting the integrity of the system as

established by JRC. These requirements

are, in many cases, more stringent than

requirements under 49 CFR part 213

that were developed for operation of a

broad range of equipment (freight and

passenger) over the general network.

Furthermore, the approach JRC takes

to manage internal rail stress in the

Tokaido Shinkansen system is very

different than standard North American

practice. The final rule requires TCRR to

comply with the JRC approach, to

ensure that the integrity of the safety

case behind the Tokaido Shinkansen

can be maintained. In addition to the

comprehensive use of well-designed

expansion joints and other engineering

means intended to manage internal rail

stress caused by thermal (and other)

loads, the regulation requires

procedures, operational restrictions, or

both, for high temperature scenarios that

are more advanced and conservative

than those employed by North

American railroads. For example, these

procedures require TCRR to monitor rail

temperature continuously, which is far

more stringent than the ‘‘average’’

temperature approach often used by

most railroads. Likewise, a system of

reference markers is required to be used

on the field side of all track to help

proactively identify any track shift that

might occur. The ties and fastener

system, and the ballast, are specifically

engineered for the tonnage and speed of

the equipment operating over it to

provide maximum resistance to track

buckling. This is superior to the practice

of most U.S. railroads, which have to

design to a general standard since a

variety of equipment traverses their

track. The comprehensive monitoring of

track conditions through temperature,

geometry and ride quality readings, in

addition to traditional visual

inspections, enables the railroad to

analyze the conditions of the rail in a

manner that is far superior to using only

visual observation as suggested by

commenters.

A number of comments also focused

on the effects that heat can have on

CWR, and the fact that alignment

curvature can increase horizontal rail

forces which could, in-turn, lead to

buckling if the track is not sufficiently

restrained and internal rail stress is not

managed effectively. Many comments

focus on concerns associated with a

specific curve referred to as the

‘‘Hockley curve.’’ These comments

primarily stem from Delta Troy

Interests, LTD. (Delta Troy), and its

commissioned study conducted by the

Virginia consulting firm R.L. Banks &

Associates, Inc.

30

(RLBA). These

comments and the RLBA study attempt

to connect an increased probability for

buckling to occur in non-tangent

(curved) track, and particularly with the

Hockley curve, with the fact that non-

tangent rail can experience higher

lateral rail forces due to thermal

expansion. This specific portion of the

proposed alignment does not represent

a geometrically challenging portion, but

Delta Troy indicated that its concern for

this portion of proposed alignment is

underscored by the fact that it traverses

a site of a planned real estate

development by the company.

The commissioned RLBA study

loosely connects the concern of track

buckling with the fact that this

particular curve includes a radius that

could be near the allowable limit for

maximum speed operation. Delta Troy,

RLBA, and other commenters, insinuate

that a different alignment would enable

TCRR to avoid ‘‘numerous sharp

curves.’’ Whether intentional or not, the

comments and RLBA analysis ignore the

fact that the Hockley curve (and other

similar curves designed to allow for

maximum design speed of a high-speed

train), by nature, utilize a curve radius

that is not fairly compared to the high-

degree curvature that can pose a risk for

track buckling, particularly when

compared to freight railroads that utilize

a more economical focused approach to

CWR management. To insinuate that the

curves are ‘‘sharp,’’ and thus

intrinsically unsafe as proposed, is

simply not true.

The RLBA study attempts to describe

the effects of curvature on the potential

for track buckling. However, this is an

issue that is not unique to TCRR, and

there are various means by which track

can be designed to address and mitigate

these concerns safely. Further, while the

RLBA study recognized that the NPRM

contained a requirement for the railroad

to develop a CWR plan to address

internal rail stress related to CWR, the

study incorrectly asserts that FRA

should dictate specific alignment

geometry as a matter of safety. This is

not appropriate or necessary, as the

safety concern is addressed by the track

safety standards and CWR requirements,

as described above. Moreover, this final

rule addresses these issues in the same

manner as all other U.S. railroad

operations subject to FRA’s jurisdiction.

F. Crashworthiness and Occupant

Protection

Some commenters raised concerns

regarding the crashworthiness

requirements proposed in the NPRM.

An examination of these comments,

however, suggests that they stem from

an incomplete reading of the NRPM.

FRA proposed to retain the

crashworthiness and occupant

requirements established by JRC

intended to address potential residual

risks to the operation and to ensure the

trainset can handle the expected

operational loads experienced in the

intended service environment.

31

While

these requirements are not directly

comparable to standard U.S. practice, as

the NPRM explains, the service

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This reference to ‘‘operating environment’’ or

‘‘environment in which the equipment will

operate’’ or other similar references, means, in this

discussion, the fully dedicated, fully grade-

separated ROW that is not comingled with any

other type of equipment (freight or passenger).

33

Docket No. FRA–2019–0068, Document ID:

FRA–2019–0068–0316.

34

Id.

35

Docket No. FRA–2019–0068, Document ID:

FRA–2019–0068–0315.

36

See section IV. D. Interference with the Union

Pacific Railroad of this final rule.

37

See sections IV. J. Emergency Response and V.

D. Decision under 49 U.S.C. 20306, Exemption for

technological improvements of this final rule.

38

See section IV. D. Interference with the Union

Pacific Railroad of this final rule.

39

See section IV. D. Interference with the Union

Pacific Railroad of this final rule.

40

See section IV. E. Track Safety of this final rule.

41

See section IV. J. Emergency Response of this

final rule.

42

See also section IV. M. Regulatory Evaluation

of this final rule.

43

84 FR 14036.

environment of TCRR’s contemplated

system is vastly different and presents

significantly less risk than conventional

North American railroad rights-of-way.

Id. To adhere to requirements based on

hazards that have otherwise been

heavily mitigated or eliminated would

require significant modification to the

existing service-proven trainset design

by changing the weight and dynamic

characteristics, making it effectively a

new trainset design, which would

negate the service-proven nature of the

system.

Some commenters asserted that FRA

is exempting TCRR from any

crashworthiness requirements so that

the N700 series trainset technology

could be imported. This assertion,

however, is not supported by the

requirements proposed in the NPRM, as

FRA makes clear that its approach is to

ensure that the trainset is safe for the

environment in which it will operate.

To this end, FRA is including additional

requirements that are not inherent in the

JRC approach to trainset structure

design. These requirements include a

dynamic collision scenario analysis that

is designed to address the residual risks

that could potentially exist within the

TCRR operating environment.

32

Of

particular note, in this instance, is the

inclusion of the steel coil collision

scenario outlined in § 299.403(c).

Despite the safety record of JRC’s

Tokaido Shinkansen system, FRA

believes that the North American

environment poses unique risks with

respect to potential objects that might

somehow enter the protected ROW,

either by accident or on purpose. In this

case, FRA believes that requiring

dynamic collision scenario analysis

using the 14,000-lbs steel coil scenario

derived from existing requirements to

protect against risks presented by grade

crossings can serve as a conservative

surrogate for potential hazards that

might be present on the TCRR ROW

(e.g., feral hogs, stray livestock,

unauthorized disposal of refuse). With

the inclusion of this dynamic collision

scenario, and adaptations of existing

U.S. requirements on emergency

systems and fire safety, FRA believes it

has reasonably addressed risks unique

to the TCRR operating environment in a

manner that appropriately considers

crashworthiness and occupant

protection standards for the operating

environment intended, while at the

same time keeping intact the service-

proven nature of the equipment.

G. Reissuance of NPRM

UPRR commented

33

that FRA needs

to re-notice the proposed rule so that it:

(1) Adequately considers the safety

impact on already existing railroads that

will intersect and/or run adjacent to the

proposed system; (2) specifically

evaluates whether modification of each

safety-critical aspect of the Japanese

Shinkansen system is needed in order to

transplant and implement them in the

United States; and (3) provides

sufficient detail to enable the public to

understand the safety standards,

operational requirements, or regulatory

framework applicable to TCRR fully.

UPRR’s comments express concern that

the NPRM ‘‘lacks any analysis of the

potential disruption to other railroad

operations and infrastructure and the

consequential safety and economic

impacts to communities and the

region,’’ and the NPRM ‘‘focuses solely

on the safety of [TCRR’s] operations and

neglects to consider the potential impact

on safety of current rail operations;

operations that are fully compliant with

existing FRA regulations.’’

34

FRA received a similar comment from

Delta Troy.

35

Delta Troy identified six

‘‘deficiencies’’ that ‘‘plague the safety

analysis’’ in the NPRM, and elaborated

that any attempt to fix the deficiencies

in a final rule would be so extensive

that the final would look nothing like

the NPRM and therefore would not be

a ‘‘logical outgrowth’’ of the NPRM, thus

necessitating FRA to re-notice the

proposed rule. The six areas identified

by Delta Troy are that the NPRM: (1)

Failed to adequately evaluate possible

EMI from TCRR to the adjacent UPRR

rail line;

36

(2) unreasonably assumed

exigent circumstances will not require

coupling or uncoupling;

37

(3) failed to

examine the safety impact of TCRR’s

grade separation proposal on the

adjacent UPRR rail line;

38

(4) failed to

acknowledge or examine the possible

increase in truck traffic and grade

crossing usage due to TCRR’s proposed

viaduct;

39

(5) did not recognize that a

different alignment could alleviate the

risks of heat-induced track buckling and

slow orders;

40

and (6) ignored the

context and local circumstances in

which proposed operations will occur.

41

FRA responds to Delta Troy’s six

identified ‘‘deficiencies’’ in other areas

of this final rule, and so FRA will

address UPRR’s concerns here.

Primarily, UPRR expressed concern

with possible EMI resulting from

TCRR’s contemplated system, along

with potential increased risk at certain

grade crossings, which is addressed in

section IV. D. Interference with the

Union Pacific Railroad. What remains

are essentially concerns regarding

whether the requirements of the rule, as

they were proposed, properly account

for the effect on safety of adjacent

railroads, that FRA has somehow

deprived the public of a meaningful

opportunity to comment, and that the

requirements are consistent with the

requirements of JRC.

UPRR stated in its comment that the

NPRM was conclusory in its approach

in ‘‘importing’’ the Shinkansen’s

regulatory framework without properly

accounting for the effect on the safety of

other existing rail operations or of the

costs imposed on those other rail

operations.

42

However, FRA expects

that the final rule framework would

have no direct bearing on the safety of

UPRR’s operation, assuming it is in

compliance with its own requirements

to protect its systems from electrical

interference. FRA makes clear that it is

imposing its own regulatory regime on

TCRR. As discussed above, this

rulemaking is translating the safety-

critical technical requirements as

implemented on JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen system to allow FRA to

provide effect safety oversight, as

discussed in the NPRM.

43

UPRR also stated that FRA has

deprived the public of a meaningful

opportunity to comment. FRA disagrees

and has clearly met the minimum

requirements of the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA). Under 5 U.S.C.

553(b)(3), when engaged in rulemaking,

an agency is required to provide notice

of a proposed rulemaking to the public

through publication in the Federal

Register, and shall, among other things,

include either the terms or substance of

the proposed rule, or a description of

the subjects and issues involved. The

NPRM, as it explained, was based on the

petition and associated supporting

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85 FR 14036, 14038.

45

For example, the following provides

information on maintenance intervals associated

with rolling stock: Docket No. FRA–2019–0068,

Document IDs. FRA–2019–0068–0016 ‘‘2017—

Exhibit C–8 Subpart J Section Analysis (Inspection

Testing and Maintenance),’’ FRA–2019–0068–0022

‘‘2017—Presentation M10P04—N700 Bogie ITM (CI

redacted),’’ and FRA–2019–0068–0024 ‘‘JRCs

Practice on Movement of Defective Equipment (CI

redacted).’’

46

85 FR 14036.

47

85 FR 14036, 14041.

technical information, all of which was

made available for public review and

scrutiny.

44

In addition, the NPRM

exceeded the statutory requirement to

provide merely the substance of the

proposed rule, by providing the entirety

of the proposed rule text for critical

examination by interested members of

the public.

In a related concern, UPRR stated that

it was unclear what FRA meant when it

used the terms ‘‘shall be based on’’ in

the regulatory text, when referring to

requirements for TCRR. For example,

under § 299.707, FRA is requiring that

TCRR’s initial maintenance schedules,

included as part of its inspection,

testing, and maintenance program, be

based on those maintenance schedules

in effect on JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen

system. UPRR asserted that the use of

this reference created ambiguity to the

degree that it denied the public a

meaningful opportunity to comment.

Again, FRA disagrees. FRA is unclear as

to what ambiguity exists in light of the

information in the rulemaking docket,

in both meeting presentations and

associated section analyses, provided by

TCRR.

45

FRA placed this information in

the docket, to allow interested members

of the public to scrutinize and provide

comment. As part of those documents,

the maintenance intervals in effect on

JRC at the time of submittal of the

documents was included. As part of the

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program review and approval process

under this final rule, TCRR must

demonstrate how its initial maintenance

intervals replicate those of JRC. FRA

would expect TCRR to include the most

current maintenance intervals in use by

JRC for the Tokaido Shinkansen.

Along with the claims discussed

above, UPRR raised several comments

regarding some of the regulatory text

associated with §§ 299.13(c)(3), 299.207,

299.209, 299.215, 299.341, and 299.351–

299.357. The concerns were focused on

ensuring that the language of those

sections, as proposed in the NPRM,

would be consistent with similar

requirements for JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen system so that TCRR would

be able to replicate the Tokaido

Shinkansen properly. UPRR was

concerned that FRA did not ensure this

consistency and asked FRA to explain

in detail whatever differences might

exist in a reissued NPRM so that the

public could meaningfully participate in

the rulemaking process.

FRA believes that UPRR does not

understand fully what FRA stated in the

NPRM, nor what the rule text is

accomplishing for the above-cited

sections of this final rule. As discussed

in the NPRM, TCRR’s petition

represented that the regulatory

requirements offered by TCRR were

translated from the technological and

operational aspects of the JRC Tokaido

Shinkansen.

46

Each of the above-cited

sections referenced by UPRR are either

technological or operational in nature.

First, as it relates to the personnel

training requirements under

§ 299.13(c)(3), it is unclear to FRA what

precise misunderstanding UPRR has

about this proposed requirement.

Section 299.13(c)(3) requires TCRR to

comply with part 243, which is a

performance-based regulation that is

designed to accommodate myriad

different railroad job functions and

personnel qualifications. This part

provides a railroad with broad

autonomy in determining how its safety-

critical employees are categorized and

does not dictate in any way the required

level of training or qualification of

employees as UPRR seems to suggest.

Part 243 is designed to help ensure that

safety critical roles and qualifications

are identified, and that proper

adherence to an adequate training

program is maintained and documented.

JRC’s training and qualification program

is very thorough and comprehensive

and far exceeds the level of employee

training, development, and hands-on

experience practiced by most, if not all,

North American rail operators. As such,

TCRR should have no difficulty

complying with the requirements of part

243, and TCRR should be able to

leverage fully JRC’s proven approach to

personnel training and qualification.

In a similar vein, UPRR’s comment

regarding the PTC Safety Plan Content

Requirements in § 299.207 is equally

perplexing. The PTC requirements

proposed are derived from 49 CFR part

236, subpart I, but modified to reflect

only those requirements common to all

systems, and specific to standalone

systems, such as TCRR’s. PTC is not a

technology itself, but rather a set of

performance requirements that establish

the minimum functionality a train

control system must have, the most

fundamental of which are required by

statute. PTC terminology used in this

context is unique to the U.S. statutory

and regulatory requirements. The PTC

Safety Plan (PTCSP) is the primary

means by which the railroad

demonstrates compliance with the

requirements in subpart B of this final

rule. And, as long as TCRR’s train

control system, as implemented in

Texas, meets the minimum performance

and functionality requirements of

subpart B, what requirements exist in

Japan are irrelevant in relation to PTC,

especially as Japan has no equivalent

PTC requirement. To put it another way,

subpart B requires that TCRR

demonstrate that its PTC system, as

implemented and installed in Texas,

fulfill the minimum safety

requirements—it is not intended to

prove JRC’s technology or its

implementation. Likewise, paragraph

(a)(6) dictates that TCRR demonstrate

the adequacy of its program, but it does

not prescribe how TCRR must do so. In

this respect, any pertinent training or

qualifications required for the

successful implementation of JRC’s

Automatic Train Control (ATC)

technology would be expected to be

articulated within TCRR’s plan and

consistent with JRC’s training.

With respect to §§ 299.209 and

299.215, these sections were not

specifically included in TCRR’s

petition. However, in TCRR’s petition,

TCRR stated that it would comply with

subpart I of 49 CFR part 236, in toto. As

further explained in the NRPM, FRA

stated that it was tailoring the

requirements of part 236, subpart I, to

TCRR’s standalone PTC system.

47

Sections 299.209 and 299.215 contain

virtually equivalent requirements as

§§ 236.1029 and 236.1039. And with

respect to the cited track sections,

§§ 299.341, and 299.351–299.357, TCRR

provided FRA the language for these

sections, again representing in its

petition that they translate the

technological and operational aspects of

JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen.

In addition, part 299, subpart B of this

final rule is a performance standard.

This provides TCRR appropriate

flexibility in how it complies with the

requirements, allowing TCRR to

replicate the service-proven, safety-

critical aspects of JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen. In its regulatory language,

FRA is not requiring TCRR to deviate

from JRC practice, but expects TCRR to

remain consistent with JRC practice.

In addition to the six ‘‘deficiencies’’

noted above, Delta Troy also

commented that FRA’s NPRM was

deficient and contrary to the APA in

that it did not provide adequate notice

in the docket of an ‘‘economic analysis,’’

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05.06.2020—TCRR Telephonic Hearing

Transcript at page 3, available at

www.regulations.gov, Docket No. FRA–2019–0068,

Docket ID: FRA–2019–0068–0300.

49

Section V. A. Executive Orders 12866, 13771,

and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the

NPRM. 85 FR 14036, 14047.

and that the NPRM was based on a

‘‘world that no longer exists.’’

In support of its assertion that FRA

failed to provide adequate notice of an

‘‘economic analysis’’ in accord with the

APA, Delta Troy argues that it could not

find any type of economic analysis

despite FRA’s repeated mentioning of

such an analysis during the telephonic

hearings held on May 4–6, 2020. Delta

Troy cited to the transcript of the May

6th hearing, noting that on page 3 of the

transcript the Hearing Officer stated that

the ‘‘purpose of tonight’s hearing is for

FRA to listen to any interested party’s

comments on the technical safety

requirements proposed in the NPRM

along with the associated economic

analysis published in the rule’s online

docket.’’

48

Further, Delta Troy

explained that it examined the NPRM

and could not find an economic analysis

contained in the NPRM, nor in the

rulemaking docket.

FRA disagrees. FRA provided its

evaluation of the regulatory burden on

the regulated entity in the NPRM as it

is required to under Executive Order

(E.O.) 12866.

49

In support of its claim that the

‘‘NPRM must be replaced as it is based

on a world that no longer exists,’’ Delta

Troy invokes the coronavirus disease

2019 (COVID–19) public health

emergency. Delta Troy asserted that the

future of intercity travel will be

dramatically different from the recent

past. It further asserted that the decision

to move forward with the rulemaking

was based on projected ridership and

train designs that were developed prior

to the COVID–19 public health

emergency, and thus now must be re-

evaluated in light of the current global

situation, and no final rule should be

issued until the re-evaluation is

complete.

While FRA agrees that these are

unprecedented times, it disagrees that

the rulemaking is obsolete. As explained

in section IV. B. Regulatory Approach of

this final rule, FRA advanced the

rulemaking because TCRR’s proposal:

(1) Is consistent with FRA’s mission is

to enable safe, reliable, and efficient

movement of people and goods by rail;

and (2) demonstrated that the proposed

system would replicate the system and

operations of the Tokaido Shinkansen

system and its 50-year safety record.

This rulemaking removes the

government barrier to private industry

seeking to bring transportation

innovations to the United States; FRA’s

analysis in an E.O. 12866 context

properly relates to the effects of

government regulatory burdens, and not

whether TCRR’s proposed operation is

financially viable. In addition, the

analysis performed under E.O. 12866 as

part of the NPRM and this final rule do

not rely on ridership estimates or other

projections of demand.

To the commenter’s assertion that

train design must be reevaluated due to

the pandemic, the technical safety

requirements identified in the NPRM

remain valid. FRA is not amending any

of its other passenger equipment safety

regulations to mandate train designs

account for any form of social

distancing. FRA expects the railroads

and the public to abide by protocols and

guidance issued by other Federal

agencies, and State and local

governments, and does not believe that

rulemaking is appropriate.

H. Electrical Arcing From the Overhead

Catenary System

A number of commenters raised

concern about the ‘‘sparking’’ effect

often associated with electrified trains.

This concern was tied to the fact Atmos

Energy maintains a natural gas

compression station near the

contemplated TCRR alignment, and that

a ‘‘spark’’ from a passing high-speed

train could in-turn ignite some volume

of gas present at either the compression

station, or pipelines along the route.

However, no specific context or

evidence was provided to elaborate why

the design or operation of either the

railroad, the compression station, or a

pipeline, provides for a specific risk to

adjacent property.

The ‘‘spark’’ often associated with

electrified train systems is caused when

there is a separation between the power

source (the catenary system) and its

collector (the pantograph on the roof of

the train). When this separation occurs,

it is possible for current to continue to

flow between the power source and

collector. In these situations, the high

voltage ionizes the air and causes what

is known as an electrical arc or ‘‘spark’’

between the two components. This

occurrence is part of the normal

operation of an electrical traction power

system like the one proposed by TCRR,

and by itself does not pose any

particular safety risk. Existing FRA

regulations do not cover electrical

arcing because of the lack of a particular

safety risk. Further, the JRC technology

and maintenance practice that is being

adopted by TCRR has refined this

interface to minimize this arcing effect

significantly, and to a degree that is not

comparable to what might be witnessed

on light-rail or other conventional U.S.

electrified operations.

FRA does not believe that this issue

requires regulatory action within this

rule. However, as this issue has been

raised, FRA expects TCRR to work with

Atmos Energy, and any other entity to

examine the risk, and take whatever

precautionary measures that are

necessary. To this extent, FRA would

expect TCRR appropriately addresses

this risk within the context of its System

Safety Program, and is willing to

provide assistance in coordinating with

external entities or regulators, as

appropriate.

I. Right-of-Way Barrier Protection

A certain number of comments were

raised concerning ROW protection and

the potential use of barriers in certain

situations. These comments primarily

involved the ability of feral hogs to

access the track, but also raised

questions regarding the protection of

TCRR structures and track from UPRR

derailments.

With respect to general ROW

protection, and specifically the risk

posed by local feral hogs, FRA notes

that safety is generally established

through multiple fronts. In this case, in

addition to requirements for ROW

protection within this rule under

§ 299.13(b)(3), FRA also points to its

crashworthiness discussion in section

IV. F. Crashworthiness and Occupant

Protection, above. Most notably, in

developing the requirements of this

final rule, both FRA and TCRR

considered the potential for differences

between the Japanese and U.S. operating

environments. The existence of animals

and other potential obstructions

supports the adoption of the final rule

requirement to verify the

crashworthiness of the trainset structure

to protect against the residual risk that

might exist beyond even the best ROW

protection measures.

As it relates to protection of TCRR

structures or ROW from potential

incursions due to UPRR derailments,

such mitigations are not covered under

FRA’s current regulations, and

protection of bridge piers is typically

driven by industry or local standard.

Factors that would drive such decisions

are highly variable based on specific site

conditions (e.g., track centers, curvature,

difference in height between top-of-rail,

etc.) and cannot be adequately

addressed globally. FRA expects that

once structural designs exist, any

localized risk presented would be

identified in TCRR’s risk-based hazard

analysis program under part 270 and

mitigated appropriately.

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While outside the scope of rulemaking FRA

considered potential disruptions to emergency

response routes in Section 3.16.5.2.2, Safety and

Security, Build Alternatives of the Final EIS. TCRR

has agreed to implement mitigation to address

potential delays. See Section 3.16.6.2, Safety and

Security, Mitigation Measures of the Final EIS, SS–

MM#1, Model Construction Impacts on Emergency

Response Times of the Final EIS.

51

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement, Section 3.4., Noise and Vibration.

52

Id. at 3.4–33.

53

85 FR 14036, 14048, FN 10.

54

In addition, as required by NEPA, FRA

considered as part of the EIS the overall direct and

indirect impacts to the socioeconomic environment

that may occur as a result of TCRR’s construction

and operation of its proposed project, including

employment and earnings, property impacts,

property tax and net change in tax revenue. FRA.

Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—Passenger

Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement, Section 3.14.5.2.3, Economic Impacts.

55

85 FR 14036, 14047.

J. Emergency Response

As part of the public hearing process,

several comments were received with

respect to emergency response and

access for first responders. These

comments largely articulated concerns

regarding the effect that the absence of

certain safety requirements might have

on first responders’ ability to get inside

a trainset, the impact construction might

generally have on emergency response

times, the ability of first responders to

access the ROW, and coordination with

local first responders to ensure adequate

capability to respond to an emergency

on the high-speed railroad. Comments

related to the first topic, the ability first

responders gaining access to a trainset,

are addressed in the discussion

regarding safety appliances under

section V. D. Decision under 49 U.S.C.

20306, Exemption for technological

improvements of this final rule. Those

comments related to potential

disruptions to normal emergency

response routes caused by construction

are outside the scope of this

rulemaking.

50

FRA defers to local and

State officials in the coordination of

potential road closures or other impacts

to potential emergency response times

caused by construction.

As it relates to comments regarding

ROW access and TCRR coordination

with local first responders, FRA notes

that the NPRM proposed to apply all

Passenger Train Emergency

Preparedness requirements contained

within 49 CFR part 239, and is doing so

in this final rule. Right-of-way access,

coordination, and establishment of the

emergency equipment needs and

training requirements for local first

responders are a part of the planning

process required by part 239. Many of

these specific planning activities cannot

begin in earnest until final ROW designs

are developed. This rule only

establishes the planning requirements,

with the execution of those

requirements naturally occurring at a

later time, and is identical to the

requirements with which all other

passenger railroads in the U.S. must

comply.

A number of commenters objected to

TCRR’s limited early engagement with

local first responders. Specifically,

commenters raised concern with TCRR

having asked the local first responders

what equipment the first responders

thought would be necessary in

responding to an emergency on the

railroad. Commenters expressed

disappointment that TCRR was not

advising the local first responders as to

the type of equipment TCRR would

expect the first responders to have. In

addition, commenters noted that TCRR

has not provided a list of necessary or

required equipment to the local first

responders. This appears to be a

byproduct of misunderstanding the

level of maturity of the system, and the

fact that only conceptual design exists at

this stage. The actions taken by TCRR at

this early stage demonstrate a proactive

approach to the matter, and will help

inform the railroad on the capability of

the local first responders along the

alignment. This knowledge will benefit

TCRR as it continues to develop the

engineering design, and situations such

as ladder height, emergency egress and

equipment needs, and ROW access

capability.

K. Noise Emission and Vibration

Several commenters raised concerns

about the noise emission and vibration

that will be caused by the passing of the

trainset once in service. With respect to

noise emission, when looking at

§ 299.3(c)(3) as proposed in the NPRM

and in this final rule, TCRR must

comply with 49 CFR part 210, Railroad

Noise Emission Compliance

Regulations, which prescribes minimum

compliance regulations for enforcement

of the Railroad Noise Emission

Standards established by the

Environmental Protection Agency in 40

CFR part 201.

There are no required vibration

standards for railroads. However, FRA

evaluated the potential impacts

resulting from vibration during

construction and operation of the HSR

system in the Final EIS, and found that

while there may be some annoyance

impacts due to vibration during

construction, no vibration impacts due

to operations are anticipated.

Nevertheless, the Final EIS identified

mitigation measures for potential noise

and vibration impacts, which includes

compliance with local regulations on

noise and vibration as well as

conducting additional noise and

vibration assessments and monitoring

noise and vibration during operations

testing.

51

In addition, where

construction activities such as pile

driving for structures and vibratory

compaction for ground improvements

would occur within 50 feet of

underground utilities, TCRR would

coordinate with the utilities to identify

where relocation and/or encasement

would be needed to avoid vibration

damage from nearby construction, and

compensate the utilities for such

work.

52

TCRR has agreed to implement

the identified mitigation. See section VI.

C. Mitigation Commitments, of this final

rule.

L. Eminent Domain

One commenter raised the issue of

eminent domain and asked FRA what

influence its Federal actions would have

on any eminent domain issue. To the

best of FRA’s knowledge, eminent

domain powers under the Fifth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are

not involved. FRA understands the

eminent domain issues to be centered

on the interpretation of various Texas

State statutes. FRA defers to the State of

Texas to interpret its own statutes.

M. Regulatory Evaluation

Several commenters discussed the

financial feasibility of TCRR and stated

that FRA did not take this into account

when it issued the NPRM. However, it

is outside FRA’s regulatory scope to

consider the economic viability of a

specific railroad project, so it was not

addressed as part of the NPRM.

53

FRA’s

economic analysis in the NPRM

evaluates the impact of the Federal

regulatory burden on TCRR

operations.

54

FRA’s responsibility is to

ensure that the railroad industry is

operating in a safe manner, not to

examine the economic viability of a

specific project.

In addition, several commenters

asserted that FRA did not adequately

account for the costs in its economic

analysis. As discussed in the NPRM,

FRA concluded that since TCRR’s

compliance with the requirements in

this rulemaking are voluntary, the

rulemaking does not impose any

additional Federal regulatory burdens.

55

Costs such as equipment design,

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5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

57

67 FR 53461 (Aug. 16, 2002).

58

85 FR 14036, 14048.

59

85 FR 14036, 14046.

60

5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

equipment changes, associated studies,

and other costs are costs voluntarily

assumed by TCRR to create the specific

system contemplated by this rule. TCRR

petitioned FRA for a rulemaking so it

could create a unique HSR system,

which does not meet Tier III passenger

equipment requirements.

UPRR commented that the rulemaking

did not address the effect of the

implementation of TCRR’s system and

on the safety of other entities. UPRR

further stated that although TCRR’s

actions may be considered voluntary,

TCRR’s system would introduce outside

interference on adjacent railroads,

which require action and incur cost to

address. FRA understands that there

could be costs to existing railroads

when an adjacent railroad begins

operations, these costs will not

necessarily occur and FRA is unable to

estimate them. These costs are

speculative and are difficult to

determine because the final designs for

the TCRR project are not yet developed.

Therefore, these costs are not included

in FRA’s economic analysis. Further, as

explained above in response to UPRR

concerns regarding potential

interference, FRA expects that the final

rule framework would have no direct

bearing on the safety of UPRR’s

operation.

Several commenters also stated that

the requirements, as proposed in the

NPRM, would have an impact on small

entities and FRA did not account for

this within its regulatory flexibility

analysis. FRA, in conjunction with the

Small Business Administration (SBA),

has developed a definition of small

entities that is used when evaluating the

economic impact of regulations.

Commuter railroads serving populations

of 50,000 or less are considered to be

small entities, therefore TCRR is not a

small entity and the regulation will not

impact any small entities. For further

information, please see FRA’s

discussion of its regulatory flexibility

analysis, as required by the Regulatory

Flexibility Act

56

and E.O. 13272,

57

under section V. B. Regulatory

Flexibility Act and Executive Order

13272; Regulatory Flexibility

Assessment of the NPRM

58

and section

VII. B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and

Executive Order 13272; Regulatory

Flexibility Assessment of this final rule.

N. Enforcement

As stated in the NPRM under section

IV. F. Enforcement, FRA will publish a

civil penalty schedule on its website.

59

Because such penalty schedules are

statements of agency policy, notice and

comment are not required prior to their

issuance, nor are they required to be

published in the CFR.

60

Although not

required, FRA solicited comment on

this subject, but did not receive any

comments on the types of actions or

omissions under each regulatory section

that would subject a person to the

assessment of a civil penalty.

FRA also clarifies that other

enforcement tools, such as emergency

orders, individual liability actions, or

compliance orders, are available for

FRA to use, as necessary, in providing

safety oversight of TCRR.

V. Discussion of Final Rule and

Regulatory Changes

A. Non-Substantive Corrections

TCRR, in its comments, pointed out a

few instances where FRA had

inadvertently included (or failed to

include) certain regulatory text that was

not submitted in the proposed rule text

included with TCRR’s petition. In

response, FRA is modifying the final

rule, but these changes are not

substantive.

Under proposed § 299.301(b), FRA

included maintenance-of-way (MOW)

yards (locations where MOW equipment

is stored) when discussing restoration or

renewal of track class H2. As track

within MOW yards will be classified

only as track class H0, it was not correct

for FRA to include a reference to yards

in this provision. Accordingly, in this

final rule, FRA has removed ‘‘yards

and’’ from paragraph (b).

Under proposed § 299.345, FRA

converted a table appearing in TCRR’s

petition to rule text. The table depicted

the frequency of certain types of

required track inspections. In converting

the table to text, FRA clarified the

requirements contained in the table.

However, in doing so, there were also

some inadvertent errors in the NPRM

rule text. Under § 299.345(b)(1), which

contains the requirements for safe

walkway inspections, FRA failed to

include the text from footnote 1 to

§ 2xx.343(c) from the TCRR petition’s

rule text. The footnote permitted a

visual inspection during overnight

hours and, in the event of extreme

weather, from the trainset cab in lieu of

a safe walkway inspection. To correct

this oversight, FRA is adding new

paragraph (b)(1)(vii), which permits a

visual inspection from the trainset cab

or an on-track visual inspection in lieu

of a safe walkway inspection in the

event of extreme weather. FRA slightly

modified the language to make clear that

an inspection during the overnight

hours is considered an on-track visual

inspection.

In addition, under § 299.345(b)(2),

FRA proposed requirements for on-track

inspections for track other than track

located within Train Maintenance

Facilities (TMFs) and MOW yards.

Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(iii) specified

that turn-outs and track crossings were

to be inspected at least once a week,

with a minimum of three calendar days

between inspections. However, FRA

inadvertently failed to distinguish

between turn-outs and track crossing on

ballasted track versus on non-ballasted

track. In this final rule, FRA is making

that distinction by clarifying that the

requirements of § 299.345(b)(2)(iii)

apply only to turn-outs and rail

crossings on ballasted track. FRA has

added new paragraph (b)(2)(iv) for non-

ballasted track, which specifies that

turn-outs and rail crossings on non-

ballasted track shall have an on-track

inspection conducted at least once every

two weeks, with a minimum of six

calendar days between inspections. This

is consistent with the rule text in

TCRR’s petition.

Under § 299.345(b)(3), FRA

inadvertently restricted the conduct of

on-track inspections to ‘‘during

maintenance hours.’’ Under

§ 299.301(b), track maintenance in

MOW yards and TMFs is not restricted

to maintenance hours, as it is for

mainline track under § 299.301(a). As

such, track inspections can be

conducted under traffic conditions, so

long as proper on-track safety is

provided as required under 49 CFR part

214. Under § 299.3(c), TCRR must

comply with 49 CFR part 214 for on-

track safety, with the exception of

§ 214.339. Accordingly, in this final

rule, FRA removed ‘‘during

maintenance hours’’ from

§ 299.345(b)(3) and added new

paragraph (b)(3)(iii) to make explicit the

requirement that 49 CFR part 214 (with

the exception of § 214.339) be followed

for on-track safety within the TMFs and

MOW yards when on-track inspections

are performed under traffic conditions.

Nothing in this discussion should be

construed as affecting the general

prohibition under § 299.301(a) of

performing on-track maintenance or

inspections of track, other than track in

MOW yards and TMFs, under traffic

conditions. In those locations, MOW

work and revenue service must still be

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85 FR 14036, 14038 and 14043.

62

85 FR 14036, 14043.

63

Unscheduled or emergency MOW operations

during revenue service hours to repair a broken rail,

for example, requires TCRR to halt revenue service

over the affected portion of the right-of-way until

the repair work is completed and has been

inspected. See §299.301(a) (prohibiting the

restoration or renewal of track under traffic

conditions that is located other than in TMFs and

MOW yards).

temporally separated, as discussed in

the NRPM.

61

Under proposed § 299.609(a), FRA

inadvertently left out the word ‘‘types’’

after vehicle. In this final rule, FRA has

added the word ‘‘types’’ to clarify the

requirement, which is consistent with

FRA practice regarding vehicle/track

interaction qualification.

In addition to the above changes, FRA

also made several minor technical

changes. Under § 299.315(g), FRA

removed an incorrect cross-reference to

§ 299.337 as the term ‘‘vehicle type’’ is

not used in § 299.337. Under

§ 299.407(d), FRA changed ‘‘emergency

window exit’’ to ‘‘emergency egress

window’’ for consistency of term use.

FRA made the same change for the same

reason to § 299.427. Finally, under

§ 299.439(b), FRA fixed an incorrect

reference to ‘‘this paragraph’’ and

correctly changed the reference to

‘‘paragraph (c) of this section.’’

B. Evaluation of Substantive Changes

1. § 299.5 Definitions

In its comments, TCRR requested that

FRA make some changes to the rule text

to help remove ambiguity. Under

§ 299.5, TCRR requested that FRA

amend the proposed definition of

‘‘passenger equipment.’’ In support of

its request, TCRR stated that the

proposed definition implied that

TCRR’s trainsets would be approved for

use on JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen HSR

system, which TCRR commented is not

correct. While TCRR’s trainset will be

based on current or future variants of

the N700 series trainset approved for

use on the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR

system, TCRR’s trainset itself will not be

approved for use on the Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system, as it has fewer

passenger cars than what JRC runs.

Accordingly, TCRR requested that FRA

change the definition of ‘‘passenger

equipment’’ to mean the N700 series

trainset that is based on trainsets

currently in service, or future variants

operated on, JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen

system, or any unit thereof. FRA agrees

and has made the change in this final

rule. To be clear, the term ‘‘passenger

equipment’’ is referring to the N700

series passenger trainset that TCRR will

operate on its system, which is based on

the trainset in use presently, or future

variants thereof, by JRC on the Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system. What is

important is not whether the TCRR

trainset has been approved for use on

the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system,

but that it is based on that technology

and complies with the requirements of

this rule.

In addition, under § 299.5, TCRR

requested that FRA amend the proposed

definition of ‘‘in passenger service/in

revenue service.’’ In support of its

request, TCRR pointed to proposed

§ 299.13(a)(3), which discussed and

defined the requirement for temporally

separating scheduled ROW maintenance

from revenue passenger operations.

TCRR raised a concern in its comment

that leaving a passenger trainset

properly secured in a station overnight

during MOW operations could run afoul

of the temporal separation requirement.

TCRR further explained that its

understanding of the temporal

separation requirement under

§ 299.13(a)(3), as proposed in the

NPRM, is that the ROW must be cleared

of all revenue service trainsets

(including any trainset repositioning

moves) in order to ensure trainsets

cannot be moved into established

maintenance zones. Moreover, TCRR

stated that it would not consider a

parked, properly secured trainset in a

station location to be a revenue service

trainset because it would not be actively

carrying or available to carry passengers.

TCRR further stated that a trainset could

be considered available to carry

passengers, and thus considered ‘‘in

passenger service/in revenue service’’

only after receiving power from the

overhead catenary system and receiving

a pre-departure inspection by the driver.

And, as overhead catenary power will

be restored to the ROW only after it has

been cleared of MOW equipment, with

the general control center returning the

signal and trainset control system to the

state required to protect revenue

operations, a trainset could not be

considered ‘‘in passenger service/in

revenue service’’ during MOW

operations, thus accomplishing the

temporal separation required by the

rule. Accordingly, to codify this

understanding, TCRR requested that

FRA add to the definition of ‘‘in

passenger service/in revenue service’’ a

carve-out that a trainset that is parked

and properly secured within a station

overnight is not considered to be in

revenue service, and thereby it does not

need to be cleared from the ROW prior

to MOW operations commencing.

The purpose of the temporal

separation requirement is two-fold: (1)

Protection of passengers in the high-

speed trainsets from a collision with

heavy MOW equipment; and (2)

protection of the MOW employees

performing work within the ROW from

the risk of being struck by a high-speed

trainset. In both situations, the risk

involves a moving high-speed trainset.

As discussed in the NPRM, removal of

overhead catenary power to those

sections of the ROW where MOW

operations are occurring or planned to

occur is a requirement,

62

and without

overhead catenary power, a high-speed

trainset is incapable of generating

tractive power, so those two risks, a

collision between a high-speed trainset

carrying passengers and MOW

equipment, and MOW employees being

struck by a high-speed trainset, are

heavily mitigated.

However, when looking at the

requirements for temporal separation

under § 299.13(a)(3), there is a

requirement that the railroad must

complete its trainset repositioning

moves prior to the commencement of

MOW operations. Trainset repositioning

moves are not considered ‘‘in passenger

service/in revenue service,’’ but rather

considered ‘‘in service,’’ as that term

was defined in the NPRM, as trainsets

being repositioned would not

necessarily be available to carry

passengers. In addition, as scheduled

MOW operations

63

occur outside of

revenue service hours, FRA would

expect trainsets to be loaded with

passengers or available to carry

passengers, and thus would not

consider trainsets outside of revenue

service hours to be ‘‘in passenger

service/in revenue service.’’ But, they

may be considered ‘‘in service.’’

Accordingly, FRA is adopting the

proposed definition of ‘‘in passenger

service/in revenue service’’ in this final

rule unchanged. But, FRA is amending

the definition of ‘‘in service’’ to include

a fourth exception to address the

situation where TCRR has a trainset

parked in a station location that is

properly secured and has been deemed

not in service by the railroad (meaning

TCRR is not intending on repositioning

or otherwise moving the trainset until

the cessation of MOW operations).

2. Subpart B—Signal and Trainset

Control System

In its response to the NPRM, TCRR

provided several comments and

suggested edits with respect to FRA’s

proposed requirements for a PTC

system, the certification process, and

TCRR’s interpretation of how those

requirements should apply to its

proposed use of the Tokaido

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Regression testing is used to ensure that

previously tested software still performs as

intended after a change to that software.

65

49 U.S.C. 20157(h).

Shinkansen ATC technology. FRA finds

that many of these comments appear to

originate from a misunderstanding of

how the term ‘‘system’’ is used and

what, exactly, FRA must certify under

49 U.S.C. 20157, Implementation of

positive train control systems.

TCRR commented on § 299.201(c) and

asserted that it does not anticipate the

need for any regression testing

64

before

FRA certifies TCRR’s PTC system. In

support of its assertion, TCRR stated

that TCRR’s system will be based on the

service-proven Tokaido Shinkansen

ATC system, and TCRR does not

anticipate that any changes will be

made to safety-critical software prior to

obtaining PTC System Certification from

FRA. Further, while TCRR does not

believe regression testing would be

necessary prior to its initial installation

of ATC and FRA certification, TCRR

does believe regression testing is

appropriate for potential changes to its

ATC technology that could possibly

occur in the future.

As proposed in the NPRM,

§ 299.201(c) generally authorizes TCRR

to conduct field testing of its uncertified

PTC system and field regression testing

of its FRA-certified PTC system, which

could encompass, for example, future

modifications to ATC functionality. As

proposed, paragraph (c) was not

intended to specify what type of tests

are required in either instance. The

exact tests to be performed are to be

defined by the railroad in the

development of its PTCSP, particularly

with respect to the content requirements

in § 299.207(a)(7), (a)(9), and (a)(10).

TCRR must demonstrate that its PTC

system, as built, fulfills the

requirements contained in subpart B.

The distinction that TCRR’s proposed

PTC system is based on a service-proven

technology has no bearing in this

instance. Under the statutory mandate,

FRA must certify that a railroad’s PTC

system complies with the applicable

PTC regulations (in this instance, 49

CFR part 299, subpart B), not the

theoretical capability of the

technology.

65

What constitutes safety-

critical software has yet to be defined in

detail by TCRR, as required under

§ 299.441, and the changes required to

be made to the existing ATC software

(whether on the executive or application

side) have yet to be described.

As such, although the term

‘‘regression testing’’ in paragraph (c) is

used in the context of post-certification

field testing, this is not intended to

suggest that this is the only

circumstance that would call for

regression testing, as several railroads

have performed regression testing on an

ongoing basis before and after obtaining

PTC System Certification from FRA.

FRA does not agree with TCRR’s reading

of § 299.201(c) as requiring regression

testing; that paragraph merely

authorizes TCRR to conduct various

levels of field testing, including

regression testing. FRA believes the

necessary level of testing and validation

should be determined as TCRR’s system

is developed and implemented, as

required under § 299.207.

In its comments, TCRR also asserts

that because it plans to use an existing

signaling system, the requirement to

include a ‘‘description of the safety

assurance concepts that are to be used

for system development, including an

explanation of the design principles and

assumptions’’ within TCRR’s PTCSP

(see § 299.207(a)(2)) should only apply

only to modifications to its system.

TCRR contends that because the system

was developed long ago, these

principles would not apply in the same

manner as they would to a system that

is under development. TCRR

recommends that paragraph (a)(2) be

modified to refer only to safety-critical

changes to the ATC system, not the

initial version of TCRR’s ATC system.

FRA disagrees with this perspective.

TCRR is correct that the core safety

assurance concepts, design principles,

and design assumptions are

fundamental to the development of any

new system, but they are also equally

important in the implementation of

existing technology. These core

concepts, principles, and assumptions

provide a baseline for safety assurance

that govern the safe implementation of

a system, whether proven or novel. In

the case of TCRR, although the ATC

system used on JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system was developed

years ago, FRA would expect that the

fundamental concepts (e.g., fail safe),

essential design principles, and any

assumptions critical to the safety case of

the system are understood by TCRR in

a manner that can be articulated as part

of its PTCSP. If TCRR cannot articulate

these fundamental concepts, FRA would

question how TCRR intends to ensure

that the application and installation of

the system in Texas is performed

correctly. FRA acknowledges that JRC’s

Tokaido Shinkansen ATC technology

has an extraordinary safety record, but

TCRR must provide sufficient

information in its PTCSP for FRA to

certify that the ATC system in Texas

fulfills the requirements under 49 CFR

part 299, subpart B.

With respect to the requirement to

include a complete description of

TCRR’s verification and validation

process in its PTCSP, under

§ 299.207(a)(5), TCRR proposed that

operational data from JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system would serve to

adequately demonstrate that the

technology and its functions, as

conceived by JRC, have been

successfully validated. FRA suspects

that TCRR’s interpretation comes from

its perception that this requirement, and

the corresponding requirement in 49

CFR 236.1015(d)(5), are intended for the

validation and verification of a new

system under development. FRA would

like to make clear that a verification and

validation process is essential to the

implementation of any system, whether

new or previously certified. The actual

application of a technology is just as

important as its theoretical performance.

In this respect, even railroads that are

implementing previously certified and

type-approved PTC systems have

substantial verification and validation

processes and tests to ensure that the

system, once installed, functions as

designed and intended. Operational

data from the existing JRC operation

would not suffice in this case. As an

example, a technology may be proven to

effectively enforce civil speeds (i.e.,

speed limits), but if the installation or

application design is not correct, the cab

signal code or track chart could allow

for a maximum authorized speed that is

not consistent with the safe civil speed

required for a particular curve. Errors

such as this are not uncommon when

considering the volume of work that

must be performed to install a system on

hundreds (or thousands) of miles of

track, and thus the verification and

validation process is critical for the safe

implementation of any train control

system.

In its comments, TCRR further

recommended changes to

§ 299.207(a)(18) to specifically reference

the Tokaido Shinkansen system as being

the baseline for comparison with

TCRR’s system. However, the

modification is unnecessary for TCRR to

reference the Tokaido Shinkansen as the

baseline for comparison. As TCRR

correctly identified, this requirement is

derived from 49 CFR 236.1007(c)(1).

FRA believes that, when possible, the

RPA and the existing PTC requirements

for high-speed service should be

consistent. TCRR will be able to comply

with § 299.207(a)(18), as the provision

permits TCRR to use foreign service data

in its PTCSP.

FRA is updating the language under

§ 299.209(e) to directly reference

§ 236.1029(h). The language of

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§ 299.209(e) as proposed in the NPRM

was based on the language of

§ 236.1029(h), so the requirement to

report has not changed. This is

consistent with other sections under

subpart B.

In addition, in its comments, TCRR

acknowledges that proposed § 299.211

would establish certain security

requirements for a PTC system utilizing

wireless communications. Although

TCRR does not currently intend for its

ATC system to utilize wireless

communications, TCRR comments that

it does not object to retaining this

provision in case it utilizes wireless

communications in the future.

Accordingly, FRA will retain the

language under proposed § 299.211, as it

mirrors the existing PTC requirements

under § 236.1033.

3. § 299.345 Visual Inspections; Right-

of-Way

Under § 299.345(b)(3)(i) and (ii),

TCRR asked for the inspection

frequency to be reduced from twice to

once during the relevant period. As

proposed, § 299.345(b)(3)(i) and (ii)

require TCRR to inspect track within

TMFs and MOW yards twice during a

60-day period for ballasted track and

twice during a 120-day period for non-

ballasted track. TCRR commented that

although the rule language as proposed

was consistent with the rule text

provided with TCRR’s petition, it is not

wholly consistent with JRC practice.

According to TCRR, JRC’s practice is to

inspect this type of track only once

during the relevant periods (a 60-day

period for ballasted track and a 120-day

period for non-ballasted track). FRA

recognizes that the language as

proposed under § 299.345(b)(3)(i) and

(ii) appears to contain requirements

more stringent than what JRC requires

on the Tokaido Shinkansen HSR system.

Therefore, consistent with FRA and

TCRR’s goal to replicate JRC’s

requirements as closely as possible, FRA

has made the requested change.

4. § 299.347 Special Inspections

TCRR requested in its comments that

FRA amend the language of proposed

§ 299.347. As proposed, §299.347

contains requirements for TCRR to

conduct a special inspection of its track

and ROW prior to the operation of a

trainset in the event of fire, flood, severe

storm, or temperature extremes that

could damage the track structure. TCRR

pointed out, though, that the language of

proposed § 299.347 prohibits movement

of a trainset, regardless of location in the

ROW (e.g., between stations), until an

inspection has been performed. TCRR

also stated that JRC has certain

operating rules that would permit

movement of a trainset to the next

forward station location prior to an

inspection so long as specific criteria

were met. TCRR offered as an example

if operations were suspended due to a

heavy rainfall, defined by an amount of

rain measured by that segment’s rainfall

gauge over a specific time interval

preceding the trainset movement, a

trainset would be allowed to move to

the next station at a speed not to exceed

30 km/h (18.6 mph). Accordingly, TCRR

requested that FRA amend the language

of this section to require inspections of

the track and ROW to be performed as

soon as possible after the occurrence of

a fire, flood, severe storm, temperature

extremes, or other types of events that

may cause damage to the track structure,

in accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program, and operating rules.

FRA agrees that an event may occur

while a trainset is en route between

stations that would halt the operation of

the trainset prior to reaching the next

station and trigger a special inspection,

as proposed in the NPRM under

§ 299.347. Because of this, FRA has

updated this section in the final rule.

FRA has designated the previously

undesignated text as paragraph (a) and

added a new paragraph (b) to allow a

trainset that is between stations to

proceed to the next forward station at

restricted speed, not to exceed 30 km/

h (18.6 mph) after an event

contemplated by this section occurs.

This allows for the movement of

passengers to a station so they are not

stranded in the ROW until an inspection

of the track and ROW can be performed.

However, FRA makes clear that no

trainset may depart a station location

until a special inspection of the effected

track and ROW can be performed. This

new paragraph (b) is only to permit the

movement of passengers to the next

station that would otherwise be

stranded between station locations.

Should the track and/or ROW be

discovered to be damaged so as to put

the safety of the passengers in jeopardy,

then the movement is expected to stop

until the track is inspected by a

qualified person, and the qualified

person makes a determination that

movement can safely proceed.

5. § 299.713 Program Approval

Procedures

TCRR further requested that FRA

amend the language of § 299.713(c)(2) as

proposed in the NPRM. As proposed,

§ 299.713(c)(2) provided the procedures

for approval of amendments to the

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program. Any amendment that relaxes

an FRA-approved requirement will be

reviewed by FRA within 45 days of

receipt of the amendment, by which

time FRA will notify TCRR whether the

amendment is approved, or if not

approved, stating the specific points in

which the amendment is deficient.

Crucial to this part of the paragraph was

that the railroad could not implement

the amendment until FRA had approved

it. The proposed paragraph further

stated that if the railroad wanted to

amend the program by making an FRA-

approved requirement more stringent,

the railroad could implement the

amendment prior to receiving FRA

approval on the amendment.

Although TCRR generally accepted

that the language would address many

possible amendments, TCRR

commented that there may be situations

where it is unclear as to whether the

proposed inspection, testing, and

maintenance program amendment is

making an FRA-approved requirement

more stringent or relaxed. Thus, TCRR

requested FRA change the language of

proposed paragraph (c)(2), such that if

the railroad proposes to amend an FRA-

approved program requirement that

TCRR deems to be more stringent, the

railroad is permitted to act immediately

to implement the amendment prior to

obtaining FRA approval.

FRA is not adopting TCRR’s

recommendation because FRA finds the

language to be sufficiently clear and

expects that most situations, as TCRR

has acknowledged, will be

straightforward in their resolution. For

example, if TCRR wishes to perform

inspections more frequently than

required in its inspection, testing, and

maintenance program, FRA would

consider TCRR’s proposed action as

more stringent than what is required.

Conversely, if TCRR wishes to perform

inspections less frequently than

required in its inspection program,

testing, and maintenance program, FRA

would consider TCRR’s proposed action

as less stringent than what is required,

and TCRR must have FRA approval

before implementing the change. When

there is a question as to whether TCRR’s

proposed action is making a

requirement more stringent or relaxed,

FRA would expect TCRR to either treat

the action as relaxing, triggering FRA

review, or to contact FRA to inquire.

C. Trainset Image Recording System

In the NPRM, FRA proposed to make

applicable to TCRR the requirement to

have an image recording system

installed on its trainsets, consistent with

FRA’s Locomotive Image and Audio

Recording Devices for Passenger Trains

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85 FR 14036, 14041; (84 FR 35712, Jul. 24,

2019).

67

85 FR 14036, 14040.

68

See docket FRA–2019–0066.

NPRM.

66

As discussed in the TCRR

NPRM, FRA stated that once the image

recording device rulemaking was

finalized, that FRA would make

conforming changes to this final rule’s

regulatory text. However, as FRA has

not yet published the image recording

devices final rule, FRA will make any

necessary changes to this regulation as

part of that rulemaking.

D. Decision Under 49 U.S.C. 20306,

Exemption for Technological

Improvements

As discussed in the NPRM, FRA’s

safety appliance regulation is based on

longstanding statutory requirements for

individual railroad cars used in general

service. These requirements are

primarily intended to keep railroad

employees safe while performing their

essential job functions. Historically,

these duties have revolved around the

practice of building trains by switching

individual cars or groups of cars, and

are not directly applicable to how

modern high-speed passenger

equipment is designed and operated.

The application of such appliances

would require a significant redesign of

HSR equipment, and would create

aerodynamic problems, particularly

with respect to associated noise

emissions. In the NPRM, FRA proposed

to exempt TCRR from statutory

requirements that are not applicable or

practical for inclusion on its high-speed

trainset technology, pursuant to the

authority granted under 49 U.S.C.

20306.

67

Rather than apply legacy

requirements that are inappropriate for

the proposed equipment’s design and

service environment, this final rule

focuses on how to provide a safe

environment for crews as it pertains to

the N700 series trainset, and modern

high-speed operations throughout the

world. In this respect, this final rule

defines specific safety appliance

performance requirements applicable to

this semi-permanently coupled trainset.

By focusing on the job functions this

approach is expected to: Improve safety

for crews and railroad employees;

provide flexibility for superior designs

based on modern ergonomics; and allow

for elimination of appliances when their

functionality is moot (e.g., riding on

side sill steps despite an inability to

couple/decouple cars). FRA believes it

is appropriate to grant relief under the

discretionary process established under

49 U.S.C. 20306 and adopts these

requirements under its statutory

authority as part of this rulemaking.

As part of the hearing held on May 4,

2020, FRA conducted proceedings

under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to determine

whether to invoke its discretionary

authority to provide relief to TCRR from

certain requirements of 49 U.S.C. ch.

203 for its planned operation of high-

speed trainsets built to the requirements

contained in this final rule. Under 49

U.S.C. 20306, FRA may exempt TCRR

from the above-identified statutory

requirements based on evidence

received and findings developed at a

hearing demonstrating that the statutory

requirements ‘‘preclude the

development or implementation of more

efficient railroad transportation

equipment or other transportation

innovations under existing law.’’

In its rulemaking petition, TCRR

requested FRA exercise its discretionary

authority under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to

exempt its high-speed passenger rail

trainsets from the requirements of 49

U.S.C. 20302, which mandates that

railroad vehicles be equipped with: (1)

Secure sill steps and efficient hand

brakes; (2) secure grab irons or

handholds on vehicle ends and sides for

greater security to individuals coupling

and uncoupling vehicles; and (3) the

standard height of drawbars. See 49

U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B), (a)(2), and (a)(3).

On May 14, 2020, FRA granted similar

relief under 49 U.S.C. 20306 to exempt

Amtrak’s new high-speed passenger rail

trainsets,

68

based on evidence presented

at a public hearing held on December

11, 2019. TCRR also testified at this

hearing in support of Amtrak’s petition

and noted its pending need for similar

technological exemption. FRA notes no

substantive differences in the

justification for exemption between

TCRR and Amtrak, as both requests

pertain to the implementation of

modern high-speed passenger rail

trainsets. FRA believes its exemption for

such technology under Amtrak’s

petition could be extended to any

similar high-speed passenger rail

trainset technology, but given the

unique nature of this rulemaking, and

the overlap in timing between TCRR’s

petition and FRA’s decision to grant

Amtrak’s petition, FRA felt it was

appropriate to conduct proceedings

under 49 U.S.C. 20306 as part of the

hearing held on May 4, 2020. By taking

this approach, FRA could ensure

transparency and provide ample

opportunity for comment from those

most affected by the TCRR proposal.

In support of its request for an

exemption, TCRR noted in its petition

that safety appliances such as sill steps,

or end or side handholds, are typically

used in conventional North American

practice by maintenance personnel who

ride the side of trainsets in yards or

maintenance facilities for marshalling

operations. The N700 series trainset, as

described in this final rule, is a fixed-

consist trainset where trainset make-up

only occurs in defined locations where

maintenance personnel can safely climb

on, under, or between the equipment,

consistent with the protections afforded

under 49 CFR part 218.

In addition, the leading and trailing

ends of the N700 series trainset are

equipped with an automatic coupler

located behind a removable shroud.

These couplers, as proposed by TCRR,

will only be used for rescue operations

in accordance with TCRR’s operating

rules, and provide for the safe coupling

of one trainset to another (i.e., each end

will have automatic self-centering

couplers that couple to other trainsets

on impact, and uncouple by

mechanisms that do not require a

person to go between trainsets or

activate a traditional uncoupling lever).

Further, as proposed, level boarding

will be provided at all locations in

trainset maintenance facilities where

crew and maintenance personnel are

normally required to access or

disembark trainsets. Moreover, because

the equipment is a fixed-consist trainset

in which individual vehicles are semi-

permanently coupled and, as noted

above, individual vehicles can only be

disconnected in repair facilities where

personnel can work on, under, or

between units under protections

consistent with 49 CFR part 218, having

drawbars at the statutorily prescribed

height is unnecessary.

As such, there is not a functional need

to equip the ends of the trainsets with

sill steps, end or side handholds, or

uncoupling levers. As this technology is

intended to operate at high-speeds, the

inclusion of these appurtenances would

have a significant and detrimental

impact on the aerodynamics of the

trainset. This increase in the

aerodynamic footprint would negatively

impact both efficiency and aerodynamic

noise emissions.

TCRR also noted that trainset

securement will be provided by the use

of wheel chocks in addition to stringent

operating rules and procedures, which

will be consistent with the service-

proven procedures utilized on the

Tokaido Shinkansen system. In

addition, as proposed in the NPRM,

TCRR will be required to demonstrate,

as part of its vehicle qualification

procedures, that the procedures

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See 05.04.2020—TCRR Telephonic Hearing

Transcript at page 17–30, available at

www.regulations.gov, Docket No. FRA–2019–0068,

Document ID: 2019–0068–0291.

effectively secure the trainset (see

§ 299.607).

In sum, TCRR asserted that requiring

compliance with the identified statutory

requirements would serve to preclude

the development or implementation of

more efficient railroad transportation

equipment or other transportation

innovations under existing law.

During the hearing conducted on May

4, 2020, TCRR provided testimony in

support of its exemption request, which

reiterated its position stated in its

rulemaking petition, which is

summarized below.

69

TCRR testified that, with respect to

couplers being able to couple

automatically on impact and capable of

being uncoupled without the necessity

of an individual going between ends of

vehicles, that the inter-car connections

and coupling mechanisms on TCRR’s

trainsets are different than those

envisioned by 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(A).

TCRR explained that its trainsets can

only be separated at a maintenance

facility, as the separation of the trainset

requires special tools and procedures to

safety disconnect the inter-car

mechanical and electrical connections.

Separation at a maintenance facility also

provides railroad employees needing to

go between individual cars proper safety

protection. Further, TCRR testified that

its trainsets will be equipped with

rescue couplers at each end of the

trainset in the event a trainset needs to

be rescued from the ROW. These rescue

couplers are located within a removable

shroud at each end of the train set, and

are automatic couplers, in that they

couple upon impact.

With respect to 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(2),

which requires secure grab irons or

handholds on the ends and sides of

vehicles for greater security for

individuals involved with coupling and

uncoupling vehicles, TCRR testified that

these are not necessary due to the

coupling arrangement of its trainset,

described above. TCRR further testified

that inclusion of these safety appliances

would have a significant and

detrimental impact on the aerodynamic

performance of the trainset and

significantly increase the aerodynamic

noise generated from the trainset. TCRR

stated that providing an exemption from

these requirements is consistent with

the treatment of similar equipment.

TCRR further testified with respect to

49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(3), which requires

drawbars to be of a standard height as

specified by FRA regulation, that TCRR

will not conduct any type of joint

operation with conventional freight or

passenger equipment. Accordingly, as

TCRR testified, there is no need to have

couplers at a standard height, as TCRR’s

trainsets will have no need to couple to

dissimilar equipment.

TCRR next testified with respect to 49

U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(B), which requires

vehicles to be equipped with secure sill

steps and efficient handbrakes, that

TCRR’s trainset will not be equipped

with a handbrake. TCRR further testified

that its unattended trainsets will be

secured through a combination of an

urgent brake application, which is

equivalent to an emergency brake

application in the U.S., and the use of

wheel chocks. According to TCRR’s

testimony, this is reflective of JRC’s

practice on the Tokaido Shinkansen

system, which has a demonstrated

safety record. TCRR also testified that its

operating rules will also define

securement procedures, which will be

based on the service-proven procedures

employed by JRC.

TCRR also testified that sill steps and

vertical handholds are not necessary for

railroad employees to access or

disembark from its trainsets. TCRR

offered that it will have provisions for

high-level boarding at all locations

(passenger stations and maintenance

facilities) an employee could be

expected to access or disembark a

trainset.

As noted above, FRA received several

comments regarding TCRR’s request for

exemption. Some comments concerned

the effect that the lack of identified

safety appliances would have on the

ability for TCRR to separate a train in

the event of an emergency, while other

comments concerned the impact that

the absence of said appliance would

have to emergency egress and first

responder access to the trainset. In both

instances, while FRA deeply appreciates

the commenters’ concerns with respect

to the efficacy of emergency response,

assisting in emergency rescue access is

not the purpose of the safety appliances

in question, and in many ways, what

TCRR has proposed exceeds common

practice for emergency passenger egress

and first responder rescue access within

the U.S.

In addition, FRA would like to

address the comments related to the

separation of trains in an emergency.

While semi-permanently coupled

passenger equipment is virtually

universal for high-speed operations, it is

also very common throughout

conventional passenger and freight

operations throughout the U.S., most

often seen in Multiple Unit (MU)

trainset operations and articulated

freight cars (e.g., double-stack well car

sets). It is not common practice to break

a train apart as part of an emergency

procedure. Rescue of an entire disabled

trainset is the most common scenario,

and TCRR will be equipping its lead

units with rescue couplers and other

appliances to allow for a disabled

trainset to be towed, if necessary. If a

train is disabled such that intermediate

uncoupling would be required to move

it, it would typically be more

appropriate to evacuate the impaired

train either to a safe location, or by

cross-transfer to another trainset,

pursuant to the railroad’s emergency

plans. FRA notes that it is not the intent

of the safety appliance requirements to

prevent the use of semi-permanently

coupled or articulated rail vehicles,

whether by statute or regulation. Rather,

the purpose of these appliances is to

ensure that railroad personnel are

provided the means to perform their

duties safely, particularly where

coupling or switching are common

place. Notably, while the absence of

such practice reduces the operational

flexibility afforded to the railroad, it

also serves to reduce the hazards that

railroad personnel are exposed to,

which, in itself, is a worthwhile

application of safe practice being

proposed for TCRR.

Notwithstanding FRA’s prior

statements on this topic, FRA received

several comments expressing concern

over first responder access to a trainset

that is not equipped with traditional

safety appliances. As discussed

previously, safety appliances are

primarily for railroad employee

protection. Other rescue access and

emergency egress systems are relied on

to facilitate the entry of first responders

into a trainset, and evacuation of

passengers off a trainset, such as rescue

access/emergency egress windows and

doors, and roof spots, to name a few.

See, generally, subpart D—Rolling

Stock. Although safety appliances, if

present, may be used for rescue access

and emergency egress, it is not the

primary function of these appliances. In

addition, the safety appliances that

would typically be utilized to access a

trainset are not required under statute,

and in virtually all cases, are

insufficient for emergency egress and

access needs.

Safety appliances as not required to

be part of the required emergency

systems for passenger equipment.

Generally, it is FRA’s position that the

safest location for a passenger during an

emergency is within the trainset or

passenger car. There are limited

circumstances where an evacuation to

an adjacent car would be necessary, and

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See FRA Docket No. FRA–2019–0068,

Document ID: FRA–2019–0068–0039.

only in a life-threatening scenario is

passenger self-evacuation off a train

necessary. In addition, FRA also

generally assumes that first responders

will have certain equipment with them

when responding to an emergency

involving a train, to include ladders,

axes, portable jaws-of-life, and other

access-gaining tools. Furthermore,

TCRR’s proposal includes the use of

deployable ladders with handrails to

facilitate egress and access from the

trainset to ground level in the event of

an emergency or other appropriate

situation. The use of such on-board

ladders, while not required by this

regulation, provide a superior means to

get on or off the trainset in such

scenarios than any traditional safety

appliance, particularly for first

responders. Further, not all emergencies

require an immediate stopping of the

trainset, as it may be more efficient to

meet first responders at a dedicated

location (such as a station location, or

a location where access has been

specifically planned for) to permit easier

access to the trainset. Understandably,

FRA is also aware that there may be

emergency situations that will not

permit continued travel along the ROW,

such as a derailment of the equipment.

FRA also received a comment from

Delta Troy challenging the legality of

virtual hearings to satisfy the hearing

requirement of 49 U.S.C. 20306.

70

In its

comment, Delta Troy argued that virtual

hearings are not an adequate or

sufficient replacement for the value of a

public hearing during notice-and-

comment rulemaking, in addition to the

statutory requirement that findings

under 49 U.S.C. 20306 be based on

evidence developed ‘‘at a hearing.’’ In

support of its position, Delta Troy stated

that conducting a virtual hearing would

necessarily limit and truncate public

engagement and discourse. And that

‘‘untold members of the public’’ would

be precluded from participation because

they lack adequate internet access,

whether due to financial, technological,

or other reasons. In conclusion, Delta

Troy stated that a virtual hearing would

not meet the requirements of 49 U.S.C.

20306, nor would it comport with ‘‘the

spirit of public comment’’ as described

in the APA. FRA disagrees and notes

that 49 U.S.C. 20306 is silent as to the

manner in which hearings may be

conducted. As discussed under section

III. Proceedings to Date, the telephonic

hearings that FRA conducted

represented only a change in the way

information was exchanged. Further, the

change to a telephonic hearing was

made specifically to address the internet

reliability concerns raised by Delta Troy

and other commenters.

Based on the evidence developed at

the hearing, including supporting

information provided in TCRR’s

rulemaking petition, FRA is providing

TCRR with its requested relief, as not

doing so would preclude the

development or implementation of more

efficient railroad transportation

equipment. FRA makes clear, though,

that this relief will be in effect for high-

speed trainsets, used only on TCRR’s

system, for the life of each variation put

into service. If the equipment is sold or

transferred to any other entity in the

U.S., that entity would have to request

its own relief under 49 U.S.C. 20306.

E. Incorporation by Reference

FRA is incorporating by reference six

Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) and

three ASTM International (ASTM)

standards. As required by 1 CFR 51.5,

FRA has summarized the standards it is

incorporating by reference and has

shown the reasonable availability of

those standards here. The Japanese

Industrial Standards are reasonably

available to all interested parties online

at www.jsa.or.jp (Japanese site), or

www.jsa.or.jp/en (English site). In

addition, the ASTM standards are

reasonably available to all interested

parties online at www.astm.org.

In § 299.13(d)(4) and (5), FRA

incorporates by reference three versions

of JIS E 1101, ‘‘Flat bottom railway rails

and special rails for switches and

crossings of non-treated steel.’’ JIS E

1101:2001 addresses the manufacturing

of the steel rail. It specifies the quality

and tests for flat bottom railway rails of

non-treated steel, with a calculated mass

of 30 kg/m or more, and special rails for

those railway switches and crossings.

JIS E 1101:2006 and JIS E 1101:2012

amend JIS E 1101:2001 by updating

references to other cited standards (e.g.,

updating the title to the cited reference),

updating references to specific clauses

within a cited standard, or by deleting

a reference to a cited standard. By

incorporating these standards by

reference, TCRR will be required to use

rail that is manufactured to the same

specifications as the rail used on the

Tokaido Shinkansen system, which will

help ensure that the rail side of the

wheel-rail interface remains identical to

that used on the service-proven high-

speed lines of JRC.

Under § 299.403(b), FRA incorporates

by reference two versions of JIS E 7105

‘‘Rolling Stock—Test methods of static

load for body structures.’’ JIS E

7105:2006 addresses test methods for

trainset carbodies. It specifies the test

methods of static load for confirming

strength, rigidity, and the like of body

structures for passenger stock, such as

electric railcars, internal combustion

railcars, and passenger cars, principally.

JIS E 7105:2011 amends JIS E 7105:2006

by updating references to other cited

standards (e.g., updating the title to the

cited reference), updating references to

specific clauses within a cited standard,

or by updating specifications from the

2006 version. By incorporating these

standards by reference, FRA will

maintain the same strength and rigidity

of TCRR’s trainset carbody structure.

This will help preserve the occupied

volume from premature degradation due

to typical in-service loads and vibration.

Under § 299.409(g), FRA incorporates

by reference JIS B 8265:2010

‘‘Construction of pressure vessels

general principles.’’ JIS B 8265:2010

addresses manufacturing of pressure

vessels and specifies certain

requirements for the construction and

fixtures of pressure vessels with the

design pressure of less than 30 MPa. By

incorporating this standard by reference,

FRA will ensure that the pressurized air

reservoirs used in TCRR’s trainset are

designed and constructed to the same

service-proven standard as used in the

N700 trainsets currently operated on the

Tokaido Shinkansen system.

Under § 299.423(e)(1) and (f)(3), FRA

incorporates by reference ASTM D

4956–07

ε1

‘‘Standard Specification for

Retroreflective Sheeting for Traffic

Control,’’ approved March 15, 2007.

ASTM D 4956–07

ε1

covers flexible,

nonexposed glass bead lens and

microprismatic, retroreflective sheeting

designed for use on traffic control signs,

delineators, barricades, and other

devices.

Under § 299.423(e)(1), FRA

incorporates by reference ASTM E 810–

03 ‘‘Standard Test Method for

Coefficient of Retroreflection of

Retroreflective Sheeting Utilizing the

Coplanar Geometry,’’ approved

February 10, 2003. Test method ASTM

E 810–03 describes an instrument

measurement of the retroreflective

performance of retroreflective sheeting.

Under § 299.423(e)(2), FRA incorporates

by reference ASTM E 2073–07

‘‘Standard Test Method for Photopic

Luminance of Photoluminescent

(Phosphorescent) Markings,’’ approved

July 1, 2007. FRA also incorporates by

reference Section 5.2 of ASTM E 2073–

07 under § 299.423(e)(2) and

§ 299.423(e)(2)(ii). Test method ASTM E

2073–07 covers a procedure for

determining the photopic luminance of

photoluminescent (phosphorescent)

markings. It does not cover scotopic or

mesopic measurements. Incorporation

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40 CFR 1500–1508.

72

40 CFR 1505.2.

73

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallashttps://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger.

74

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement.

of the three ASTM standards by

reference is to ensure that the materials

used for interior and exterior emergency

markings can provide adequate

photoluminescence or retroreflectivity.

As the markings utilizing these

materials will be relied on during

emergencies (either for passenger egress

or first responder access), it is important

that the marking can be easily identified

and followed should the emergency

occur during hours of limited visibility,

with possible degradation or complete

loss of interior lighting. The standards

either provide performance

specifications for design and

manufacture, or provide the testing

methods.

VI. FRA’s Record of Decision

This final rule constitutes the Record

of Decision (ROD) for FRA’s publication

of an RPA, pursuant to NEPA and the

NEPA implementing regulations from

the Council on Environmental Quality

(CEQ).

71

In making its decision to

proceed with the RPA, FRA considered

the information and analysis included

in the Draft and Final EIS, public and

agency comments submitted on the

Draft and Final EIS for Dallas to

Houston High-Speed Rail, technical

supporting information, and public and

agency comments submitted on the

NPRM.

As required by CEQ regulations,

72

in

addition to the Agency’s decision, this

final rule and ROD sets forth a summary

of the alternatives considered by FRA in

reaching its decision, including the

environmentally preferable alternative,

and identifies the mitigation measures

to be implemented.

A. Summary of Alternatives Considered

TCRR identified its intent to construct

and operate a high-speed rail system

between Dallas and Houston in its

rulemaking petition. Therefore, while

FRA’s decision is whether to publish an

RPA (or take other regulatory action

necessary for the implementation of the

Tokaido Shinkansen technology within

the U.S.), FRA also identified and

evaluated six end-to-end Build

Alternatives in the Draft and Final EIS

to understand the potential impacts that

could result if FRA publishes the RPA

and TCRR advances the proposed Dallas

to Houston project.

To identify the six end-to-end Build

Alternatives evaluated in the Draft and

Final EIS, FRA completed a two-step

alternatives development process.

Section 2.4, Alternatives Considered,

Development and Evaluation of

Proposed Corridors of the Final EIS,

summarizes the process FRA undertook

to identify four corridor alternatives.

The Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail

Project, Corridor Alternatives Analysis

Technical Report, which describes the

corridor analysis in detail, is available

on FRA’s website.

73

Section 2.5, Alternatives Considered,

Development and Evaluation of Initial

Alignment, Station and TMF

Alternatives of the Final EIS, details the

process that FRA undertook to identify

the six build alternatives that were

evaluated in the Draft and Final EIS.

The complete analysis of alignment

alternatives is described in the Dallas to

Houston High Speed Rail Project,

Alignment Alternatives Analysis Report,

also available on FRA’s website.

1. No Build Alternative

As required by NEPA, the Final EIS

included the No Build Alternative, also

known as the alternative of no action, in

its analysis as the baseline for

comparison with Build Alternatives A

through F and the three Houston

Terminal Station Options. Under the No

Build Alternative, FRA would not

publish an RPA or take other regulatory

action necessary for the implementation

of the Tokaido Shinkansen technology

within the U.S.; therefore, TCRR would

not construct nor be able to operate the

HSR system and associated facilities.

Travel between Dallas and Houston

would continue via existing highway

(IH–45) and airport (Dallas Fort Worth

International Airport [DFW], Dallas

Love Field Airport [DAL], George Bush

Intercontinental Airport [IAH] and

William P. Hobby Airport [HOU])

infrastructure. See Section 2.61,

Alternatives Considered, No Build

Alternative of the Final EIS for a full

description of the No Build Alternative.

2. Build Alternatives

The two-step alternatives

development process resulted in the six

end-to-end Build Alternatives, A

through F, considered in the Draft and

Final EIS. For analytical purposes, each

alternative was divided into segments,

as depicted on Figure 2–28 of the Final

EIS.

74

Table 1 identifies the segments

that create each Build Alternative. In

addition to the track alignments, the

limits of disturbance evaluated for each

Build Alternative contains the

infrastructure necessary to support HSR

operations including stations, TMFs,

MOW Facilities, signaling and

communications infrastructure, Traction

Power Substations (TPSS), sectioning

posts, and sub-sectioning posts. See

Section 2.6.2, Alternatives Considered,

Build Alternatives of the Final EIS for

complete descriptions of the alternatives

and associated infrastructure.

The Final EIS analyzed the three

stations proposed by TCRR, the Dallas

Terminal Station, Brazos Valley

Intermediate Station in Grimes County,

and the Houston Terminal Station

(which included three station location

options in Houston). Stations and

platforms would be designed to

accommodate planned future

operations. Two TMFs would be located

near the terminal stations to serve as

cleaning and maintenance facilities for

the HSR trainsets. Each would occupy

approximately 100 acres and include

sidings for trainset storage, trainset car

washes and other facilities. Seven MOW

facilities would be located every 15 to

46 miles along the HSR ROW. Each

MOW facility would be approximately

35 acres and have sidings for MOW

equipment and sweeper vehicles.

Signaling and communications

infrastructure would typically be

between 0.1 and 0.3 acre and spaced no

more than 25 miles apart along the

alignment. Radio towers approximately

50 feet tall would be spaced at

approximately 6-mile intervals.

Approximately 14 TPSSs, including 2 at

the TMFs, would be spaced between 10

and 25 miles apart, generally adjacent to

or within 1 mile of existing 138 kV

transmission line. The TPSSs would

have a footprint of approximately 6

acres with a substation building of

approximately 2,200 square feet. An

anticipated 11 sectioning posts and nine

sub-sectioning posts would be placed

between the TPSSs. Each would have a

footprint of approximately one half to

one acre each, with a small electrical

building (approximately 1,600 square

feet).

T

ABLE

1—B

UILD

A

LTERNATIVES

A

T

HROUGH

F

Build alternative Segment

Alternative A ....................... 1, 2A, 3A, 4, 5.

Alternative B ....................... 1, 2A, 3B, 4, 5.

Alternative C ....................... 1, 2A, 3C, 5.

Alternative D ....................... 1, 2B, 3A, 4, 5.

Alternative E ....................... 1, 2B, 3B, 4, 5.

Alternative F ....................... 1, 2B, 3C, 5.

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CEQ’s Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning

CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act

Regulations, 46 FR 18026 (Mar. 23, 1981, as

amended 1986).

76

See Section 2.7, Alternatives Considered,

Preferred Alternative of the Final EIS for a more

detailed comparison of the potential environmental

impacts that differentiate the Build Alternatives and

Houston Terminal Station Options.

77

Including air quality, elderly and handicapped,

socioeconomic, electromagnetic field,

environmental justice, vibration, aesthetics and

visual, and greenhouse gas emissions.

78

Specific impacts are not included in this

comparison table if they are equal across Build

Alternatives A, B and C. Section references within

this table are to sections of the Final EIS.

79

Threatened and Endangered Species acreages

include habitat for species with mapped habitat that

may be impacted, including the Houston toad,

large-fruited sand verbena, and Navasota ladies’-

tresses. Threatened and endangered species in the

Study Area that may be impacted, but that do not

have mapped habitat, include the interior least tern

and the whooping crane.

80

Road modifications reflect the number of

reroutes, road adjustments, or road over rail

constructions that would occur. Some roads are

affected by multiple modifications (such as IH–45).

Modifications do not reflect total number of roads,

but total number of road construction sites.

81

Shared access roads are included in roadway

modification lengths. Shared access roads will be

developed to provide for maintenance, emergency

response access, and private property access with

a corresponding reduction in the number of new

public roads to decrease burden on roadway

authorities. Shared access roads would be

constructed and maintained by TCRR.

82

Anxiety Aerodrome would be directly

impacted by Segment 3B, which is part of

Alternatives B and E. Indirect impacts to special

status farmland in Section 3.13, Land Use of the

Final EIS are defined as a 25-foot setback added to

the LOD to account for indirect loss of productive

farmland to accommodate the use of farm and ranch

equipment or impacts such as induced wind and

changes in irrigation.

Segment 1 is located in Dallas County

and is common to all Build Alternatives.

The segment is approximately 18-miles

and includes the Dallas Terminal

Station, Dallas TMF and a TPSS.

Segment 2A, located in Ellis County

beginning about 1.5 miles south of the

Ellis County Line, is approximately 23

miles in length. Segment 2A includes

one MOW facility and one TPSS.

Segment 2B is also located in Ellis

County and is approximately 23 miles

in length. Segment 2B includes one

MOW facility and one TPSS. Segment

3A is located in Ellis and Navarro

counties. It is approximately 30 miles in

length and includes one siding-off track

and two TPSSs. Segment 3B is also

located in Ellis and Navarro counties

and is approximately 31 miles in length.

Segment 3B includes one siding off

track and one TPSS. Segment 3C,

approximately 113 miles long, is located

in Navarro, Freestone, Leon, Madison

and Grimes counties. Segment 3C

includes two MOW facilities, one siding

off track and six TPSSs. Segment 4 is

located in Freestone, Limestone, Leon,

Madison and Grimes counties. It is

approximately 80 miles in length and

includes two MOW facilities, two siding

off tracks and four TPSSs. Segment 5, at

approximately 84 miles, is common to

all Build Alternatives. It is located in

Grimes, Waller and Harris counties.

Segment 5 includes the Brazos Valley

Intermediate Station, one TMF, two

MOW facilities, one siding off track and

four TPSSs.

In addition, as detailed in Section

2.5.2.3, Alternatives Considered,

Houston Terminal Station Options of

the Final EIS, three terminal station

options, including the Industrial Site,

Northwest Mall and Northwest Transit

Center were considered for the Houston

Terminal Station located in northwest

Houston within the vicinity of US 290,

IH–10 and IH–610 north of Post Oak

Road, west of IH–610 and just north of

Hempstead Road.

B. Environmentally Preferable

Alternative

The environmentally preferable

alternative is the alternative that is least

damaging to the environment or that

best protects, preserves, and enhances

historic, cultural, and natural

resources.

75

After considering the

comparative analysis of the potential

impacts of the No Build Alternative,

Build Alternatives A–F, and the three

Houston Terminal Station options

presented in the Final EIS, FRA finds

that Build Alternative A (comprised of

Segments 1, 2A, 3A, 4, and 5) and the

Houston Northwest Mall Terminal

Station Option, which were identified

as the Preferred Alternative in the Final

EIS, are the environmentally preferable

alternatives that provide the best

balance to transportation goals while

minimizing physical impacts to the

built and natural environment.

76

1. Environmentally Preferable Build

Alternative

For many resource areas, there are no

distinguishable differences in impacts

among Build Alternatives A–F.

77

When

the environmental impacts of Build

Alternatives A–F are compared, Build

Alternative A would have the overall

fewest permanent impacts to the

socioeconomic, natural, physical, and

cultural resources environment,

including generally fewer permanent

acquisitions and displacements, and

impacts to transportation, floodplains,

and waters of the U.S.

In addition, Segment 2B, a component

of Build Alternatives D, E, and F, would

cross U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(USACE) fee land. Coordination with

USACE identified that the USACE

National Non-Recreation Outgrant

Policy would prevent USACE from

carrying forward Segment 2B in the

USACE evaluation criteria, as there is a

viable alternative not on federal

property. Environmental resources that

differentiate Build Alternatives A, B,

and C are presented in Table 2.

T

ABLE

2—C

OMPARISON OF

B

UILD

A

LTERNATIVES

A, B

AND

C

78

Evaluation criteria Measure Alt A Alt B Alt C

Water Quality (Section 3.3)

Impaired Waterbodies—303(d) List ............................................................ Feet ..................... 344.7 517.4 496

Impaired Waterbodies Total ....................................................................... Feet ..................... 830.0 1,002.7 981.3

Groundwater Wells ..................................................................................... Count .................. 9 13 7

Noise and Vibration (Section 3.4)

Severe Noise Impact:

Residential ........................................................................................... Count .................. 10 12 10

Moderate Noise Impact:

Residential ........................................................................................... Count .................. 280 290 275

Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Section 3.5)

Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ........................................................... Count .................. 297 298 326

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ABLE

2—C

OMPARISON OF

B

UILD

A

LTERNATIVES

A, B

AND

C

78

—Continued

Evaluation criteria Measure Alt A Alt B Alt C

Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ................................................... Count .................. 155 155 165

Natural Ecological Systems and Protected Species (Section 3.6)

79

Protected Species Modeled Habitat—Temporary ...................................... Acres ................... 328 328 325

Protected Species Modeled Habitat—Permanent ...................................... Acres ................... 1,058 1,058 1,452

Waters of the U.S. (Section 3.7)

Stream Crossings—Temporary .................................................................. Feet ..................... 83,459 83,791 90,942

Stream Crossings—Permanent .................................................................. Feet ..................... 38,898 45,631 35,096

Wetlands—Temporary ................................................................................ Acres ................... 59.5 59.0 44.3

Wetlands—Permanent ................................................................................ Acres ................... 50.0 47.4 63.4

Waterbodies—Temporary ........................................................................... Acres ................... 33.5 36.3 30.4

Waterbodies—Permanent .......................................................................... Acres ................... 27.6 27.2 21.1

Floodplains (Section 3.8)

Impacts to 100-Year Floodplain ................................................................. Acres ................... 616 557 642

Impacts to 500-Year Floodplain ................................................................. Acres ................... 132 132 133

Permanent Impacts to 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains ..................... Acres ................... 529 479 579

Temporary Impacts to 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains ...................... Acres ................... 219 210 196

Total Acres of Impacted Floodplain ........................................................... Acres ................... 748 689 775

Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct Crossings of FEMA Zone AE ................. Count .................. 63 63 71

Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct Crossings of FEMA Zone A ................... Count .................. 126 142 137

Utilities and Energy (Section 3.9)

New Electric TPSS Connections ................................................................ Count .................. 13 12 13

Electric Utility Pole Adjustments ................................................................. Count .................. 85 85 74

Total Electric Connections and Adjustment ............................................... Count .................. 98 97 87

Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells ................................................................... Count .................. 37 37 22

Aesthetics and Scenic Resources (Section 3.10)

Total Number of Adverse Visual Resource Impacts .................................. Count .................. 11 11 10

Transportation (Section 3.11)

Road Modifications

80

(Public and Private) ................................................ Count .................. 138 150 102

Road Modifications

81

(Public only) ............................................................ Count .................. 59 66 79

Length added to Public Roads (miles) ....................................................... Miles ................... 16.8 21.4 46.9

Length removed from Public Roads (miles) ............................................... Miles ................... 5.1 5.0 27.2

Impacts to airports

82

.................................................................................. Count .................. 0 1 0

Land Use (Section 3.13)

LU Conversion—Temporary ....................................................................... Acres ................... 2,553.4 2,532.9 2,393.2

LU Conversion—Permanent ....................................................................... Acres ................... 6,619.8 6,814.0 7,295.6

Special Status Farmland—Temporary ....................................................... Acres ................... 1,710.8 1,690.4 1,459.8

Special Status Farmland—Permanent ....................................................... Acres ................... 3,534.5 3,764.3 3,573.4

Special Status Farmland—Indirect

5

........................................................... Acres ................... 847.5 888.2 697.3

Displacement—Commercial (primary) ........................................................ Count .................. 42 42 65

Displacement—Residence (primary) .......................................................... Count .................. 235 255 239

Displacement—Community Facilities (primary) ......................................... Count .................. 2 2 3

Estimated Permanent Parcel Acquisitions ................................................. Count .................. 1,731 1,814 1,789

Estimated Temporary Parcel Acquisitions ................................................. Count .................. 272 277 259

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Agriculture ........................................... Count .................. 196 223 196

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Commercial ......................................... Count .................. 12 12 18

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Cultural/Civic Resources .................... Count .................. 2 2 1

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Oil and Gas ......................................... Count .................. 12 12 17

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Residence ........................................... Count .................. 49 50 51

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Transportation and Utilities ................. Count .................. 0 0 1

Safety and Security (Section 3.16)

Permanent Road Modifications resulting in 1 minute or more in addi-

tional through travel time. Count .................. 12 13 9

Total fire and EMS service areas bisected by construction ...................... Count .................. 56 57 51

Fire and EMS providers with high potential for construction effects ......... Count .................. 3 4 5

Fire and EMS providers with localized potential for construction effects .. Count .................. 8 7 6

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49 U.S.C. 303.

84

See Chapter 7.0, Section 4(f) and Section 6(f)

Evaluation, of the Final EIS.

85

Section references within this table are to

sections of the Final EIS.

T

ABLE

2—C

OMPARISON OF

B

UILD

A

LTERNATIVES

A, B

AND

C

78

—Continued

Evaluation criteria Measure Alt A Alt B Alt C

Recreational Facilities (Section 3.17)

Parks ........................................................................................................... Count .................. 0 0 1

Environmental Justice (Section 3.18)

Number of Minority and/or Low-Income block groups intersected by the

Study Area. Count .................. 80 80 81

Number of all block groups intersected by the Study Area ....................... Count .................. 118 118 119

Cultural Resources (Section 3.19)

Adverse Impacts to Historic Properties ...................................................... Count .................. 14 14 13

Soils and Geology (Section 3.20)

LOD Area .................................................................................................... Acres ................... 9,173.4 9,347.1 9,689.0

Shrink-Swell Potential—Low ...................................................................... Acres ................... 2,593.6 2,585.8 2,848.3

Shrink-Swell Potential—Moderate .............................................................. Acres ................... 1,458.4 1,465.1 1,485.0

Shrink-Swell Potential—High ...................................................................... Acres ................... 2,284.0 2,477.1 2,471.2

Shrink-Swell Potential—Very High ............................................................. Acres ................... 2,727.9 2,697.5 2,781.8

Erosion Potential—Low .............................................................................. Acres ................... 1,611.6 1,591.3 1,914.1

Erosion Potential—Moderate ...................................................................... Acres ................... 4,511.2 4,619.9 4,786.6

Erosion Potential—High ............................................................................. Acres ................... 2,963.5 3,036.8 2,907.9

Corrosion Potential—Low ........................................................................... Acres ................... 55.3 71.8 81.4

Corrosion Potential—Moderate .................................................................. Acres ................... 2,204.8 2,182.0 2,761.1

Corrosion Potential—High .......................................................................... Acres ................... 6,824.5 6,992.5 6,764.5

Prime Farmland Soils ................................................................................. Acres ................... 5,245.3 5,454.7 5,033.2

Source: AECOM, 2019.

2. Environmentally Preferable Houston

Station Option

Like the Build Alternatives, for most

resource areas, there are no

distinguishable differences among the

Houston Terminal Station Options.

When the environmental impacts of

each station option are compared, the

Houston Industrial Site Terminal

Station Option would have fewer

permanent impacts to the

socioeconomic, natural, physical, and

cultural resources environment.

However, the Houston Industrial Site

Terminal Station Option would require

the use of a resource protected by

Section 4(f) of the Department

Transportation Act,

83

which the other

Houston Terminal Station Options

would not.

84

Because of the special

consideration given to resources

protected under Section 4(f), FRA finds

that the Houston Industrial Site

Terminal Station Option is not

environmentally preferable.

When the environmental impacts of

Houston Northwest Mall Terminal

Station Option and Northwest Transit

Center Terminal Station Option are

compared, the Houston Northwest Mall

Terminal Station Option would have

fewer permanent impacts to the

socioeconomic, natural, physical, and

cultural resources environment, as

shown in Table 3.

T

ABLE

3—C

OMPARISON OF

H

OUSTON

N

ORTHWEST

T

RANSIT

C

ENTER

T

ERMINAL

S

TATION

O

PTIONS AND

H

OUSTON

N

ORTHWEST

M

ALL

T

ERMINAL

S

TATION

O

PTION

85

Evaluation criteria Measure Northwest

Transit

Center

Northwest

Mall

Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Section 3.5)

Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites .................................................................................. Count ........................ 6 0

Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ......................................................................... Count ........................ 8 3

High-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ................................................................................. Count ........................ 0 0

Waters of the U.S. (Section 3.7)

Wetlands—Temporary ...................................................................................................... Acres ........................ 1.6 0.0

Waterbodies—Temporary ................................................................................................. Acres ........................ 0.10 0.0

Transportation (Section 3.11)

Intersections at LOS E or F .............................................................................................. Count ........................ 22 24

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FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Mitigation Commitments.

87

83 FR 59182 (Nov. 21, 2018).

T

ABLE

3—C

OMPARISON OF

H

OUSTON

N

ORTHWEST

T

RANSIT

C

ENTER

T

ERMINAL

S

TATION

O

PTIONS AND

H

OUSTON

N

ORTHWEST

M

ALL

T

ERMINAL

S

TATION

O

PTION

85

—Continued

Evaluation criteria Measure Northwest

Transit

Center

Northwest

Mall

Land Use (Section 3.13)

LU Conversion—Temporary ............................................................................................. Acres ........................ 11.8 27.4

LU Conversion—Permanent ............................................................................................. Acres ........................ 88.7 75.8

Displacement—Commercial (primary) .............................................................................. Count ........................ 15 22

Displacement—Community Facility (primary) ................................................................... Count ........................ 1 0

Estimated Permanent Parcel Acquisitions ........................................................................ Count ........................ 43 40

Estimated Temporary Parcel Acquisitions ........................................................................ Count ........................ 0 1

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Commercial ............................................................... Count ........................ 0 1

Socioeconomics and Community Facilities (Section 3.14)

Community Facility ............................................................................................................ Count ........................ 1 0

Cultural Resources (Section 3.19)

Adverse Impacts to Historic Properties ............................................................................ Count ........................ 1 0

Source: AECOM 2019.

C. Mitigation Commitments

FRA identified compliance and

mitigation measures based upon

identification of best practices and

technical consideration of the likely

success in implementation, Agency

consultations, comments on the Draft

and Final EIS, regulatory requirements,

and input from TCRR. These mitigation

commitments would avoid, minimize,

mitigate, or compensate for the potential

adverse impacts related to the

construction and/or operation of TCRR’s

proposed Dallas to Houston project.

TCRR has agreed to implement the

compliance and mitigation measures

identified in the Dallas to Houston

High-Speed Rail Mitigation

Commitments, which is located on

FRA’s website.

86

The compliance and

mitigation measures were also included

in the Final EIS. In addition, TCRR is

responsible for adhering to applicable

Federal, State, and local laws,

ordinances and requirements. TCRR has

agreed to maintain an environmental

compliance system to serve as a

database of compliance and mitigation

commitments and provide

accountability and transparency to

environmental regulatory agencies.

TCRR will also prepare a quarterly

report that summarizes the status of

implementing compliance and

mitigation measures by geographic area,

mitigation activities completed,

significant upcoming activities, and any

corrective actions taken for any

instances of non-compliance. TCRR will

make the quarterly report available to

the public by posting it on the TCRR

website.

VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13771,

and DOT Regulatory Policies and

Procedures

The TCRR high-speed system is

modeled on JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen

HSR system, which does not meet many

of the requirements under the Passenger

Equipment Safety Standards (Tier III)

final rule.

87

TCRR desires to maintain

the safety record of the Tokaido

Shinkansen HSR system, so it is

imperative that the systems approach to

safety and the philosophy of the JRC

system be implemented in the United

States. As such, TCRR is requesting,

through this rulemaking, that it comply

with regulations that are different, and

in some instances, more stringent than

the Tier III requirements.

FRA has a regulatory program that

addresses equipment, track, operating

practices, and human factors in the

existing, conventional railroad

environment. However, significant

operational and equipment differences

exist between the system contemplated

by TCRR and other passenger operations

in the United States. In many of the

railroad safety disciplines, FRA’s

existing regulations do not address the

operational characteristics of TCRR’s

system. Therefore, to ensure that this

new system will operate safely,

minimum Federal safety standards must

be in place when TCRR commences

operations.

Through this final rule, FRA will

regulate the TCRR system as a

standalone system. FRA stated in the

Tier III final rule that a standalone

system would have to combine all

aspects of railroad safety (such as

operating practices, signal and train

control, and track) that must be applied

to the individual system. Such an

approach covers more than passenger

equipment and would likely necessitate

particular ROW intrusion protection

and other safety requirements not

adequately addressed in FRA’s

regulations. Without this final rule,

TCRR would not be allowed to

implement its system as it does not meet

many of the requirements of FRA’s

existing regulations of general

applicability. Accordingly, by enabling

private activity that would otherwise be

prohibited, this final rule is an E.O.

13771 deregulatory action.

E.O. 12866 requires agencies to

account for additional regulatory

burdens that a particular regulatory

action would have on a regulated entity.

In the rulemaking context, under E.O.

12866, two similar forms of regulatory

action (e.g., a rulemaking versus a

waiver process) could have substantially

different burdens on a regulated entity.

For this reason, the methodology used

to evaluate burdens of a particular

regulatory action on a regulated entity

under E.O. 12866 will differ from the

methodology used under NEPA to

assess the potential environmental

impacts that may result from the

regulatory action. For more information

regarding the NEPA process, please see

section VII. F. National Environmental

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85 FR 14036, 14047.

89

5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

90

67 FR 53461, Aug. 16, 2002.

91

‘‘Size Eligibility Provisions and Standards,’’ 13

CFR part 121, subpart A.

92

44 U.S.C. 3501–3520.

93

5 CFR part 1320.

94

64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999).

95

Repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 20106.

96

45 U.S.C. 22–34, repealed and recodified at 49

U.S.C. 20701–20703.

97

See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S.

605 (1926).

Policy Act, or the Final EIS which has

been included in the rulemaking docket

(Docket No. FRA–2019–0068, Final

Environmental Impact Statement).

This final rule though, as an RPA, was

not subject to review under E.O. 12866,

as that applies only to rules of general

applicability. Accordingly, FRA

concluded that because this final rule

generally includes only voluntary

actions or alternative actions that would

be voluntary, the final rule does not

impart additional burdens on regulated

entities, specifically TCRR. Even though

not subject to E.O. 12866 review, FRA

has provided a qualitative discussion on

the costs, benefits, and alternatives

considered, which can be found under

section V. A. Executive Orders 12866

and 13771, and DOT Regulatory Policies

and Procedures of the NPRM.

88

Responses to comments on FRA’s

regulatory evaluation are under section

IV. M. Regulatory Evaluation of this

final rule.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and

Executive Order 13272; Regulatory

Flexibility Assessment

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of

1980

89

and E.O. 13272

90

require agency

review of proposed and final rules to

assess their impacts on small entities.

An agency must prepare a Final

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis unless it

determines and certifies that a rule, if

promulgated, would not have a

significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

‘‘Small entity’’ is defined in 5 U.S.C.

601 as a small business concern that is

independently owned and operated, and

is not dominant in its field of operation.

The SBA has authority to regulate issues

related to small businesses, and

stipulates in its size standards that a

‘‘small entity’’ in the railroad industry is

a for profit ‘‘line-haul railroad’’ that has

fewer than 1,500 employees, a ‘‘short

line railroad’’ with fewer than 500

employees, or a ‘‘commuter rail system’’

with annual receipts of less than seven

million dollars.

91

In addition, section

601(5) of the Small Business Act defines

‘‘small entities’’ as governments of

cities, counties, towns, townships,

villages, school districts, or special

districts with populations less than

50,000 that operate railroads. Federal

agencies may adopt their own size

standards for small entities in

consultation with SBA and in

conjunction with public comment.

Thus, in consultation with SBA, FRA

has published a final statement of

agency policy that formally establishes

‘‘small entities’’ or ‘‘small businesses’’

as railroads, contractors, and shippers

that meet the revenue requirements of a

Class III railroad—$20 million or less in

inflation-adjusted annual revenue—and

commuter railroads or small

government jurisdictions that serve

populations of 50,000 or less.

As this final rule applies only to one

railroad, TCRR, which provides

intercity rail passenger service between

Dallas and Houston, Texas, which have

populations larger than 50,000 people,

TCRR is not considered a small entity.

FRA invited all interested parties to

submit comments, data, and information

demonstrating the potential economic

impact on any small entity that would

result from the adoption of the final

rule. During the comment period, FRA

did not receive any comments from the

public or stakeholders regarding the

impact that the final rule would have on

small entities.

Accordingly, the Administrator of

FRA hereby certifies that this final rule

will not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1995,

92

and its

implementing regulations,

93

when

information collection requirements

pertain to nine or fewer entities, Office

of Management and Budget (OMB)

approval of the collection requirements

is not required. This regulation pertains

to one railroad, and therefore, OMB

approval of the paperwork collection

requirements in this final rule is not

required.

D. Federalism Implications

E.O. 13132, ‘‘Federalism,’’

94

requires

FRA to develop an accountable process

to ensure ‘‘meaningful and timely input

by State and local officials in the

development of regulatory policies that

have federalism implications.’’ ‘‘Policies

that have federalism implications’’ are

defined in the E.O. to include

regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct

effects on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government.’’ Under

E.O. 13132, an agency may not issue a

regulation with federalism implications

that imposes substantial direct

compliance costs and that is not

required by statute, unless the Federal

Government provides the funds

necessary to pay the direct compliance

costs incurred by State and local

governments, or the agency consults

with State and local government

officials early in the process of

developing the regulation. Where a

regulation has federalism implications

and preempts State law, the agency

seeks to consult with State and local

officials in the process of developing the

regulation.

This final rule has been analyzed

under the principles and criteria

contained in E.O. 13132. This final rule

will not have a substantial effect on the

States or their political subdivisions,

and it will not affect the relationships

between the Federal Government and

the States or their political subdivisions,

or the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. In addition, FRA

has determined that this regulatory

action will not impose substantial direct

compliance costs on the States or their

political subdivisions. Therefore, the

consultation and funding requirements

of E.O. 13132 do not apply.

However, the final rule arising from

this rulemaking could have preemptive

effect by operation of law under certain

provisions of the Federal railroad safety

statutes, specifically the former Federal

Railroad Safety Act of 1970,

95

and the

former Locomotive Boiler Inspection

Act (LIA).

96

Section 20106 provides that

States may not adopt or continue in

effect any law, regulation, or order

related to railroad safety or security that

covers the subject matter of a regulation

prescribed or order issued by the

Secretary of Transportation (with

respect to railroad safety matters) or the

Secretary of Homeland Security (with

respect to railroad security matters),

except when the State law, regulation,

or order qualifies under the ‘‘essentially

local safety or security hazard’’

exception to section 20106. Moreover,

the former LIA has been interpreted by

the Supreme Court as preempting the

field concerning locomotive safety.

97

E. International Trade Impact

Assessment

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979

prohibits Federal agencies from

engaging in any standards or related

activities that create unnecessary

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the

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Public Law 96–39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.

99

40 CFR 1500–1508.

100

64 FR 28545 (May 26, 1999), as updated in 78

FR 2713 (Jan. 14, 2013).

101

79 FR 36123 (Jun. 24, 2014).

102

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail

Scoping Report.

103

82 FR 60723 (Dec. 22, 2017).

104

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Draft Environmental Impact

Statement.

105

40 CFR 1502.13.

106

40 CFR 1502.14.

107

40 CFR 1502.14.

108

Section 3.1.2, Impacts of the TCRR HSR

System Independent of Location of the Final EIS.

109

85 FR 32390 (May 29, 2020).

United States. Legitimate domestic

objectives, such as safety, are not

considered unnecessary obstacles.

98

The

statute also requires consideration of

international standards and, where

appropriate, that they be the basis for

U.S. standards.

FRA has assessed the potential effect

of this final rule on foreign commerce

and believes that its requirements are

consistent with the Trade Agreements

Act. The requirements are safety

standards, which, as noted, are not

considered unnecessary obstacles to

trade.

F. National Environmental Policy Act

FRA is the lead agency for the

preparation of the EIS in compliance

with CEQ’s NEPA-implementing

regulations,

99

FRA’s Procedures for

Considering Environmental Impacts,

100

and associated environmental laws.

Cooperating agencies in the EIS include

the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal

Highway Administration, the Federal

Transit Administration, the STB,

USACE and the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service (USFWS). The Texas

Department of Transportation provided

technical assistance to FRA in the

preparation of the EIS.

FRA published a Notice of Intent

(NOI) to prepare an EIS in the Federal

Register on June 25, 2014.

101

The NOI

announced FRA’s intent to prepare an

EIS and the beginning of the scoping

period, provided a brief background on

TCRR’s proposal, and identified the

preliminary contents of the EIS, the

required approvals by the Federal

Government, and procedures expected

for coordination and public

involvement based on NEPA

requirements.

After publication of the NOI, FRA

conducted extended scoping through

January 9, 2015. Notification of the

extended scoping period included an

email to the mailing list, letters to

elected officials, FRA media advisory

and a notice on FRA’s website. FRA also

conducted a series of 12 public scoping

meetings in October and December

2014. A total of 1,943 individuals,

including 118 elected officials, attended

12 public scoping meetings. Additional

details on these public scoping meetings

may be found on FRA’s website.

102

After scoping, FRA identified the

Build Alternatives described in section

VI. A. Summary of Alternatives

Considered of this final rule, and

evaluated the potential impacts of those

alternatives in the Draft EIS. On

December 22, 2017, EPA published a

Notice of Availability (NOA) for the

Draft EIS in the Federal Register.

103

FRA circulated the Draft EIS to affected

local jurisdictions, State and Federal

agencies, tribes, community

organizations and other interested

groups, interested individuals and the

public. The Draft EIS was available for

public review at 24 locations and posted

on the FRA website.

104

FRA published

notices that the Draft EIS was available

for review in 27 newspapers throughout

the area of the proposed Dallas to

Houston project and FRA also mailed

notices to 2,722 individuals,

landowners and organizations on the

mailing list.

As required by NEPA, the EIS

identified the purpose and need to

which the agency is responding.

105

FRA’s purpose and need was developed

in response to the proposal in the

petition submitted by TCRR, which is

also the basis for FRA’s regulatory

action. Accordingly, in the EIS, FRA

identified that ‘‘the purpose of the

privately proposed Project is to provide

the public with reliable and safe HSR

transportation between Dallas and

Houston.’’ The need is described in

detail in Section 1.2.2, Introduction,

Need of the Final EIS. The Draft EIS

analyzed six end-to-end Build

Alternatives (Alternatives A through F)

and three Houston Terminal Station

Options: The Houston Industrial Site

Station Terminal, the Houston

Northwest Mall Terminal Station, and

the Houston Northwest Transit Center

Terminal Station, as well as the No

Build Alternative. The Build

Alternatives included a terminal station

in Dallas and an intermediate station in

Grimes County. As required by CEQ

regulations,

106

the Draft EIS identified

Build Alternative A as the Preferred

Alternative. The Draft EIS did not

identify a preferred Houston Terminal

Station option.

The public comment period for the

Draft EIS ran from December 22, 2017

through March 9, 2018. FRA conducted

11 public hearings to accept agency and

public comments on the Draft EIS

during the comment period. FRA

received a total of 25,309 comments

from approximately 6,000 individuals.

A total of 2,971 individuals, including

84 elected officials, attended the 11

public hearings. See Section 9.6, Public

and Agency Involvement, Draft EIS of

the Final EIS for more information on

the public comment period and hearing

format.

FRA reviewed and assessed all

comments (written and oral) received

during the public comment period on

the Draft EIS through the preparation of

the Final EIS. These comments helped

to inform FRA’s development of the

Final EIS. FRA responded to all public

comments in the Final EIS.

The Final EIS identifies, evaluates,

and documents the potential

environmental and socioeconomic

effects of FRA’s proposed action. This

includes implementing TCRR’s

proposed HSR service between Dallas

and Houston as described in TCRR’s

petition, which is the only future

operating location TCRR has identified

to FRA. As required by CEQ

regulations,

107

the Final EIS identified

Build Alternative A (comprised of

Segments 1, 2A, 3A, 4, and 5) and the

Houston Northwest Mall Terminal

Station Option as the Preferred

Alternative.

FRA’s rulemaking would enable the

safe operation of TCRR’s HSR system in

locations other than between Dallas and

Houston, even though FRA is aware of

no proposal to operate such service.

Thus, the Final EIS also evaluates and

documents the reasonably foreseeable

potential beneficial and adverse

environmental impacts of implementing

TCRR’s HSR system in any location

within the United States.

108

However, as

TCRR has not proposed to operate in

any other location, discussion of

location-specific impacts, other than the

service proposed in TCRR’s rulemaking

petition and conceptual engineering,

would be speculative.

FRA signed the Final EIS on May 15,

2020, and EPA published an NOA for

the EIS in the Federal Register on May

29, 2020.

109

FRA also circulated the

Final EIS to affected local jurisdictions,

State and Federal agencies, tribes,

community organizations and other

interested groups, interested individuals

and the public. The Final EIS was made

available for public review at 24

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FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Final Environmental Impact

Statement.

111

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Final EIS Errata and Updated Information.

locations and was posted on the FRA

website.

110

FRA also provided 25 print

copies and 200 electronic copies (via

USB flash drive) of the Final EIS to the

public, upon request. The NOA was

published in 26 newspapers throughout

the area of the proposed Dallas to

Houston project and mailed notices to

5,018 individuals, landowners and

organizations on the mailing list.

1. Summary of Comments on the Final

EIS

FRA reviewed and analyzed

comments received since the Final EIS

was released on May 29, 2020. FRA

received a total of 96 comment

submissions from approximately 76

individuals, agencies, businesses, and/

or organizations between May 29, 2020

and July 28, 2020. Submissions were

categorized by comment topic, which

resulted in some submissions being split

into multiple comments, and in total

FRA received 143 comments. In general,

comments were regarding impacts to

transportation, cultural resources, build

alternatives, project viability, general

project support or opposition, or the

overall NEPA process. Comments

received have raised no new substantive

issues relevant to environmental

concerns from those received during the

public comment period of the Draft EIS

(see Appendix H, Response to Draft EIS

Comments of the Final EIS) or on topics

not already addressed within the Final

EIS. However, several comments raised

issues that warrant clarification or

correction here, specifically comments

related to the capital cost of TCRR’s

proposed Dallas to Houston project, and

safety concerns related to electrical

arcing from the HSR system and

proximity to natural gas pipelines.

Several commenters noted that capital

costs publicly reported by TCRR in

April 2020 ($30 billion) differ from the

capital costs reported in the Final EIS

($16–19 billion). The capital costs

estimate in the Final EIS (Section

3.14.5.2.3, Socioeconomics and

Community Facilities, Economic

Impacts) includes construction labor,

materials, indirect costs, and

approximately $2.6 billion for systems

and rolling stock.

Additional information provided by

TCRR clarified that the $30 billion

capital costs reported by Texas Central

Board Chairman Drayton McLane in an

April 8, 2020, letter was based on the

overall conservative project costs. This

value included the direct costs to

design, construct, and commission the

rail system as portrayed in the Final EIS,

but also other indirect costs excluded

from the Final EIS analysis (e.g., land

acquisition, litigation, property taxes,

insurance, financing costs, and

increased costs of foreign supply). TCRR

also reported that the $30 billion

included contingency and increased

escalation of costs.

FRA believes that the increased

escalation costs could result in larger

economic benefits than what was

identified in the Final EIS. Therefore,

the escalation values in the $16 billion

and $19 billion ($2019) projections from

the Final EIS represent a more

conservative estimate of the potential

beneficial impacts.

Comments regarding safety concerns

related to electrical arcing from the HSR

system and proximity to natural gas

pipelines were similar to the comments

FRA received on those topics in

response to the NPRM. FRA notes that

proximity to pipelines was addressed in

the Final EIS (See Section 3.9, Utilities

and Energy) and in the detailed

discussion in response to comments in

section IV. C. General Safety Oversight,

of this final rule. As discussed in

section IV. H. Electrical Arcing from the

Overhead Catenary System, of this final

rule, this occurrence is part of the

normal operation of an electrical

traction power system like the one

proposed by TCRR, and by itself does

not pose any particular safety risk. FRA

does not believe there is a potential

environmental impact or safety concern

as a result of this phenomenon that

requires assessment under NEPA.

Clarifications and/or updates to the

Final EIS text, some of which were

identified in comments submitted on

the Final EIS, are included in the Final

EIS Errata and Updated Information.

111

2. Potential Environmental Impacts

The Final EIS assessed the potential

beneficial and adverse environmental

impacts of FRA’s proposed rulemaking.

The Final EIS considered impacts from

TCRR’s proposed project, the

approximately 240-mile, for-profit, HSR

system connecting Dallas and Houston

based on JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen

system technology, as described in

Section 2.2, Alternatives Considered,

Proposed HSR Infrastructure and

Operations of the Final EIS and in the

rulemaking petition submitted by TCRR.

The HSR service between Dallas and

Houston is the only proposed service or

future operating location TCRR has

identified to FRA and therefore FRA

determined it was appropriate to

evaluate the potential project-specific

impacts of this proposed service. The

potential impacts that would result from

implementing the proposed project are

identified and discussed in Chapter 3.0,

Affected Environment and

Environmental Consequences and

Chapter 4, Indirect and Cumulative

Impacts, of the Final EIS and are

summarized below in Table 4.

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Evaluation criteria Measure Build alts. A–F Houston Terminal

Station options Total

Air Quality (Final EIS Section 3.2)

Air Quality Impacts ....................................................................... N/A .................. Net emissions benefit for permanent operations, temporary

construction impacts.

Water Quality (Final EIS Section 3.3)

Impaired Waterbodies—303(d) List ............................................. Feet ................. 344.7–517.4 0 344.7–517.4

Impaired Waterbodies with TMDLs .............................................. Feet ................. 485.3 0 485.3

Impaired Waterbodies Total ......................................................... Feet ................. 830–1,002.7 0 830–1,002.7

Active Public Water System Wells ............................................... Count ............... 1 0 1

Groundwater Wells ....................................................................... Count ............... 7–13 0 7–13

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Evaluation criteria Measure Build alts. A–F Houston Terminal

Station options Total

Reservoir/Dam Crossings ............................................................ Count ............... 0 0 0

Noise and Vibration (Final EIS Section 3.4)

Severe Noise Impact:

Residential ............................................................................ Count ............... 9–12 0 9–12

Institutional ............................................................................ Count ............... 0 0 0

Moderate Noise Impact:

Residential ............................................................................ Count ............... 275–295 0 275–295

Institutional ............................................................................ Count ............... 1 0 1

Vibration Impact:

Residential ............................................................................ Count ............... 0 0 0

Institutional ............................................................................ Count ............... 0 0 0

Hazardous Materials and Solid Waste (Final EIS Section 3.5)

Low-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ............................................. Count ............... 297–326 0–6 297–332

Moderate-Risk Hazardous Material Sites .................................... Count ............... 155–165 3–8 158–173

High-Risk Hazardous Material Sites ............................................ Count ............... 3–4 0–2 3–6

Natural Ecological Systems and Protected Species (Final EIS Section 3.6)

113

Protected Species Modeled Habitat—Temporary ....................... Acres ............... 325–328 0 325–328

Protected Species Modeled Habitat—Permanent ....................... Acres ............... 1,058–1,452 0 1,058–1,452

Waters of the U.S. (Final EIS Section 3.7)

Stream Crossings—Temporary .................................................... Feet ................. 83,459–90,942 0 83,459–90,942

Stream Crossings—Permanent ................................................... Feet ................. 34,839–45,631 0 34,839–45,631

Wetlands—Temporary ................................................................. Acres ............... 44.3–61.1 0 44.3–61.1

Wetlands—Permanent ................................................................. Acres ............... 47.4–64.4 0–1.6 47.4–66.0

Waterbodies—Temporary ............................................................ Acres ............... 27.9–36.3 0–0.1 27.9–36.4

Waterbodies—Permanent ............................................................ Acres ............... 21.1–29.3 0 21.1–29.3

Floodplains (Final EIS Section 3.8)

Impacts to 100-Year Floodplain ................................................... Acres ............... 557–657 0 557–657.0

Impacts to 500-Year Floodplain ................................................... Acres ............... 132–133 0–0.1 132–133.1

Permanent Impacts to 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains ....... Acres ............... 479–589 0–0.1 479–589.1

Temporary Impacts to 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains ....... Acres ............... 196–225 0 196–225.0

Total Acres of Impacted Floodplain ............................................. Acres ............... 689–790 0–0.1 689–790.1

Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct Crossings of FEMA Zone AE ... Count ............... 63–76 NA 63–76.0

Total Number of Bridge/Viaduct Crossings of FEMA Zone A ..... Count ............... 126–155 NA 126–155.0

Utilities and Energy (Final EIS Section 3.9)

New Electric TPSS Connections ................................................. Count ............... 12–13 0 12–13

Electric Utility Pole Adjustments .................................................. Count ............... 74–89 0 74–89

Total Electric Connections and Adjustment ................................. Count ............... 87–102 0 87–102

Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells .................................................... Count ............... 22–37 0 22–37

Aesthetics and Scenic Resources (Final EIS Section 3.10)

Total Number of Beneficial

114

..................................................... Count ............... 2 1 3

Total Number of Neutral .............................................................. Count ............... 8 0 8

Total Number of Adverse ............................................................. Count ............... 2 0 2

Total Number of Adverse Visual Resource Impacts ................... Count ............... 10–11 0 10–11

Transportation (Final EIS Section 3.11)

Rail Crossings

115

......................................................................... Count ............... 27 0 27

Road Modifications

116

(Public and Private) ................................ Count ............... 102–158 0 102–158

Road Modifications

117

(Public only) ............................................ Count ............... 59–80 0 59–80

Length added to Public Roads (miles) ........................................ Miles ................ 16.6–46.9 0 16.6–46.9

Length removed from Public Roads (miles) ................................ Miles ................ 5.0–27.2 0 5.0–27.2

Impacts to airports

118

.................................................................. Count ............... 0–1 0 0–1

Number of Intersections at LOS E or F ....................................... Count ............... NA 22–25 22–25

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Elderly and Handicapped (Final EIS Section 3.12)

Elderly and Handicapped Impacts ............................................... NA ................... Proposed project would be designed, constructed and oper-

ated in compliance with ADA; therefore, there would be no

impacts related to accessibility of the HSR system for the

elderly and handicapped.

Land Use (Final EIS Section 3.13)

Existing Land Use Conversion—Temporary ................................ Acres ............... 2,393.2–2,592.4 0–27.4 2,393.2–2,619.8

Existing Land Use Conversion—Permanent ............................... Acres ............... 6,610.0–7,295.6 75.8–92.2 6,685.8–7,387.8

Special Status Farmland—Temporary ......................................... Acres ............... 1,459.8–1,719.4 0.0 1,459.8–1,719.4

Special Status Farmland—Permanent ......................................... Acres ............... 3,483.5–3,764.3 0.0 3,483.5–3,764.3

Special Status Farmland—Indirect

119

......................................... Acres ............... 697.3–888.2 0.0 697.3–888.2

Displacement—Commercial (primary) ......................................... Count ............... 42–65 14–22 56–87

Displacement—Residence (primary) ........................................... Count ............... 235–269 0 235–269

Displacement—Community Facilities (primary)

120

...................... Count ............... 2–3 0 2–3

Estimated Permanent Parcel Acquisitions ................................... Count ............... 1,731–1,847 25–43 1,756–1,890

Estimated Temporary Parcel Acquisitions ................................... Count ............... 258–277 0–1 258–278

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Agriculture ............................ Count ............... 196–230 0 196–230

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Commercial .......................... Count ............... 12–18 0–1 12–19

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Community Facilities ............ Count ............... 0 0 0

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Cultural/Civic Resources ...... Count ............... 1–2 0 1–2

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Oil and Gas .......................... Count ............... 12–17 0 12–17

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Residence ............................. Count ............... 49–54 0 49–54

Estimated Structure Acquisitions—Transportation and Utilities .. Count ............... 0–1 0 0–1

Socioeconomics and Community Facilities (Final EIS Section 3.14)

Communities with Disrupted Character and Cohesion ................ Count ............... 4 0 4

Economic Impacts ........................................................................ NA ................... Positive

Employment ................................................................................. Job Years ........ 317,207

Earnings ....................................................................................... 2019 billions .... $14.50

Tax Revenue ................................................................................ N ...................... Positive

Children’s Health and Safety

121

.................................................. Count ............... 0 0–1 0–1

Community Facilities

122

............................................................... Count ............... 5 0–1 5–6

Electromagnetic Fields (Final EIS Section 3.15)

Electromagnetic Field (EMF) Impacts .......................................... NA ................... No EMI or adverse EMF exposure would occur.

Safety and Security (Final EIS Section 3.16)

Permanent Road Modifications resulting in 1 minute or more in

additional through travel time. Count ............... 8–13 0 8–13

Permanent Road Modifications reducing through travel time by

1 minute or more. Count ............... 0–1 0 0–1

Total fire and EMS service areas bisected by construction ........ Count ............... 51–57 0 51–57

Fire and EMS providers with high potential for construction ef-

fects. Count ............... 3–5 0 3–5

Fire and EMS providers with localized potential for construction

effects. Count ............... 6–8 0 6–8

Recreational Facilities (Final EIS Section 3.17)

Parks ............................................................................................ Count ............... 0–2 0 0–2

Environmental Justice (Final EIS Section 3.18)

Number of Minority and/or Low-Income block groups inter-

sected by the Study Area. Count ............... 80–81 5–7 85–88

Number of all block groups intersected by the Study Area ......... Count ............... 118–119 8–14 126–133

Identified Minority and/or Low-Income Communities ................... Count ............... 5 1 5

Disproportionately High and Adverse Impact to Minority and/or

Low-Income Communities. NA ................... No No No

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Section references within this table are to the

sections of the Final EIS.

113

Threatened and Endangered Species acreages

include habitat for species with modeled habitat

that may be impacted, including Houston toad,

large-fruited sand verbena and Navasota ladies’-

tresses. Threatened and endangered species in the

Study Area that may be impacted but that do not

have modeled habitat include the interior least tern

and the whooping crane.

114

A single landscape unit is shared between

Segment 5 and the Houston Terminal Station

Options; therefore, the total number of beneficial

landscape units is the same as Build Alternative A.

115

Totals for rail impacts do not include rail at

Houston Terminal Stations. Totals also include

DART-owned rail lines in Dallas County.

116

Road modifications reflect the number of

reroutes, road adjustments, or road over rail

constructions that would occur. Some roads are

affected by multiple modifications (such as IH–45).

Modifications do not reflect total number of roads

but total number of road construction sites.

117

Shared access roads are included in roadway

modification lengths. Shared access roads will be

developed to provide for maintenance, emergency

response access, and private property access, with

a corresponding reduction in the number of new

public roads to decrease burden on roadway

authorities. Shared access roads would be

constructed and maintained by TCRR.

118

Anxiety Aerodrome would be directly

impacted by Segment 3B, which are part of

Alternatives B and E.

119

Indirect impacts to special status farmland in

Section 3.13, Land Use of the Final EIS are defined

as a 25-foot setback added to the LOD to account

for indirect loss of productive farmland to

accommodate the use of farm and ranch equipment

or impacts such as induced wind and changes in

irrigation.

120

The ‘‘Community Facilities’’ category in

Section 3.14, Socioeconomics and Community

Facilities of the Final EIS, encompasses categories

of affected structures and facilities that are broken

down into more defined categories within Section

3.13, Land Use of the Final EIS, therefore values

between the two sections are not identical. Refer to

the Section for a complete definition of each

category.

121

Children’s health and safety impacts are the

result of temporary construction effects. These

impacts will no longer exist once construction has

ended.

122

The ‘‘Community Facilities’’ category in

Section 3.14, Socioeconomics and Community

Facilities of the Final EIS, encompasses categories

of affected structures and facilities that are broken

down into more defined categories within Section

3.13, Land Use of the Final EIS, therefore values

between the two sections are not identical. Refer to

the Section for a complete definition of each

category.

123

The Midlothian Quarry and Plant in Ellis

County was identified at approximately one-half-

mile west of Segment 2A. Exact limits would need

to be field-verified to confirm or discount presence

in the Study Area.

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Station options Total

Cultural Resources (Final EIS Section 3–19)

Adverse Impacts to Historic Properties ....................................... Count ............... 11–14 0–1 11–15

Soils and Geology (Final EIS Section 3.20)

LOD Area ..................................................................................... Acres ............... 9,173.4–9,718.4 0–103.9 9,173.4–9,822.4

Shrink-Swell Potential—Low ........................................................ Acres ............... 2,585.8–2,848.3 0 2,585.8–2,848.3

Shrink-Swell Potential—Moderate ............................................... Acres ............... 1,456.9–1,485.0 3.0–19.2 1,459.9–1,504.0

Shrink-Swell Potential—High ....................................................... Acres ............... 2,284.0–2,484.4 0 2,284.0–2,484.4

Shrink-Swell Potential—Very High ............................................... Acres ............... 2,697.5–2,806.7 0 2,697.5–2,806.7

Erosion Potential—Low ................................................................ Acres ............... 1,591.3–1,981.9 0 1,591.3–1,981.9

Erosion Potential—Moderate ....................................................... Acres ............... 4,472.1–4,786.6 3.0–47.0 4,475.1–4,833.6

Erosion Potential—High ............................................................... Acres ............... 2,907.9–3,036.8 3.0–16.2 2,910.9–3,053.0

Corrosion Potential—Low ............................................................ Acres ............... 55.3–81.4 0 55.3–81.4

Corrosion Potential—Moderate .................................................... Acres ............... 2,182.0–2,761.1 0 2,182.0–2,761.1

Corrosion Potential—High ............................................................ Acres ............... 6,764.5–7,021.2 11–51 6,775.5–7,072.2

Prime Farmland Soils ................................................................... Acres ............... 4,990.8–5,454.7 0 4,990.8–5,454.7

Surface Mines

123

......................................................................... Count ............... 0

a

0 0

a

Green House Gas Emissions (Final EIS Section 3.21)

GHG Emissions ............................................................................ NA ................... No long-term increases in GHG emissions; would likely

reduce GHG emissions by shifting the modes of travel

G. Executive Order 12898

(Environmental Justice)

In accordance with E.O. 12898 and

USDOT Order 5610.2(a), FRA is

required to identify and address

minority and low-income populations

that are affected by disproportionately

high and adverse impacts by a Federal

action and to provide opportunities for

meaningful participation. As part of the

preparation of the EIS, persons who

have a potential interest in the proposed

Dallas to Houston project, including

members of minority and low-income

populations, were invited to participate

in the environmental review process.

FRA identified and addressed the

potential effects of the alternatives on

minority and low-income populations

in Section 3.18, Environmental Justice

in the Final EIS. FRA conducted

specific outreach efforts to connect with

potentially impacted minority and low-

income populations in the Study Area

and to bring awareness of the proposed

project to communities or individuals;

gather additional feedback on the

potential impacts of the proposed

project; and identify appropriate

mitigation for minority and low-income

populations.

Five neighborhoods or communities

identified in minority and/or low-

income block groups would be

potentially impacted: Downtown Dallas,

Le May and Le Forge neighborhood,

Hash Road and Nail Drive, Plantation

Forest and the Houston Terminal

Station Option area (including Spring

Branch Super Neighborhood). The EIS

identified disproportionately high and

adverse effects to minority and/or low-

income communities near the station

locations in Dallas and Houston related

to air-quality impacts during

construction, as well as effects related to

structure displacement and parcel

acquisition, and disruption to

community cohesion for the Le May and

Le Forge neighborhood, Hash Road and

Nail Drive, and Plantation Forest

communities. All identified locations

where there would be

disproportionately high and adverse

effects would be on Segment 1 and

Segment 5, which are common to all

Build Alternatives.

TCRR will mitigate adverse air quality

effects during construction through use

of dust suppression techniques, wetting

and covering construction materials

transported near homes or businesses,

limiting construction vehicle travel

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Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. (1970).

125

40 CFR part 51, subpart W, and 40 CFR part

93, subpart B.

126

36 CFR 800.

127

54 U.S.C. 306108.

128

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Section 106 Programmatic Agreement.

129

49 U.S.C. 303.

130

16 U.S.C. 1531, et seq.

speeds and idling of construction

equipment, and by complying with the

Texas Low Emission Diesel Fuel

Program, as identified in the Mitigation

Commitments. TCRR will mitigate

localized impacts to the Le May and Le

Forge neighborhood, the Hash Road and

Nail Drive neighborhood and the

Plantation Forest neighborhood by

implementing mitigation developed

based on consultation with community

members, as identified in the Mitigation

Commitments. Mitigation includes

making offers to acquire all properties

and attempts to relocate within

proximity or in the same neighborhood

(for the Le May and Le Forge

neighborhood), extending the notice to

vacate period, and offering personal

relocation assistance. After

implementation of mitigation measures,

there would be no disproportionately

high and adverse impacts to minority

and/or low-income populations as a

result of the Build Alternatives and

Houston Terminal Station Options.

H. Clean Air Act/Air Quality General

Conformity

The Clean Air Act of 1970 (as

amended) requires Federal agencies to

determine the conformity of proposed

actions with respect to State

Implementation Plans for attainment of

air quality goals.

124

As detailed in

Section 3.2, Affected Environment and

Environmental Consequences, Air

Quality of the Final EIS, FRA assessed

air quality impacts through an analysis

of emissions that would occur during

construction and operation of the

proposed Dallas to Houston project for

a general conformity analysis.

125

FRA

has determined that the predicted

annual pollutant emissions during the

5-year construction period in

nonattainment areas (Dallas-Fort Worth

[DFW], Houston-Galveston-Brazoria

[HGB], and Freestone and Anderson

Counties nonattainment area [FRE])

generated by the proposed project are all

below general conformity de minimis

threshold values and no conformity

determination is required.

I. Section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act

Section 106 of the National Historic

Preservation Act (NHPA) and its

implementing regulations

126

require

that prior to issuing Federal funding,

partial funding, permitting, licensing,

approval or taking other action, Federal

agencies must take into account the

effects of their undertakings on historic

properties and provide the Advisory

Council on Historic Preservation

(ACHP) an opportunity to comment on

the undertaking.

127

FRA determined

that the undertaking would adversely

affect historic properties. However,

because FRA is not able to fully

determine effects to historic properties

prior to this final rule, consistent with

36 CFR 800.14(b)(1)(ii), FRA, in

consultation with the Texas Historical

Commission (THC), ACHP, USACE,

TCRR, and other consulting parties,

developed a Programmatic Agreement

(PA) for the undertaking. The PA

establishes the process that governs the

resolution of adverse effects from the

undertaking.

FRA provided consulting parties with

an opportunity to review and comment

on the draft PA prior to the release of

the Final EIS and provided the public

an opportunity to review the draft PA by

appending the draft PA to the Final EIS.

During the 30-day public review from

May 29, 2020, through June 29, 2020,

FRA received a total of four comments

that were specific to the PA. These

include one comment from THC, two

comments from consulting parties, and

one comment from the public. In

response to these comments, FRA added

two new consulting parties to the PA.

The executed PA is available on FRA’s

website.

128

J. Department of Transportation Act

Section 4(f) Determination

Section 4(f) of the USDOT Act of 1966

prohibits USDOT agencies from

approving the use of a Section 4(f)

property unless: The agency determines

that there is no feasible or prudent

alternative to such use, and a project

includes all possible planning to

minimize harm to the property resulting

from such use; or a finding can be made

that a project, including any measure(s)

to minimize harm, has a de minimis, or

minimal, impact on the Section 4(f)

property.

129

Based on the evaluation contained

within Chapter 7.0, Section 4(f) and

Section 6(f) Evaluation of the Final EIS,

FRA determines that there is no prudent

and feasible alternative to the use of

three properties protected by Section

4(f): DA.023 (Cadiz Street Underpass

and Overpass), Dallas; DA.076a

(Guiberson Corporation), Dallas; and

DA.110b (Linfield Elementary School).

All possible planning to minimize

harm, identified through consultation

with officials with jurisdiction, was

incorporated through TCRR’s design

refinements to reduce or eliminate

impacts to Section 4(f) properties where

reasonably feasible.

FRA provided the Section 4(f)

evaluation to U.S. Department of the

Interior (DOI) and shared it with the

officials with jurisdiction for the Section

4(f) properties with the May 29, 2020,

release of the Final EIS. DOI did not

comment on FRA’s Final Section 4(f)

Evaluation.

K. Endangered Species Act/Section 7

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Biological

Opinion

Under the Endangered Species Act

(ESA) of 1973 as amended,

130

the

USFWS has the authority to list and

monitor the status of species whose

populations are threatened or

endangered, and including the

ecosystems on which they depend.

Section 7 of the ESA requires that

Federal agencies consult with the

USFWS to ensure projects they

authorize, fund or carry out would not

jeopardize the continued existence of an

endangered or threatened species or

destroy or adversely modify designated

critical habitat.

As described in Section 3.6, Natural

Ecological Systems and Protected

Species, of the Final EIS, FRA

determined the proposed Dallas to

Houston project would have ‘‘no effect’’

on the West Indian manatee (Trichechus

manatus), golden-cheeked warbler

(Setophaga [Dendroica] chrysoparia),

Texas fawnsfoot (Truncilla macrodon),

and Texas prairie dawn (Hymenoxys

texana) because suitable habitat (or

modeled habitat) was not identified

within the Action Area. FRA

determined it ‘‘may affect, but is not

likely to adversely affect’’ the Houston

toad (Anaxyrus houstonensis), interior

least tern (Sterna antillarum), whooping

crane (Grus americana) based on the

results of presence/absence species

surveys and the implementation of

avoidance and mitigation measures.

FRA determined it ‘‘may affect, and is

likely to adversely affect’’ due to the

presence of Navasota ladies’-tresses

(Spiranthes parksii) within the Study

Area and the potential for large-fruited

sand verbena (Abronia marcocarpa) in

unsurveyed areas.

On November 14, 2019, FRA

submitted a Biological Assessment (BA)

to USFWS as part of formal consultation

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FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Biological Opinion. FRA has since reinitiated

consultation for the limited purpose of addressing

TCRR’s recent identification of locations for

permittee responsible mitigation. The reinitiation

follows TCRR’s consultation with the USACE Fort

Worth District as part of the Clean Water Act

permitting process and does not affect the BO.

132

The White House, E.O. 11990—Protection of

Wetlands, 42 FR 2696.1, Office of the White House

Press Secretary, 1977.

133

33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.

134

33 U.S.C. 403.

135

33 U.S.C. 408.

136

FRA. Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—

Passenger Service from Houston to Dallas https://

railroads.dot.gov/environmental-reviews/dallas-

houston-high-speed-rail/dallas-houston-high-speed-

rail-passenger, Record of Decision Attachments,

Mitigation Commitments.

137

44 CFR 9, Floodplain Management and

Protection of Wetlands, 2003.

138

USDOT, Floodplain Management and

Protection, DOT 5650.2, 1979.

under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.

USFWS issued a Biological Opinion

(BO) detailing mitigation measures for

the proposed Dallas to Houston project

on July 8, 2020 (02ETTX00–2019–F–

2135).

131

The BO found that the

proposed Dallas to Houston project

would not likely jeopardize the

continued existence of the federally

endangered large-fruited sand-verbena

or the federally endangered Navasota

ladies’-tresses, and includes the

following conservation measures: TCRR

will offset the loss of large-fruited sand-

verbena habitat by conserving acres

under permanent protection within the

species’ known geographic range; TCRR

will offset the loss of Navasota ladies’-

tresses habitat by conserving acres

under permanent protection within the

species’ known geographic range; and

TCRR will institute measures to avoid

and minimize potential impacts to the

25 Navasota ladies’-tresses individuals

found during species-specific surveys in

Madison County.

The BO provided concurrence with

FRA’s determination that the proposed

Dallas to Houston project ‘‘may affect,

but is not likely to adversely affect’’ the

interior least tern, whooping crane, and

the Houston toad due to implementation

of avoidance and minimization

measures detailed in Appendix A of the

BO. The BO also included additional

conservation recommendations specific

to the large-fruited sand-verbena;

Navasota ladies’-tresses; landscaping to

benefit the large-fruited sand-verbena,

Navasota ladies’-tresses, and/or their

habitats; the candidate species, Texas

fawnsfoot; and avian species including

migratory birds. TCRR has agreed to

comply with the BO.

L. Executive Order 11990 Preservation

of the Nation’s Wetlands (Executive

Order 11990 & DOT Order 5660.1a)

For projects that are undertaken,

financed, or assisted by Federal

agencies, potential impact to wetlands

are considered under E.O. 11990,

Protection of Wetlands. The objective of

E.O. 11990 is to minimize the

destruction, loss or degradation of

wetlands while enhancing and

protecting the natural and beneficial

values.

132

DOT Order 5660.1a sets forth

DOT policy for interpreting E.O. 11990

and requires that transportation projects

‘‘located in or having an impact on

wetlands’’ should be conducted to

assure protection of the Nation’s

wetlands.

In addition, the USACE and EPA have

statutory responsibilities under Section

404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA).

133

Under this Act, discharges of dredged or

fill material into waters of the U.S. may

require permit authorization. Section

401 of the CWA regulates the discharge

of pollutants into waters of the U.S. and

is enforced by the Texas Commission on

Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The

USACE has statutory authority under

Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act

to regulate the construction of any

structure in or over a navigable water of

the U.S. and for any structure or work

that affects the course, location or

condition of the navigable waterbody.

134

Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors

Act, commonly referred to as Section

408, requires approval from USACE to

alter a USACE federally authorized civil

works project.

135

As detailed within Section 3.7,

Affected Environment and

Environmental Consequences, Waters of

the U.S. of the Final EIS, impacts would

occur within waters of the U.S. during

the construction and operation of the

proposed Dallas to Houston project.

TCRR, in coordination with the USACE

Fort Worth and Galveston Districts, is

developing the final design to avoid and

minimize impacts to waters of the U.S.,

as practicable. However, due to the

linear nature and the curvature

restrictions associated with the

operation of the HSR system, some

crossings would be unavoidable.

Impacts to waters of the U.S. would

require Section 404/401/10 CWA

permits and Section 408 permissions

from USACE and TCEQ that would

include permit provisions to avoid,

minimize, and mitigate impacts. TCRR

has agreed to implement compliance

and mitigation measures to offset effects

of construction within the wetlands and

waters of the U.S.

136

M. Floodplain Management (Executive

Order 11988 & DOT Order 5650.2)

E.O. 11988, Floodplain Management

requires Federal agencies avoid adverse

impacts on floodplains to the extent

possible, determine whether reasonable

alternatives exist that avoid impacts to

floodplains, and avoid situations that

would support floodplain development

if a practicable alternative exists.

137

USDOT Order 5650.2 (Floodplain

Management and Protection) establishes

policies and procedures for

transportation projects regarding

floodplain impacts that include

avoiding and minimizing, where

practicable or reasonable, adverse

impacts to floodplains and restoring and

preserving natural and beneficial

floodplain functions that are adversely

impacted by transportation projects.

138

As detailed within 3.8, Affected

Environment and Environmental

Consequences, Floodplains of the Final

EIS, FRA determined that the proposed

Dallas to Houston project would impact

748 acres of 100-year and 500-year

regulatory floodplains. During

construction, the footprint of the LOD

additional workspace area, laydown

yards and construction workspace

would have a temporary impact to the

floodplains. The HSR track and

supporting facilities (e.g., permanent

roads, parking areas, access/

maintenance areas, terminals, and non-

vegetated embankments) would also

result in a permanent impact to the

floodplain system and a permanent

increase in impervious cover and an

increase in ground compaction in those

areas during operations.

TCRR’s proposed design would

minimize potential increases to the

floodplain elevations by retaining

existing water surface elevations where

feasible to avoid impacting the available

flood storage and minimizing fill in

sensitive areas. Many regulatory

floodplains and unregulated stream

segments would be fully spanned and

potential impacts avoided. TCRR will

implement best management practices

for construction and operation within

floodplains as detailed in the Mitigation

Commitments.

N. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal

Consultation)

FRA has evaluated this final rule in

accordance with the principles and

criteria contained in E.O. 13175,

‘‘Consultation and Coordination with

Indian Tribal Governments,’’ dated

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66 FR 28355 (May 22, 2001).

140

82 FR 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).

November 6, 2000. This final rule will

not have a substantial direct effect on

one or more Indian tribes, will not

impose substantial direct compliance

costs on Indian tribal governments, and

will not preempt tribal laws. Therefore,

the funding and consultation

requirements of E.O. 13175 do not

apply, and a tribal summary impact

statement is not required.

O. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of

1995

Under section 201 of the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.

104–4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal

agency ‘‘shall, unless otherwise

prohibited by law, assess the effects of

Federal regulatory actions on State,

local, and tribal governments, and the

private sector (other than to the extent

that such regulations incorporate

requirements specifically set forth in

law).’’ Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C.

1532) further requires that ‘‘before

promulgating any general notice of

proposed rulemaking that is likely to

result in the promulgation of any rule

that includes any Federal mandate that

may result in expenditure by State,

local, and tribal governments, in the

aggregate, or by the private sector, of

$100,000,000 or more (adjusted

annually for inflation) in any 1 year, and

before promulgating any final rule for

which a general notice of proposed

rulemaking was published, the agency

shall prepare a written statement’’

detailing the effect on State, local, and

tribal governments and the private

sector. This final rule will not result in

the expenditure, in the aggregate, of

$100,000,000 or more (as adjusted

annually for inflation) in any one year,

and thus preparation of such a

statement is not required.

P. Energy Impact

E.O. 13211, ‘‘Actions Concerning

Regulations That Significantly Affect

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,’’

requires Federal agencies to prepare a

Statement of Energy Effects for any

‘‘significant energy action.’’

139

FRA has

evaluated this final rule in accordance

with E.O. 13211 and determined that

this regulatory action is not a

‘‘significant energy action’’ within the

meaning of the E.O.

E.O. 13783, ‘‘Promoting Energy

Independence and Economic Growth,’’

requires Federal agencies to review

regulations to determine whether they

potentially burden the development or

use of domestically produced energy

resources, with particular attention to

oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy

resources.

140

FRA has determined this

regulatory action will not burden the

development or use of domestically

produced energy resources.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 299

High-speed rail, Incorporation by

reference, Railroad safety, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Tokaido

Shinkansen.

The Rule

For the reasons discussed in the

preamble, FRA adds part 299 to chapter

II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal

Regulations as follows:

■1. Part 299 is added to read as follows:

PART 299—TEXAS CENTRAL

RAILROAD HIGH–SPEED RAIL

SAFETY STANDARDS

Subpart A—General Requirements

Sec.

299.1 Purpose and scope.

299.3 Applicability.

299.5 Definitions.

299.7 Responsibility for compliance.

299.9 Notifications and filings.

299.11 Electronic recordkeeping.

299.13 System description.

299.15 Special approvals.

299.17 Incorporation by reference.

Subpart B—Signal and Trainset Control

System

Sec.

299.201 Technical PTC system

requirements.

299.203 PTC system required.

299.205 PTC System Certification.

299.207 PTC Safety Plan content

requirements.

299.209 PTC system use and failures.

299.211 Communications and security

requirements.

299.213 Records retention.

299.215 Operations and Maintenance

Manual.

Subpart C—Track Safety Standards

Sec.

299.301 Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions.

299.303 Measuring track not under load.

299.305 Drainage.

299.307 Vegetation.

299.309 Classes of track: operating speed

limits.

299.311 Track geometry; general.

299.313 Track geometry; performance

based.

299.315 Curves; elevations and speed

limitations.

299.317 Track strength.

299.319 Track fixation and support.

299.321 Defective rails.

299.323 Continuous welded rail (CWR)

plan.

299.325 Continuous welded rail (CWR);

general.

299.327 Rail end mismatch.

299.329 Rail joints and torch cut rails.

299.331 Turnouts and crossings generally.

299.333 Frog guard rails and guard faces;

gauge.

299.335 Derails.

299.337 Automated vehicle-based

inspection systems.

299.339 Daily sweeper inspection.

299.341 Inspection of rail in service.

299.343 Initial inspection of new rail and

welds.

299.345 Visual inspections; right-of-way.

299.347 Special inspections.

299.349 Inspection records.

299.351 Qualifications for track

maintenance and inspection personnel.

299.353 Personnel qualified to supervise

track restoration and renewal.

299.355 Personnel qualified to inspect

track.

299.357 Personnel qualified to inspect and

restore continuous welded rail.

Subpart D—Rolling Stock

Sec.

299.401 Clearance requirements.

299.403 Trainset structure.

299.405 Trainset interiors.

299.407 Glazing.

299.409 Brake system.

299.411 Bogies and suspension system.

299.413 Fire safety.

299.415 Doors.

299.417 Emergency lighting.

299.419 Emergency communication.

299.421 Emergency roof access.

299.423 Markings and instructions for

emergency egress and rescue access.

299.425 Low-location emergency exit path

marking.

299.427 Emergency egress windows.

299.429 Rescue access windows.

299.431 Driver’s controls and cab layout.

299.433 Exterior lights.

299.435 Electrical system design.

299.437 Automated monitoring.

299.439 Event recorders.

299.441 Trainset electronic hardware and

software safety.

299.443 Safety appliances.

299.445 Trainset inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements.

299.447 Movement of defective equipment.

Subpart E—Operating Rules

Sec.

299.501 Purpose.

299.503 Operating rules; filing and

recordkeeping.

299.505 Programs of operational tests and

inspections; recordkeeping.

299.507 Program of instruction on operating

rules; recordkeeping.

Subpart F—System Qualification Tests

Sec.

299.601 Responsibility for verification

demonstrations and tests.

299.603 Preparation of system-wide

qualification test plan.

299.605 Functional and performance

qualification tests.

299.607 Pre-revenue service systems

integration testing.

299.609 Vehicle/track system qualification.

299.611 Simulated revenue operations.

299.613 Verification of compliance.

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Subpart G—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Program

Sec.

299.701 General requirements.

299.703 Compliance.

299.705 Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing, and

maintenance, or repairs.

299.707 Maintenance intervals.

299.709 Quality control program.

299.711 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program format.

299.713 Program approval procedures.

Appendix A to Part 299—Criteria for

Certification of Crashworthy Event Recorder

Memory Module

Appendix B to Part 299—Cab Noise Test

Protocol

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133,

20141, 20302–20303, 20306, 20701–20702,

21301–21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note;

and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart A—General Requirements

§ 299.1 Purpose and scope.

This part prescribes minimum Federal

safety standards for the high-speed

transportation system described in

detail in § 299.13, known as Texas

Central Railroad, LLC and hereinafter

referred to as the ‘‘railroad.’’ The

purpose of this part is to prevent

accidents, casualties, and property

damage which could result from

operation of this system.

§ 299.3 Applicability.

(a) This part applies only to the

railroad, as described in § 299.13.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c)

of this section, this part, rather than the

generally applicable Federal railroad

safety regulations, shall apply to the

railroad.

(c) The following Federal railroad

safety regulations found in Title 49 of

the Code of Federal Regulations, and

any amendments are applicable to the

railroad.

(1) Part 207, Railroad Police Officers;

(2) Part 209, Railroad Safety

Enforcement Procedures;

(3) Part 210, Railroad Noise Emission

Compliance Regulations;

(4) Part 211, Rules of Practice;

(5) Part 212, State Safety Participation

Regulations;

(6) Part 214, Railroad Workplace

Safety, except § 214.339;

(7) Part 216, Special Notice and

Emergency Order Procedures;

(8) Part 218, Railroad Operating

Practices;

(9) Part 219, Control of Alcohol and

Drug Use;

(10) Part 220, Radio Standards and

Procedures;

(11) Part 225, Railroad Accidents/

Incidents: Reports, Classification, and

Investigations;

(12) Part 227, Occupational Noise

Exposure except § 227.119(c)(10) and

(11) with respect to the railroad’s high-

speed trainsets only, which shall

comply with 299.431(h) and (i);

(13) Part 228, Hours of Service of

Railroad Employees;

(14) Part 233, Signal Systems

Reporting Requirements;

(15) Part 235, Instructions Governing

Applications for Approval of a

Discontinuance or Material

Modification of a Signal System or

Relief from the Requirements of Part

236, except § 235.7;

(16) Part 236, Installation, Inspection,

Maintenance and Repair of Signal and

Train Control System, Devices, and

Appliances, subparts A through G, as

excepted by the railroad’s PTC Safety

Plan (PTCSP) under § 299.201(d);

(17) Part 237, Railroad Bridge Safety

Standards;

(18) Part 239, Passenger Train

Emergency Preparedness;

(19) Part 240, Qualification and

Certification of Locomotive Engineers;

(20) Part 242, Qualification and

Certification of Train Conductors;

(21) Part 243, Training, Qualification,

and Oversight for Safety-Related

Railroad Employees;

(22) Part 270, System Safety Program

(23) Part 272, Critical Incident Stress

Plans; and

(24) The following parts shall apply to

the railroad’s maintenance-of-way

equipment as it is used in work trains,

rescue operations, yard movements, and

other non-passenger functions:

(i) Part 215, Railroad Freight Car

Safety Standards;

(ii) Part 223, Glazing Standards;

(iii) Part 229, Railroad Locomotive

Safety Standards, except—

(A) Section 229.71. Instead, the

railroad’s maintenance-of-way

equipment shall comply with

§ 299.401(b), except for the sweeper

vehicle, which shall have a clearance

above top of rail no less than 35 mm

(1.77 inches).

(B) Section 229.73. Instead, the

railroad’s maintenance-of-way

equipment shall be designed so as to be

compatible with the railroad’s track

structure under subpart C of this part.

(iv) Part 231, Railroad Safety

Appliance Standards; and,

(v) Part 232, Railroad Power Brakes

and Drawbars.

(d) The Federal railroad safety statutes

apply to all railroads, as defined in 49

U.S.C. 20102. The railroad covered by

this part is a railroad under that

definition. Therefore, the Federal

railroad safety statutes, Subtitle V of

Title 49 of the United States Code, apply

directly to the railroad. However,

pursuant to authority granted under 49

U.S.C. 20306, FRA has exempted the

railroad from certain requirements of 49

U.S.C. ch. 203.

§ 299.5 Definitions.

As used in this part—

Absolute block means a block of track

circuits in which no trainset is

permitted to enter while occupied

by another trainset.

Adjusting/de-stressing means the

procedure by which a rail’s neutral

temperature is readjusted to the

desired value. It typically consists

of cutting the rail and removing rail

anchoring devices, which provides

for the necessary expansion and

contraction, and then re-assembling

the track.

Administrator means the Administrator

of the FRA or the Administrator’s

delegate.

Associate Administrator means FRA’s

Associate Administrator for Safety

and Chief Safety Officer, or that

person’s delegate.

Automatic train control (ATC) means

the signaling system, composed of

ground and on-board equipment.

The on-board equipment

continually receives a signal from

the ground equipment. ATC on-

board equipment controls the

trainset speed to prevent train-to-

train collisions and overspeed

derailments.

ATC cut-out mode means the mode of

ATC on-board equipment used for

emergency operations to disable the

ATC on-board equipment on the

trainset.

ATC main line mode means the mode of

ATC on-board equipment which

controls trainset speed on

mainlines.

ATC overrun protection means an

overlay of the ATC shunting mode

to prevent overrun at the end of a

track.

ATC shunting mode means the mode of

ATC on-board equipment which

restricts the trainsets maximum

speed to 30 km/h (19 mph).

Brake, air means a combination of

devices operated by compressed air,

arranged in a system and controlled

electrically or pneumatically, by

means of which the motion of a

train or trainset is retarded or

arrested.

Brake, disc means a retardation system

used on the passenger trainsets that

utilizes flat discs as the braking

surface.

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Brake, electric means a trainset braking

system in which the kinetic energy

of a moving trainset is used to

generate electric current at the

traction motors, which is then

returned into the catenary system.

Brake, emergency application means a

brake application initiated by a de-

energized brake command and is

retrievable when there is no

malfunction that initiates an

automatic emergency brake

application. An emergency brake

application can be initiated by the

driver or automatically by ATC. An

emergency brake application, as

defined here, is equivalent to a full-

service brake application in the U.S.

Brake, urgent application means an

irretrievable brake application

designed to minimize the braking

distance. An urgent brake

application, as defined here, is the

equivalent of an emergency brake

application in the U.S.

Bogie means an assembly that supports

the weight of the carbody and

which incorporates the suspension,

wheels and axles, traction motors

and friction brake components.

Each unit of a trainset is equipped

with two bogies. In the U.S., a bogie

is commonly referred to as a truck.

Broken rail means a partial or complete

separation of an otherwise

continuous section of running rail,

excluding rail joints, expansion

joints, and insulated joints.

Buckling incident/buckling rail means

the formation of a lateral

misalignment caused by high

longitudinal compressive forces in a

rail sufficient in magnitude to

exceed the track geometry

alignment safety limits defined in

§ 299.311.

Buckling-prone condition means a track

condition that can result in the

track being laterally displaced due

to high compressive forces caused

by critical rail temperature

combined with insufficient track

strength and/or train dynamics.

Cab means the compartment or space

within a trainset that is designed to

be occupied by a driver and contain

an operating console for exercising

control over the trainset.

Cab car means a rail vehicle at the

leading or trailing end, or both, of

a trainset which has a driver’s cab

and is intended to carry passengers,

baggage, or mail. A cab car may or

may not have propelling motors.

Cab end structure means the main

support projecting upward from the

underframe at the cab end of a

trainset.

Cab signal means a signal located in the

driver’s compartment or cab,

indicating a condition affecting the

movement of a trainset.

Calendar day means a time period

running from one midnight to the

next midnight on a given date.

Cant deficiency means the additional

height, which if added to the outer

rail in a curve, at the designated

vehicle speed, would provide a

single resultant force, due to the

combined effects of weight and

centrifugal force on the vehicle,

having a direction perpendicular to

the plane of the track.

Continuous welded rail (CWR) means

rail that has been welded together

into lengths exceeding 122 m (400

feet). Rail installed as CWR remains

CWR, regardless of whether a joint

is installed into the rail at a later

time.

Consist, fixed means a semi-

permanently coupled trainset that is

arranged with each unit in a

specific location and orientation

within the trainset.

Core system, high-speed means the

safety-critical systems, sub-systems,

and procedures required for a high-

speed system operation that assures

a safe operation as required within

this part.

Crewmember means a railroad employee

called to perform service covered by

49 U.S.C. 21103.

Critical buckling stress means the

minimum stress necessary to

initiate buckling of a structural

member.

Desired rail installation temperature

range means the rail temperature

range in a specific geographical

area, at which forces in CWR

installed in that temperature range

should not cause a track buckle in

extreme heat, or a pull-apart during

extreme cold weather.

Disturbed track means the disturbance

of the roadbed or ballast section, as

a result of track maintenance or any

other event, which reduces the

lateral or longitudinal resistance of

the track, or both.

Driver means any person who controls

the movement of a trainset(s) from

the cab, and is required to be

certified under 49 CFR part 240. A

driver, as used in this part, is

equivalent to a locomotive engineer.

Employee or railroad employee means

an individual who is engaged or

compensated by the railroad or by

a contractor to the railroad to

perform any of the duties defined in

this part.

Event recorder means a device, designed

to resist tampering, that monitors

and records data, as detailed in

§§ 299.439 and 236.1005(d) of this

chapter, over the most recent 48

hours of operation of the trainset.

Expansion joint means a piece of special

trackwork designed to absorb heat-

induced expansion and contraction

of the rails.

General control center means the

location where the general control

center staff work.

General control center staff means

qualified individuals located in the

general control center who are

responsible for the safe operation of

the railroad’s high-speed passenger

rail system. The duties of

individuals who work at the general

control center include: Trainset

movement control, crew logistic

management, signaling, passenger

services, rolling stock logistic

management, and right-of-way

maintenance management.

Glazing, end-facing means any exterior

glazing installed in a trainset cab

located where a line perpendicular

to the exterior surface glazing

material makes horizontal angle of

50 degrees or less with the

longitudinal center line of the rail

vehicle in which the panel is

installed. A glazing panel that

curves so as to meet the definition

for both side-facing and end-facing

glazing is end-facing glazing.

Glazing, exterior means a glazing panel

that is an integral part of the

exterior skin of a rail vehicle with

a surface exposed to the outside

environment.

Glazing, side-facing means any glazing

located where a line perpendicular

to the exterior surface of the panel

makes an angle of more than 50

degrees with the longitudinal center

line of the rail vehicle in which the

panel is installed.

High voltage means an electrical

potential of more than 150 volts.

In passenger service/in revenue service

means a trainset that is carrying, or

available to carry, passengers.

Passengers need not have paid a

fare in order for the trainset to be

considered in passenger or in

revenue service.

In service means, when used in

connection with a trainset, a

trainset subject to this part that is in

revenue service, unless the

equipment—

(1) Is being handled in accordance

with § 299.447, as applicable;

(2) Is in a repair shop or on a repair

track;

(3) Is on a storage track and is not

carrying passengers; or,

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(4) Is parked at a station location and

has been properly secured in

accordance with §§ 299.409(n) and

299.431(d).

Insulated joint, glued means a rail joint

located at the end of a track circuit

designed to insulate electrical

current from the signal system in

the rail.

Interior fitting means any component in

the passenger compartment which

is mounted to the floor, ceiling,

sidewalls, or end walls and projects

into the passenger compartment

more than 25 mm (1 in.) from the

surface or surfaces to which it is

mounted. Interior fittings do not

include side and end walls, floors,

door pockets, or ceiling lining

materials, for example.

Intermediate car means a passenger car

or unit of a trainset located between

cab cars which may or may not

have propelling motors.

L/V ratio means the ratio of the lateral

force that any wheel exerts on an

individual rail to the vertical force

exerted by the same wheel on the

rail.

Lateral means the horizontal direction

perpendicular to the direction of

travel.

Locomotive means a piece of on-track

rail equipment, other than hi-rail,

specialized maintenance, or other

similar equipment, which may

consist of one or more units

operated from a single control stand

with one or more propelling motors

designed for moving other

passenger equipment; with one or

more propelling motors designed to

transport freight or passenger

traffic, or both; or without

propelling motors but with one or

more control stands.

Longitudinal means in a direction

parallel to the direction of travel of

a rail vehicle.

Marking/delineator means a visible

notice, sign, symbol, line or trace.

N700 means the N700 series trainset

that is based on trainsets currently

in, or future variants operated on,

JRC’s Tokaido Shinkansen system,

or any unit thereof.

Occupied volume means the volume of

a passenger car or a unit in a

trainset where passengers or

crewmembers are normally located

during service operation, such as

the cab and passenger seating areas.

The entire width of a vehicle’s end

compartment that contains a control

stand is an occupied volume. A

vestibule is typically not considered

occupied.

On-board attendant means a qualified

individual on a trainset that is

responsible for coordination with a

station platform attendant to assure

safety during passenger boarding

and alighting within a station. An

on-board attendant, as used in this

part, is equivalent to a passenger

conductor.

Override means to climb over the

normal coupling or side buffers and

linking mechanism and impact the

end of the adjoining rail vehicle or

unit above the underframe.

Overrun protection coil means track

circuit cables placed short of

turnouts, or crossovers within

stations and trainset maintenance

facilities to prevent unauthorized

route access.

Passenger car means a unit of a trainset

intended to provide transportation

for members of the general public.

A cab car and an intermediate car

are considered passenger cars.

Passenger compartment means an area

of a passenger car that consists of a

seating area and any vestibule that

is connected to the seating area by

an open passageway.

Passenger equipment means the N700

series trainset that is based on

trainsets currently in, or future

variants operated on, JRC’s Tokaido

Shinkansen system, or any unit

thereof.

Permanent deformation means the

undergoing of a permanent change

in shape of a structural member of

a rail vehicle.

PTC means positive train control as

further described in § 299.201.

Qualified individual means a person

that has successfully completed all

instruction, training, and

examination programs required by

both the employer and this part,

and that the person, therefore, may

reasonably be expected to perform

his or her duties proficiently in

compliance with all Federal

railroad safety laws, regulations,

and orders.

Rail neutral temperature is the

temperature at which the rail is

neither in compression nor tension.

Rail temperature means the temperature

of the rail, measured with a rail

thermometer.

Rail vehicle means railroad rolling

stock, including, but not limited to,

passenger and maintenance

vehicles.

Railroad equipment means all trains,

trainsets, rail cars, locomotives, and

on-track maintenance vehicles

owned or used by the railroad.

Railroad, the means the company, also

known as the Texas Central

Railroad, LLC, which is the entity

that will operate and maintain the

high-speed rail system initially

connecting Dallas to Houston,

Texas, and is responsible for

compliance with all aspects of this

rule.

Repair point means a location

designated by the railroad where

repairs of the type necessary occur

on a regular basis. A repair point

has, or should have, the facilities,

tools, and personnel qualified to

make the necessary repairs. A repair

point need not be staffed

continuously.

Representative car/area means a car/

area that shares the relevant

characteristics as the car(s)/area(s) it

represents (i.e., same signage/

marking layout, and charging light

system for passive systems or light

fixtures and power system for

electrically powered systems).

Rollover strength means the strength

provided to protect the structural

integrity of a rail vehicle in the

event the vehicle leaves the track

and impacts the ground on its side

or roof.

Safety appliance means an appliance,

required under 49 U.S.C. ch. 203,

excluding power brakes. The term

includes automatic couplers,

handbrakes, crew steps, handholds,

handrails, or ladder treads made of

steel or a material of equal or

greater mechanical strength used by

the traveling public or railroad

employees that provides a means

for safe coupling, uncoupling, or

ascending or descending passenger

equipment.

Safety-critical means a component,

system, software, or task that, if not

available, defective, not

functioning, not functioning

correctly, not performed, or not

performed correctly, increases the

risk of damage to railroad

equipment or injury to a passenger,

railroad employee, or other person.

Search, valid means a continuous

inspection for internal rail defects

where the equipment performs as

intended and equipment responses

are interpreted by a qualified

individual as defined in subpart C.

Semi-permanently coupled means

coupled by means of a drawbar or

other coupling mechanism that

requires tools to perform the

coupling or uncoupling operation.

Coupling and uncoupling of each

semi-permanently coupled unit in a

trainset can be performed safely

only while at a trainset

maintenance facility where

personnel can safely get under a

unit or between units, or other

location under the protections of

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subpart B of part 218 of this

chapter.

Side sill means that portion of the

underframe or side at the bottom of

the rail vehicle side wall.

Shinkansen, Tokaido means the high-

speed rail system operated by the

Central Japan Railway Company

between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka,

Japan, that is fully dedicated and

grade separated.

Slab track means railroad track

structure in which the rails are

attached to and supported by a bed

or slab, usually of concrete (or

asphalt), which acts to transfer the

load and provide track stability.

Spall, glazing means small pieces of

glazing that fly off the back surface

of the glazing when an object strikes

the front surface.

Speed, maximum approved means the

maximum trainset speed approved

by FRA based upon the

qualification tests conducted under

§ 299.609(g).

Speed, maximum authorized means the

speed at which trainsets are

permitted to travel safely, as

determined by all operating

conditions and signal indications.

Speed, maximum safe operating means

the highest speed at which trainset

braking may occur without thermal

damage to the discs.

Station platform attendant means a

qualified individual positioned on

the station platform in close

proximity to the train protection

switches while a trainset is

approaching and departing a

station, and is responsible for

coordination with an on-board

attendant to assure safety during

passenger boarding and alighting

within a station.

Superelevation means the actual

elevation of the outside rail above

the inside rail.

Sweeper vehicle means a rail vehicle

whose function is to detect

obstacles within the static

construction gauge prior to the start

of daily revenue service.

Tight track means CWR which is in a

considerable amount of

compression.

Track acceleration measurement system

(TAMS) means an on-track, vehicle-

borne technology used to measure

lateral and vertical carbody

accelerations.

Track geometry measurement system

(TGMS) means an on-track, vehicle-

borne technology used to measure

track surface, twist, crosslevel,

alignment, and gauge.

Track lateral resistance means the

resistance provided to the rail/

crosstie structure against lateral

displacement.

Track longitudinal resistance means the

resistance provided by the rail

anchors/rail fasteners and the

ballast section to the rail/crosstie

structure against longitudinal

displacement.

Track, non-ballasted means a track

structure not supported by ballast

in which the rails are directly

supported by concrete or steel

structures. Non-ballasted track can

include slab track and track

structures where the rails are

directly fixed to steel bridges or to

servicing pits within trainset

maintenance facilities.

Train means a trainset, or locomotive or

locomotive units coupled with or

without cars.

Train-induced forces means the vertical,

longitudinal, and lateral dynamic

forces which are generated during

train movement and which can

contribute to the buckling potential

of the rail.

Train protection switch means a safety

device located on station platforms

and on safe walkways along the

right-of-way. The train protection

switch is tied directly into the ATC

system and is used in the event that

trainsets in the immediate area

must be stopped.

Trainset means a passenger train

including the cab cars and

intermediate cars that are semi-

permanently coupled to operate as

a single consist. The individual

units of a trainset are uncoupled

only for emergencies or

maintenance conducted in repair

facilities.

Trainset maintenance facility means a

location equipped with the special

tools, equipment, and qualified

individuals capable of conducting

pre-service inspections and regular

inspections on the trainsets in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and

maintenance program. Trainset

maintenance facilities are also

considered repair points.

Transponder means a wayside

component of the ATC system used

to provide trainset position

correction on the mainline or to

provide an overlay of overrun

protection within a trainset

maintenance facility.

Underframe means the lower horizontal

support structure of a rail vehicle.

Unit, trainset means a cab car or

intermediate car of a trainset.

Vestibule means an area of a passenger

car that normally does not contain

seating, is located adjacent to a side

exit door, and is used in passing

from a seating area to a side exit

door.

Yard means a system of tracks within

defined limits and outside of the

territory controlled by signals,

which can be used for the making

up of non-passenger trains or the

storing of maintenance-of-way

equipment.

Yield strength means the ability of a

structural member to resist a change

in length caused by an applied load.

Exceeding the yield strength will

cause permanent deformation of the

member.

§ 299.7 Responsibility for compliance.

(a) The railroad shall not—

(1) Use, haul, or permit to be used or

hauled on its line(s) any trainset—

(i) With one or more defects not in

compliance with this part; or

(ii) That has not been inspected and

tested as required by a provision of this

part.

(2) Operate over any track, except as

provided in paragraph (e) of this

section, with one or more conditions not

in compliance this part, if the railroad

has actual knowledge of the facts giving

rise to the violation, or a reasonable

person acting in the circumstances and

exercising reasonable care would have

that knowledge.

(3) Violate any other provision of this

part or any provision of the applicable

FRA regulations listed under § 299.3(c).

(b) For purposes of this rule, a trainset

shall be considered in use prior to the

trainset’s departure as soon as it has

received, or should have received the

inspection required under this part for

movement and is ready for service.

(c) Although many of the

requirements of this part are stated in

terms of the duties of the railroad, when

any person (including, but not limited

to, a contractor performing safety-

related tasks under contract to the

railroad subject to this part) performs

any function required by this part, that

person (whether or not the railroad) is

required to perform that function in

accordance with this part.

(d) For purposes of this part, the

railroad shall be responsible for

compliance with all track safety

provisions set forth in subpart C of this

part. When the railroad and/or its

assignee have actual knowledge of the

facts giving rise to a violation, or a

reasonable person acting in the

circumstances and exercising reasonable

care would have knowledge that the

track does not comply with the

requirements of this part, it shall—

(1) Bring the track into compliance;

(2) Halt operations over that track; or

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(3) Continue operations over the

segment of non-complying track in

accordance with the provisions of

§ 299.309(b) or (c).

(e) The FRA Administrator may hold

the railroad, the railroad’s contractor, or

both responsible for compliance with

the requirements of this part and subject

to civil penalties.

§ 299.9 Notifications and filings.

All notifications and filings to the

FRA required by this part shall be

submitted to the Associate

Administrator for Railroad Safety and

Chief Safety Officer, 1200 New Jersey

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590,

unless otherwise specified.

§ 299.11 Electronic recordkeeping.

The railroad’s electronic

recordkeeping shall be retained such

that—

(a) The railroad maintains an

information technology security

program adequate to ensure the integrity

of the electronic data storage system,

including the prevention of

unauthorized access to the program

logic or individual records;

(b) The program and data storage

system must be protected by a security

system that utilizes an employee

identification number and password, or

a comparable method, to establish

appropriate levels of program access

meeting all of the following standards:

(1) No two individuals have the same

electronic identity; and

(2) A record cannot be deleted or

altered by any individual after the

record is certified by the employee who

created the record.

(c) Any amendment to a record is

either—

(1) Electronically stored apart from

the record that it amends; or

(2) Electronically attached to the

record as information without changing

the original record;

(d) Each amendment to a record

uniquely identifies the person making

the amendment;

(e) The system employed by the

railroad for data storage permits

reasonable access and retrieval; and

(f) Information retrieved from the

system can be easily produced in a

printed format which can be readily

provided to FRA representatives in a

timely manner and authenticated by a

designated representative of the railroad

as a true and accurate copy of the

railroad’s records if requested to do so

by FRA representatives.

§ 299.13 System description.

(a) General. This section describes the

components, operations, equipment,

and systems of the railroad’s high-speed

rail system. The railroad shall adhere to

the following general requirements:

(1) The railroad shall not exceed the

maximum trainset speed approved by

FRA under § 299.609(g) while in

revenue service, up to a maximum

speed of 330 km/h (205 mph).

(2) The railroad shall not transport or

permit to be transported in revenue

service any product that has been

established to be a hazardous material

pursuant to 49 CFR part 172, as

amended.

(3) The railroad shall not conduct

scheduled right-of-way maintenance on

a section of the right-of-way prior to that

section of the right-of-way being cleared

of all revenue service trainsets

(including any trainset repositioning

moves), and proper action is taken by

the general control center staff to protect

incursion into established maintenance

zones by revenue trainsets.

Additionally, the railroad shall not

commence revenue service prior to

completion of the maintenance

activities, that section of the right-of-

way being cleared of all maintenance-of-

way equipment. Further, the railroad is

prohibited from commencing revenue

operations until after conclusion of the

daily sweeper inspection, under

§ 299.339, and the general control center

returning the signal and trainset control

system to the state required to protect

revenue operations.

(b) Right-of-way. (1) The railroad shall

operate on a completely dedicated right-

of-way and shall not operate or conduct

joint operations with any other freight

equipment, other than the railroad’s

maintenance-of-way equipment, or

passenger rail equipment. Only the

railroad’s high-speed trainsets approved

for revenue operations under this part,

and any equipment required for

construction, maintenance, and rescue

purposes may be operated over the

railroad’s right-of-way.

(2) There shall be no public highway-

rail grade crossings. Animal and non-

railroad equipment crossings shall be

accomplished by means of an underpass

or overpass. Private at-grade crossings

shall be for the exclusive use by the

railroad and shall be limited to track

Classes H0 and H1.

(3) The railroad shall develop and

comply with a right-of-way barrier plan.

The right-of-way barrier plan shall be

maintained at the system headquarters

and will be made available to FRA upon

request. At a minimum, the plan will

contain provisions in areas of

demonstrated need for the prevention

of—

(i) Vandalism;

(ii) Launching of objects from

overhead bridges or structures onto the

path of trainsets;

(iii) Intrusion of vehicles from

adjacent rights-of-way; and

(iv) Unauthorized access to the right-

of-way.

(4) The entire perimeter of the

system’s right-of-way, except for

elevated structures such as bridges and

viaducts, shall be permanently fenced.

Elevated structures shall be equipped

with walkways and safety railing.

(5) The railroad shall install intrusion

detectors in accordance with the

requirements set forth in subpart B of

this part.

(6) The railroad shall install rain,

flood, and wind detectors in locations

identified by the railroad, based on

relevant criteria used by JRC to provide

adequate warning of when operational

restrictions are required due to adverse

weather conditions. Operating

restrictions shall be defined in the

railroad’s operating rules.

(7) Access to the right-of-way for

maintenance-of-way staff shall be

provided on both sides of the right-of-

way in accordance with the inspection,

testing, and maintenance program. This

access shall be protected against entry

by unauthorized persons.

(8) Provisions shall be made to permit

emergency personnel to access the right-

of-way in accordance with the

Emergency Preparedness Plan pursuant

to part 239 of this chapter. This access

shall be protected against entry by

unauthorized persons.

(9) Throughout the length of the right-

of-way, the railroad shall install

walkways located at a safe distance from

the tracks at a minimum distance of 2.0

m (6.56 feet) from the field side of the

outside rail for a design speed of 330

km/h (205 mph). The walkways shall be

used primarily for track and right-of-

way inspection, but may be used for

emergency evacuation or rescue access.

(10) Access to the right-of-way by

maintenance-of-way personnel shall not

be allowed during revenue operations

unless the access is outside the

minimum safe distance defined in

§ 299.13(b)(9). In the event of

unscheduled maintenance or repair,

emergency access will be provided

under specific circumstances allowed

under the railroad’s operating rules and

the inspection, testing, and maintenance

program.

(11) The railroad shall record all

difficulties and special situations

regarding geology, hydrology,

settlement, landslide, concrete, and

quality criteria that arise during

construction of the right-of-way. After

construction, the railroad shall monitor

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the stability and quality standards of

structures such as bridges, viaducts, and

earth structures.

(12) The railroad shall make available

for review by the FRA the track layout

drawings which show, at a minimum,

the following information:

(i) Length of straight sections, spirals

and curves, curve radius,

superelevation, superelevation

variations, gradients, and vertical curve

radii;

(ii) Turnouts and crossover location,

technology, and geometry;

(iii) Maximum operating speed and

allowable cant deficiencies;

(iv) Signal boxes, Go/No-Go signals,

and communication devices;

(v) Details and arrangement of track

circuitry;

(vi) Power feeding equipment

including sectionalization, and return

routing;

(vii) Location of accesses to the right-

of-way; and

(viii) The railroad shall also submit

the specifications for the track layout,

permissible track forces, components

such as rail, ballast, ties, rail fasteners,

and switches.

(13) Protection devices shall be

installed on all highway bridge

overpasses in accordance with the right-

of-way plan in paragraph (b)(3) of this

section.

(14) There shall be no movable

bridges in the railroad’s system.

Stationary rail bridges located over

highways or navigable waterways shall

have their foundations, piers, or other

support structure appropriately

protected against the impact of road

vehicles or water-borne vessels.

(15) Train protection switches shall be

installed at regular intervals on both

sides of the right-of-way at intervals

defined by the railroad and at intervals

not to exceed 60 m (197 feet) on

platforms within stations. These devices

shall act directly on the ATC system.

(16) The railroad shall use the design

wheel and rail profiles, service-proven

on the Tokaido Shinkansen system, or

alternate wheel and rail profiles

approved by FRA.

(c) Railroad system safety—(1)

Inspection, testing, and maintenance

procedures and criteria. The railroad

shall develop, implement, and use a

system of inspection, testing,

maintenance procedures and criteria,

under subpart G of this part, which are

initially based on the Tokaido

Shinkansen system service-proven

procedures and criteria, to ensure the

integrity and safe operation of the

railroad’s rolling stock, infrastructure,

and signal and trainset control system.

The railroad may, subject to FRA review

and approval, implement inspection,

testing, maintenance procedures and

criteria, incorporating new or emerging

technology, under § 299.713(c)(4).

(2) Operating practices. The railroad

shall develop, implement, and use

operating rules, which meet the

standards set forth in subpart E of this

part and which are based on practices

and procedures proven on the Tokaido

Shinkansen system to ensure the

integrity and safe operation of the

railroad’s system. The railroad shall

have station platform attendants on the

platform in close proximity to the train

protection switches required by

paragraph (b)(15) of this section, while

trainsets are approaching and departing

the station. The railroad’s operating

rules shall require coordination between

on-board crew and station platform

attendants to assure safety during

passenger boarding and alighting from

trainsets at stations.

(3) Personnel qualification

requirements. The railroad shall

develop, implement, and use a training

and testing program, which meets the

requirements set forth in this part and

part 243 of this chapter, to ensure that

all personnel, including railroad

employees and employees of railroad

contractors, possess the skills and

knowledge necessary to effectively

perform their duties.

(4) System qualification tests. The

railroad shall develop, implement, and

use a series of operational and design

tests, which meet the standards set forth

in subpart F of this part, to demonstrate

the safe operation of system

components, and the system as a whole.

(d) Track and infrastructure. (1) The

railroad shall construct its track and

infrastructure to meet all material and

operational design criteria, within

normal acceptable construction

tolerances, and to meet the requirements

set forth in subpart C of this part.

(2) The railroad shall operate on

nominal standard gauge, 1,435 mm (56.5

inches), track.

(3) The railroad shall install and

operate on double track throughout the

mainlines, with a minimum nominal

distance between track centerlines of 4

m (13.1 feet) for operating speeds up to

170 km/h (106 mph) (track Classes up

to H4) and 4.2 m (13.8 feet) for operating

speeds greater than 170 km/h (106 mph)

(track Classes H5 and above). Generally,

each track will be used for a single

direction of traffic, and trainset will not

overtake each other on mainline tracks

(except at non-terminal station

locations). The railroad may install

crossover connections between the

double track at each station, and at

regular intervals along the line to permit

flexibility in trainset operations,

maintenance, and emergency rescue.

(4) The railroad’s main track (track

Classes H4 and above) shall consist of

continuous welded rail. Once installed,

the rail shall be field-welded to form

one continuous track segment except

rail expansion joints and where glued-

insulated joints are necessary for

signaling purposes. The rail shall be JIS

E 1101 60 kg rail, as specified in JIS E

1101:2001(E) as amended by JIS E

1101:2006(E), and JIS E 1101:2012(E)

(all incorporated by reference, see

§ 299.17).

(5) In yards and maintenance

facilities, where operations will be at

lower speeds, the railroad shall install

either JIS E 1101 50kgN rail or JIS E

1101 60 kg rail as specified in JIS E

1101:2001(E) as amended by JIS E

1101:2006(E), and JIS E 1101:2012(E)

(all incorporated by reference, see

§ 299.17).

(6) The railroad shall use either

ballasted or non-ballasted track to

support the track structure, as

appropriate for the intended high-speed

system.

(i) Except as noted in paragraph

(c)(6)(ii) of this section, for ballasted

mainline track structure, the railroad

shall install pre-stressed concrete ties.

(ii) For special track work such as

turnouts and expansion joints, and at

transitions to bridges, and for non-

ballasted track, the railroad shall install

either pre-stressed, composite ties, or

use direct fixation. Detailed

requirements are included in subpart C

of this part.

(7) Turnouts, expansion joints and

glued-insulated joints shall be of the

proven design as used on the Tokaido

Shinkansen system.

(8) The trainsets and stations shall be

designed to permit level platform

boarding for passengers and crew at all

side entrance doors. Provisions for high

level boarding shall be made at all

locations in trainset maintenance

facilities where crew and maintenance

personnel are normally required to

access or disembark trainsets.

(e) Signal and trainset control

systems. (1) The railroad’s signal and

trainset control systems, shall be based

upon the service-proven system utilized

on the Tokaido Shinkansen system and

shall include an automatic train control

(ATC) system, interlocking equipment,

and wayside equipment, including:

track circuits, transponders, and Go/No-

Go signals in stations and trainset

maintenance facilities.

(2) The railroad’s signaling system

shall extend beyond the mainline into

trainset maintenance facilities and be

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designed to prevent collisions at all

speeds.

(3) The ATC system shall be designed

with a redundant architecture utilizing

an intrinsic fail-safe design concept.

(4) The trainset braking curves shall

be determined by the on-board

equipment based on the ATC signal

from the ground facility and on-board

database that includes the alignment

and rolling stock performance data. The

on-board equipment shall generate the

braking command based upon the

trainset location, speed, and braking

curves.

(5) The ATC on-board equipment

shall have three modes: mainline,

shunting, and cut-out.

(i) Mainline mode shall be used for

operations on mainlines and for

entering into the trainset maintenance

facilities. The mainline mode of ATC

on-board equipment shall provide the

following functions:

(A) Prevent train-to-train collisions;

and

(B) Prevent overspeed derailments.

(ii) Shunting mode shall be used to

protect movements within trainset

maintenance facilities and for

emergency operations as required by the

operating rules. When operating in

shunting mode, the trainset shall be

restricted to a maximum speed of 30

km/h.

(iii) Cut-out mode shall be used for

emergency operations and/or in the

event of an ATC system failure as

required by the operating rules.

(6) Interlocking equipment shall

prevent the movement of trainsets

through a switch in an improper

position and command switch-and-lock

movements on mainlines and within

trainset maintenance facilities.

(7) Track circuits shall be used to

provide broken rail detection.

(8) Overrun protection coils shall be

used at mainline turnouts, crossovers

within stations and trainset

maintenance facilities to prevent

unauthorized route access.

(9) Transponders shall be used on the

mainline to provide trainset position

correction. Transponders may be used

to provide an overlay of overrun

protection within a trainset

maintenance facility.

(10) Go/No-Go signals shall be used in

stations for shunting and emergency

operations and in trainset maintenance

facilities to provide trainset movement

authority.

(11) The railroad shall include an

intrusion detection system as required

by paragraph (b)(3) and (5) of this

section that shall interface with the ATC

system and have the capability to stop

the trainset under specified intrusion

scenarios.

(f) Communications. (1) The railroad

shall install a dedicated communication

system along the right-of-way to

transmit data, telephone, and/or radio

communications that is completely

isolated and independent of the signal

and trainset control system. To ensure

transmission reliability, the system shall

include back-up transmission routes.

(2) For trainset operation and

maintenance, the railroad shall install—

(i) A portable radio system for

maintenance and service use; and

(ii) A trainset radio, which shall

facilitate communication between each

trainset and the general control center.

(g) Rolling stock. (1) The railroad’s

rolling stock shall be designed,

operated, and maintained in accordance

with the requirements set forth in

subparts D, E, and G of this part.

(2) The railroad shall utilize bi-

directional, fixed-consist, electric

multiple unit (EMU), high-speed

trainsets based on the N700.

(3) Each trainset shall be equipped

with wheel slide control.

(4) Each trainset shall be equipped

with two electrically connected

pantographs. The position of the

pantographs (up or down) shall be

displayed in the driver’s cab.

(5) The driver’s cab shall be a full

width and dedicated cab and shall be

arranged to enhance safety of operation,

range of vision, visibility and readability

of controls and indicators, accessibility

of controls, and climate control.

(6) The railroad’s passenger

equipment brake system shall be based

on the N700’s design and shall meet the

following standards:

(i) Each trainset shall be equipped

with an electronically controlled brake

system that shall ensure that each unit

in the trainset responds independently

to a brake command. The brake

command shall be transmitted through

the on-board internal trainset control

network, as well as through the trainline

for redundancy.

(A) Motorized cars shall be equipped

with regenerative and electronically

controlled pneumatic brakes. The

system shall be designed to maximize

the use of regenerative brakes.

(B) Non-motorized cars shall be

equipped with electronically controlled

pneumatic brakes.

(C) The friction brakes on each bogie

shall be cheek mounted disc brakes.

(D) Each car shall be equipped with

an electronic and pneumatic brake

control unit and a main reservoir. The

system shall be designed that in the

event of a failure of an electronic control

unit in a car, brake control shall be

provided by the electronic control unit

on the adjacent car. Each car in the

trainset shall be equipped with a backup

wheel slide protection controller that

will provide wheel slide protection in

the event of a wheel slide protection

controller failure.

(ii) The braking system shall be

designed with the following brake

controls: Service, emergency, urgent,

and rescue brake.

(iii) The service and emergency brake

shall be applied automatically by ATC

or manually by the driver.

(iv) The urgent brake control shall be

independent of the service and

emergency brake control and shall be

automatically applied if the trainset is

parted. Application of the urgent brake

shall produce an irretrievable stop. The

urgent brake force shall be designed to

vary according to speed in order to

minimize the braking distance and

avoid excessive demand of adhesion at

higher speeds.

(v) A disabled trainset shall be

capable of having its brake system

controlled electronically by a rescue

trainset.

(vi) Independent of the driver’s brake

handle in the cab, each trainset shall be

equipped with two urgent brake

switches in each cab car, accessible only

to the crew; located adjacent to the door

control station and that can initiate an

urgent brake application. If door control

stations are provided in intermediate

cars that are accessible only to crew

members, then the urgent brake

switches must also be included adjacent

to the door control stations.

(vii) The railroad shall establish a

maximum safe operating speed to

address brake failures that occur in

revenue service as required by

§ 299.409(f)(4). In the event of any

friction brake failure on a trainset, the

speed shall be limited by ATC on-board

equipment in accordance with the brake

failure switch position selected by the

driver and as required by § 299.447.

§ 299.15 Special approvals.

(a) General. The following procedures

govern consideration and action upon

requests for special approval of

alternative standards to this part.

(b) Petitions for special approval of

alternative standard. Each petition for

special approval of an alternative

standard shall contain—

(1) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to review of

the petition;

(2) The alternative proposed, in detail,

to be substituted for the particular

requirements of this part; and

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(3) Appropriate data or analysis, or

both, establishing that the alternative

will provide at least an equivalent level

of safety.

(c) Petitions for special approval of

alternative compliance. Each petition

for special approval of alternative

compliance shall contain—

(1) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to the

petition;

(2) High-speed core systems and

system components of special design

shall be deemed to comply with this

part, if the FRA Associate Administrator

determines under paragraph (d) of this

section that the core system or system

components provide at least an

equivalent level of safety in the

environment defined within § 299.13

with respect to the protection of railroad

employees and the public. In making a

determination under paragraph (d) of

this section the Associate Administrator

shall consider, as a whole, all of those

elements of casualty prevention or

mitigation relevant to the integrity of the

core system or components that are

addressed by the requirements of this

part.

(d) Petition contents. The Associate

Administrator may only make a finding

of equivalent safety and compliance

with this part, based upon a submission

of data and analysis sufficient to

support that determination. The petition

shall include—

(1) The information required by

§ 299.15(b) or (c), as appropriate;

Information, including detailed

drawings and materials specifications,

sufficient to describe the actual

construction and function of the core

systems or system components of

special design;

(2) A quantitative risk assessment,

incorporating the design information

and engineering analysis described in

this paragraph, demonstrating that the

core systems or system components, as

utilized in the service environment

defined in § 299.13, presents no greater

hazard of serious personal injury than

existing core system or system

components that conform to the specific

requirements of this part.

(e) Federal Register notice. FRA will

publish a notice in the Federal Register

concerning each petition under

paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.

(f) Comment. Not later than 30 days

from the date of publication of the

notice in the Federal Register

concerning a petition under paragraphs

(b) and (c) of this section, any person

may comment on the petition.

(1) Each comment shall set forth

specifically the basis upon which it is

made, and contain a concise statement

of the interest of the commenter in the

proceeding.

(2) Each comment shall be submitted

to the U.S. Department of

Transportation, Docket Operations (M–

30), West Building Ground Floor, Room

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,

Washington, DC 20590, and shall

contain the assigned docket number for

that proceeding. The form of such

submission may be in written or

electronic form consistent with the

standards and requirements established

by the Federal Docket Management

System and posted on its website at

http://www.regulations.gov.

(g) Disposition of petitions. (1) FRA

will conduct a hearing on a petition in

accordance with the procedures

provided in § 211.25 of this chapter.

(2) If FRA finds that the petition

complies with the requirements of this

section or that the proposed plan is

acceptable the petition will be granted,

normally within 90 days of its receipt.

If the petition is neither granted nor

denied within 90 days, the petition

remains pending for decision. FRA may

attach special conditions to the approval

of the petition. Following the approval

of a petition, FRA may reopen

consideration of the petition for cause

stated.

(3) If FRA finds that the petition does

not comply with the requirements of

this section, or that the proposed plan

is not acceptable or that the proposed

changes are not justified, or both, the

petition will be denied, normally within

90 days of its receipt.

(4) When FRA grants or denies a

petition, or reopens consideration of the

petition, written notice is sent to the

petitioner and other interested parties.

§ 299.17 Incorporation by reference.

Certain material is incorporated by

reference into this part with the

approval of the Director of the Federal

Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1

CFR part 51. All approved material is

available for inspection at Federal

Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk,

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202–

493–6052); email: FRALegal@dot.gov

and is available from the sources

indicated in this section. It is also

available for inspection at the National

Archives and Records Administration

(NARA). For information on the

availability of this material at NARA,

email fedreg.legal@nara.gov or go to

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/

ibr-locations.html.

(a) ASTM International, 100 Barr

Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West

Conshohocken, PA 19428–2959,

www.astm.org.

(1) ASTM D 4956–07

ε1

, Standard

Specification for Retroreflective

Sheeting for Traffic Control, approved

March 15, 2007; into § 299.423.

(2) ASTM E 810–03, Standard Test

Method for Coefficient of Retroreflection

of Retroreflective Sheeting Utilizing the

Coplanar Geometry, approved February

10, 2003; into § 299.423.

(3) ASTM E 2073–07, Standard Test

Method for Photopic Luminance of

Photoluminescent (Phosphorescent)

Markings, approved July 1, 2007; into

§ 299.423.

(b) Japanese Standards Association 3–

13–12 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 108–

0073, Japan, www.jsa.or.jp (Japanese

site), or www.jsa.or.jp/en (English site).

(1) JIS B 8265:2010(E) ‘‘Construction

of pressure vessels-general principles,’’

Published December 27, 2010, Second

English edition, published December

2013; into § 299.409.

(2) JIS E 1101:2001(E), ‘‘Flat bottom

railway rails and special rails for

switches and crossings of non-treated

steel,’’ Published March 21, 2001,

Second English edition, published

August 2008; into § 299.13(d).

(3) JIS E 1101:2006(E) ‘‘Flat bottom

railway rails and special rails for

switches and crossings of non-treated

steel,’’ (Amendment 1), Published

March 27, 2006, First English edition,

published December 2006; into

§ 299.13(d).

(4) JIS E 1101:2012(E) ‘‘Flat bottom

railway rails and special rails for

switches and crossings of non-treated

steel,’’ (Amendment 2), Published

February 20, 2012, First English edition,

May 2012; into § 299.13(d).

(5) JIS E 7105:2006(E), ‘‘Rolling

Stock—Test methods of static load for

body structures,’’ Published February 6,

2006, First English edition published

May 2010; into § 299.403(b).

(6) JIS E 7105:2011(E), ‘‘Rolling

Stock—Test methods of static load for

body structures,’’ (Amendment 1)

Published September 7, 2011, First

English edition, published December

2011; into § 299.403(b).

Subpart B—Signal and Trainset

Control System

§ 299.201 Technical PTC system

requirements.

(a) The railroad shall comply with all

applicable requirements under 49 U.S.C.

20157, including, but not limited to, the

statutory requirement to fully

implement an FRA-certified PTC system

prior to commencing revenue service.

(b) The railroad’s PTC system shall be

designed to prevent train-to-train

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collisions, over-speed derailments,

incursions into established work zone

limits, and movements of trainset

through switches left in the wrong

position, reliably and functionally, in

accordance with § 236.1005(a) and (c)

through (f) of this chapter.

(c) The railroad is authorized to

conduct field testing of its PTC system

on its system, prior to obtaining PTC

System Certification from FRA, in

accordance with its system-wide

qualification test plan under § 299.603.

During any field testing of its

uncertified PTC system and regression

testing of its FRA-certified PTC system,

FRA may oversee the railroad’s testing,

audit any applicable test plans and

procedures, and impose additional

testing conditions that FRA believes

may be necessary for the safety of

trainset operations.

(d) The railroad is not exempted from

compliance with any requirement of

subparts A through G of 49 CFR part

236, or 49 CFR parts 233 and 235,

unless the railroad’s FRA-approved

PTCSP provides for such an exemption.

(e)(1) All materials filed in accordance

with this subpart must be in the English

language, or have been translated into

English and attested as true and correct.

(2) Each filing referenced in this

subpart may include a request for full or

partial confidentiality in accordance

with § 209.11 of this chapter. If

confidentiality is requested as to a

portion of any applicable document,

then in addition to the filing

requirements under § 209.11 of this

chapter, the person filing the document

shall also file a copy of the original

unredacted document, marked to

indicate which portions are redacted in

the document’s confidential version

without obscuring the original

document’s contents.

§ 299.203 PTC system required.

The railroad shall not commence

revenue service prior to installing and

making operative its FRA-certified PTC

system.

§ 299.205 PTC System Certification.

(a) Prior to operating its PTC system

in revenue service, the railroad must

first obtain a PTC System Certification

from FRA by submitting an acceptable

PTCSP and obtaining FRA’s approval of

its PTCSP.

(b) Each PTCSP requirement under

this subpart shall be supported by

information and analysis sufficient to

establish that the PTC system meets the

requirements of § 236.1005(a) and (c)

through (f) of this chapter.

(c) If the Associate Administrator

finds that the PTCSP and its supporting

documentation support a finding that

the PTC system complies with

§ 236.1005(a) and (c) through (f) of this

chapter and § 299.211, the Associate

Administrator shall approve the PTCSP.

If the Associate Administrator approves

the PTCSP, the railroad shall receive

PTC System Certification for its PTC

system and shall implement the PTC

system according to the PTCSP.

(d) Issuance of a PTC System

Certification is contingent upon FRA’s

confidence in the implementation and

operation of the subject PTC system.

This confidence may be based on FRA-

monitored field testing or an

independent assessment performed in

accordance with § 236.1017 of this

chapter.

(e)(1) As necessary to ensure safety,

FRA may attach special conditions to its

certification of the railroad’s PTC

System.

(2) After granting a PTC System

Certification, FRA may reconsider the

PTC System Certification upon

revelation of any of the following factors

concerning the contents of the PTCSP:

(i) Potential error or fraud;

(ii) Potentially invalidated

assumptions determined as a result of

in-service experience or one or more

unsafe events calling into question the

safety analysis supporting the approval.

(3) During FRA’s reconsideration in

accordance with this paragraph, the PTC

system may remain in use if otherwise

consistent with the applicable law and

regulations, and FRA may impose

special conditions for use of the PTC

system.

(4) After FRA’s reconsideration in

accordance with this paragraph, FRA

may:

(i) Dismiss its reconsideration and

continue to recognize the existing PTC

System Certification;

(ii) Allow continued operations under

such conditions the Associate

Administrator deems necessary to

ensure safety; or

(iii) Revoke the PTC System

Certification and direct the railroad to

cease operations.

(f) FRA shall be afforded reasonable

access to monitor, test, and inspect

processes, procedures, facilities,

documents, records, design and testing

materials, artifacts, training materials

and programs, and any other

information used in the design,

development, manufacture, test,

implementation, and operation of the

system, as well as interview any

personnel.

(g) Information that has been certified

under the auspices of a foreign

regulatory entity recognized by the

Associate Administrator may, at the

Associate Administrator’s sole

discretion, be accepted as

independently verified and validated

and used to support the railroad’s

PTCSP.

(h) The railroad shall file its PTCSP in

FRA’s Secure Information Repository at

https://sir.fra.dot.gov, consistent with

§ 299.201(e).

§ 299.207 PTC Safety Plan content

requirements.

(a) The railroad’s PTCSP shall contain

the following elements:

(1) A hazard log consisting of a

comprehensive description of all safety-

relevant hazards of the PTC system,

specific to implementation on the

railroad, including maximum threshold

limits for each hazard (for unidentified

hazards, the threshold shall be exceeded

at one occurrence);

(2) A description of the safety

assurance concepts that are to be used

for system development, including an

explanation of the design principles and

assumptions;

(3) A risk assessment of the as-built

PTC system;

(4) A hazard mitigation analysis,

including a complete and

comprehensive description of each

hazard and the mitigation techniques

used;

(5) A complete description of the

safety assessment and Verification and

Validation processes applied to the PTC

system, their results, and whether these

processes address the safety principles

described in appendix C to part 236 of

this chapter directly, using other safety

criteria, or not at all;

(6) A complete description of the

railroad’s training plan for railroad, and

contractor employees and supervisors

necessary to ensure safe and proper

installation, implementation, operation,

maintenance, repair, inspection, testing,

and modification of the PTC system;

(7) A complete description of the

specific procedures and test equipment

necessary to ensure the safe and proper

installation, implementation, operation,

maintenance, repair, inspection, testing,

and modification of the PTC system on

the railroad and establish safety-critical

hazards are appropriately mitigated.

These procedures, including calibration

requirements, shall be consistent with

or explain deviations from the

equipment manufacturer’s

recommendations;

(8) A complete description of the

configuration or revision control

measures designed to ensure that the

railroad or its contractor does not

adversely affect the safety-functional

requirements and that safety-critical

hazard mitigation processes are not

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compromised as a result of any such

change;

(9) A complete description of all

initial implementation testing

procedures necessary to establish that

safety-functional requirements are met

and safety-critical hazards are

appropriately mitigated;

(10) A complete description of all

post-implementation testing (validation)

and monitoring procedures, including

the intervals necessary to establish that

safety-functional requirements, safety-

critical hazard mitigation processes, and

safety-critical tolerances are not

compromised over time, through use, or

after maintenance (adjustment, repair,

or replacement) is performed;

(11) A complete description of each

record necessary to ensure the safety of

the system that is associated with

periodic maintenance, inspections,

tests, adjustments, repairs, or

replacements, and the system’s resulting

conditions, including records of

component failures resulting in safety-

relevant hazards (see § 299.213);

(12) A safety analysis to determine

whether, when the system is in

operation, any risk remains of an

unintended incursion into a roadway

work zone due to human error. If the

analysis reveals any such risk, the

PTCSP shall describe how that risk will

be mitigated;

(13) A complete description of how

the PTC system will enforce authorities

and signal indications;

(14) A complete description of how

the PTC system will appropriately and

timely enforce all integrated hazard

detectors in accordance with § 236.1005

of this chapter;

(15) The documents and information

required under § 299.211;

(16) A summary of the process for the

product supplier or vendor to promptly

and thoroughly report any safety-

relevant failures or previously

unidentified hazards to the railroad,

including when another user of the

product experiences a safety-relevant

failure or discovers a previously

unidentified hazard;

(17) Documentation establishing—by

design, data, or other analysis—that the

PTC system meets the fail-safe operation

criteria under paragraph (b)(4)(v) of

appendix C to part 236 of this chapter;

and,

(18) An analysis establishing that the

PTC system will be operated at a level

of safety comparable to that achieved

over the 5-year period prior to the

submission of the railroad’s PTCSP by

other train control systems that perform

PTC functions, and which have been

utilized on high-speed rail systems with

similar technical and operational

characteristics in the United States or in

foreign service.

(b) As the railroad’s PTC system may

be considered a standalone system

pursuant to § 236.1015(e)(3) of this

chapter, the following requirements

apply:

(1) The PTC system shall reliably

execute the functions required by

§ 236.1005 of this chapter and be

demonstrated to do so to FRA’s

satisfaction; and

(2) The railroad’s PTCSP shall

establish, with a high degree of

confidence, that the system will not

introduce any hazards that have not

been sufficiently mitigated.

(c) When determining whether the

PTCSP fulfills the requirements under

this section, the Associate

Administrator may consider all

available evidence concerning the

reliability of the proposed system.

(d) When reviewing the issue of the

potential data errors (for example, errors

arising from data supplied from other

business systems needed to execute the

braking algorithm, survey data needed

for location determination, or

mandatory directives issued through the

computer-aided dispatching system),

the PTCSP must include a careful

identification of each of the risks and a

discussion of each applicable

mitigation. In an appropriate case, such

as a case in which the residual risk after

mitigation is substantial, the Associate

Administrator may require submission

of a quantitative risk assessment

addressing these potential errors.

(e) The railroad must comply with the

applicable requirements under

§ 236.1021 of this chapter prior to

modifying a safety-critical element of an

FRA-certified PTC system.

(f) If a PTCSP applies to a PTC system

designed to replace an existing certified

PTC system, the PTCSP will be

approved provided that the PTCSP

establishes with a high degree of

confidence that the new PTC system

will provide a level of safety not less

than the level of safety provided by the

system to be replaced.

§ 299.209 PTC system use and failures.

(a) When any safety-critical PTC

system component fails to perform its

intended function, the cause must be

determined and the faulty component

adjusted, repaired, or replaced without

undue delay. Until repair of such

essential components is completed, the

railroad shall take appropriate action as

specified in its PTCSP.

(b) Where a trainset that is operating

in, or is to be operated within, a PTC-

equipped track segment experiences a

PTC system failure or the PTC system is

otherwise cut out while en route (i.e.,

after the trainset has departed its initial

terminal), the trainset may only

continue in accordance with all of the

following:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph

(b)(4) of this section, when no absolute

block protection is established, the

trainset may proceed at a speed not to

exceed restricted speed.

(2) When absolute block protection

can be established in advance of the

trainset, the trainset may proceed at a

speed not to exceed 120 km/h (75 mph),

and the trainset shall not exceed

restricted speed until the absolute block

in advance of the trainset is established.

(3) A report of the failure or cut-out

must be made to a designated railroad

officer of the railroad as soon as safe and

practicable.

(4) Where the PTC system is the

exclusive method of delivering

mandatory directives, an absolute block

must be established in advance of the

trainset as soon as safe and practicable,

and the trainset shall not exceed

restricted speed until the absolute block

in advance of the trainset is established.

(5) Where the failure or cut-out is a

result of a defective onboard PTC

apparatus, the trainset may be moved in

passenger service only to the next

forward location where the necessary

repairs can be made; however, if the

next forward location where the

necessary repairs can be made does not

have the facilities to handle the safe

unloading of passengers, the trainset

may be moved past the repair location

in service only to the next forward

passenger station in order to facilitate

the unloading of passengers. When the

passengers have been safely unloaded,

the defective trainset shall be moved to

the nearest location where the onboard

PTC apparatus can be repaired or

exchanged.

(c) The railroad shall comply with all

provisions in its PTCSP for each PTC

system it uses and shall operate within

the scope of initial operational

assumptions and predefined changes

identified.

(d) The normal functioning of any

safety-critical PTC system must not be

interfered with in testing or otherwise

without first taking measures to provide

for the safe movement of trainsets that

depend on the normal functioning of the

system.

(e) The railroad shall comply with the

reporting requirements under

§ 236.1029(h) of this chapter.

(f) The railroad and the PTC system

vendors and/or suppliers must comply

with each applicable requirement under

§ 236.1023 of this chapter.

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§ 299.211 Communications and security

requirements.

(a) All wireless communications

between the office, wayside, and

onboard components in a PTC system

shall provide cryptographic message

integrity and authentication.

(b) Cryptographic keys required under

this section shall—

(1) Use an algorithm approved by the

National Institute of Standards or a

similarly recognized and FRA-approved

standards body;

(2) Be distributed using manual or

automated methods, or a combination of

both; and

(3) Be revoked—

(i) If compromised by unauthorized

disclosure of the cleartext key; or

(ii) When the key algorithm reaches

its lifespan as defined by the standards

body responsible for approval of the

algorithm.

(c) The cleartext form of the

cryptographic keys shall be protected

from unauthorized disclosure,

modification, or substitution, except

during key entry when the cleartext

keys and key components may be

temporarily displayed to allow visual

verification. When encrypted keys or

key components are entered, the

cryptographically protected cleartext

key or key components shall not be

displayed.

(d) Access to cleartext keys shall be

protected by a tamper-resistant

mechanism.

(e) If the railroad elects to also

provide cryptographic message

confidentiality, it shall:

(1) Comply with the same

requirements for message integrity and

authentication under this section; and

(2) Only use keys meeting or

exceeding the security strength required

to protect the data as defined in the

railroad’s PTCSP.

(f) The railroad, or its vendor or

supplier, shall have a prioritized service

restoration and mitigation plan for

scheduled and unscheduled

interruptions of service. This plan shall

be made available to FRA upon request,

without undue delay, for restoration of

communication services that support

PTC system services.

§ 299.213 Records retention.

(a) The railroad shall maintain at a

designated office on the railroad—

(1) A current copy of each FRA-

approved PTCSP that it holds;

(2) Adequate documentation to

demonstrate that the PTCSP meets the

safety requirements of this RPA,

including the risk assessment;

(3) An Operations and Maintenance

Manual, pursuant to § 299.215; and

(4) Training and testing records

pursuant to § 236.1043(b) of this

chapter.

(b) Results of inspections and tests

specified in the PTCSP must be

recorded pursuant to § 236.110 of this

chapter.

(c) Each contractor providing services

relating to the testing, maintenance, or

operation of the railroad’s PTC system

shall maintain at a designated office

training records required under

§§ 236.1043(b) of this chapter, and

299.207(a)(6).

(d) After the PTC system is placed in

service, the railroad shall maintain a

database of all safety-relevant hazards as

set forth in its PTCSP and those that had

not been previously identified in its

PTCSP. If the frequency of the safety-

relevant hazards exceeds the threshold

set forth in its PTCSP, then the railroad

shall—

(1) Report the inconsistency in

writing to FRA’s Secure Information

Repository at https://sir.fra.dot.gov,

within 15 days of discovery;

(2) Take prompt countermeasures to

reduce the frequency of each safety-

relevant hazard to below the threshold

set forth in its PTCSP; and

(3) Provide a final report when the

inconsistency is resolved to FRA’s

Secure Information Repository at

https://sir.fra.dot.gov, on the results of

the analysis and countermeasures taken

to reduce the frequency of the safety-

relevant hazard(s) below the threshold

set forth in its PTCSP.

§ 299.215 Operations and Maintenance

Manual.

(a) The railroad shall catalog and

maintain all documents as specified in

its PTCSP for the operation, installation,

maintenance, repair, modification,

inspection, and testing of the PTC

system and have them in one

Operations and Maintenance Manual,

readily available to persons required to

perform such tasks and for inspection

by FRA and FRA-certified state

inspectors.

(b) Plans required for proper

maintenance, repair, inspection, and

testing of safety-critical PTC systems

must be adequate in detail and must be

made available for inspection by FRA

and FRA-certified state inspectors

where such PTC systems are deployed

or maintained. They must identify all

software versions, revisions, and

revision dates. Plans must be legible and

correct.

(c) Hardware, software, and firmware

revisions must be documented in the

Operations and Maintenance Manual

according to the railroad’s configuration

management control plan and any

additional configuration/revision

control measures specified in its PTCSP.

(d) Safety-critical components,

including spare equipment, must be

positively identified, handled, replaced,

and repaired in accordance with the

procedures specified in the railroad’s

PTCSP.

(e) The railroad shall designate in its

Operations and Maintenance Manual an

appropriate railroad officer responsible

for issues relating to scheduled

interruptions of service.

Subpart C—Track Safety Standards

§ 299.301 Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions.

(a) Restoration or renewal of track,

other than in yards and trainset

maintenance facilities, under traffic

conditions is prohibited.

(b) Restoration or renewal of track

under traffic conditions on track Class

H2 in trainset maintenance facilities is

limited to the replacement of worn,

broken, or missing components or

fastenings that do not affect the safe

passage of trainset.

(c) The following activities are

expressly prohibited on track Class H2

in trainset maintenance facilities under

traffic conditions:

(1) Any work that interrupts rail

continuity, e.g., as in joint bar

replacement or rail replacement;

(2) Any work that adversely affects

the lateral or vertical stability of the

track with the exception of spot tamping

an isolated condition where not more

than 4.5 m (15 feet) of track are involved

at any one time and the ambient air

temperature is not above 35°C (95°F);

and

(3) Removal and replacement of the

rail fastenings on more than one tie at

a time within 4.5 m (15 feet).

§ 299.303 Measuring track not under load.

When unloaded track is measured to

determine compliance with

requirements of this part, evidence of

rail movement, if any, that occurs while

the track is loaded shall be added to the

measurements of the unloaded track.

§ 299.305 Drainage.

Each drainage or other water carrying

facility under or immediately adjacent

to the roadbed shall be maintained and

kept free of obstruction, to

accommodate expected water flow for

the area concerned.

§ 299.307 Vegetation.

Vegetation on railroad property which

is on or immediately adjacent to

roadbed shall be controlled so that it

does not—

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(a) Become a fire hazard to track-

carrying structures;

(b) Obstruct visibility of railroad signs

and signals along the right-of-way;

(c) Interfere with railroad employees

performing normal trackside duties;

(d) Prevent proper functioning of

signal and communication lines; or

(e) Prevent railroad employees from

visually inspecting moving equipment

from their normal duty stations.

§ 299.309 Classes of track: operating

speed limits.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph

(b) of this section and as otherwise

provided in this part, the following

maximum allowable operating speeds

apply—

T

ABLE

1

TO PARAGRAPH

(a)

Over track that

meets all of the

requirements

prescribed in this

part for—

The maximum

allowable operating

speed in km/h (mph)

Class H0 track .......... 20 (12)

Class H1 track .......... 30 (19)

T

ABLE

1

TO PARAGRAPH

(a)—

Continued

Over track that

meets all of the

requirements

prescribed in this

part for—

The maximum

allowable operating

speed in km/h (mph)

Class H2 track .......... 70 (44)

Class H3 track .......... 120 (75)

Class H4 track .......... 170 (106)

Class H5 track .......... 230 (143)

Class H6 track .......... 285 (177)

Class H7 track .......... 330 (205)

(b) Except as provided in paragraph

(c) of this section, if a segment of track

does not meet all of the requirements for

its intended Class, it is to be reclassified

to the next lower track Class for which

it does meet all of the requirements of

this part. However, if the segment of

track does not at least meet the

requirements for track Class H1 track,

operations may continue at Class H1

speeds for a period of not more than 30

days without bringing the track into

compliance, under the authority of an

individual designated under § 299.353,

after that individual determines that

operations may safely continue and

subject to any limiting conditions

specified by such individual.

(c) If a segment of track designated as

track Class H0 does not meet all of the

requirements for its intended class,

operations may continue at Class H0

speeds for a period of not more than 30

days without bringing the track into

compliance, under the authority of an

individual designated under § 299.353,

after that individual determines that

operations may safely continue and

subject to any limiting conditions

specified by such individual.

(d) No high-speed passenger trainset

shall operate over track Class H0.

§ 299.311 Track geometry; general.

If the values listed in the following

table are exceeded, the railroad shall

initiate remedial action. A reduction in

operating speed so that the condition

complies with the limits listed for a

lower speed shall constitute bringing

the track into compliance.

T

ABLE

1

TO

§ 299.311

Track geometry parameter (millimeter (mm)) Track class H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7

Gauge is measured between the heads of the

rails at right angles to the rails in a plane 14

mm (0.55 inches) below the top of the rail

head and may not exceed—.

Min. ................ 1429 1429 1429 1429 1429 1429 1429 1429

Max. ............... 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454 1454

The deviation from uniformity

1

of the mid-chord

offset on either rail for a 10 meter (m) chord

(alignment) may not be more than—.

10 m chord .... 38 31 31 14 12 10 8 7

The deviation from uniform profile on either rail

at the mid-ordinate of a 10 m chord (surface)

may not be more than—.

10 m chord .... 40 40 40 27 22 18 15 13

The deviation from uniform crosslevel at any

point on tangent and curved track may not be

more than—.

........................ 50 26 26 22 18 14 9 9

The difference in crosslevel between any two

points 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) apart (twist) may

not be more than—.

2.5 m .............. 26 26 26 22 18 14 9 9

1

Uniformity for alignment at any point along the track is established by averaging the measured mid-chord offset values for a 10 m (32.8 feet)

chord for nine consecutive points that are centered around that point and spaced at 2.5 m (8.2 feet) intervals.

§ 299.313 Track geometry; performance

based.

(a) For all track of Class H4 and above,

vibration in the lateral and vertical

directions measured on the carbody of

a vehicle representative of the service

fleet traveling at a speed no less than 10

km/h (6.2 mph) below the maximum

speed permitted for the class of track,

shall not exceed the limits prescribed in

the following table:

T

ABLE

1

TO PARAGRAPH

(a)

Carbody acceleration limits

12

Lateral vibration

3

Vertical vibration

3

≤ 0.35 g peak-to-peak ≤ 0.45g peak-to-peak

1 sec window ............ 1 sec window

excluding peaks < 50

msec. excluding peaks < 50

msec

1

Carbody accelerations in the vertical and

lateral directions shall be measured by

accelerometers oriented and located in ac-

cordance with § 299.337(c)(3).

2

Acceleration measurements shall be proc-

essed through an LPF with a minimum cut-off

frequency of 10 Hz. The sample rate for accel-

eration data shall be at least 200 samples per

second.

3

Peak-to-peak accelerations shall be meas-

ured as the algebraic difference between the

two extreme values of measured acceleration

in any 1-second time period, excluding any

peak lasting less than 50 milliseconds.

(b) If the carbody acceleration

requirements are not met on a segment

of track, the segment of track is to be

reclassified to the next lower Class of

track for which it does meet the

requirements of this part.

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§ 299.315 Curves; elevation and speed

limitations.

(a) The maximum elevation of the

outside rail of a curve may not be more

than 200 mm (7-7/8 inches). The outside

rail of a curve may not be lower than the

inside rail by design, except when

engineered to address specific track or

operating conditions; the limits in

§ 299.311 apply in all cases.

(b) The maximum allowable posted

timetable operating speed for each curve

is determined by the following formula:

Where—

V

max

= Maximum allowable posted timetable

operating speed (km/h).

E

a

= Actual elevation of the outside rail

(mm). Actual elevation, E

a

, for each 50-

meter track segment in the body of the

curve is determined by averaging the

elevation for 11 points through the

segment at 5-meter spacing. If the curve

length is less than 50-meters, average the

points through the full length of the body

of the curve.

E

u

= Qualified cant deficiency (mm) of the

vehicle type.

R = Radius of curve (m). Radius of curve, R,

is determined by averaging the radius of

the curve over the same track segment as

the elevation.

(c) All vehicles are considered

qualified for operating on track with a

cant deficiency, E

u

, not exceeding 75

mm (3 inches).

(d) Each vehicle type must be

approved by FRA, under § 299.609, to

operate on track with a qualified cant

deficiency, E

u

, greater than 75 mm (3

inches). Each vehicle type must

demonstrate in a ready-for-service load

condition, compliance with the

requirements of either paragraph (d)(1)

or (2) of this section.

(1) When positioned on a track with

a uniform superelevation equal to the

proposed cant deficiency:

(i) No wheel of the vehicle unloads to

a value less than 60 percent of its static

value on perfectly level track; and

(ii) For passenger cars, the roll angle

between the floor of the equipment and

the horizontal does not exceed 8.6

degrees; or

(2) When operating through a constant

radius curve at a constant speed

corresponding to the proposed cant

deficiency, and a test plan is submitted

and approved by FRA in accordance

with § 299.609(d)—

(i) The steady-state (average) load on

any wheel, throughout the body of the

curve, is not less than 60 percent of its

static value on perfectly level track; and

(ii) For passenger cars, the steady-

state (average) lateral acceleration

measured on the floor of the carbody

does not exceed 0.15g.

(e) The railroad shall transmit the

results of the testing specified in

paragraph (d) of this section to FRA in

accordance with §§ 299.9 and 299.613

requesting approval under § 299.609(g)

for the vehicle type to operate at the

desired curving speeds allowed under

the formula in paragraph (b) of this

section. The request shall be made in

writing and shall contain, at a

minimum, the following information:

(1) A description of the vehicle type

involved, including schematic diagrams

of the suspension system(s) and the

estimated location of the center of

gravity above top of rail; and

(2) The test procedure, including the

load condition under which the testing

was performed, and description of the

instrumentation used to qualify the

vehicle type, as well as the maximum

values for wheel unloading and roll

angles or accelerations that were

observed during testing.

Note 1 to paragraph (e)(2). The test

procedure may be conducted whereby all the

wheels on one side (right or left) of the

vehicle are raised to the proposed cant

deficiency and lowered, and then the vertical

wheel loads under each wheel are measured

and a level is used to record the angle

through which the floor of the vehicle has

been rotated.

(f) Upon FRA approval of the request

to approve the vehicle type to operate at

the desired curving speeds allowed

under the formula in paragraph (b) of

this section, the railroad shall notify

FRA in accordance with § 299.9 in

writing no less than 30 calendar days

prior to the proposed implementation of

the approved higher curving speeds

allowed under the formula in paragraph

(b) of this section. The notification shall

contain, at a minimum, identification of

the track segment(s) on which the

higher curving speeds are to be

implemented.

(g) As used in this section, and

§ 299.609, vehicle type means like

vehicles with variations in their

physical properties, such as suspension,

mass, interior arrangements, and

dimensions that do not result in

significant changes to their dynamic

characteristics.

§ 299.317 Track strength.

(a) Track shall have a sufficient

vertical strength to withstand the

maximum vehicle loads generated at

maximum permissible trainset speeds,

cant deficiencies and surface

limitations. For purposes of this section,

vertical track strength is defined as the

track capacity to constrain vertical

deformations so that the track shall,

under maximum load, remain in

compliance with the track performance

and geometry requirements of this part.

(b) Track shall have sufficient lateral

strength to withstand the maximum

thermal and vehicle loads generated at

maximum permissible trainset speeds,

cant deficiencies and lateral alignment

limitations. For purposes of this section

lateral track strength is defined as the

track capacity to constrain lateral

deformations so that track shall, under

maximum load, remain in compliance

with the track performance and

geometry requirements of this part.

§ 299.319 Track fixation and support.

(a) Crossties, if used shall be of

concrete or composite construction,

unless otherwise approved by FRA

under § 299.15, for all tracks over which

trainsets run in revenue service.

(b) Each 25 m (82 feet) segment of

track that contains crossties shall have—

(1) A sufficient number of crossties to

provide effective support that will—

(i) Hold gauge within limits

prescribed in § 299.311;

(ii) Maintain surface within the limits

prescribed in § 299.311;

(iii) Maintain alignment within the

limits prescribed in § 299.311; and

(iv) Maintain longitudinal rail

restraint.

(2) The minimum number and type of

crossties specified in paragraph (b)(4) of

this section and described in paragraph

(c) or (d) of this section, as applicable,

effectively distributed to support the

entire segment;

(3) At least one non-defective crosstie

of the type specified in paragraphs (c)

and (d) of this section that is located at

a joint location as specified in paragraph

(e) of this section; and

(4) The minimum number of crossties

as indicated in the following table:

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P

ARAGRAPH

(b)(4)

Minimum number of non-defective crossties

Track class Other than on non-ballasted bridge & turnout Non-ballasted

bridge Turnout

H0 ................................................................................. 20 .................................................................................. 26 24

H1 ................................................................................. 28 .................................................................................. 36 33

H2 ................................................................................. 31, unless inside a TMF, then 28 ................................ 36 33

H3 ................................................................................. 35 .................................................................................. 40 37

H4–H7 ........................................................................... 39 .................................................................................. 45 41

(c) Crossties, other than concrete,

counted to satisfy the requirements set

forth in paragraph (b)(4) of this section

shall not be—

(1) Broken through;

(2) Split or otherwise impaired to the

extent the crossties will allow the

ballast to work through, or will not hold

spikes or rail fasteners;

(3) Deteriorated so that the tie plate or

base of rail can move laterally 9.5 mm

(

3

⁄

8

inch) relative to the crossties;

(4) Cut by the tie plate through more

than 40 percent of a crosstie’s thickness;

(5) Configured with less than 2 rail

holding spikes or fasteners per tie plate;

or

(6) Unable, due to insufficient fastener

toeload, to maintain longitudinal

restraint and maintain rail hold down

and gauge.

(d) Concrete crossties counted to

satisfy the requirements set forth in

paragraph (b)(4) of this section shall not

be—

(1) Broken through or deteriorated to

the extent that prestressing material is

visible;

(2) Deteriorated or broken off in the

vicinity of the shoulder or insert so that

the fastener assembly can either pull out

or move laterally more than 9.5 mm (

3

⁄

8

inch) relative to the crosstie;

(3) Deteriorated such that the base of

either rail can move laterally more than

9.5 mm (

3

⁄

8

inch) relative to the crosstie;

(4) Deteriorated so that rail seat

abrasion is sufficiently deep so as to

cause loss of rail fastener toeload;

(5) Deteriorated such that the

crosstie’s fastening or anchoring system

is unable to maintain longitudinal rail

restraint, or maintain rail hold down, or

maintain gauge due to insufficient

fastener toeload; or

(6) Configured with less than two

fasteners on the same rail.

(e) Classes H0 and H1 track shall have

one crosstie whose centerline is within

0.61 m (24 inches) of each rail joint

(end) location. Classes H2 and H3 track

shall have one crosstie whose centerline

is within 0.46 m (18 inches) of each rail

joint (end) location. Classes H4–H7

track shall have one crosstie whose

centerline is within 0.32 m (12.6 inches)

of each rail joint (end) location. The

relative position of these crossties is

described in the following three

diagrams:

(1) Each rail joint in Classes H0 and

H1 track shall be supported by at least

one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c)

and (d) of this section whose centerline

is within 1.22 m (48 inches) as shown

in Figure 1 to this paragraph.

(2) Each rail joint in Classes H2 and

H3 track shall be supported by at least one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c)

and (d) of this section whose centerline is within 0.92 m (36.2 inches) as shown

in Figure 2 to this paragraph.

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(3) Each rail joint in Classes H4–H7

track shall be supported by at least one crosstie specified in paragraphs (c) and

(d) of this section whose centerline is within 0.64 m (25.2 inches) as shown in

Figure 3 to this paragraph.

(f) In Class H3 track there shall be at

least two non-defective ties each side of

a defective tie.

(g) In Classes H4 to H7 track and at

any expansion joints there shall be at

least three non-defective ties each side

of a defective tie.

(h) Defective ties shall be replaced in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program.

(i) Track shall be fastened by a system

of components that effectively

maintains gauge within the limits

prescribed in § 299.311. Each

component of each such system shall be

evaluated to determine whether gauge is

effectively being maintained.

(j) For track constructed without

crossties, such as slab track and track

connected directly to bridge structural

components, track over servicing pits,

etc., the track structure shall be

sufficient to maintain the geometry

limits specified in § 299.311.

§ 299.321 Defective rails.

(a) The railroad’s inspection, testing,

and maintenance program shall include

a description of defective rails

consistent with the practice on the

Tokaido Shinkansen system. The

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program shall include identification of

rail defect types, definition of the

inspection criteria, time required for

verification and the corresponding

remedial action.

(b) When the railroad learns that a rail

in that track contains any of the defects

listed in the railroad’s inspection,

testing, and maintenance program, a

person designated under § 299.353 or

§ 299.355 shall determine whether the

track may continue in use. If the

designated person determines that the

track may continue in use, operation

over the defective rail is not permitted

until—

(1) The rail is replaced or repaired; or

(2) The remedial action prescribed in

the inspection, testing, and maintenance

program is initiated.

§ 299.323 Continuous welded rail (CWR)

plan.

(a) The railroad shall have in effect

and comply with a plan that contains

written procedures which address: The

installation, adjustment, maintenance,

and inspection of CWR; and inspection

of CWR joints.

(b) The railroad shall file its CWR

plan with FRA pursuant to § 299.9. The

initial CWR plan shall be filed 60 days

prior to installation of any CWR track.

The effective date of the plan is the date

the plan is filed with FRA.

(c) The railroad’s existing plan shall

remain in effect until the railroad’s new

plan is developed and filed with FRA.

§ 299.325 Continuous welded rail (CWR);

general.

The railroad shall comply with the

contents of the CWR plan developed

under § 299.323. The plan shall contain

the following elements—

(a) Procedures for the installation and

adjustment of CWR which include—

(1) Designation of a desired rail

installation temperature range for the

geographic area in which the CWR is

located;

(2) De-stressing procedures/methods

which address proper attainment of the

desired rail installation temperature

range when adjusting CWR; and

(3) Glued insulated or expansion joint

installation and maintenance

procedures.

(b) Rail anchoring, if used, or

fastening requirements that will provide

sufficient restraint to limit longitudinal

rail and crosstie movement to the extent

practical, and that specifically address

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CWR rail anchoring or fastening

patterns on bridges, bridge approaches,

and at other locations where possible

longitudinal rail and crosstie movement

associated with normally expected

trainset-induced forces—is restricted.

(c) CWR joint installation and

maintenance procedures.

(d) Procedures which specifically

address maintaining a desired rail

installation temperature range when

cutting CWR including rail repairs, in-

track welding, and in conjunction with

adjustments made in the area of tight

track, a track buckle, or a pull-apart.

(e) Procedures which control trainset

speed on CWR track when—

(1) Maintenance work, track

rehabilitation, track construction, or any

other event occurs which disturbs the

roadbed or ballast section and reduces

the lateral or longitudinal resistance of

the track; and

(2) The difference between the rail

temperature and the rail neutral

temperature is in a range that causes

buckling-prone conditions to be present

at a specific location.

(f) Procedures which prescribe when

and where physical track inspections

are to be performed under extreme

temperature conditions.

(g) Scheduling and procedures for

inspections to detect cracks and other

indications of potential failures in CWR

joints.

(h) The railroad shall have in effect a

comprehensive training program for the

application of these written CWR

procedures, with provisions for periodic

retraining for those individuals

designated as qualified in accordance

with this subpart to supervise the

installation, adjustment, and

maintenance of CWR track and to

perform inspections of CWR track.

(i) The plan shall prescribe and

require compliance with recordkeeping

requirements necessary to provide an

adequate history of track constructed

with CWR. At a minimum, these records

shall include—

(1) The rail laying temperature,

location, and date of CWR installations.

Each record shall be retained until the

rail neutral temperature has been

adjusted; and

(2) A record of any CWR installation

or maintenance work that does not

conform to the written procedures. Such

record must include the location of the

rail and be maintained until the CWR is

brought into conformance with such

procedures.

§ 299.327 Rail end mismatch.

Any mismatch of rails at joints may

not be more than that prescribed by the

following table:

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§ 299.327

Track class

Any mismatch of rails at joints may

not be more than the following:

On the tread of

the rail ends

(mm)

On the gauge side

of the rail ends

(mm)

H0 ................................................................................................................................................................ 6 5

H1–H2 .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 4

H3–H7 .......................................................................................................................................................... 2 2

§ 299.329 Rail joints and torch cut rails.

(a) Each rail joint, insulated joint,

expansion joint, and compromise joint

shall be of a structurally sound design

and appropriate dimensions for the rail

on which it is applied.

(b) If a joint bar is cracked, broken, or

permits excessive vertical movement of

either rail when all bolts are tight, it

shall be replaced.

(c) Except for glued-insulated joints,

each joint bar shall be held in position

by track bolts tightened to allow the

joint bar to firmly support the abutting

rail ends. For track Classes H0 to H3

track bolts shall be tightened, as

required, to allow longitudinal

movement of the rail in the joint to

accommodate expansion and

contraction due to temperature

variations.

(d) Except as provided in paragraph

(e) of this section, each rail shall be

bolted with at least two bolts at each

joint.

(e) Clamped joint bars may be used for

temporary repair during emergency

situations, and speed over that rail end

and the time required to replace the

joint bar must not exceed the limits

specified in the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(f) No rail shall have a bolt hole which

is torch cut or burned.

(g) No joint bar shall be reconfigured

by torch cutting.

(h) No rail having a torch cut or flame

cut end may be used.

§ 299.331 Turnouts and crossings

generally.

(a) In turnouts and track crossings, the

fastenings shall be intact and

maintained to keep the components

securely in place. Also, each switch,

frog, and guard rail shall be kept free of

obstructions that may interfere with the

passage of wheels. Use of rigid rail

crossings at grade is limited to track

Classes H0, H1, and H2.

(b) The track through and on each

side of track crossings and turnouts

shall be designed to restrain rail

movement affecting the position of

switch points and frogs.

(c) Each flangeway at turnouts shall

be at least 39 mm (1.5 inches) wide.

(d) For all turnouts and track

crossings, the railroad shall prepare

inspection and maintenance

requirements to be included in the

railroad’s inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

§ 299.333 Frog guard rails and guard

faces; gauge.

The guard check and guard face gages

in frogs shall be within the limits

prescribed in the following table:

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§ 299.333

Track class

Guard check gage

The distance between the gauge line of a frog

to the guard line

1

of its guard rail or guarding

face, measured across the track at right

angles to the gauge line,

2

may not be less

than—

Guard face gage

The distance between the guard lines,

1

measured across the track at right angles to

the gauge line,

2

may not be more than—

H0–H7 ................................................................ 1,393 mm ......................................................... 1,358 mm.

1

A line along that side of the flangeway which is nearer to the center of the track and at the same elevation as the gage line.

2

A line 14 mm (0.55 inches) below the top of the center line of the head of the running rail, or corresponding location of the tread portion of

the track structure.

§ 299.335 Derails.

(a) Derails shall be installed at

locations where maintenance-of-way

equipment can access track other than

Class H0, in a configuration intended to

derail the un-controlled equipment

away from the mainline and at a

distance from the point of intersection

with the mainline that will not foul the

dynamic envelope of the mainline.

(b) Each derail shall be clearly visible

to railroad personnel operating rail

equipment on the affected track and to

railroad personnel working adjacent to

the affected track. When in a locked

position, a derail shall be free of any lost

motion that would allow it to be

operated without removal of the lock.

(c) Each derail shall be maintained

and function as intended.

(d) Each derail shall be properly

installed for the rail to which it is

applied.

(e) If a track is equipped with a derail

it shall be in the derailing position

except as provided in the railroad’s

operating rules, special instructions, or

changed to permit movement.

§ 299.337 Automated vehicle-based

inspection systems.

(a) A qualifying Track Geometry

Measurement System (TGMS) and a

qualifying Track Acceleration

Measurement System (TAMS) shall be

operated over the route at the following

frequency:

(1) For track Class H3, at least twice

per calendar year with not less than 120

days between inspections; and

(2) For track Classes H4, H5, H6, and

H7, at least twice within any 60-day

period with not less than 12 days

between inspections.

(b) The qualifying TGMS shall meet or

exceed minimum design requirements

which specify that—

(1) Track geometry measurements

shall be taken no more than 1 meter (3.3

feet) away from the contact point of

wheels carrying a vertical load of no less

than 4,500 kg (10,000 lb) per wheel;

(2) Track geometry measurements

shall be taken and recorded on a

distance-based sampling interval not

exceeding 0.60 m (2 feet), preferably

0.30 m (1 foot);

(3) Calibration procedures and

parameters are assigned to the system

which assures that measured and

recorded values accurately represent

track conditions. Track geometry

measurements recorded by the system

shall not differ on repeated runs at the

same site at the same speed more than

3 mm (

1

⁄

8

inch); and

(4) The TGMS shall be capable of

measuring and processing the necessary

track geometry parameters to determine

compliance with §§ 299.311 and

299.315.

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(c) A qualifying TAMS shall be on a

vehicle having dynamic response

characteristics that are representative of

other vehicles assigned to the service

and shall—

(1) Be operated at the revenue speed

profile in accordance with § 299.309;

(2) Be capable of measuring and

processing carbody acceleration

parameters to determine compliance

with Carbody Acceleration Limits per

§ 299.313; and

(3) Monitor lateral and vertical

accelerations of the carbody. The

accelerometers shall be attached to the

carbody on or under the floor of the

vehicle, as near the center of a bogie as

practicable.

(d) The qualifying TGMS and TAMS

shall be capable of producing, within 24

hours of the inspection, output reports

that—

(1) Provide a continuous plot, on a

constant-distance axis, of all measured

track geometry and carbody acceleration

parameters required in paragraph (b)

and (c) of this section;

(2) Provide an exception report

containing a systematic listing of all

track geometry and all acceleration

conditions which constitute an

exception to the class of track over the

segment surveyed.

(e) The output reports required under

paragraph (d) of this section shall

contain sufficient location identification

information which enables field

personnel to easily locate indicated

exceptions.

(f) Following a track inspection

performed by a qualifying TGMS or

TAMS, the railroad shall, institute

remedial action for all exceptions to the

class of track in accordance with the

railroad’s inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(g) The railroad shall maintain for a

period of one year following an

inspection performed by a qualifying

TGMS and TAMS, a copy of the plot

and the exception report for the track

segment involved, and additional

records which—

(1) Specify the date the inspection

was made and the track segment

involved; and,

(2) Specify the location, remedial

action taken, and the date thereof, for all

listed exceptions to the class.

§ 299.339 Daily sweeper inspection.

A sweeper vehicle shall be operated

each morning after the overnight

maintenance over all tracks except track

Class H2 in stations, prior to

commencing revenue service over that

track. The sweeper vehicle shall operate

at a speed no greater than 120 km/h (75

mph) to conduct a visual inspection to

ensure the right-of-way is clear of

obstacles within the clearance envelope

and to identify conditions that could

cause accidents, and shall have a

minimum clearance of no less than 35

mm above top of rail.

§ 299.341 Inspection of rail in service.

(a) Prior to revenue service the

railroad shall submit written procedures

for the inspection of rails in accordance

with the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(b) On track Classes H4 to H7, and H2

within stations, a continuous search for

internal defects shall be made of all rail

within 180 days after initiation of

revenue service and, thereafter, at least

annually, with not less than 240 days

between inspections.

(c) Each defective rail shall be marked

with a highly visible marking on both

sides of the rail.

(d) Inspection equipment shall be

capable of detecting defects between

joint bars and within the area enclosed

by joint bars.

(e) If the person assigned to operate

the rail defect detection equipment

being used determines that, due to rail

surface conditions, a valid search for

internal defects could not be made over

a particular length of track, the test on

that particular length of track cannot be

considered as a search for internal

defects under this section.

(f) When the railroad learns, through

inspection or otherwise, that a rail in

that track contains any of the defects in

accordance with § 299.321, a qualified

individual designated under § 299.353

or § 299.355 shall determine whether or

not the track may continue in use. If the

qualified individual so designated

determines that the track may continue

in use, operation over the defective rail

is not permitted until—

(1) The rail is replaced; or

(2) The remedial action as prescribed

in § 299.321 has been taken.

(g) The person assigned to operate the

rail defect detection equipment must be

a qualified operator as defined in this

subpart and have demonstrated

proficiency in the rail flaw detection

process for each type of equipment the

operator is assigned.

§ 299.343 Initial inspection of new rail and

welds.

(a) The railroad shall provide for the

initial inspection of newly

manufactured rail, and for initial

inspection of new welds made in either

new or used rail. The railroad may

demonstrate compliance with this

section by providing for—

(1) Mill inspection. A continuous

inspection at the rail manufacturer’s

mill shall constitute compliance with

the requirement for initial inspection of

new rail, provided that the inspection

equipment meets the applicable

requirements as specified under the

railroad’s inspection, testing, and

maintenance program and § 299.321.

The railroad shall obtain a copy of the

manufacturer’s report of inspection and

retain it as a record until the rail

receives its first scheduled inspection

under § 299.341;

(2) Welding plant inspection. A

continuous inspection at a welding

plant, if conducted in accordance with

the provisions of paragraph (a)(1) of this

section, and accompanied by a plant

operator’s report of inspection which is

retained as a record by the railroad,

shall constitute compliance with the

requirements for initial inspection of

new rail and plant welds, or of new

plant welds made in used rail; and

(3) Inspection of field welds. Initial

inspection of new field welds, either

those joining the ends of CWR strings or

those made for isolated repairs, shall be

conducted before the start of revenue

service in accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program. The initial inspection may be

conducted by means of portable test

equipment. The railroad shall retain a

record of such inspections until the

welds receive their first scheduled

inspection under § 299.341.

(b) Each defective rail found during

inspections conducted under paragraph

(a)(3) of this section shall be marked

with highly visible markings on both

sides of the rail and the appropriate

remedial action as set forth in § 299.341

will apply.

§ 299.345 Visual inspections; right of way.

(a) General. All track shall be visually

inspected in accordance with the

schedule prescribed in paragraph (c) of

this section by an individual qualified

under this subpart. The visual

inspection shall be conducted in

accordance with the requirements set

forth in the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program under subpart G

of this part.

(b) Inspection types and frequency—

(1) Safe walkway inspection. Except for

track located inside trainset

maintenance facilities and MOW yards

and the associated portions of the right-

of-way, the right-of-way and all track

shall be inspected from the safe

walkway during daytime hours, in

accordance with the following

conditions:

(i) Ballasted track shall be inspected

at least once every two weeks, with a

minimum of six calendar days in

between inspections.

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(ii) Non-ballasted track shall be

inspected at least once every four

weeks, with a minimum of twelve

calendar days in between inspections.

(iii) No two consecutive visual

inspections from the safe walkway shall

be performed from the same safe

walkway. Safe walkway inspections

shall alternate between safe walkways

on each side of the right-of-way.

(iv) In stations, the safe walkway

inspection may be performed from

either the safe walkway or the station

platform.

(v) An additional on-track visual

inspection conducted during

maintenance hours under paragraph

(b)(2) of this section performed in place

of a visual inspection from the safe

walkway under paragraph (b)(1) of this

section will satisfy the visual inspection

requirement of paragraph (b)(1) of this

section. However, a safe walkway visual

inspection performed under paragraph

(b)(1) of this section cannot replace an

on-track visual inspection conducted

during maintenance hours under

paragraph (b)(2) of this section.

(vi) Except for paragraph (b)(1)(v) of

this section, inspections performed

under paragraph (b)(1) of this section

shall not occur during the same week as

inspections performed under paragraph

(b)(2) of this section.

(vii) In the event a safe walkway

visual inspection is not possible on a

given day due to extreme weather, the

inspection may be conducted from the

cab of a trainset or as an on-track visual

inspection on that day in accordance

with the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(2) On-track inspections; other than

trainset maintenance facilities and

MOW yards. Except for track located

inside trainset maintenance facilities

and MOW yards and the associated

portions of the right-of-way, on-track

visual inspections, conducted on foot

during maintenance hours, shall be

performed on all track in accordance

with the following conditions:

(i) Ballasted track shall be inspected

at least once every two weeks, with a

minimum of six calendar days in

between inspections.

(ii) Non-ballasted track shall be

inspected at least once every four

weeks, with a minimum of twelve

calendar days in between inspections.

(iii) Turn-outs and track crossings on

ballasted track shall be inspected at

least once a week, with a minimum of

three calendar days in between

inspections.

(iv) Turn-outs and track crossings on

non-ballasted track shall be inspected at

least once every two weeks, with a

minimum of six calendar days in

between inspections.

(3) On-track inspections; trainset

maintenance facilities and MOW yards.

For track located inside trainset

maintenance facilities and MOW yards

and the associated portions of the right-

of-way, including turn-outs and track

crossings, on-track visual inspections,

conducted on foot, shall be performed

on all track in accordance with the

following conditions:

(i) Ballasted track shall be inspected

at least once during any 60-day period,

with a minimum of twelve calendar

days in between inspections.

(ii) Non-ballasted track shall be

inspected at least once within any 120-

day period, with a minimum of twenty-

four calendar days in between

inspections.

(iii) On-track safety shall be

established in accordance with 49 CFR

part 214 of this chapter, except for 49

CFR 214.339.

(4) Visual inspections from trainset

cab. Visual inspections from trainset cab

shall be performed for the right-of-way

and track for track Class H3 and above,

except for track leading to a trainset

maintenance facility, at least twice

weekly with a minimum of two calendar

days between inspections.

(c) If a deviation from the

requirements of this subpart is found

during the visual inspection, remedial

action shall be initiated immediately in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program required under subpart G of

this part.

§ 299.347 Special inspections.

(a) In the event of fire, flood, severe

storm, temperature extremes, or other

occurrence which might have damaged

track structure, a special inspection

shall be made of the track and right-of-

way involved as soon as possible after

the occurrence, prior to the operation of

any trainset over that track.

(b) Should a trainset be between

stations when an event such as those

described in paragraph (a) of this

section occurs, that trainset may

proceed to the next forward station at

restricted speed, in accordance with the

railroad’s operating rules and

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program.

§ 299.349 Inspection records.

(a) The railroad shall keep a record of

each inspection required to be

performed on that track under this

subpart.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (f)

of this section, each record of an

inspection under §§ 299.325 and

299.345 shall be prepared on the day the

inspection is made and signed by the

person making the inspection.

(c) Records shall specify the track

inspected, date of inspection, location,

and nature of any deviation from the

requirements of this part, name of

qualified individual who made the

inspection, and the remedial action, if

any, taken by the person making the

inspection.

(d) Rail inspection records shall

specify the date of inspection, the

location and nature of any internal

defects found, name of qualified

individual who made the inspection,

the remedial action taken and the date

thereof, and the location of any intervals

of track not tested pursuant to § 299.341

of this part. The railroad shall retain a

rail inspection record for at least two

years after the inspection and for one

year after remedial action is taken.

(e) The railroad shall make inspection

records required by this section

available for inspection and copying by

the FRA.

(f) For purposes of compliance with

the requirements of this section, the

railroad may maintain and transfer

records through electronic transmission,

storage, and retrieval provided that—

(1) The electronic system is compliant

with the requirements of § 299.11;

(2) The electronic storage of each

record shall be initiated by the person

making the inspection within 24 hours

following the completion of that

inspection; and

(3) Track inspection records shall be

kept available to persons who

performed the inspection and to persons

performing subsequent inspections.

(g) Each track/vehicle performance

record required under § 299.337 shall be

made available for inspection and

copying by the FRA.

§ 299.351 Qualifications for track

maintenance and inspection personnel.

(a) General. The railroad shall

designate qualified individuals

responsible for the maintenance and

inspection of track in compliance with

the safety requirements prescribed in

this subpart. Each designated

individual, including contractors and

their employees, must meet the

minimum qualifications set forth in this

subpart.

(b) Recordkeeping. In addition to the

requirements contained in § 243.203 of

this chapter, the railroad shall also

maintain, with respect to the

designation of individuals under this

subpart, the track inspection records

made by each individual as required by

§ 299.349.

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§ 299.353 Personnel qualified to supervise

track restoration and renewal.

Each individual designated to

supervise restorations and renewals of

track, shall have—

(a) Successfully completed a course

offered by the employer or by a college

level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training emphasizing the techniques to

be employed in the supervision,

restoration, and renewal of high-speed

track;

(b) Demonstrated to the railroad, at

least once per calendar year, that the

individual—

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of this subpart that apply

to the restoration and renewal of the

track for which he or she is responsible;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

(c) Written authorization from the

railroad or the employer to prescribe

remedial actions to correct or safely

compensate for deviations from the

requirements of this subpart and shall

have successfully completed a recorded

examination on this subpart as part of

the qualification process.

§ 299.355 Personnel qualified to inspect

track.

Each individual designated to inspect

track for defects, shall have—

(a) Successfully completed a course

offered by the railroad or by a college

level engineering program,

supplemented by special on-the-job

training emphasizing the techniques to

be employed in the inspection of high-

speed track;

(b) Demonstrated to the railroad, at

least once per calendar year, that the

individual—

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of this subpart that apply

to the inspection of the track for which

he or she is responsible;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or safely

compensate for those deviations.

(c) Written authorization from the

railroad or the employer to prescribe

remedial actions to correct or safely

compensate for deviations from the

requirements in this subpart and shall

have successfully completed a recorded

examination on this subpart as part of

the qualification process.

§ 299.357 Personnel qualified to inspect

and restore continuous welded rail.

Individuals designated under

§ 299.353 or 299.355 that inspect

continuous welded rail (CWR) or

supervise the installation, adjustment,

and maintenance of CWR in accordance

with the written procedures established

by the railroad shall have—

(a) Current qualifications under either

§ 299.353 or 299.355;

(b) Successfully completed a training

course of at least eight hours duration

specifically developed for the

application of written CWR procedures

issued by the railroad;

(c) Demonstrated to the railroad that

the individual—

(1) Knows and understands the

requirements of those written CWR

procedures;

(2) Can detect deviations from those

requirements; and

(3) Can prescribe appropriate

remedial action to correct or

compensate for those deviations safely.

(d) Written authorization from the

railroad or the employer to prescribe

remedial actions to correct or safely

compensate for deviations from the

requirements in those procedures and

must have successfully completed a

recorded examination on those

procedures as part of the qualification

process. The recorded examination may

be written, or in the form of a computer

file with the results of an interactive

training course.

Subpart D—Rolling Stock

§ 299.401 Clearance requirements.

(a) General. The rolling stock shall be

designed to meet all applicable

clearance requirements of the railroad.

The railroad shall make its clearance

diagrams available to FRA upon request.

(b) Clearance above top of rail. No

part or appliance of a trainset except the

wheels, sander tips, wheel guards, and

other components designed to be in the

path of the wheel (i.e., above the rail

and aligned inside the wheel width

path) may be less than 60 mm (2.36

inches) above the top of rail.

(c) Obstacle deflector. The leading

end of a trainset shall be equipped with

an obstacle deflector that extends across

both rails of the track. The minimum

clearance above the rail of the obstacle

deflector shall be 76 mm (3 inches), and

the maximum clearance shall be 229

mm (9 inches).

(d) Flexible wheel guards. The lead

axle of a trainset shall be equipped with

flexible wheel guards mounted on the

bogie below the primary suspension

with a maximum clearance above the

rail of 15 mm (0.59 inches).

§ 299.403 Trainset structure.

(a) Occupied volume integrity. To

demonstrate resistance to loss of

occupied volume, the trainsets shall

comply with both the compression load

requirement in paragraph (b) of this

section and the dynamic collision

requirements in paragraph (c) of this

section.

(b) Compression load requirement.

The end compression load shall be

applied to the vehicle as defined in JIS

E 7105:2006(E) as amended by JIS E

7105:2011(E) (all incorporated by

reference, see § 299.17), with an end

load magnitude no less than 980 kN

(220,300 lbf) without permanent

deformation of the occupied volume.

(c) Dynamic collision scenario. In

addition to the requirements of

paragraph (b) of this section, occupied

volume integrity shall also be

demonstrated for the trainset through an

evaluation of a dynamic collision

scenario in which a moving trainset

impacts a proxy object under the

following conditions:

(1) The initially-moving trainset is

made up of the equipment undergoing

evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run

weight.

(2) The scenario shall be evaluated on

tangent, level track.

(3) The trainset shall have an initial

velocity of 32 km/h (20 mph) and shall

not be braked.

(4) The proxy object shall have the

following characteristics:

(i) The object shall be a solid circular

cylinder that weighs 6350 kg (14,000

pounds);

(ii) The object shall have a width of

914 mm (36 inches) and a diameter of

1219 mm (48 inches);

(iii) The axis of the cylinder shall be

perpendicular to the direction of

trainset motion and parallel to the

ground; and

(iv) The center of the object shall be

located 762 mm (30 inches) above the

top of the underframe.

(5) Two collision configurations shall

be evaluated.

(i) The center of the object shall be

located 483 mm (19 inches) from the

longitudinal centerline of the trainset;

and

(ii) The center of the object shall be

aligned with the side of the cab car at

the point of maximum width.

(6) The model used to demonstrate

compliance with the dynamic collision

requirements must be validated. Model

validation shall be demonstrated and

submitted to FRA for review and

approval.

(7) As a result of the impact described

in paragraphs (c)(5)(i) and (ii) of this

section—

(i) One of the following two

conditions must be met for the occupied

volume:

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(A) There shall be no more than 254

mm (10 inches) of longitudinal

permanent deformation; or

(B) Global vehicle shortening shall not

exceed 1 percent over any 4.6 m (15-

feet) length of occupied volume.

(ii) Compliance with each of the

following conditions shall also be

demonstrated for the cab after the

impact:

(A) Each seat provided for an

employee regularly assigned to occupy

the cab, and any floor-mounted seat in

the cab, shall maintain a survival space

where there is no intrusion for a

minimum of 305 mm (12 inches) from

each edge of the seat. Walls or other

items originally within this defined

space shall not further intrude more

than 38 mm (1.5 inches) towards the

seat under evaluation.

(B) There shall be a clear exit path for

the occupants of the cab;

(C) The vertical height of the cab

(floor to ceiling) shall not be reduced by

more than 20 percent; and

(D) The operating console shall not

have moved closer to the driver’s seat by

more than 51 mm (2 inches).

(d) Equipment override. (1) Using the

dynamic collision scenarios described

in paragraph (c) of this section, and with

all units in the trainset positioned at

their nominal running heights, the anti-

climbing performance shall be evaluated

for each of the following sets of initial

conditions:

(2) For the initial conditions specified

in paragraphs (c)(1) through (3) of this

section, compliance with the following

conditions shall be demonstrated after a

dynamic impact:

(i) The relative difference in elevation

between the underframes of the

connected equipment shall not change

by more than 102 mm (4 inches); and

(ii) The tread of any wheel of the

trainset shall not rise above the top of

rail by more than 102 mm (4 inches).

(e) Roof and side structure integrity.

To demonstrate roof and side structure

integrity, each passenger car shall

comply with the following:

(1) Rollover strength. (i) Each

passenger car shall be designed to rest

on its side and be uniformly supported

at the top and bottom cords of the

vehicle side. The allowable stress in the

structural members of the occupied

volumes for this condition shall be one-

half yield or one-half the critical

buckling stress, whichever is less. Local

yielding to the outer skin of the

passenger car is allowed provided that

the resulting deformations in no way

intrude upon the occupied volume of

the car.

(ii) Each passenger car shall also be

designed to rest on its roof so that any

damage in occupied areas is limited to

roof extrusions. Other than roof

extrusions, the allowable stress in the

structural members of the occupied

volumes for this condition shall be one-

half yield or one-half the critical

buckling stress, whichever is less. Local

yielding to the outer skin, including the

floor structure, of the car is allowed

provided that the resulting deformations

in no way intrude upon the occupied

volume of the car. Deformation to the

roof extrusions is allowed to the extent

necessary to permit the vehicle to be

supported directly on the top chords of

the sides and ends.

(2) Side structure. (i) The sum of the

section moduli about a longitudinal

axis, taken at the weakest horizontal

section between the side sill and roof,

of the extrusions on each side of the car

located between the inside edge of the

doors shall be not less than 3.95 x 105

mm

3

(24.1 in

3

).

(ii) The sum of the section moduli

about a transverse axis, taken at the

weakest horizontal section on each side

of the car located between body corners

shall be not less than 2.64 x 105 mm

3

(16.1 in

3

).

(iii) The minimum section moduli or

thicknesses specified in paragraph

(f)(2)(i) of this section shall be adjusted

in proportion to the ratio of the yield

strength of the material used to a value

of 172 MPa (25 ksi).

(iv) The combined thickness of the

skin of the side structure extrusions

shall not be less than 3 mm (0.125 inch)

nominal thickness. The thicknesses

shall be adjusted in proportion to the

ratio of the yield strength of the material

used to a value of 172 MPa (25 ksi).

(f) Bogie-to-carbody attachment. (1)

The bogie-to-carbody attachment shall

utilize the service-proven design as used

on the N700.

(2) The bogie shall be securely

attached to the carbody and designed to

operate without failure under the

operating conditions of the railroad,

including expected mechanical shocks

and vibrations.

§ 299.405 Trainset interiors.

(a) Interior fittings. Interior fittings of

trainsets shall be—

(1) Securely attached and designed to

operate without failure under the

conditions typically found in passenger

rail equipment including expected

mechanical vibrations, and shock.

(2) To the extent possible, all interior

fittings shall be recessed or flush

mounted. Corners and/or sharp edges

shall be either avoided or padded to

mitigate the consequence of impact with

such surfaces.

(b) Luggage stowage. (1) Luggage

stowage racks shall slope downward in

the outboard direction at a minimum

ratio of 1:8 with respect to a horizontal

plane to provide lateral restraint for

stowed articles.

(2) Luggage stowage compartments

shall provide longitudinal restraint for

stowed articles.

§ 299.407 Glazing.

(a) General. The railroad shall install

glazing systems compliant with the

requirements defined in this section.

(b) Trainset glazing; end-facing. (1)

Each end-facing exterior window of the

trainset shall comply with the

requirements for large object and

ballistic impact scenarios as defined in

this section.

(2) Each end-facing exterior window

of the trainset shall demonstrate

compliance with the following

requirements for the large object impact

test.

(i) The glazing article shall be

impacted with a cylindrical projectile

that complies with the following design

specifications as depicted in Figure 1 to

paragraph (b)(2)(i)(D) of this section:

(A) The projectile shall be constructed

of aluminum alloy such as ISO 6362–

2:1990, grade 2017A, or its

demonstrated equivalent;

(B) The projectile end cap shall be

made of steel;

(C) The projectile assembly shall

weigh 1 kilogram (kg) (¥0, +0.020 kg)

or 2.2 lbs (¥0, +0.044 lbs) and shall

have a hemispherical tip. Material may

be removed from the interior of the

aluminum portion to adjust the

projectile mass according to the

prescribed tolerance. The hemispherical

tip shall have a milled surface with 1

mm (0.04 inches) grooves; and

(D) The projectile shall have an

overall diameter of 94 mm (3.7 inches)

with a nominal internal diameter of 70

mm (2.76 inches).

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(ii) The test of the glazing article shall

be deemed satisfactory if the test

projectile does not penetrate the glazing

article, the glazing article remains in its

frame, and the witness plate is not

marked by spall.

(iii) A new projectile shall be used for

each test.

(iv) The glazing article to be tested

shall be that which has the smallest area

for each design type. For the test, the

glazing article shall be fixed in a frame

of the same construction as that

mounted on the vehicle.

(v) A minimum of four tests shall be

conducted and all must be deemed

satisfactory. Two tests shall be

conducted with the complete glazing

article at 0 °C ± 0.5°C (32 °F ± 0.9°F) and

two tests shall be conducted with the

complete glazing article at 20 °C ± 5°C

(68 °F ± 9°F). For the tests to be valid

it shall be demonstrated that the core

temperature of the complete glazing

article during each test is within the

required temperature range.

(vi) The test glazing article shall be

mounted at the same angle relative to

the projectile path as it will be to the

direction of travel when mounted on the

vehicle.

(vii) The projectile’s impact velocity

shall equal the maximum operating

speed of the trainset plus 160 km/h (100

mph). The projectile velocity shall be

measured within 4 m (13 feet) of the

point of impact.

(viii) The point of impact shall be at

the geometrical center of the glazing

article.

(3) Representative samples for large

object impact testing of large end-facing

cab glazing articles may be used, instead

of the actual design size provided that

the following conditions are met:

(i) Testing of glazing articles having

dimensions greater than 1,000 mm by

700 mm (39.4 by 27.6 inches), excluding

framing, may be performed using a flat

sample having the same composition as

the glazing article for which compliance

is to be demonstrated. The glazing

manufacturer shall provide

documentation containing its technical

justification that testing a flat sample is

sufficient to verify compliance of the

glazing article with the requirements of

this paragraph.

(ii) Flat sample testing is permitted

only if no surface of the full-size glazing

article contains curvature whose radius

is less than 2,500 mm (98 inches); and

when a complete, finished, glazing

article is laid (convex side uppermost)

on a flat horizontal surface, the distance,

(measured perpendicularly to the flat

surface) between the flat surface and the

inside face of the glazing article is not

greater than 200 mm (8 inches).

(4) End-facing glazing shall

demonstrate sufficient resistance to

spalling, as verified by the large impact

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projectile test under the following

conditions:

(i) An annealed aluminum witness

plate of maximum thickness 0.15 mm

(0.006 inches) and of dimension 500

mm by 500 mm (19.7 by 19.7 inches) is

placed vertically behind the sample

under test, at a horizontal distance of

500 mm (19.7 inches) from the point of

impact in the direction of travel of the

projectile or the distance between the

point of impact of the projectile and the

location of the driver’s eyes in the

driver’s normal operating position,

whichever is less. The center of the

witness plate is aligned with the point

of impact.

(ii) Spalling performance shall be

deemed satisfactory if the aluminum

witness plate is not marked.

(iii) For the purposes of this part,

materials used specifically to protect the

cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall

shields) shall not be required to meet

the flammability and smoke emission

performance requirements of § 299.413.

(5) Each end-facing exterior window

in a cab shall, at a minimum, provide

ballistic penetration resistance that

meets the requirements of appendix A

to part 223 of this chapter.

(c) Trainset glazing; side-facing.

Except as provided in paragraph (d) of

this section, each side-facing exterior

window in a trainset shall comply with

the requirements for Type II glazing as

defined in part 223 of this chapter or

other alternative standard approved by

FRA.

(d) Side-facing breakable glazing. A

side-facing exterior window intended to

be breakable and serve as an emergency

egress window may comply with an

alternative standard approved for use by

FRA under § 299.15.

(e) Certification of Glazing Materials.

Glazing materials shall be certified in

accordance with the following

procedures:

(1) Each manufacturer that provides

glazing materials, intended by the

manufacturer for use in achieving

compliance with the requirements of

this subpart, shall certify that each type

of glazing material being supplied for

this purpose has been successfully

tested in accordance with this section

and that test verification data are

available to the railroad or to FRA upon

request.

(2) Tests performed on glazing

materials for compliance with this part

shall be conducted by either—

(i) An independent third party (lab,

facility, underwriter); or

(ii) The glazing manufacturer,

providing FRA with the opportunity to

witness all tests by written notice, a

minimum of 30 days prior to testing.

(3) Any glazing material certified to

meet the requirements of this part shall

be re-certified if any change is made to

the glazing that may affect its

mechanical properties or its mounting

arrangement on the vehicle.

(4) All certification/re-certification

documentation shall be made available

to FRA upon request. The test

verification data shall contain all

pertinent original data logs and

documentation that the selection of

material samples, test set-ups, test

measuring devices, and test procedures

were performed by qualified individuals

using recognized and acceptable

practices and in accordance with this

section.

(5) Glazing shall be marked in the

following manner:

(i) Each end-facing exterior window

in a cab shall be permanently marked,

prior to installation, in such a manner

that the marking is clearly visible after

the material has been installed. The

marking shall include:

(A) The words ‘‘FRA TYPE IHS’’ to

indicate that the material meets the

requirements specified in paragraph (b)

of this section;

(B) The manufacturer of the material;

and

(C) The type or brand identification of

the material.

(ii) Each side-facing exterior window

in a trainset shall be permanently

marked, prior to installation, in such a

manner that the marking is clearly

visible after the material has been

installed. The marking shall include:

(A) The words ‘‘FRA TYPE II’’ to

indicate that the material meets the

requirements specified in paragraph (c)

of this section;

(B) The manufacturer of the material;

and

(C) The type or brand identification of

the material.

(f) Glazing securement. Each exterior

window shall remain in place when

subjected to—

(1) The forces due to air pressure

differences caused when two trainsets

pass at the minimum separation for two

adjacent tracks, while traveling in

opposite directions, each trainset

traveling at the maximum approved

trainset speed in accordance with

§ 299.609(g); and

(2) The impact forces that the exterior

window is required to resist as specified

in this section.

§ 299.409 Brake system.

(a) General. The railroad shall

demonstrate through analysis and

testing the maximum safe operating

speed for its trainsets that results in no

thermal damage to equipment or

infrastructure during normal operation

of the brake system.

(b) Minimum performance

requirement for brake system. Each

trainset’s brake system, under the worst-

case adhesion conditions as defined by

the railroad, shall be capable of stopping

the trainset from its maximum operating

speed within the signal spacing existing

on the track over which the trainset is

operating.

(c) Urgent brake system. A trainset

shall be provided with an urgent brake

application feature that produces an

irretrievable stop. An urgent brake

application shall be available at any

time, and shall be initiated by an

unintentional parting of the trainset or

by the trainset crew from the conductor

rooms.

(d) Application/release indication.

The brake system shall be designed so

that an inspector may determine

whether the brake system is functioning

properly without being placed in a

dangerous position on, under or

between the equipment. This

determination may be made through

automated monitoring system that

utilizes sensors to verify that the brakes

have been applied and released.

(e) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A

means to initiate a passenger brake

alarm shall be provided at two locations

in each unit of a trainset. The words

‘‘Passenger Brake Alarm’’ shall be

legibly stenciled or marked on each

device or on an adjacent badge plate.

(2) All passenger brake alarms shall be

installed so as to prevent accidental

activation.

(3) When a passenger brake alarm is

activated, it shall initiate an emergency

brake application. The emergency brake

application can be overridden by the

driver so that the trainset can be

stopped at a safe location.

(4) To retrieve the emergency brake

application described in paragraph

(e)(3) of this section, the driver must

activate appropriate controls to issue a

command for brake application as

specified in the railroad’s operating

rules.

(f) Degraded brake system

performance. The following

requirements address degraded brake

system performance on the railroad’s

high-speed trainsets—

(1) Loss of power or failure of

regenerative brake shall not result in

exceeding the allowable stopping

distance as defined by the railroad;

(2) The available friction braking shall

be adequate to stop the trainset safely

under the operating conditions defined

by the railroad;

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(3) The operational status of the

trainset brake system shall be displayed

for the driver in the operating cab; and

(4) Under § 299.607(b)(5), the railroad

shall demonstrate through analysis and

testing the maximum speed for safely

operating its trainsets using only the

friction brake system with no thermal

damage to equipment or infrastructure.

The analysis and testing shall also

determine the maximum safe operating

speed for various percentages of

operative friction brakes.

(g) Main reservoir system. The main

reservoirs in a trainset shall be designed

and tested to meet the requirements set

forth in JIS B 8265:2010(E)

(incorporated by reference, see

§ 299.17). Reservoirs shall be certified

based on their size and volume

requirements.

(h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial

installation, each main reservoir shall be

subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic

pressure test based on the maximum

working pressure defined in paragraph

(g) of this section unless otherwise

established by the railroad’s mechanical

officer. Records of the test date,

location, and pressure shall be

maintained by the railroad for the life of

the equipment. Periodic inspection

requirements for main reservoirs shall

be defined in the railroad’s inspection,

testing, and maintenance program

required under § 299.445.

(i) Brake gauges. All mechanical

gauges and all devices providing

electronic indication of air pressure that

are used by the driver to aid in the

control or braking of a trainset shall be

located so that they can be conveniently

read from the driver’s normal position

during operation of the trainset.

(j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake

actuators shall be designed to provide

brake pad clearance when the brakes are

released.

(2) The minimum brake cylinder

pressure shall be established to provide

adequate adjustment from minimum

service to emergency for proper trainset

operation.

(k) Leakage. The method of inspection

for main reservoir pipe and brake

cylinder pipe leakage shall be

prescribed in the railroad’s inspection,

testing, and maintenance program

required by § 299.445.

(l) Slide alarm. (1) A trainset shall be

equipped with an adhesion control

system designed to automatically adjust

the braking force on each wheel to

prevent sliding during braking.

(2) A wheel slide alarm that is visual

or audible, or both, shall alert the driver

in the operating cab to wheel-slide

conditions on any axle of the trainset.

(3) Operating restrictions for a trainset

with wheel slide protection devices that

are not functioning as intended shall be

defined by the railroad under its

requirements for movement of defective

equipment required by § 299.447, and

within the railroad’s operating rules, as

appropriate.

(m) Monitoring and diagnostic system.

Each trainset shall be equipped with a

monitoring and diagnostic system that is

designed to assess the functionality of

the brake system for the entire trainset

automatically. Details of the system

operation and the method of

communication of brake system

functionality prior to the dispatch of the

trainset shall be described in detail in

the railroad’s Operating Rules and

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program required by § 299.445.

(n) Trainset securement. Each trainset

shall be equipped with a means of

securing the equipment, independent of

the friction brake, on the grade

condition defined by the railroad. The

railroad’s operating rules shall define

procedures for trainset securement and

the railroad shall demonstrate that these

procedures effectively secure the

equipment in accordance with

§ 299.607(b)(5).

(o) Rescue operation; brake system. A

trainset’s brake system shall be designed

so as to allow a rescue vehicle or

trainset to control its brakes when the

trainset is disabled.

§ 299.411 Bogies and suspension system.

(a) Wheel climb. (1) Suspension

systems shall be designed to reasonably

prevent wheel climb, wheel unloading,

rail rollover, rail shift, and a vehicle

from overturning to ensure safe, stable

performance and ride quality. These

requirements shall be met—

(i) In all operating environments, and

under all track conditions and loading

conditions as determined by the

railroad; and

(ii) At all track speeds and over all

track qualities consistent with the

requirements in subpart C of this part,

up to the maximum trainset speed and

maximum cant deficiency of the

equipment in accordance with

§ 299.609(g).

(2) All passenger equipment shall

meet the safety performance standards

for suspension systems contained in

§ 299.609(h). In particular—

(i) Vehicle/track system qualification.

All trainsets shall demonstrate safe

operation during vehicle/track system

qualification in accordance with

§ 299.609 and is subject to the

requirements of § 299.315.

(ii) Revenue service operation. All

passenger equipment in service is

subject to the requirements of § 299.315.

(b) Lateral accelerations. The trainsets

shall not operate under conditions that

result in a steady-state lateral

acceleration greater than 0.15g, as

measured parallel to the car floor inside

the passenger compartment.

(c) Journal bearing overheat sensors.

Bearing overheat sensors shall be

provided on all journal bearings on each

trainset.

§ 299.413 Fire safety.

(a) General. All materials used in

constructing the interior of the trainset

shall meet the flammability and smoke

emission characteristics and testing

standards contained in appendix B to

part 238 of this chapter. For purposes of

this section, the interior of the trainset

includes walls, floors, ceilings, seats,

doors, windows, electrical conduits, air

ducts, and any other internal

equipment.

(b) Certification. The railroad shall

require certification that a

representative sample of combustible

materials to be—

(1) Used in constructing a passenger

car or a cab, or

(2) Introduced in a passenger car or a

cab, as part of any kind of rebuild,

refurbishment, or overhaul of the car or

cab, has been tested by a recognized

independent testing laboratory and that

the results show the representative

sample complies with the requirements

of paragraph (a) of this section at the

time it was tested.

(c) Fire safety analysis. The railroad

shall ensure that fire safety

considerations and features in the

design of the trainsets reduce the risk of

personal injury caused by fire to an

acceptable level in its operating

environment using a formal safety

methodology. To this end, the railroad

shall complete a written fire safety

analysis for the passenger equipment

being procured. In conducting the

analysis, the railroad shall—

(1) Identify, analyze, and prioritize

the fire hazards inherent in the design

of the equipment.

(2) Take effective steps to design the

equipment and select materials which

help provide sufficient fire resistance to

reasonably ensure adequate time to

detect a fire and safely evacuate the

passengers and crewmembers, if a fire

cannot be prevented. Factors to consider

include potential ignition sources; the

type, quantity, and location of the

materials; and availability of rapid and

safe egress to the exterior of the

equipment under conditions secure

from fire, smoke, and other hazards.

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(3) Reasonably ensure that a

ventilation system in the equipment

does not contribute to the lethality of a

fire.

(4) Identify in writing any trainset

component that is a risk of initiating fire

and which requires overheat protection.

An overheat detector shall be installed

in any component when the analysis

determines that an overheat detector is

necessary.

(5) Identify in writing any unoccupied

trainset compartment that contains

equipment or material that poses a fire

hazard, and analyze the benefit

provided by including a fire or smoke

detection system in each compartment

so identified. A fire or smoke detector

shall be installed in any unoccupied

compartment when the analysis

determines that such equipment is

necessary to ensure sufficient time for

the safe evacuation of passengers and

crewmembers from the trainset. For

purposes of this section, an unoccupied

trainset compartment means any part of

the equipment structure that is not

normally occupied during operation of

the trainset, including a closet, baggage

compartment, food pantry, etc.

(6) Determine whether any occupied

or unoccupied space requires a portable

fire extinguisher and, if so, the proper

type and size of the fire extinguisher for

each location. As required by § 239.101

of this chapter, each passenger car is

required to have a minimum of one

portable fire extinguisher. If the analysis

performed indicates that one or more

additional portable fire extinguishers

are needed, such shall be installed.

(7) Analyze the benefit provided by

including a fixed, automatic fire-

suppression system in any unoccupied

trainset compartment that contains

equipment or material that poses a fire

hazard, and determine the proper type

and size of the automatic fire-

suppression system for each such

location. A fixed, automatic fire-

suppression system shall be installed in

any unoccupied compartment when the

analysis determines that such

equipment is practical and necessary to

ensure sufficient time for the safe

evacuation of passengers and

crewmembers from the trainset.

(8) Explain how safety issues are

resolved in the design of the equipment

and selection of materials to reduce the

risk of each fire hazard.

(9) Describe the analysis and testing

necessary to demonstrate that the fire

protection approach taken in the design

of the equipment and selection of

materials meets the fire protection

requirements of this part.

(d) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance. The railroad shall develop

and adopt written procedures for the

inspection, testing, and maintenance of

all fire safety systems and fire safety

equipment on the passenger equipment

it operates under § 299.445(b), and

subpart G of this part. The railroad shall

comply with those procedures that it

designates as mandatory for the safety of

the equipment and its occupants.

§ 299.415 Doors.

(a) Each powered, exterior side door

in a vestibule that is partitioned from

the passenger compartment of a trainset

shall have a manual override device that

is—

(1) Capable of releasing the door to

permit it to be opened without power.

(2) Located such that—

(i) Interior access is provided adjacent

to each manual door release mechanism;

and,

(ii) Exterior access is provided on

each side of each car.

(3) Designed and maintained so that a

person may access and operate the

override device readily without

requiring the use of a tool or other

implement.

(4) The railroad may protect a manual

override device used to open a powered,

exterior door with a cover or a screen.

(5) When a manual override device is

activated, door panel friction, including

seals and hangers, shall allow the doors

to be opened or closed manually with as

low a force as practicable.

(6) The emergency release mechanism

shall require manual reset.

(b) Each passenger car shall have a

minimum of one exterior side door per

side. Each such door shall provide a

minimum clear opening with

dimensions of 813 mm (32 inches)

horizontally by 1,850 mm (72.8 inches)

vertically.

(c) Door exits shall be marked, and

instructions provided for their use, as

specified in § 299.423.

(d) All doors intended for access by

emergency responders shall be marked,

and instructions provided for their use,

as specified in § 299.423.

(e) Vestibule doors and other interior

doors intended for passage through a

passenger car.

(1) General. Except for a door

providing access to a control

compartment each powered vestibule

door and any other powered interior

door intended for passage through a

passenger car shall have a manual

override device that conforms with the

requirements of paragraphs (e)(2) and

(3) of this section.

(2) Manual override devices. Each

manual override device shall be:

(i) Capable of releasing the door to

permit it to be opened without power;

(ii) Located adjacent to the door it

controls; and

(iii) Designed and maintained so that

a person may readily access and operate

the override device from each side of

the door without the use of a tool or

other implement.

(3) Marking and instructions. Each

manual override device and each

retention mechanism shall be marked,

and instructions provided for their use,

as specified in § 299.423.

(f) The status of each powered,

exterior side door in a passenger car

shall be displayed to the driver in the

operating cab. Door interlock sensors

shall be provided to detect trainset

motion and shall be nominally set to

operate at 5 km/h.

(g) All powered exterior side

passenger doors shall—

(1) Be equipped with the service-

proven door safety system utilized by

the N700 or an alternate door safety

system designed subject to a Failure

Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis

(FMECA);

(2) Be designed with an obstruction

detection system capable of detecting a

rigid flat bar, 6.4 mm (

1

⁄

4

inches) wide

and 76 mm (3 inches) high and a rigid

rod, 9.5 mm (

3

⁄

8

inches) in diameter;

(3) Incorporate an obstruction

detection system sufficient to detect

large obstructions;

(4) Be designed so that activation of

a door by-pass feature does not affect

the operation of the obstruction

detection system on all the other doors

on the trainset;

(5) Have the door control station

located in a secured area that is only

accessible to crewmembers or

maintenance personnel;

(6) Be designed such that the door

open or closed circuit is not affected by

the throttle position; and

(7) Use discrete, dedicated trainlines

for door-open and door-close

commands, door-closed summary

circuit, and no motion, if trainlined.

(h) All powered exterior side door

systems in a trainset shall—

(1) Be designed with a door summary

circuit. The door summary circuit shall

be connected or interlocked to prohibit

the trainset from developing tractive

power if an exterior side door in a

passenger car, other than a door under

the direct physical control of a

crewmember for his or her exclusive

use, is not closed;

(2) Be connected to side door status

indicators located on the exterior of

each unit of the trainset;

(3) Be connected to a door summary

status indicator that is readily viewable

to the driver from his or her normal

position in the operating cab;

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(4) If equipped with a trainset-wide

door by-pass device, be designed so that

the trainset-wide door by-pass functions

only when activated from the operating

cab of the trainset;

(5) Be equipped with a lock (cut-out/

lock-out) mechanism installed at each

door panel to secure a door in the closed

and locked position. When the lock

mechanism is utilized to secure the door

in the closed position, a door-closed

indication shall be provided to the door

summary circuit; and

(6) Be designed such that a crew key

or other secure device be required to

lock-out an exterior side door to prevent

unauthorized use.

(i)(1) Visual inspections and

functional tests. The inspection and

functional tests required for the door

safety system, including the trainset-

wide door by-pass verification, shall be

conducted in accordance with the

railroad’s trainset inspection, testing,

and maintenance program in accordance

with § 299.445, and operating rules

under subpart E.

(2) Face-to-face relief. Crewmembers

taking control of a trainset do not need

to perform a visual inspection or a

functional test of the door by-pass

devices in cases of face-to-face relief of

another trainset crew and notification

by that crew as to the functioning of the

door by-pass devices.

(j) The railroad shall maintain a

record of each door by-pass activation

and each unintended opening of a

powered exterior side door, including

any repair(s) made, in the defect

tracking system as required by

§ 299.445(h).

§ 299.417 Emergency lighting.

(a) General. Emergency lighting shall

be provided in each unit of a trainset.

The emergency lighting system shall be

designed to facilitate the ability of

passengers and trainset crew members,

and/or emergency responders to see and

orient themselves, to identify obstacles,

in order to assist them to safely move

through and out of a passenger rail car.

(1) Emergency lighting shall

illuminate the following areas:

(i) Passenger car aisles, passageways,

and toilets;

(ii) Door emergency exit controls/

manual releases;

(iii) Vestibule floor near the door

emergency exits (to facilitate safe

entrance/exit from the door);

(iv) Within the car diaphragm and

adjacent area; and

(v) Specialty car locations such as

crew offices.

(b) Minimum illumination levels. (1)

A minimum, average illumination level

of 10.7 lux (1 foot-candle) measured at

floor level adjacent to each exterior door

and each interior door providing access

to an exterior door (such as a door

opening into a vestibule);

(2) A minimum, average illumination

level of 10.7 lux (1 foot-candle)

measured 635 mm (25 inches) above

floor level along the center of each aisle

and passageway;

(3) A minimum illumination level of

1.1 lux (0.1 foot-candle) measured 635

mm (25 inches) above floor level at any

point along the center of each aisle and

passageway;

(c) Lighting activation. Each

emergency lighting fixture shall activate

automatically or be energized

continuously whenever the car is in

revenue service and normal lighting is

not available.

(d) Independent power source.

Emergency lighting system shall have an

independent power source(s) that is

located in or within one half a car

length of each light fixture it powers.

(e) Functional requirements.

Emergency lighting system components

shall be designed to operate without

failure and capable of remaining

attached under the conditions typically

found in passenger rail equipment

including expected mechanical

vibrations, and shock in accordance

with § 299.405(a)(1), as well as comply

with electromagnetic interference

criteria in § 299.435(e).

(1) All emergency lighting system

components shall be capable to operate

in all railcar orientations.

(2) All emergency lighting system

components shall be capable to operate

when normal power is unavailable for

90 minutes without a loss of more than

40% of the minimum illumination

levels specified in paragraph (b) of this

section.

(f) Inspection. (1) The railroad shall

inspect the emergency lighting system

as required by its inspection, testing,

and maintenance program in accordance

with § 299.445.

(2) If batteries are used as

independent power sources, they shall

have automatic self-diagnostic modules

designed to perform discharge tests.

§ 299.419 Emergency communication.

(a) PA (public address) system. Each

passenger car shall be equipped with a

PA system that provides a means for a

trainset crewmember to communicate

by voice to passengers of his or her

trainset in an emergency situation. The

PA system shall also provide a means

for a trainset crewmember to

communicate by voice in an emergency

situation to persons in the immediate

vicinity of his or her trainset (e.g.,

persons on the station platform). The PA

system may be part of the same system

as the intercom system.

(b) Intercom system. Each passenger

car shall be equipped with an intercom

system that provides a means for

passengers and crewmembers to

communicate by voice with each other

in an emergency situation. Except as

further specified, at least one intercom

that is accessible to passengers without

using a tool or other implement shall be

located in each end (half) of each car.

(c) Marking and instructions. The

following requirements apply to all

units of a trainset:

(1) The location of each intercom

intended for passenger use shall be

conspicuously marked with HPPL

material in accordance with § 299.423;

and

(2) Legible and understandable

operating instructions shall be made of

HPPL material in accordance with

§ 299.423 and posted at or near each

such intercom.

(d) Back-up power. PA and intercom

systems shall have a back-up power

system capable of—

(1) Powering each system to allow

intermittent emergency communication

for a minimum period of 90 minutes.

Intermittent communication shall be

considered equivalent to continuous

communication during the last 15

minutes of the 90-minute minimum

period; and

(2) Operating in all equipment

orientations within 90 degrees of

vertical.

(e) Additional requirements. The PA

and intercom systems shall be designed

to operate without failure and remain

attached under the conditions typically

found in passenger rail equipment

including expected mechanical

vibrations, and shock in accordance

with § 299.405(a)(1), as well as comply

with electromagnetic interference

criteria in § 299.435(e).

§ 299.421 Emergency roof access.

(a) Number and dimensions. Each

passenger car shall have a minimum of

two emergency roof access locations,

each providing a minimum opening of

660 mm (26 inches) longitudinally (i.e.,

parallel to the longitudinal axis of the

car) by 610 mm (24 inches) laterally.

(b) Means of access. Emergency roof

access shall be provided by means of a

conspicuously marked structural weak

point in the roof for access by properly

equipped emergency response

personnel.

(c) Location. Emergency roof access

locations shall be situated so that when

a car is on its side—

(1) One emergency access location is

situated as close as practicable within

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each half of the roof as divided top from

bottom; and (2) One emergency access location is

situated as close as practicable within each half of the roof as divided left from

right. (See Figure 1 to this paragraph.)

(d) Obstructions. The ceiling space

below each emergency roof access

location shall be free from wire, cabling,

conduit, and piping. This space shall

also be free of any rigid secondary

structure (e.g., a diffuser or diffuser

support, lighting back fixture, mounted

PA equipment, or luggage rack) where

practicable. It shall be permissible to cut

through interior panels, liners, or other

non-rigid secondary structures after

making the cutout hole in the roof,

provided any such additional cutting

necessary to access the interior of the

vehicle permits a minimum opening of

the dimensions specified in paragraph

(a) of this section to be maintained.

(e) Marking instructions. Each

emergency roof access location shall be

conspicuously marked with

retroreflective material of contrasting

color meeting the minimum

requirements specified in § 299.423.

Legible and understandable instructions

shall be posted at or near each such

location.

§ 299.423 Markings and instructions for

emergency egress and rescue access.

(a) General. Instructions and markings

shall be provided in each unit of a

trainset in accordance with the

minimum requirements of this section

to provide instructions for passengers

and trainset crewmembers regarding

emergency egress, and rescue access

instructions for emergency responders.

(b) Visual identity and recognition.

Emergency exit signage/marking

systems shall enable passengers and

trainset crewmembers to make positive

identification of emergency exits.

(1) Each interior emergency exit sign

and emergency exit locator sign shall be

conspicuous (i.e., clearly recognizable/

distinguishable) or become conspicuous

to passengers and trainset crewmembers

immediately and automatically upon

the loss of power for normal lighting,

from a minimum distance of 1.52 m (5

feet).

(2) The signs and markings shall

operate independently of the car’s

normal and emergency lighting systems,

for a minimum of 90 minutes after loss

of all power for normal lighting.

(3) An emergency exit locator sign

shall be located in close proximity of

each emergency exit and shall work in

conjunction with the emergency exit

sign. The location of the sign,

directional arrow(s), or wording shall

guide passengers and trainset

crewmembers to the emergency exit

route.

(c) Rescue access signage/marking

systems. (1) Rescue access signage and

marking systems shall enable emergency

responders to make positive

identification of rescue access points.

(2) Rescue access information for

emergency responders placed on the

exterior of the carbody shall, at a

minimum, consist of the following:

(i) Each door intended for use by

emergency responders for rescue access

shall be identified with emergency

access signs, symbols, or other

conspicuous marking consisting of

retroreflective material that complies

with paragraphs (d) and (e) of this

section.

(ii) Rescue access door control locator

signs/markings and instructions;

(A) Each door intended for use by

emergency responders for rescue access

shall have operating instructions for

opening the door from outside the car

placed on or immediately adjacent to

the door on the carbody. If a power door

does not function with an integral

release mechanism, the instructions

shall indicate the location of the exterior

manual door control.

(B) Each power door intended for use

by emergency responders for rescue

access which has a non-integral release

mechanism located away from the door,

shall have a door control sign/marking

placed at the location of this control that

provides instructions for emergency

operation, either as part of the access

sign/marking or as another sign/

marking.

(C) Each car equipped with manual

doors shall have operating instructions

for opening the door from the exterior,

either as part of the access sign/marking

or as another sign/marking.

(iii) Rescue access window locator

signs/markings and instructions; and

(A) Each rescue access window shall

be identified with a unique

retroreflective and easily recognizable

sign, symbol, or other conspicuous

marking that complies with paragraphs

(d) and (e) of this section.

(B) Signs, symbols, or marking shall

be placed at the bottom of each such

window, on each window, or adjacent

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to each window, utilizing arrows, where

necessary, to clearly designate rescue

assess window location. Legible and

understandable window-access

instructions, including any pictogram/

instructions for removing the window,

shall be posted at or near each rescue

access window.

(iv) Roof access locator signs/

markings and instructions.

(A) The location of each emergency

access point provided on the roof of a

passenger car shall be clearly marked

with retroreflective material of

contrasting color that complies with

paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section.

(B) Legible and understandable

instructions shall be posted at or near

each such location.

(C) If emergency roof access is

provided by means of a structural weak

point:

(1) The retroreflective material shall

clearly mark the line along which the

roof skin shall be cut; and

(2) A sign plate with a retroreflective

border shall also state:

CAUTION—DO NOT USE FLAME

CUTTING DEVICES.

CAUTION—WARN PASSENGERS

BEFORE CUTTING.

CUT ALONG DASHED LINE TO

GAIN ACCESS.

ROOF CONSTRUCTION—[STATE

RELEVANT DETAILS].

(d) Color contrast. Exterior signs/

markings shall provide luminance

contrast ratio of not less than 0.5, as

measured by a color-corrected

photometer.

(e) Materials—(1) Retroreflective

material. Exterior emergency rescue

access locator signs/markings shall be

constructed of retroreflective material

that conforms to the specifications for

Type I material sheeting, as specified in

ASTM D 4956–07

ε1

(incorporated by

reference, see § 299.17), as tested in

accordance with ASTM E 810–03

(incorporated by reference, see

§ 299.17).

(2) HPPL materials. All HPPL

materials used in finished component

configurations shall comply with the

minimum luminance criterion of 7.5

mcd/m

2

after 90 minutes when tested

according to the provisions of ASTM E

2073–07 (incorporated by reference, see

§ 299.17), with the following three

modifications:

(i) Activation. The HPPL material

shall be activated with a fluorescent

lamp of 40W or less and a color

temperature of 4000–4500K that

provides no more than 10.7 lux (1 fc) of

illumination as measured on the

material surface. The activation period

shall be for no more than 60 minutes.

(ii) Luminance. The photopic

luminance of all specimens of the HPPL

material shall be measured with a

luminance meter as defined in section

5.2 of ASTM E 2073–07, a minimum of

90 minutes after activation has ceased.

(iii) Luminance in mcd/m

2

. The test

report shall include a luminance

measurement 90 minutes after

activation has ceased.

(f) Recordkeeping. (1) The railroad

shall retain a copy of the car

manufacturer/supplier provided

independent laboratory certified test

report results showing that the

illuminance or luminance

measurements, as appropriate, on the

active area of the signage/marking

component. Such records shall be kept

until all cars with those components are

retired, transferred, leased, or conveyed

to another railroad for use in revenue

service. A copy of such records shall be

transferred to the accepting railroad

along with any such cars.

(2) The railroad shall retain a copy of

the railroad-approved illuminance test

plan(s) and test results until the next

periodic test, or other test specified in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program is conducted on a

representative car/area, or until all cars

of that type are retired, or are

transferred, leased, or conveyed to

another railroad. A copy of such records

shall be transferred to the accepting

railroad along with such car(s).

(3) The railroad shall retain a copy of

the certified independent laboratory test

report results that certify that the

retroreflective material complies with

Type I materials per ASTM D–4956–

07

ε1

until all cars containing the

retroreflective material are retired, or are

transferred, leased, or conveyed to

another railroad. A copy of such records

shall be provided to the accepting

railroad along with any car(s) that are

transferred, leased, or conveyed.

§ 299.425 Low-location emergency exit

path marking.

(a) General. Low-location emergency

exit path marking (LLEEPM) shall be

provided in each unit of a trainset. The

LLEEPM system shall be designed to

identify the location of primary door

exits and the exit path to be used to

reach such doors by passengers and

trainset crewmembers under conditions

of darkness when normal and

emergency sources of illumination are

obscured by smoke or are inoperative.

(b) Visual identity and recognition.

The LLEEPM system shall be

conspicuous (i.e., clearly recognizable/

distinguishable), or become

conspicuous immediately and

automatically from a low-location upon

loss of power for normal lighting, and

under the minimum general emergency

light illumination levels as specified in

§ 299.423.

(c) Signage and markings. At a

minimum, the LLEEPM system shall

have the following three components:

(1) Primary door exit signs. (i) Each

primary door exit shall be clearly

marked with an exit sign;

(ii) The exit sign shall be visible from

a low-location from the exit along the

exit path; and

(iii) Each exit sign shall be located on

or immediately adjacent to each door

and placed between 152.4 and 457.2

mm (6 and 18 inches) above the floor.

(2) Primary door exit marking/

delineators. (i) The location of the exit

path shall be marked using electrically

powered (active) marking/delineators or

light fixtures, HPPL (passive) marking/

delineators or a combination of these

two systems.

(ii) The requirements in this section

apply for both electrical and HPPL

components, whether installed on the

walls, floors, or seat assemblies.

(iii) Each primary door shall be

marked on or around the door’s

operating handle.

(3) Exit path marking/delineators. (i)

The marking/delineator components

shall be positioned so as to identify an

exit path to all primary exits that is

clearly visible and easily recognizable

from any seat or compartment in the

trainset, when normal lighting and

emergency lighting are unavailable in

conditions of darkness and/or smoke.

(ii) Markings/delineators shall be

located on the floor or no higher than

457.2 mm (18 inches) on the seat

assembly, or walls/partitions of aisles,

and/or passageways.

(iii) Changes in the direction of the

exit path shall be indicated by the

LLEEPM and be placed within 102 mm

(4 inches) of the corner of the exit path.

(d) Material—(1) HPPL passive

systems. HPPL strip marking/delineator

material used for LLEEPM components

shall be capable of providing a

minimum luminance level of 7.5 mcd/

m

2

, measured 90 minutes after normal

power has ceased.

(2) Electroluminescent marking/

delineator strips. The luminance value

of the electroluminescent (EL) marking/

delineator strip shall be at least 1,000

mcd/m

2

, as measured on the strip

surface.

(e) Conspicuity of markings. LLEEPM

signs shall comply with the text, color

and respective illuminance or

luminance requirements specified in

§ 299.423 and in this section.

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(f) Emergency performance duration.

The LLEEPM system shall operate

independently of the car’s normal and

emergency lighting systems for 90

minutes after loss of all power for

normal lighting.

(g) Recordkeeping. (1) The railroad

shall retain a copy of the car

manufacturer/supplier provided

certified independent laboratory test

report results showing that the

illuminance or luminance

measurements, as appropriate, on the

active area of the signage/marking/

delineator component comply with the

criteria specified in § 299.423 and in

this section.

(2) The railroad shall retain a copy of

the railroad-approved illuminance test

plan(s) and test results until the next

periodic test, or other test specified in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program and ensure that tests are

conducted on a representative car, or

until all cars of that type are retired,

transferred, leased, or conveyed to

another railroad. A copy of such records

shall be provided to the accepting

railroads along with any car(s) that are

transferred, leased, or conveyed.

(3) Illegible, broken, damaged,

missing, or non-functioning components

of the LLEEPM system, including the

normal and emergency power systems,

shall be reported and repaired in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program as specified in § 299.445.

§ 299.427 Emergency egress windows.

(a) Number and location. Each unit in

a trainset shall have a minimum of four

emergency egress windows. At least one

emergency egress window shall be

located in each side of each end (half)

of the car, in a staggered configuration

where practicable. (See Figure 1 to this

paragraph.)

(b) Ease of operability. Each

emergency egress window shall be

designed to permit rapid and easy

removal from the inside of the car

during an emergency situation using a

hammer designed to break the glazing

that shall be located adjacent to each

emergency egress window. The railroad

shall inspect for the presence of the

emergency hammers each day prior to

the trainset being placed into service in

accordance with § 299.711(b).

(c) Dimensions. Except as provided in

paragraph (f) of this section, each

emergency egress window in a

passenger car shall have an

unobstructed opening with minimum

dimensions of 660 mm (26 inches)

horizontally by 610 mm (24 inches)

vertically. A seatback is not an

obstruction if it can be moved away

from the window opening without using

a tool or other implement.

(d) Marking and instructions. (1) Each

emergency egress window shall be

conspicuously and legibly marked with

luminescent material on the inside of

each car to facilitate passenger egress as

specified in § 299.423.

(2) Legible and understandable

operating instructions, including

instructions for removing the emergency

egress window shall be made of

luminescent material, shall be posted at

or near each such emergency egress

window as specified in § 299.423.

(e) Obstructions. If emergency egress

window removal may be hindered by

the presence of a seatback, headrest,

luggage rack, or other fixture, the

instructions shall state the method for

allowing rapid and easy removal of the

emergency egress window, taking into

account the fixture(s), and this portion

of the instructions may be in written or

pictorial format.

(f) Additional emergency egress

windows. Any emergency egress

window in addition to the minimum

number required by paragraph (a) of this

section that has been designated for use

by the railroad need not comply with

the minimum dimension requirements

in paragraph (c) of this section, but must

otherwise comply with all requirements

in this subpart applicable to emergency

egress windows.

§ 299.429 Rescue access windows.

(a) General. Each emergency egress

window required by § 299.427 shall also

serve as a means of rescue access.

(b) Ease of operability. Each rescue

access window must be capable of being

removed without unreasonable delay by

an emergency responder using tools or

implements that are commonly

available to the responder in a passenger

trainset emergency.

(c) Marking and instructions. (1) Each

rescue access window shall be marked

with retroreflective material on the

exterior of each car as specified in

§ 299.423. A unique and easily

recognizable symbol, sign, or other

conspicuous marking shall also be used

to identify each such window.

(2) Legible and understandable

window-access instructions, including

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instructions for removing the window,

shall be posted at or near each rescue

access window as specified in

§ 299.423.

§ 299.431 Driver’s controls and cab layout.

(a) Driver controls and cab layout.

Driver controls and cab layout shall

replicate that used in the N700, unless

otherwise approved by FRA.

(b) Cab seating. Each seat provided for

an employee regularly assigned to

occupy a cab and any floor-mounted

seat in the cab shall be securely attached

in accordance with § 299.405.

(c) Cab interior surface. Sharp edges

and corners shall be eliminated from the

interior of the cab, and interior surfaces

of the cab likely to be impacted by an

employee during a collision or

derailment shall be padded with shock-

absorbent material.

(d) Cab securement. Trainset interior

cab doors shall be equipped with the

following:

(1) A secure and operable device to

lock the door from the outside that does

not impede egress from the cab; and

(2) A securement device on each cab

door that is capable of securing the door

from inside of the cab.

(e) Cab glazing serviceability. End-

facing cab windows of the lead trainset

cab shall be free of cracks, breaks, or

other conditions that obscure the view

of the right-of-way for the crew from

their normal position in the cab.

(f) Floors of cabs, passageways, and

compartments. Floors of cabs,

passageways, and compartments shall

be kept free from oil, water, waste or

any obstruction that creates a slipping,

tripping or fire hazard. Floors shall be

properly treated to provide secure

footing.

(g) Cab environmental control. Each

lead cab in a trainset shall be heated and

air conditioned. The HVAC system shall

be inspected and maintained to ensure

that it operates properly and meets the

railroad’s performance standard which

shall be defined in the inspection,

testing, and maintenance program.

(h) Trainset cab noise. Performance

standards for the railroad’s trainsets—

(1) The average noise levels in the

trainset cab shall be less than or equal

to 85 dB(A) when the trainset is

operating at maximum approved

trainset speed as approved under

§ 299.609(g). Compliance with this

paragraph (h)(1) shall be demonstrated

during the pre-revenue service system

integration testing as required by

§ 299.607.

(2) The railroad shall not make any

alterations during maintenance or

modifications to the cab, that cause the

average sound level to exceed the

requirements in paragraph (h)(1) of this

section.

(3) The railroad or manufacturer shall

follow the test protocols set forth in

appendix B to this part to determine

compliance with paragraph (h)(1) of this

section, and, to the extent reasonably

necessary to evaluate the effect of

alterations during maintenance, to

determine compliance with paragraph

(h)(2) of this section.

(i) Maintenance of trainset cabs. (1) If

the railroad receives an excessive noise

report, and if the condition giving rise

to the noise is not required to be

immediately corrected under this part,

the railroad shall maintain a record of

the report, and repair or replace the item

identified as substantially contributing

to the noise:

(i) On or before the next periodic

inspection required by the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program under subpart G; or

(ii) If the railroad determines that the

repair or replacement of the item

requires significant shop or material

resources that are not readily available,

at the time of the next major equipment

repair commonly used for the particular

type of maintenance needed.

(2) The railroad has an obligation to

respond to an excessive noise report

that a trainset-cab-occupant files. The

railroad meets its obligation to respond

to an excessive noise report, as set forth

in paragraph (i)(1) of this section, if the

railroad makes a good faith effort to

identify the cause of the reported noise,

and where the railroad is successful in

determining the cause, if the railroad

repairs or replaces the items that cause

the noise.

(3)(i) The railroad shall maintain a

written or electronic record of any

excessive noise report, inspection, test,

maintenance, replacement, or repair

completed pursuant to paragraph (i) of

this section, and the date on which that

inspection, test, maintenance,

replacement, or repair occurred. If the

railroad elects to maintain an electronic

record, the railroad must satisfy the

conditions listed in § 299.11.

(ii) The railroad shall retain these

records for a period of one year.

(iii) The railroad shall establish an

internal, auditable, monitorable system

that contains these records.

(j) Trainset sanitation facilities for

employees. Sanitation facilities shall be

provided for crewmembers either:

(1) On the trainset, that meet

otherwise applicable sanitation

standards, which are accessible at

frequent intervals during the course of

their work shift; or

(2) Ready access to railroad-provided

sanitation facilities outside of the

trainset.

(k) Speed indicators. (1) Each trainset

controlling cab shall be equipped with

a speed indicator which is—

(i) Accurate within ±2 km/h (1.24

miles per hour) for speed lower than 30

km/h (18.6 miles per hour), then

increasing linearly up to ±12 km/h (7.5

miles per hour) at 500 km/h (311 miles

per hour); and

(ii) Clearly readable from the driver’s

normal position under all light

conditions.

(2) The speed indicator shall be based

on a system of independent on-board

speed measurement sources

guaranteeing the accuracy level

specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this

section under all operational conditions.

The system shall be automatically

monitored for inconsistencies and the

driver shall be automatically notified of

any inconsistency potentially

compromising this accuracy level.

(3) The speed indicator shall be

calibrated periodically as defined in the

railroad’s inspection, testing, and

maintenance program.

(l) Cab lights. (1) Each trainset cab

shall have cab lights which will provide

sufficient illumination for the control

instruments, meters, and gauges to

enable the driver to make accurate

readings from his or her normal

positions in the cab. These lights shall

be located, constructed, and maintained

so that light shines only on those parts

requiring illumination and does not

interfere with the driver’s vision of the

track and signals. Each trainset cab shall

also have a conveniently located light

that can be readily turned on and off by

the driver operating the trainset and that

provides sufficient illumination for

them to read trainset orders and

timetables.

(2) Cab passageways and

compartments shall be illuminated.

§ 299.433 Exterior lights.

(a) Headlights. Each leading end of a

trainset shall be equipped with two or

more headlights.

(1) Each headlight shall produce

80,000 candela.

(2) Headlights shall be arranged to

illuminate signs in the right-of-way.

(3) Headlights shall be recognized 600

m (1,968 feet) ahead of the cab car by

a driver in another trainset or a

maintenance person standing in the

right-of-way under clear weather

conditions.

(b) Taillights (marking devices). (1)

The trailing end of the trainset shall be

equipped with two red taillights;

(2) Each taillight shall be located at

least 1.2 m (3.9 feet) above rail;

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(3) Each taillight shall be recognizable

200 m (656 feet) ahead of the cab car by

a driver in another trainset or a

maintenance person standing in the

right-of-way under clear weather

conditions;

(4) Taillights of the trailing end of the

trainset shall be on when the trainset is

in operation;

(5) Taillights shall not be on in the

direction of trainset travel, except if the

driver shall re-position the trainset in a

station. Such re-positioning operations

shall be done in accordance with the

railroad’s operating rules; and

(6) In an emergency situation, the

headlight on the rear of the trainset may

serve as the taillights in accordance

with the railroad’s operating rules.

§ 299.435 Electrical system design.

(a) Overhead collector systems. (1)

Pantographs shall be so arranged that

they can be operated from the driver’s

normal position in the cab. Pantographs

that automatically rise when released

shall have an automatic locking device

to secure them in the down position.

(2) Each overhead collector system,

including the pantograph, shall be

equipped with a means to electrically

ground any uninsulated parts to prevent

the risk of electrical shock when

working on the system.

(3) Means shall be provided to permit

the driver to determine that the

pantograph is in its lowest position, and

for securing the pantograph if necessary,

without the need to mount the roof of

the trainset.

(4) Each trainset equipped with a

pantograph operating on an overhead

collection system shall also be equipped

with a means to safely lower the

pantograph in the event of an

emergency. If an emergency pole is used

for this purpose, that part of the pole

which can be safely handled shall be

marked to so indicate. This pole shall be

protected from moisture and damage

when not in use. Means of securement

and electrical isolation of a damaged

pantograph, when it cannot be

performed automatically, shall be

addressed in the railroad’s operating

rules.

(b) Circuit protection. (1) Each

auxiliary circuit shall be provided with

a circuit breaker or equivalent current-

limiting devices located as near as

practicable to the point of connection to

the source of power for that circuit.

Such protection may be omitted from

circuits controlling safety-critical

devices.

(2) The 25-kV main power line shall

be protected with a lightning arrestor,

automatic circuit breaker, and overload

relay. The lightning arrestor shall be run

by the most direct path possible to

ground with a connection to ground of

not less than No. 6 AWG. These

overload protection devices shall be

housed in an enclosure designed

specifically for that purpose with the arc

chute vented directly to outside air.

(3) Auxiliary power supply (440

VAC), providing power distribution,

shall be provided with both overload

and ground fault protection.

(c) Main battery system. (1) The main

batteries shall be isolated from the cab

and passenger seating areas by a non-

combustible barrier.

(2) If batteries have the potential to

vent explosive gases, the batteries shall

be adequately ventilated to prevent

accumulation of explosive

concentrations of these gases.

(3) Battery chargers shall be designed

to protect against overcharging.

(4) Battery circuits shall include an

emergency battery cut-off switch to

completely disconnect the energy stored

in the batteries from the load.

(d) Capacitors for high-energy storage.

(1) Capacitors, if provided, shall be

isolated from the cab and passenger

seating areas by a non-combustible

barrier.

(2) Capacitors shall be designed to

protect against overcharging and

overheating.

(e) Electromagnetic interference (EMI)

and electromagnetic compatibility

(EMC). (1) The railroad shall ensure

electromagnetic compatibility of the

safety-critical equipment systems with

their environment. Electromagnetic

compatibility can be achieved through

equipment design or changes to the

operating environment.

(2) The electronic equipment shall not

produce electrical noise that interferes

with trainline control and

communications or with wayside

signaling systems.

(3) To contain electromagnetic

interference emissions, suppression of

transients shall be at the source

wherever possible.

(4) Electrical and electronic systems

of equipment shall be capable of

operation in the presence of external

electromagnetic noise sources.

(5) All electronic equipment shall be

self-protected from damage or improper

operation, or both, due to high voltage

transients and long-term over-voltage or

under-voltage conditions. This includes

protection from both power frequency

and harmonic effects as well as

protection from radio frequency signals

into the microwave frequency range.

(f) Insulation or grounding of metal

parts. All unguarded noncurrent-

carrying metal parts subject to becoming

charged shall be grounded or thoroughly

insulated.

(g) High voltage markings: doors,

cover plates, or barriers. External

surfaces of all doors, cover plates, or

barriers providing direct access to high

voltage equipment shall be

conspicuously and legibly marked

‘‘DANGER–HIGH VOLTAGE’’ or with

the word ‘‘DANGER’’ and the normal

voltage carried by the parts so protected.

Labels shall be retro-reflective.

(h) Hand-operated switches. All hand-

operated switches carrying currents

with a potential of more than 150 volts

that may be operated while under load

shall be covered and shall be operative

from the outside of the cover. Means

shall be provided to show whether the

switches are open or closed. Switches

that should not be operated while under

load shall be conspicuously and legibly

marked with the words ‘‘must not be

operated under load’’ and the voltage

carried.

(i) Conductors; jumpers; cable

connections. (1) Conductor sizes shall

be selected on the basis of current-

carrying capacity, mechanical strength,

temperature, flexibility requirements,

and maximum allowable voltage drop.

Current-carrying capacity shall be

derated for grouping and for operating

temperature.

(2) Jumpers and cable connections

between trainset units shall be located

and guarded to provide sufficient

vertical clearance. They may not hang

with one end free.

(3) Cable and jumper connections

between trainset units may not have any

of the following conditions:

(i) Broken or badly chafed insulation;

(ii) Broken plugs, receptacles,

terminals, or trainline pins; and

(iii) Broken or protruding strands of

wire.

(j) Traction motors. All traction

motors shall be in proper working order,

or safely cut-out.

§ 299.437 Automated monitoring.

(a) Each trainset shall be equipped to

monitor the performance of the

following systems or components:

(1) Reception of cab and trainset

control signals;

(2) Electric brake status;

(3) Friction brake status;

(4) Fire detection systems, if so

equipped;

(5) Auxiliary power status;

(6) Wheelslide;

(7) On-board bearing-temperature

sensors;

(8) Door open/closed status; and

(9) Bogie vibration detection.

(b) When any of the monitored

parameters are out of predetermined

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limits, an alert shall be sent

immediately to the driver. The railroad’s

operating rules shall control trainset

movement when the monitored

parameters are out of predetermined

limits.

(c) The railroad shall develop

appropriate operating rules to address

driver and equipment performance in

the event that the automatic monitoring

system becomes defective.

(d) The monitoring system shall be

designed with an automatic self-test

feature that notifies the driver that the

monitoring capability is functioning

correctly and alerts the driver when a

system failure occurs.

§ 299.439 Event recorders.

(a) Duty to equip and record. Each

trainset shall be equipped with an

operative event recorder that monitors

and records as a minimum all safety

data required by paragraph (b) of this

section. The event recorder shall record

the most recent 48 hours of operational

data of the trainset on which it is

installed.

(b) Equipment requirements. Event

recorders shall monitor and record data

elements or information needed to

support the data elements required by

paragraph (c) of this section. The data

shall be recorded with at least the

accuracy required of the indicators

displaying any of the required data

elements to the driver.

(c) Data elements. The event recorder

shall be equipped with a certified

crashworthy event recorder memory

module that meets the requirements of

appendix A to this part. The certified

event recorder memory module shall be

mounted for its maximum protection.

The event recorder shall record, and the

certified crashworthy event recorder

memory module shall retain, the

following data elements or information

needed to support the data elements:

(1) Trainset speed;

(2) Selected direction of motion;

(3) Date and time;

(4) Distance traveled;

(5) Throttle position;

(6) Applications and operations of the

trainset brake system, including urgent

and emergency applications. The system

shall record, or provide a means of

determining, that a brake application or

release resulted from manipulation of

brake controls at the position normally

occupied by the driver. In the case of a

brake application or release that is

responsive to a command originating

from or executed by an on-board

computer (e.g., electronic braking

system controller, controlling cab

electronic control system, or trainset

control computer), the system shall

record, or provide a means of

determining, the involvement of any

such computer;

(7) Applications and operations of the

regenerative brake;

(8) Cab signal aspect(s);

(9) Urgent brake application(s);

(10) Passenger brake alarm request;

(11) Wheel slip/slide alarm activation

(with a property-specific minimum

duration);

(12) Trainset number;

(13) Trainset tractive effort (positive

and negative);

(14) Trainset brake cylinder pressures;

(15) Cruise control on/off, if so

equipped and used;

(16) Bogie vibration detection;

(17) Door status opened/closed; and

(18) Safety-critical trainset control

data routed to the controlling driver’s

display with which the driver is

required to comply, specifically

including text messages conveying

mandatory directives and maximum

authorized speed. The specific

information format, content, and

proposed duration for retention of such

data shall be specified in the PTC Safety

Plan submitted for the trainset control

system under subpart B, subject to FRA

approval. If it can be calibrated against

other data required by this part, such

trainset control data may, at the election

of the railroad, be retained in a separate

certified crashworthy memory module.

(d) Response to defective equipment.

A trainset on which the event recorder

has been taken out of service may

remain in-service only until the next

pre-service inspection. A trainset with

an inoperative event recorder is not

deemed to be in improper condition,

unsafe to operate, or a non-complying

trainset under § 299.447.

(e) Annual tests. (1) The railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program under subpart G of this part

shall require annual testing of the event

recorder. All testing under this section

shall be performed at intervals that do

not exceed 368 calendar days.

(2) A microprocessor-based event

recorder with a self-monitoring feature

equipped to verify that all data elements

required by this part are recorded,

requires further maintenance and testing

only if either of the following conditions

exist:

(i) The self-monitoring feature

displays an indication of a failure. If a

failure is displayed, further

maintenance and testing must be

performed until a subsequent test is

successful. When a successful test is

accomplished, a record, in any medium,

shall be made of that fact and of any

maintenance work necessary to achieve

the successful result. This record shall

be available at the location where the

trainset is maintained until a record of

a subsequent successful test is filed; or

(ii) A download of the event recorder,

taken within the preceding 30 days and

reviewed for the previous 48 hours of

trainset operation, reveals a failure to

record a regularly recurring data

element or reveals that any required

data element is not representative of the

actual operations of the trainset during

this time period. If the review is not

successful, further maintenance and

testing shall be performed until a

subsequent test is successful. When a

successful test is accomplished, a

record, in any medium, shall be made

of that fact and of any maintenance

work necessary to achieve the

successful result. This record shall be

kept at the location where the trainset

is maintained until a record of a

subsequent successful test is filed. The

download shall be taken from

information stored in the certified

crashworthy crash hardened event

recorder memory module.

(f) Preserving accident data. If any

trainset equipped with an event

recorder, or any other trainset mounted

recording device or devices designed to

record information concerning the

functioning of a trainset, is involved in

an accident/incident that is required to

be reported to FRA under part 225 of

this chapter, the railroad shall, to the

extent possible, and to the extent

consistent with the safety of life and

property, preserve the data recorded by

each such device for analysis by FRA in

accordance with § 299.11. This

preservation requirement permits the

railroad to extract and analyze such

data, provided the original downloaded

data file, or an unanalyzed exact copy

of it, shall be retained in secure custody

and shall not be utilized for analysis or

any other purpose except by direction of

FRA or the National Transportation

Safety Board. This preservation

requirement shall expire one (1) year

after the date of the accident/incident

unless FRA or the Board notifies the

railroad in writing that the data are

desired for analysis.

(g) Relationship to other laws.

Nothing in this section is intended to

alter the legal authority of law

enforcement officials investigating

potential violation(s) of Federal or State

criminal law(s), and nothing in this

chapter is intended to alter in any way

the priority of National Transportation

Safety Board investigations under 49

U.S.C. 1131 and 1134, nor the authority

of the Secretary of Transportation to

investigate railroad accidents under 49

U.S.C. 5121, 5122, 20107, 20111, 20112,

20505, 20702, 20703, and 20902.

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(h) Disabling event recorders. Any

individual who willfully disables an

event recorder, or who tampers with or

alters the data recorded by such a device

is subject to civil penalty as provided in

part 218 of this chapter, and to

disqualification from performing safety-

sensitive functions on a railroad under

subpart D of part 209 of this chapter.

§ 299.441 Trainset electronic hardware and

software safety.

(a) Purpose and scope. The

requirements of this section apply to all

safety-critical electronic control

systems, subsystems, and components

on the trainsets, except for on-board

signaling and trainset control system

components that must meet the software

safety requirements defined in subpart B

of this part.

(b) Applicability. (1) The trainsets

shall utilize the service-proven safety-

critical electronic control systems,

subsystems, and components as used on

the N700 to control and monitor safety-

critical components.

(2) Any modifications to the existing

service-proven safety-critical electronic

control systems, subsystems, and

components shall be subject to the

requirements defined in paragraph (c) of

this section.

(i) The railroad shall assure that the

suppliers of new or modified safety-

critical systems, subsystems, and

components utilize an industry

recognized hardware and software

development process which is evaluated

and certified by an independent third-

party assessor authorized by the

industry standard utilized.

(ii) The railroad shall require that all

suppliers submit the certifications and

audit results as applicable. All such

certifications shall be made available to

FRA upon request.

(3) Any major upgrades or

introduction of new safety-critical

technology shall be subject to

§ 299.613(d).

(c) Electronic hardware and software

safety program. The railroad shall

develop and maintain a written

electronic hardware and software safety

program to guide the design,

development, testing, integration, and

verification of all new or modified

safety-critical trainset hardware and

software.

(1) Hardware and software safety

program description. The hardware and

software safety program shall include a

description of how the following will be

implemented to ensure safety and

reliability:

(i) The hardware and software design

process;

(ii) The hardware and software design

documentation;

(iii) The hardware and software

hazard analysis;

(iv) Hardware and software safety

reviews;

(v) Hardware and software hazard

monitoring and tracking;

(vi) Hardware and software

integration safety testing;

(vii) Demonstration of overall

hardware and software system safety as

part of the pre-revenue service testing of

the equipment; and

(viii) Safety-critical changes and

failures.

(2) Safety analysis. The hardware and

software safety program shall be based

on a formal safety methodology that

includes a FMECA; verification and

validation testing for all hardware and

software components and their

interfaces; and comprehensive hardware

and software integration testing to

ensure that the hardware and software

system functions as intended.

(3) Compliance. The railroad shall

comply with the elements of its

hardware and software safety program

that affect the safety of the passenger

trainset.

(4) Safety-critical changes and

failures. Whenever a planned safety-

critical design change is made to the

safety-critical electronic control

systems, subsystems and components

(the products) that are in use by the

railroad and subject to this subpart, the

railroad shall—

(i) Notify FRA in accordance with

§ 299.9 of the design changes made by

the product supplier;

(ii) Ensure that the safety analysis

required under paragraph (c)(2) of this

section is updated as required;

(iii) Conduct all safety-critical

changes in a manner that allows the

change to be audited;

(iv) Document all arrangements with

suppliers for notification of all

electronic safety-critical changes as well

as safety-critical failures in the

supplier’s system, subsystem, or

components, and the reasons for that

change or failure from the suppliers,

whether or not the railroad has

experienced a failure of that safety-

critical system, sub-system, or

component;

(v) Specify the railroad’s procedures

for action upon receipt of notification of

a safety-critical change or failure of an

electronic system, sub-system, or

component, and until the upgrade or

revision has been installed;

(vi) Identify all configuration/revision

control measures designed to ensure

that safety-functional requirements and

safety-critical hazard mitigation

processes are not compromised as a

result of any such change, and that any

such change can be audited;

(vii) Require suppliers to provide

notification of all electronic safety-

critical changes as well as safety-critical

failures in the supplier’s system,

subsystem, or components;

(ix) Document all arrangements with

suppliers for notification of any and all

electronic safety-critical changes as well

as safety-critical failures in the

supplier’s system, subsystem, or

components.

(d) Specific requirements. Hardware

and software that controls or monitors a

trainset’s primary braking system shall

either—

(1) Fail safely by initiating an

emergency or urgent brake application

in the event of a hardware or software

failure that could impair the ability of

the driver to apply or release the brakes;

or

(2) Provide the driver access to direct

manual control of the primary braking

system (emergency or urgent braking).

(e) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance records. The inspection,

testing, and maintenance conducted by

the railroad in accordance with

§ 299.445 shall be recorded in hardcopy

or stored electronically. Electronic

recordkeeping or automated tracking

systems, subject to the provisions

contained in § 299.11, may be utilized to

store and maintain any testing or

training record required by this subpart.

Results of product testing conducted by

a vendor in support of a safety analysis

shall be provided to and recorded by the

railroad.

(1) The testing records shall contain

all of the following:

(i) The name of the railroad;

(ii) The location and date that the test

was conducted;

(iii) The equipment tested;

(iv) The results of tests;

(v) The repairs or replacement of

equipment;

(vi) Any preventative adjustments

made; and

(vii) The condition in which the

equipment is left.

(2) Each record shall be—

(i) Signed by the employee

conducting the test, or electronically

coded, or identified by the automated

test equipment number;

(ii) Filed in the office of a supervisory

official having jurisdiction, unless

otherwise noted; and

(iii) Available for inspection and

copying by FRA.

(3) The results of the testing

conducted in accordance with this

section shall be retained as follows:

(i) The results of tests that pertain to

installation or modification of a product

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shall be retained for the life-cycle of the

product tested and may be kept in any

office designated by the railroad;

(ii) The results of periodic tests

required for the maintenance or repair

of the product tested shall be retained

until the next record is filed and in no

case less than one year; and

(iii) The results of all other tests and

training shall be retained until the next

record is filed and in no case less than

one year.

(f) Review of safety analysis. (1) Prior

to the initial planned use of a new

product as defined by paragraphs (b)(2)

or (3) of this section, the railroad shall

notify FRA in accordance with § 299.9

of the intent to place this product in

service. The notification shall provide a

description of the product, and identify

the location where the complete safety

analysis documentation and the testing

are maintained.

(2) The railroad shall maintain and

make available to FRA upon request all

railroad or vendor documentation used

to demonstrate that the product meets

the safety requirements of the safety

analysis for the life-cycle of the product.

(g) Hazard tracking. After a new

product is placed in service in

accordance with paragraphs (b)(2) or (3)

of this section, the railroad shall

maintain a database of all safety-

relevant hazards encountered with the

product. The database shall include all

hazards identified in the safety analysis

and those that had not been previously

identified in the safety analysis. If the

frequency of the safety-relevant hazards

exceeds the threshold set forth in the

safety analysis, then the railroad shall—

(1) Report the inconsistency to the

Associate Administrator, within 15 days

of discovery in accordance with § 299.9;

(2) Take immediate countermeasures

to reduce the frequency of the safety-

relevant hazard(s) below the threshold

set forth in the safety analysis;

(3) Provide a final report to the

Associate Administrator, on the results

of the analysis and countermeasures

taken to mitigate the hazard to meet the

threshold set forth in the safety analysis

when the problem is resolved. For

hazards not identified in the safety

analysis the threshold shall be exceeded

at one occurrence; and

(4) Electronic or automated tracking

systems used to meet the requirements

contained in paragraph (g) of this

section shall be in accordance with

§ 299.11.

(h) Operations and maintenance

manual. The railroad shall maintain all

supplier or vendor documents

pertaining to the operation, installation,

maintenance, repair, modification,

inspection, and testing of the safety-

critical electronic control systems,

subsystems and components.

(i) Training and qualification

program. Under § 299.13(c)(3), the

railroad shall establish and implement a

training and qualification program for

the safety-critical electronic control

systems, subsystems, and components

subject to subpart G of this part prior to

the safety-critical electronic control

systems, subsystems, and components

being placed in use.

(j) Operating personnel training. The

training program required by

§ 299.13(c)(3) for any driver or other

person who participates in the operation

of a trainset using the safety-critical

electronic control systems, subsystems

and components shall address all the

following elements:

(1) Familiarization with the electronic

control system equipment on-board the

trainset and the functioning of that

equipment as part of the system and in

relation to other on-board systems under

that person’s control;

(2) Any actions required of the

operating personnel to enable or enter

data into the system and the role of that

function in the safe operation of the

trainset;

(3) Sequencing of interventions by the

system, including notification,

enforcement, and recovery from the

enforcement as applicable;

(4) Railroad operating rules applicable

to control systems, including provisions

for movement and protection of any

unequipped passenger equipment, or

passenger equipment with failed or cut-

out controls;

(5) Means to detect deviations from

proper functioning of on-board

electronic control system equipment

and instructions explaining the proper

response to be taken regarding control of

the trainset and notification of

designated railroad personnel; and

(6) Information needed to prevent

unintentional interference with the

proper functioning of on-board

electronic control equipment.

§ 299.443 Safety appliances.

(a) Couplers. (1) The leading and

trailing ends of each trainset shall be

equipped with an automatic rescue

coupler that couples on impact.

(i) Uncoupling of the rescue coupler

shall be done only at a trainset

maintenance facility or other location

where personnel can safely get under or

between units.

(ii) The leading and the trailing ends

of a trainset are not required to be

equipped with sill steps or end or side

handholds.

(2) The leading and trailing end

couplers and uncoupling devices may

be stored within a removable shrouded

housing.

(3) Leading and trailing automatic

couplers of trainsets shall be compatible

with the railroad’s rescue vehicles. A

coupler adaptor can be used to meet this

requirement.

(4) The railroad shall develop and

implement rescue procedures that

assure employee safety during rescue

operations and shall be contained in the

railroad’s operating rules.

(5) Each unit within a trainset shall be

semi-permanently coupled and shall

only be uncoupled at a trainset

maintenance facility or other locations

identified by the railroad where the

protections afforded in subpart B of part

218 of this chapter can be applied.

(6) The ends of units in a trainset that

are semi-permanently coupled are not

required to be equipped with automatic

couplers, sill steps, end handholds or

side handholds.

(b) Crew access. (1) Each trainset shall

provide a minimum of two (2) locations

per side, where crew members can

board or disembark the trainset safely

from ground level.

(2) Each location used for crew access

shall be equipped with retractable stairs

with handrails designed for safe access

to the trainset from ground level.

§ 299.445 Trainset inspection, testing, and

maintenance requirements.

(a) General. (1) The railroad shall

develop a written inspection program

for the rolling stock, in accordance with

and approved under the requirements of

§ 299.713. As further specified in this

section, the program shall describe in

detail the procedures, equipment, and

other means necessary for the safe

operation of the passenger equipment,

including all inspections set forth in

paragraph (e) of this section. This

information shall include a detailed

description of the methods of ensuring

accurate records of required inspections.

(2) The initial inspection, testing, and

maintenance program submitted under

§ 299.713 shall, as a minimum, address

the specific safety inspections contained

in paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this

section. The railroad may submit the

procedures detailing the bogie

inspections or general overhaul

requirements contained in paragraph

(e)(3) and (4) of this section,

respectively, at a later date than the

initial inspection, testing, and

maintenance program, but not less than

180 days prior to the scheduled date of

the first bogie inspection or general

overhaul.

(b) Identification of safety-critical

items. In addition to safety critical items

identified under § 299.711(b), on-board

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emergency equipment, emergency back-

up systems, trainset exits and trainset

safety-critical hardware and software

systems in accordance with § 299.441

shall be deemed safety-critical.

(c) Compliance. The railroad shall

adopt and comply with the approved

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program in accordance with § 299.703.

(d) General condition. The inspection,

testing, and maintenance program shall

ensure that all systems and components

of the equipment are free of conditions

that endanger the safety of the crew,

passengers, or equipment. These

conditions include, but are not limited

to the following:

(1) A continuous accumulation of oil

or grease;

(2) Improper functioning of a

component;

(3) A crack, break, excessive wear,

structural defect, or weakness of a

component;

(4) A leak;

(5) Use of a component or system

under conditions that exceed those for

which the component or system is

designed to operate; and

(6) Insecure attachment of a

component.

(e) Specific safety inspections. The

program under paragraph (a) of this

section shall specify that all passenger

trainsets shall receive thorough safety

inspections by qualified individuals

designated by the railroad at regular

intervals. At a minimum, and in

addition to the annual tests required for

event recorder under § 299.439(e), the

following shall be performed on each

trainset:

(1) Pre-service inspections. (i) Each

trainset in use shall be inspected at least

once every two calendar days by

qualified individuals at a location where

there is a repair pit and access to the top

of the trainset. The inspection shall

verify the correct operation of on-board

safety systems defined in the inspection,

testing, and maintenance program. If

any of the conditions defined as safety-

critical in paragraph (b) of this section

and § 299.711(b) are found during this

inspection, the trainset shall not be put

into service until that condition is

rectified. The pre-service inspection

shall include the following:

(A) Functional tests to determine the

status of application and release of the

service, emergency, and urgent air

brakes using the monitoring system;

(B) Operational tests of the exterior

doors; and

(C) A review of the log of on-board

ATC equipment.

(ii) If the existence of any safety-

critical conditions cannot be determined

by use of an automated monitoring

system, the railroad shall perform a

visual inspection to determine if the

condition exists.

(2) Regular inspections. The railroad

shall perform a regular inspection on all

trainsets in accordance with the test

procedures and inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a) of this

section and at the intervals defined by

paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the

conditions defined as safety-critical in

paragraph (b) of this section and

§ 299.711(b) are found during this

inspection, the trainset shall not be put

into service until that condition is

rectified.

(3) Bogie inspections. The railroad

shall perform a bogie inspection on all

trainsets in accordance with the test

procedures and inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a) of this

section and at the intervals defined by

paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the

conditions defined as safety-critical in

paragraph (b) of this section and

§ 299.711(b) are found during this

inspection, the trainset shall not be put

into service until that condition is

rectified.

(4) General overhaul. The railroad

shall perform a general overhaul on all

trainsets in accordance with the test

procedures and inspection criteria

established in paragraph (a) of this

section and at the intervals defined by

paragraph (f) of this section. If any of the

conditions defined as safety-critical in

paragraph (b) of this section and

§ 299.711(b) are found during this

inspection, the trainset shall not be put

into service until that condition is

rectified.

(f) Maintenance intervals. The

railroad’s program established pursuant

to paragraph (a) of this section shall

include the railroad’s scheduled

maintenance intervals for all specific

safety inspections in paragraph (e) of

this section, as required by § 299.707.

(g) Training and qualification

program. The railroad shall establish a

training and qualification program as

defined in § 299.13(c)(3) to qualify

individuals to perform inspections,

testing, and maintenance on the

equipment. Only qualified individuals

shall perform inspections, testing, and

maintenance of the equipment.

(h) Reporting and tracking of repairs

to defective trainsets. The railroad shall

have in place prior to start of operations

a reporting and tracking system for

passenger trainsets with a defect not in

conformance with this subpart. The

reporting and tracking system shall

record the following information:

(1) The identification number of the

defective unit within a trainset, and

trainset identification number;

(2) The date the defect was

discovered;

(3) The nature of the defect;

(4) The determination made by a

qualified individual whether the

equipment is safe to run;

(5) The name of the qualified

individual making such a

determination;

(6) Any operating restrictions placed

on the equipment; and

(7) Repairs made and the date that

they were completed.

(i) Retention of records. At a

minimum, the railroad shall keep the

records described in paragraph (j) of

each required inspection under this

section in accordance with § 299.11.

Each record shall be maintained for at

least one year from the date of the

inspection.

(j) Availability of records. The railroad

shall make defect reporting and tracking

records available to FRA upon request.

(k) Brake system repair points. The

railroad shall designate brake system

repair points in the inspection, testing,

and maintenance program required by

paragraph (a) of this section. No trainset

shall depart a brake system repair point

unless that trainset has a 100 percent

operational brake system.

§ 299.447 Movement of defective

equipment.

(a) A trainset with one or more

conditions not in compliance with the

list of safety critical defects identified in

accordance with § 299.445(b) during a

pre-service inspection required by

§ 299.445(e)(1) shall not be moved in

revenue service and shall only be

moved in accordance with paragraph (e)

of this section.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph

(c) of this section, and after departure in

compliance with the pre-service

inspection required by § 299.445(e)(1), a

trainset with one or more conditions not

in compliance with the list of safety

critical defects identified in accordance

with §§ 299.445(b) and 299.711(b) may

be moved in revenue service only after

the railroad has complied with all of the

following:

(1) A qualified individual determines

that it is safe to move the trainset,

consistent with the railroad’s operating

rules;

(i) If appropriate, these

determinations may be made based

upon a description of the defective

condition provided by a crewmember.

(ii) If the determinations required by

this paragraph are made by an off-site

qualified individual based on a

description of the defective condition by

on-site personnel, then a qualified

individual shall perform a physical

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inspection of the defective equipment,

at the first location possible, in

accordance with the railroad’s

inspection, testing, and maintenance

program and operating rules, to verify

the description of the defect provided

by the on-site personnel.

(2) The qualified individual who

made the determination in paragraph

(b)(1) of this section, notifies the driver

in charge of movement of the trainset,

in accordance with the railroad’s

operating rules, of the maximum

authorized speed, authorized

destination, and any other operational

restrictions that apply to the movement

of the non-compliant trainset. This

notification may be achieved through

the tag required by paragraph (b)(3) of

this section; and

(3) A tag bearing the words ‘‘non-

complying trainset’’ and containing the

following information, are securely

attached to the control stand on each

control cab of the trainset:

(i) The trainset number and unit or car

number;

(ii) The name of the qualified

individual making the determination in

paragraph (b)(1) of this section;

(iii) The location and date of the

inspection that led to the discovery of

the non-compliant item;

(iv) A description of each defect;

(v) Movement restrictions, if any;

(vi) The authorized destination of the

trainset; and

(vii) The signature, if possible, as well

as the job title and location of the

person making the determinations

required by this section.

(4) Automated tracking systems used

to meet the tagging requirements

contained in paragraph (b)(3) of this

section may be reviewed and monitored

by FRA at any time to ensure the

integrity of the system. FRA’s Associate

Administrator may prohibit or revoke

the railroad’s ability to utilize an

automated tracking system in lieu of

tagging if FRA finds that the automated

tracking system is not properly secure,

is inaccessible to FRA or the railroad’s

employees, or fails to track or monitor

the movement of defective equipment

adequately. Such a determination will

be made in writing and will state the

basis for such action.

(c) A trainset that develops a non-

complying condition in service may

continue in revenue service, so long as

the requirements of paragraph (b) of this

section are otherwise fully met, until the

next pre-service inspection.

(d) In the event of an in-service failure

of the braking system, the trainset may

proceed in accordance with the

railroad’s operating rules relating to the

percentage of operative brakes and at a

speed no greater than the maximum

authorized speed as determined by

§ 299.409(f)(4) so long as the

requirements of paragraph (b) of this

section are otherwise fully met, until the

next pre-service inspection.

(e) A non-complying trainset may be

moved without passengers within a

trainset maintenance facility, at speeds

not to exceed 16 km/h (10 mph),

without meeting the requirements of

paragraph (a) of this section where the

movement is solely for the purpose of

repair. The railroad shall ensure that the

movement is made safely.

(f) Nothing in this section authorizes

the movement of equipment subject to

a Special Notice for Repair under part

216 of this chapter unless the movement

is made in accordance with the

restrictions contained in the Special

Notice.

Subpart E—Operating Rules

§ 299.501 Purpose.

Through the requirements of this

subpart, FRA learns the condition of the

operating rules and practices in use by

the railroad. The rules and practices

covered by this subpart include the

procedures for instruction and testing of

all employees involved with the

movement of rail vehicles, including

drivers, on-board attendants, station

platform attendants, general control

center staff, and all maintenance staff,

which are necessary to ensure that they

possess the requisite skill and

knowledge of the rules and operating

practices to maintain the safety of the

system.

§ 299.503 Operating rules; filing and

recordkeeping.

(a) Prior to commencing operations,

the railroad shall develop a code of

operating rules, timetables, and

timetable special instructions. The

initial code of operating rules,

timetables, and timetable special

instructions shall be based on practices

and procedures proven on the Tokaido

Shinkansen system.

(b) The railroad shall keep one copy

of its current code of operating rules,

timetables, timetable special instruction,

at its system headquarters, and shall

make them available to FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. If the railroad elects to

maintain an electronic record, the

railroad must satisfy the conditions

listed in § 299.11.

§ 299.505 Programs of operational tests

and inspections; recordkeeping.

(a) Requirement to conduct

operational tests and inspections. The

railroad shall periodically conduct

operational tests and inspections to

determine the extent of employee

knowledge, application, and compliance

with its code of operating rules,

timetables, and timetable special

instructions in accordance with a

written program retained at its system

headquarters.

(b) Railroad and railroad testing

officer responsibilities. (1) Each railroad

officer who conducts operational tests

and inspections (railroad testing officer)

shall—

(i) Be qualified on the railroad’s

operating rules in accordance with

§ 299.507;

(ii) Be qualified on the operational

testing and inspection program

requirements and procedures relevant to

the testing and inspections the officer

will conduct;

(iii) Receive appropriate field training,

as necessary to achieve proficiency, on

each operational test or inspection that

the officer is authorized to conduct; and

(iv) Conduct operational tests and

inspections in accordance with the

railroad’s program of operational tests

and inspections.

(2) The railroad shall maintain a

record documenting qualification of

each railroad testing officer. The record

shall be retained by the railroad and

shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. If the railroad elects to

maintain an electronic record, the

railroad must satisfy the conditions

listed in § 299.11.

(c) Written program of operational

tests and inspections. Within 30 days of

commencing operations, the railroad

shall have a written program of

operational tests and inspections in

effect. The railroad shall maintain one

copy of its current program for periodic

performance of the operational tests and

inspections required by paragraph (a) of

this section, and shall maintain one

copy of each subsequent amendment to

the program as amendments are made.

These records shall be retained at the

system headquarters of the railroad for

three calendar years after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate.

These records shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours. The program shall—

(1) Provide for operational testing and

inspection under the various operating

conditions on the railroad;

(2) Describe each type of operational

test and inspection adopted, including

the means and procedures used to carry

it out;

(3) State the purpose of each type of

operational test and inspection;

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(4) State the frequency with which

each type of operational test and

inspection is conducted;

(5) The program shall address with

particular emphasis those operating

rules that cause or are likely to cause the

most accidents or incidents, such as

those accidents or incidents identified

in the six-month reviews and the annual

summaries as required under

paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section;

(6) Identify the officer(s) by name and

job title responsible for ensuring that the

program of operational tests and

inspections is properly implemented

and is responsible for overseeing the

entire program. The responsibilities of

such officer(s) shall include, but not be

limited to, ensuring that the railroad’s

testing officers are directing their efforts

in an appropriate manner to reduce

accidents/incidents and that all required

reviews and summaries are completed;

and

(7) Include a schedule for making the

program fully operative within 210 days

after it begins.

(d) Records. (1) The railroad shall

keep a written or electronic record of

the date, time, place, and result of each

operational test and inspection that was

performed in accordance with its

program. Each record shall specify the

officer administering the test and

inspection and each employee tested.

These records shall be retained at the

system headquarters of the railroad for

one calendar year after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate.

These records shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours.

(2) The railroad shall retain one copy

of its current program for periodic

performance of the operational tests and

inspections required by paragraph (a) of

this section and one copy of each

subsequent amendment to such

program. These records shall be retained

for three calendar years after the end of

the calendar year to which they relate at

the system headquarters where the tests

and inspections are conducted. These

records shall be made available to

representatives of the FRA for

inspection and copying during normal

business hours.

(e) Reviews of tests and inspections

and adjustments to the program of

operational tests—(1) Reviews by the

railroad. Not less than once every 180

days the railroad’s designated officer(s)

shall conduct periodic reviews and

analyses as provided in this paragraph

and shall retain, at its system

headquarters, one copy of the reviews.

Each such review shall be completed

within 30 days of the close of the

period. The designated officer(s) shall

conduct a written review of—

(i) The operational testing and

inspection data for the system to

determine compliance by the railroad

testing officers with its program of

operational tests and inspections

required by paragraph (c) of this section.

At a minimum, this review shall include

the name of each railroad testing officer,

the number of tests and inspections

conducted by each officer, and whether

the officer conducted the minimum

number of each type of test or

inspection required by the railroad’s

program;

(ii) Accident/incident data, the results

of prior operational tests and

inspections, and other pertinent safety

data for the system to identify the

relevant operating rules related to those

accidents/incidents that occurred

during the period. Based upon the

results of that review, the designated

officer(s) shall make any necessary

adjustments to the tests and inspections

required of railroad officers for the

subsequent period(s); and

(iii) Implementation of the program of

operational tests and inspections from a

system perspective, to ensure that it is

being utilized as intended, that the other

reviews provided for in this paragraph

have been properly completed, that

appropriate adjustments have been

made to the distribution of tests and

inspections required, and that the

railroad testing officers are

appropriately directing their efforts.

(2) Records retention. The records of

reviews required in paragraphs (e)(1) of

this section shall be retained for a

period of one year after the end of the

calendar year to which they relate and

shall be made available to

representatives of FRA for inspection

and copying during normal business

hours.

(f) Annual summary on operational

tests and inspections. Before March 1 of

each calendar year, the railroad shall

retain, at its system headquarters, one

copy of a written summary of the

following with respect to its previous

year’s activities: The number, type, and

result of each operational test and

inspection that was conducted as

required by paragraphs (a) and (c) of this

section. These records shall be retained

for three calendar years after the end of

the calendar year to which they relate

and shall be made available to

representatives of FRA for inspection

and copying during normal business

hours.

(g) Electronic recordkeeping. Nothing

in this section precludes the railroad

from maintaining the information

required to be retained under this part

in an electronic format provided that the

railroad satisfy the conditions listed in

§ 299.11.

(h) Disapproval of program. Upon

review of the program of operational

tests and inspections required by this

section, the Associate Administrator for

Safety may, for cause stated, disapprove

the program in whole or in part.

Notification of such disapproval shall be

made in writing and specify the basis

for the disapproval decision. If the

Associate Administrator for Safety

disapproves the program—

(1) The railroad has 35 days from the

date of the written notification of such

disapproval to—

(i) Amend its program; or

(ii) Provide a written response in

support of the program to the Associate

Administrator for Safety. If the

Associate Administrator for Safety still

disapproves the program in whole or in

part after receiving the railroad’s written

response, the railroad shall amend its

program.

(2) A failure to adequately amend the

program will be considered a failure to

implement a program under this

subpart.

§ 299.507 Program of instruction on

operating rules; recordkeeping.

(a) To ensure that each railroad

employee whose activities are governed

by the railroad’s operating rules

understands those rules, the railroad

periodically shall instruct each such

employee on the meaning and

application of its operating rules with a

written program developed under

§ 299.13(c)(3) and retained at its system

headquarters.

(b) Prior to commencing operations,

the railroad shall file and retain one

copy of its current program for the

periodic instruction of its employees as

required by paragraph (a) of this section

and shall file and retain one copy of any

amendment to that program as

amendments are made. These records

shall be retained at the railroad’s system

headquarters for one calendar year after

the end of the calendar year to which

they relate. These records shall be made

available to representatives of the FRA

for inspection and copying during

normal business hours. This program

shall—

(1) Describe the means and

procedures used for instruction of the

various classes of affected employees;

(2) State the frequency of instruction

and the basis for determining that

frequency;

(3) Include a schedule for completing

the initial instruction of employees who

are already employed when the program

begins;

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(4) Begin on the date of commencing

operations; and

(5) Provide for initial instruction of

each employee hired after the program

begins.

(c) The railroad is authorized to retain

by electronic recordkeeping its program

for periodic instruction of its employees

on operating rules, provided that the

requirements stated in § 299.11 are

satisfied.

Subpart F—System Qualification Tests

§ 299.601 Responsibility for verification

demonstrations and tests.

The railroad shall comply with the

pre-revenue qualification tests and

verification requirements set forth in

this subpart to demonstrate the overall

safety of the system, prior to revenue

operations.

§ 299.603 Preparation of system-wide

qualification test plan.

(a) Prior to execution of any tests as

defined in this subpart, the railroad

shall develop a system-wide

qualification test plan, that identifies

the tests that will be carried out, to

demonstrate the operability of all

system elements, including track and

infrastructure, signal and trainset

control system, communications, rolling

stock, software, and operating practices,

and the system as a whole.

(b) The system-wide qualification test

plan shall be submitted to FRA in

accordance with § 299.9 for review at

least 180 days prior to testing. FRA shall

notify the railroad, in writing, within 45

days of receipt of the railroad’s

submission, and identify any

deficiencies in the test plan. FRA will

notify the railroad of any procedures to

be submitted for review. The plan shall

include the following:

(1) A list of all tests to be conducted;

(2) A summary statement of the test

objectives;

(3) A planned schedule for

conducting the tests which indicates the

sequence of testing and

interdependencies; and

(4) The approach taken for—

(i) Verifying results of installation

tests performed by contractors and

manufacturers;

(ii) Functional and performance

qualification testing of individual

safety-related equipment, facilities, and

subsystems in accordance with

§ 299.605;

(iii) Pre-revenue service system

integration testing of the system per

§ 299.607, that includes vehicle/track

system qualification testing per

§ 299.609;

(iv) Simulated revenue operations of

the system per § 299.611;

(v) Compliance with operating rules

as per subpart E of this part;

(vi) Training and qualification of all

personnel involved in the test program

to conduct tests safely and in

accordance with operating rules;

(vii) Verification of all emergency

preparedness procedures; and

(viii) Field testing of the railroad’s

uncertified PTC system and regression

testing of its FRA-certified PTC system,

under § 299.201.

(c) The railroad shall adopt and

comply with the system-wide

qualification test plan, including

completion of all tests required by the

plan.

(d) After FRA review of the system-

wide test plan, detailed test procedures

as required by paragraph (b) of this

section shall be submitted 15 days prior

to testing to FRA in accordance with

§ 299.9 for review.

(e) Each test procedure shall include

the following elements:

(1) A clear statement of the test

objectives. One of the principal test

objectives shall be to demonstrate that

the railroad’s system meets the safety

design and performance requirements

specified in this part when operated in

the environment in which it will be

used;

(2) Any special safety precautions to

be observed during the testing;

(3) A description of the railroad

property or facilities to be used to

conduct the tests;

(4) Prerequisites for conducting each

test;

(5) A detailed description of how the

tests are to be conducted. This

description shall include—

(i) An identification of the systems

and equipment to be tested;

(ii) The method by which the systems

and equipment shall be tested;

(iii) The instrumentation to be used

and calibration procedures;

(iv) The means by which the test

results will be recorded, analyzed and

reported to FRA;

(v) A description of the information or

data to be obtained;

(vi) A description of how the

information or data obtained is to be

analyzed or used;

(vii) A description of any criteria to be

used as safety limits during the testing;

(viii) The criteria to be used to

evaluate performance of the systems and

equipment. If system qualification is to

be based on extrapolation of less than

full-level testing results, the analysis

done to justify the validity of the

extrapolation shall be described; and

(ix) Inspection, testing, and

maintenance procedures to be followed

to ensure that testing is conducted

safely.

(f) The railroad shall provide FRA

notice at least 30 days in advance of the

times and places of any domestic testing

and notice at least 90 days in advance

for testing not conducted domestically

to permit FRA observation of such tests.

§ 299.605 Functional and performance

qualification tests.

The railroad shall conduct functional

and performance qualification tests,

prior to commencing revenue

operations, to verify that all safety-

critical components meet all functional

and all performance specifications.

§ 299.607 Pre-revenue service system

integration testing.

(a) Prior to commencing revenue

operations, the railroad shall conduct

tests of the trainsets throughout the

system to—

(1) Verify mechanical positioning of

the overhead catenary system; and

(2) Verify performance of the trainset,

track, and signal and trainset control

systems.

(b) The railroad shall demonstrate safe

operation of the system during normal

and degraded-mode operating

conditions. At a minimum, the

following operation tests shall be

performed:

(1) Slow-speed operation of a trainset;

(2) Verification of correct overhead

catenary and pantograph interaction;

(3) Verification of trainset clearance at

structures and passenger platforms;

(4) Incremental increase of trainset

speed;

(5) Performance tests on trainsets to

verify braking rates in accordance with

§ 299.409;

(6) Verification of vehicle noise;

(7) Verification of correct vehicle

suspension characteristics;

(8) Vehicle/track system qualification

as defined in § 299.609;

(9) Load tests with vehicles to verify

relay settings and signal and

communication system immunization;

(10) Monitoring of utility supply

circuits and telephone circuits to ensure

the adequacy of power supplies, and to

verify that transient-related disturbances

are within acceptable limits;

(11) Verification of vehicle detection

due to shunting of signal system

circuits;

(12) Verification of safe operation of

the signal and trainset control system as

required by subpart B of this part;

(13) Tests of trainset radio reception

during system-wide vehicle operation;

and

(14) Verification of electromagnetic

interference/electromagnetic

compatibility between various

subsystems.

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§ 299.609 Vehicle/track system

qualification.

(a) General. All vehicles types

intended to operate in revenue service

shall be qualified for operation in

accordance with this subpart. A

qualification program shall be used to

demonstrate that the vehicle/track

system will not exceed the wheel/rail

force safety limits, and the carbody and

bogie acceleration criteria specified in

paragraph (h) of this section—

(1) At any speed up to and including

10 km/h (6 mph) above the proposed

maximum operating speed; and

(2) On track meeting the requirements

for the class of track associated with the

proposed maximum operating speed as

defined in § 299.309. For purposes of

qualification testing, speeds may exceed

the maximum allowable operating speed

for the class of track in accordance with

the test plan approved by FRA.

(b) New vehicle/track system

qualification. Vehicle types not

previously qualified under this subpart

shall be qualified in accordance with

the requirements of this paragraph (b).

(1) Carbody acceleration. For vehicle

types intended to operate in revenue

service at track class H4 speeds or

above, qualification testing conducted

over a representative segment of the

route shall demonstrate that the vehicle

type will not exceed the carbody lateral

and vertical acceleration safety limits

specified in paragraph (h) of this

section.

(2) Bogie lateral acceleration. For

vehicle types intended to operate at

track class H4 speeds or above,

qualification testing conducted over a

representative segment of the route shall

demonstrate that the vehicle type will

not exceed the bogie lateral acceleration

safety limit specified in paragraph (h) of

this section.

(3) Measurement of wheel/rail forces.

For vehicle types intended to operate at

track class H4 speeds or above,

qualification testing conducted over a

representative segment of the route shall

demonstrate that the vehicle type will

not exceed the wheel/rail force safety

limits specified in paragraph (h) of this

section.

(c) Previously qualified vehicle/track

system. Vehicle/track systems

previously qualified under this subpart

for a track class and cant deficiency on

one route may be qualified for operation

at the same class and cant deficiency on

another route through testing to

demonstrate compliance with paragraph

(a) of this section in accordance with the

following:

(1) Carbody acceleration. For vehicle

types intended to operate at track class

H4 speeds and above, qualification

testing conducted over a representative

segment of the new route shall

demonstrate that the vehicle type will

not exceed the carbody lateral and

vertical acceleration safety limits

specified in paragraph (h) of this

section.

(2) Bogie lateral acceleration. For

vehicle types intended to operate at

track class H4 speeds or above,

measurement of bogie lateral

acceleration during qualification testing

shall demonstrate that the vehicle type

will not exceed the bogie lateral

acceleration safety limit specified in

paragraph (h) of this section.

Measurement of bogie lateral

acceleration, if conducted, shall be

performed over a representative segment

of the new route.

(d) Vehicle/track system qualification

testing plan. To obtain the data required

to support the qualification program

outlined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this

section, the railroad shall submit a

qualification testing plan as required by

§ 299.603(b) at least 60 days prior to

testing, requesting approval to conduct

the testing at the desired speeds and

cant deficiencies. This test plan shall

provide for a test program sufficient to

evaluate the operating limits of the track

and vehicle type and shall include—

(1) Identification of the representative

segment of the route for qualification

testing;

(2) Consideration of the operating

environment during qualification

testing, including operating practices

and conditions, the signal system, and

trainset on adjacent tracks;

(3) The maximum angle found on the

gauge face of the designed (newly-

profiled) wheel flange referenced with

respect to the axis of the wheelset that

will be used for the determination of the

Single Wheel L/V Ratio safety limit

specified in paragraph (h) of this

section; and

(4) A target maximum testing speed in

accordance with paragraph (a) of this

section and the maximum testing cant

deficiency.

(e) Qualification testing. Upon FRA

approval of the vehicle/track system

qualification testing plan, qualification

testing shall be conducted in two

sequential stages as required in this

subpart.

(1) Stage-one testing shall include

demonstration of acceptable vehicle

dynamic response of the subject vehicle

as speeds are incrementally increased—

(i) On a segment of tangent track, from

acceptable track class H4 speeds to the

target maximum test speed; and

(ii) On a segment of curved track,

from the speeds corresponding to 76

mm (3 inches) of cant deficiency to the

maximum testing cant deficiency.

(2) When stage-one testing has

successfully demonstrated a maximum

safe operating speed and cant

deficiency, stage-two testing shall

commence with the subject equipment

over a representative segment of the

route as identified in paragraph (d)(1) of

this section.

(i) A test run shall be conducted over

the route segment at the speed the

railroad will request FRA to approve for

such service.

(ii) An additional test run shall be

conducted at 10 km/h (6 mph) above

this speed.

(3) When conducting stage-one and

stage-two testing, if any of the

monitored safety limits are exceeded on

any segment of track, testing may

continue provided that the track

location(s) where any of the limits are

exceeded be identified and test speeds

be limited at the track location(s) until

corrective action is taken. Corrective

action may include making adjustments

to the track, to the vehicle, or to both of

these system components.

(4) Prior to the start of the

qualification testing program, a

qualifying Track Geometry

Measurement System (TGMS) shall be

operated over the intended route within

30 calendar days prior to the start of the

qualification testing program to verify

compliance with the track geometry

limits specified in § 299.311.

(f) Qualification testing results. The

railroad shall submit a report to FRA

detailing all the results of the

qualification program in accordance

with § 299.613. The report shall be

submitted at least 60 days prior to the

intended operation of the equipment in

revenue service over the route.

(g) Cant deficiency. Based on the test

results and all other required

submissions, FRA will approve a

maximum trainset speed and value of

cant deficiency for revenue service,

normally within 45 days of receipt of all

the required information. FRA may

impose conditions necessary for safely

operating at the maximum approved

trainset speed and cant deficiency.

(h) Vehicle/track interaction

regulatory limits. The following vehicle/

track interaction regulatory limits shall

not be exceeded during qualification

testing in accordance with this section.

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

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BILLING CODE 4910–06–C

§ 299.611 Simulated revenue operations.

(a) The railroad shall conduct

simulated revenue operations for a

minimum period of two weeks prior to

revenue operations to verify overall

system performance, and provide

operating and maintenance experience.

(b) The railroad shall maintain a log

of tests conducted during the simulated

revenue operations period. This log of

tests shall identify any problems

encountered during testing, and actions

necessary to correct defects in

workmanship, materials, equipment,

design, or operating parameters.

(c) The railroad shall implement all

actions necessary to correct safety

defects, as identified by the log prior to

the initiation of revenue service.

§ 299.613 Verification of compliance.

(a) The railroad shall prepare a report

detailing the results of functional and

performance qualification tests, pre-

revenue service system integration

testing, and vehicle/track system

qualification tests required under

§§ 299.605, 299.607, and 299.609

respectively. The report shall identify

any problems encountered during

testing, and alternative actions

necessary to correct defects in

workmanship, materials, equipment,

design, or operating parameters.

(b) The railroad shall implement all

actions necessary to correct defects, as

identified by the report.

(c) The railroad shall submit the

report(s) required by paragraph (a) of

this section to FRA prior to commencing

simulated revenue operations and at

least 60 days prior to the intended start

of full revenue service per § 299.609(f).

(d)(1) Prior to implementing a major

upgrade to any safety-critical system

component or sub-system, or prior to

introducing any new safety-critical

technology, the railroad shall submit for

FRA approval the detailed test

procedures and/or analysis in

accordance with § 299.603(d).

(2) The railroad shall prepare a report

detailing the results of functional and

performance qualification tests, pre-

revenue service system integration

testing, and vehicle/track system

qualification tests required under

§§ 299.605, 299.607, and 299.609

respectively pertaining to a major

upgrade to any safety-critical system

component or sub-system, or

introduction of any new safety-critical

technology. The report shall identify

any problems encountered during

testing, and alternative actions

necessary to correct defects in

workmanship, materials, equipment,

design, or operating parameters.

Subpart G—Inspection, Testing, and

Maintenance Program

§ 299.701 General requirements.

Under the procedures provided in

§ 299.713, the railroad shall obtain FRA

approval of a written inspection, testing,

and maintenance program. The program

shall provide detailed information,

consistent with the requirements set

forth in §§ 299.337 through 299.349, and

299.445(a), on the inspection, testing,

and maintenance procedures necessary

for the railroad to safely operate its

system. This information shall include a

detailed description of—

(a) Safety inspection procedures,

intervals, and criteria;

(b) Test procedures and intervals;

(c) Scheduled preventive maintenance

intervals;

(d) Maintenance procedures; and

(e) Special testing equipment or

measuring devices required to perform

safety inspections and tests.

§ 299.703 Compliance.

After the railroad’s inspection, testing,

and maintenance program is approved

by FRA pursuant to the requirements

and procedures set forth in § 299.713,

the railroad shall adopt and comply

with the program, and shall perform—

(a) All inspections and tests described

in the program in accordance with the

procedures and criteria that the railroad

identified as safety-critical; and

(b) All maintenance tasks and

procedures described in the program in

accordance with the procedures and

intervals that the railroad identified as

safety-critical.

§ 299.705 Standard procedures for safely

performing inspection, testing, and

maintenance, or repairs.

(a) The railroad shall establish written

standard procedures for performing all

safety-critical or potentially hazardous

inspection, testing, maintenance, and

repair tasks. These standard procedures

shall—

(1) Describe in detail each step

required to safely perform the task;

(2) Describe the knowledge necessary

to safely perform the task;

(3) Describe any precautions that shall

be taken to safely perform the task;

(4) Describe the use of any safety

equipment necessary to perform the

task;

(5) Be approved by the railroad’s

official responsible for safety;

(6) Be enforced by the railroad’s

supervisors responsible for

accomplishing the tasks; and

(7) Be reviewed annually by the

railroad. The railroad shall provide

written notice to FRA in accordance

with § 299.9 at least one month prior to

the annual review. If the Associate

Administrator or their designee

indicates a desire to be present, the

railroad shall provide a scheduled date

and location for the annual review. If

the Associate Administrator requests the

annual review be performed on another

date but the railroad and the Associate

Administrator are unable to agree on a

date for rescheduling, the annual review

may be performed as scheduled.

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(b) The inspection, testing, and

maintenance program required by this

section is not intended to address and

should not include procedures to

address employee working conditions

that arise in the course of conducting

the inspections, tests, and maintenance

set forth in the program. When

reviewing the railroad’s program, FRA

does not intend to review or approve

any portion of the program that relates

to employee working conditions.

§ 299.707 Maintenance intervals.

(a) The initial scheduled maintenance

intervals shall be based on those in

effect on the Tokaido Shinkansen

system as required under § 299.13(c)(1).

(b) The maintenance interval of

safety-critical components shall be

changed only when justified by

accumulated, verifiable operating data,

and approved by FRA under paragraph

§ 299.713.

§ 299.709 Quality control program.

The railroad shall establish an

inspection, testing, and maintenance

quality control program enforced by the

railroad or its contractor(s) to reasonably

ensure that inspections, testing, and

maintenance are performed in

accordance with inspection, testing, and

maintenance program established under

this subpart.

§ 299.711 Inspection, testing, and

maintenance program format.

The submission to FRA for each

identified subsystem shall consist of

two parts—

(a) The complete inspection, testing,

and maintenance program, in its

entirety, including all required

information prescribed in § 299.701, and

all information and procedures required

for the railroad and its personnel to

implement the program.

(b) A condensed version of the

program that contains only those items

identified as safety-critical, per

§ 299.703 submitted for approval by

FRA under § 299.713.

§ 299.713 Program approval procedure.

(a) Submission. Except as provided in

§ 299.445(a)(2), the railroad shall submit

for approval an inspection, testing, and

maintenance program as described in

§ 299.711(b) not less than 180 days prior

to pre-revenue service system

integration testing. The program shall be

submitted to FRA in accordance with

§ 299.9. If the railroad seeks to amend

an approved program as described in

§ 299.711(b), the railroad shall file with

FRA in accordance with § 299.9 for

approval of such amendment not less

than 60 days prior to the proposed

effective date of the amendment. A

program responsive to the requirements

of this subpart or any amendment to the

program shall not be implemented prior

to FRA approval.

(b) Contents. Each program or

amendment shall contain:

(1) The information prescribed in

§ 299.701 for such program or

amendment; and

(2) The name, title, address, and

telephone number of the primary person

to be contacted with regard to review of

the program, its content, or

amendments.

(c) Approval. (1) Within 90 days of

receipt of the initial inspection, testing,

and maintenance program, FRA will

review the program. The Associate

Administrator will notify the primary

railroad contact person in writing

whether the inspection, testing, and

maintenance program is approved and,

if not approved, the specific points in

which the program is deficient.

Deficiencies identified shall be

addressed as directed by FRA prior to

implementing the program.

(2) FRA will review each proposed

amendment to the program that relaxes

an FRA-approved requirement within

45 days of receipt. The Associate

Administrator will then notify the

primary railroad contact person in

writing whether the proposed

amendment has been approved by FRA

and, if not approved, the specific points

in which the proposed amendment is

deficient. The railroad shall correct any

deficiencies as directed by FRA prior to

implementing the amendment. For

amendments proposing to make an

FRA-approved program requirement

more stringent, the railroad is permitted

to implement the amendment prior to

obtaining FRA approval.

(3) Following initial approval of a

program or amendment, FRA may

reopen consideration of the program or

amendment for cause stated.

(4) The railroad may, subject to FRA

review and approval under § 299.15,

implement inspection, testing,

maintenance procedures and criteria,

incorporating new or emerging

technology.

Appendix A to Part 299—Criteria for

Certification of Crashworthy Event

Recorder Memory Module

Section 299.439(c) requires that trainsets

be equipped with an event recorder that

includes a certified crashworthy event

recorder memory module. This appendix

prescribes the requirements for certifying an

event recorder memory module (ERMM) as

crashworthy, including the performance

criteria and test sequence for establishing the

crashworthiness of the ERMM as well as the

marking of the event recorder containing the

crashworthy ERMM.

A. General Requirements

(a) Each manufacturer that represents its

ERMM as crashworthy shall, by marking it as

specified in section B of this appendix,

certify that the ERMM meets the performance

criteria contained in this appendix and that

test verification data are available to the

railroad or to FRA upon request.

(b) The test verification data shall contain,

at a minimum, all pertinent original data logs

and documentation that the test sample

preparation, test set up, test measuring

devices and test procedures were performed

by designated, qualified individuals using

recognized and acceptable practices. Test

verification data shall be retained by the

manufacturer or its successor as long as the

specific model of ERMM remains in service

on any trainset.

(c) A crashworthy ERMM shall be marked

by its manufacturer as specified in section B

of this appendix.

B. Marking Requirements

(a) The outer surface of the event recorder

containing a certified crashworthy ERMM

shall be colored international orange. In

addition, the outer surface shall be inscribed,

on the surface allowing the most visible area,

in black letters on an international orange

background, using the largest type size that

can be accommodated, with the words

‘‘CERTIFIED DOT CRASHWORTHY’’,

followed by the ERMM model number (or

other such designation), and the name of the

manufacturer of the event recorder. This

information may be displayed as follows:

CERTIFIED DOT CRASHWORTHY

Event Recorder Memory Module Model

Number

Manufacturer’s Name

Marking ‘‘CERTIFIED DOT

CRASHWORTHY’’ on an event recorder

designed for installation in the railroad’s

trainsets is the certification that all

performance criteria contained in this

appendix have been met and all functions

performed by, or on behalf of, the

manufacturer whose name appears as part of

the marking, conform to the requirements

specified in this appendix.

(b) Retro-reflective material shall be

applied to the edges of each visible external

surface of an event recorder containing a

certified crashworthy ERMM.

C. Performance Criteria for the ERMM

An ERMM is crashworthy if it has been

successfully tested for survival under

conditions of fire, impact shock, static crush,

fluid immersion, and hydro-static pressure

contained in one of the two tables shown in

this section of appendix B. (See Tables 1 and

2.) Each ERMM must meet the individual

performance criteria in the sequence

established in section D of this appendix. A

performance criterion is deemed to be met if,

after undergoing a test established in this

appendix B for that criterion, the ERMM has

preserved all of the data stored in it. The data

set stored in the ERMM to be tested shall

include all the recording elements required

by § 299.439(c). The following tables describe

alternative performance criteria that may be

used when testing an ERMM’s

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crashworthiness. A manufacturer may utilize

either table during its testing but may not combine the criteria contained in the two

tables.

T

ABLE

1

TO

A

PPENDIX

A

OF

P

ART

299—A

CCEPTABLE

P

ERFORMANCE

C

RITERIA

—O

PTION

A

Parameter Value Duration Remarks

Fire, High Temperature .................. 750 °C (1400 °F) .......................... 60 minutes .................................... Heat source: Oven.

Fire, Low Temperature .................. 260 °C (500 °F) ............................ 10 hours.

Impact Shock ................................. 55g ................................................ 100 ms ..........................................

1

⁄

2

sine crash pulse.

Static Crush ................................... 110kN (25,000 lbf) ........................ 5 minutes.

Fluid Immersion ............................. #1 Diesel, #2 Diesel, Water, Salt

Water, Lube Oil. Any single fluid, 48 hours.

Fire Fighting Fluid ......................... 10 minutes, following immersion

above. Immersion followed by 48 hours in

a dry location without further

disturbance.

Hydrostatic Pressure ..................... Depth equivalent = 15 m. (50 ft.) 48 hours at nominal temperature

of 25 °C (77 °F).

T

ABLE

2

TO

A

PPENDIX

A

TO

P

ART

299—A

CCEPTABLE

P

ERFORMANCE

C

RITERIA

—O

PTION

B

Parameter Value Duration Remarks

Fire, High Temperature .................. 1,000 °C (1,832 °F) ...................... 60 minutes .................................... Heat source: Open flame.

Fire, Low Temperature .................. 260 °C (500 °F) ............................ 10 hours ........................................ Heat source: Oven.

Impact Shock—Option 1 ................ 23gs .............................................. 250 ms.

Impact Shock—Option 2 ................ 55gs .............................................. 100 ms ..........................................

1

⁄

2

sine crash pulse.

Static Crush ................................... 111.2kN (25,000 lbf), 44.5kN

(10,000 lbf). 5 minutes. (single ‘‘squeeze’’) ...... Applied to 25% of surface of larg-

est face.

Fluid Immersion ............................. #1 Diesel, #2 Diesel, Water, Salt

Water, Lube Oil, Fire Fighting

Fluid.

48 hours each.

Hydrostatic Pressure ..................... 46.62 psig (= 30.5 m. or 100 ft.) .. 48 hours at nominal temperature

of 25 °C (77 °F).

D. Testing Sequence

In order to reasonably duplicate the

conditions an event recorder may encounter,

the ERMM shall meet the various

performance criteria, described in section C

of this appendix, in a set sequence. (See

Figure 1). If all tests are done in the set

sequence (single branch testing), the same

ERMM must be utilized throughout. If a

manufacturer opts for split branch testing,

each branch of the test must be conducted

using an ERMM of the same design type as

used for the other branch. Both alternatives

are deemed equivalent, and the choice of

single branch testing or split branch testing

may be determined by the party representing

that the ERMM meets the standard.

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E. Testing Exception

If a new model ERMM represents an

evolution or upgrade from an older model

ERMM that was previously tested and

certified as meeting the performance criteria

contained in section C of this appendix, the

new model ERMM need only be tested for

compliance with those performance criteria

contained in section C of this appendix that

are potentially affected by the upgrade or

modification. FRA will consider a

performance criterion not to be potentially

affected if a preliminary engineering analysis

or other pertinent data establishes that the

modification or upgrade will not change the

performance of the older model ERMM

against the performance criterion in question.

The manufacturer shall retain and make

available to FRA upon request any analysis

or data relied upon to satisfy the

requirements of this paragraph to sustain an

exception from testing.

Appendix B to Part 299—Cab Noise

Test Protocol

This appendix prescribes the procedures

for the in-cab noise measurements for high-

speed trainsets at speed. The purpose of the

cab noise testing is to ensure that the noise

levels within the cab of the trainset meet the

minimum requirements defined within

§ 299.431(h).

A. Measurement Instrumentation

The instrumentation used shall conform to

the requirements prescribed in appendix H to

part 229 of this chapter.

B. Test Site Requirements

The test shall meet the following

requirements:

(a) The passenger trainset shall be tested

over a representative segment of the railroad

and shall not be tested in any site specifically

designed to artificially lower in-cab noise

levels.

(b) All windows, doors, cabinets, seals,

etc., must be installed in the trainset cab and

be closed.

(c) The heating, ventilation and air

conditioning (HVAC) system or a dedicated

heating or air conditioner system must be

operating on high, and the vents must be

open and unobstructed.

C. Procedures for Measurement

(a) L

Aeq,T

is defined as the A-weighted,

equivalent sound level for a duration of T

seconds, and the sound level meter shall be

set for A-weighting with slow response.

(b) The sound level meter shall be

calibrated with the acoustic calibrator

immediately before and after the in-cab tests.

The calibration levels shall be recorded.

(c) Any change in the before and after

calibration level(s) shall be less than 0.5 dB.

(d) The sound level meter shall be located:

(1) Laterally as close as practicable to the

longitudinal centerline of the cab, adjacent to

the driver’s seat,

(2) Longitudinally at the center of the

driver’s nominal seating position, and

(3) At a height 1219 mm (48 inches) above

the floor.

(e) The sound measurements shall be taken

autonomously within the cab.

(f) The sound level shall be recorded at the

maximum approved trainset speed (0/¥3

km/h).

(g) After the passenger trainset speed has

become constant at the maximum test speed

and the in-cab noise is continuous, L

Aeq,T

shall be measured, either directly or using a

1 second sampling interval, for a minimum

duration of 30 seconds at the measurement

position (L

Aeq, 30s

).

D. Reporting

To demonstrate compliance, the railroad

shall prepare and submit a test report in

accordance with § 299.613. As a minimum

that report shall contain—

(a) Name(s) of person(s) conducting the

test, and the date of the test.

(b) Description of the passenger trainset

cab being tested, including: Car number and

date of manufacture.

(c) Description of sound level meter and

calibrator, including: Make, model, type,

serial number, and manufacturer’s calibration

date.

(d) The recorded measurement during

calibration and for the microphone location

during operating conditions.

(e) The recorded measurements taken

during the conduct of the test.

(f) Other information as appropriate to

describe the testing conditions and

procedure.

Issued in Washington, DC.

Quintin Kendall,

Deputy Administrator.

[FR Doc. 2020–20388 Filed 11–2–20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

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Published date	03 November 2020
Citation	85 FR 69700
Record Number	2020-20388
Section	Rules and Regulations
Court	Federal Railroad Administration

Texas Central Railroad High-Speed Rail Safety Standards

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